



Translating Freud

Edited by Darius Gray Ornston, Jr., M.D.

T R A N S L A T I N G

FREUD

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Preface

This book is about translating the writings of Sigmund Freud into English, French, and Spanish. The chapters are written so that anyone who reads Freud in English will be able to understand more about translating, teaching, or just reading Freud—even in German.

Almost all of our examples are taken from familiar translations that plainly illustrate the problems at hand—that is, the choices a translator has to make. We begin and end with consideration of James Strachey's Standard Edition because his translation, although demonstrably tendentious, is good and because his running commentary clarifies some of Freud's allusions and provides one way of resolving inconsistencies that may baffle any modern reader. Strachey has guided the past few generations through Freud's works; his carefully crafted and integrated texts have become essential to anyone who studies Freud in any language. This is because many foreign translators have borrowed heavily from Strachey's editorial apparatus or have simply reproduced it whole in their target language. Early on, Freud's German editors were equally enthralled by the groundwork Strachey had laid, so that even their scholarship is no exception.

Of course, critics are bound to find fault with any translation. Walter Kaufmann, a German scholar who had devoted much of his life to teaching and translating Nietzsche, Goethe, and Hegel, said that "Freud's ideas come across better in translation than his sense of humor or his personality" (1980, p. 23). A German-born cultural historian, who is also a Freud biographer and trained in psychoanalysis, Peter Gay praised the "heroic job" done by Freud's translators; at the same time, he found that "in rendering his vigorous and supple German into English and normalizing his language across a lifetime of writing, they have often failed to convey Freud's economy of expression or capture the felicity of his formulations" (Gay 1978, p. 41 n. 20; 1988). We will describe and exemplify many more serious divergencies between what Freud said about his ways of picturing unconscious life and what his most popular translators have made of it.

If there really are significant differences between what Freud wrote and what his major translators produced, why has systematic criticism of these translations developed so slowly? To say that Strachey's version is very good is not good enough, because until recently many native German speakers accepted the Standard Edition.

On the other hand, for a long time many Germans and Austrians working quietly in other countries did notice significant differences when they read Freud in translation and either modified the standard reading or made independent translations of pertinent passages for their own works, sometimes explaining their selections but more often not. Few have confronted Strachey's intentionally very English way of reading Freud (Strachey 1966a, p. xix; Kaufmann 1980).

In retrospect it seems obvious that reading Freud could never be the same as reading the work of a devoted and creative translator-editor, but few people discerned and described the orderly patterns of difference that are now so apparent. Those who did criticize the way Freud's theories had been efficiently altered for consumption in other countries were either not heard or not attended to (Erikson 1954; Brandt 1961, 1966; Brull 1975).

This may very well be an instance of knowing about something and not knowing at the same time. Where Bruno Bettelheim (1983) sees a political conspiracy against lay analysts, we find much more disturbing and difficult problems. For example, although the ancient and impassioned, complicated and ever-evolving attitudes of both German and English people toward each other's languages have not been studied, we do know that many native speakers of German narrowly escaped the worst of World War II. For a long time thereafter they still heard and felt the German language as another bitter victim of atrocity, abrading their scars and calling to mind the horrors of the Nazi era. Perhaps we can feel our way into the awful predicament of our refugee teachers, many alienated from or now even hating their mother tongue, desperately grateful and confused, some of them cast as experts even while they were struggling to learn enough of a new language to get along and conduct analyses in a strange land. When one emigré analyst revealed his bewilderment to a patient who had constantly complained about the way people treated him because he was gay, his patient responded, "Where the hell have you been?" (Wyatt 1988, p. 147). Rudolph Loewenstein candidly confessed that he felt he could not really resume analyzing until he had stopped translating during his work with patients (Newman 1978, p. 5). I infer that many if not most German-speaking emigrant analysts did not feel ready to enjoy, let alone try to explain, the raw beauty and evocative wit of Freud's own language (Timms and Segal 1988; Mahony 1987a).

Another reason for the delay is that standards for scholarly editing probably have changed as much as has standard psychoanalytic theory. Until recently professional translators in many fields—including the hu-

manities—would take it for granted that the copy they were given of a published text in the original language was valid. In turn, far too many scholars accepted an adequate translation as a plain transmission of the original. Translation is still too often disdained as a relatively trivial chore that can be hired out or relegated to graduate students. With a few striking exceptions, those who translate are appallingly underpaid and their achievements discounted.

Freud did indeed change a whole climate of opinion. Many of his elementary assumptions and refreshing views of unconscious life are now self-evident; one good reason is that these ideas were thoroughly promulgated throughout the world in the Standard Edition and in its many derivatives in other languages.

Today it is much more difficult to distinguish translating from editing, although these two activities are certainly not the same. An editor's unconscious beliefs and unwitting tendencies become especially evident when one works with Freud's writings. We will show how these two creative tasks are inevitably entangled and ask our readers to take into account how dramatically the standards for adequate scholarly editing have been altered in the few decades since Strachey produced his Standard Edition. At that time it was quite natural—as well as consonant with current psychoanalytic metapsychology—"for him to suppose he had little interest in theory and to believe that he could set his own convictions aside" (Ornston 1988, p. 204).

"The very concept of a scholarly edition is far less stable in 1990 than it was in 1970" (Hill 1990, p. 5). While Strachey (1966a) could candidly allow that Freud's German texts were quite unsatisfactory and that he had seldom consulted Freud's manuscripts, it is now argued, if not agreed, that the primary obligation and basic task of any scholarly editor is to establish a reliable text (Hill 1988; Modern Language Association 1990).

In view of these considerations, we will begin this book with some problems of translation and gradually introduce editorial dilemmas. We must venture beyond observed differences to consider the translator-editor's tradition, training, experience, assumptions, convictions, and autonomy, as well as (perhaps unconscious) beliefs, motives, intentions, and strategy.

It is hard to conjure up the smug metapsychological fervor current among psychoanalysts around 1960 (Grob 1991). The Standard Edition (1953–66) had been subscribed in advance by many Americans and was slowly appearing, one book at a time. Criticisms of that bold and plainly successful venture were often muddled with, or mistaken for, criticism

of Freud's own publications or even personal attacks on Freud himself. I remember being told by a renowned training analyst that systematic metapsychology was a delicate "house of cards" and that one mustn't tinker with the basic concepts or the whole thing would fall apart. Now I am embarrassed that such an answer shut me up. To almost everyone else it seemed self-evident that psychoanalytic theory was a solid structure of mutually supportive hypotheses awaiting only clarification and resolution of a few inconsistencies.

In such a bumptious climate, few psychoanalysts shared James Jackson Putnam's position that "Freud's doctrines are not a 'theory' but a series of provisional conclusions based on observations" (Hale 1971a, p. 249). It took a psychoanalytic writer with the authority accorded David Rapaport (1960) to say that it was still too early for a systematization of psychoanalytic theory.

To sort out and describe the meaningful differences between Freud and his many translators—that is, the patterns of difference that do matter—one must first know as much as possible about Freud's scientific and literary sources and about his descriptive style. Freud safely assumes, for example, that his educated contemporaries will recognize his literary allusions and recall whole scenes with complex nuances once learned by rote from Goethe or Schiller.¹ Indeed, for a person who had been through the thoroughly standardized educational system of imperial Vienna, much of the pleasure in reading Freud was responding to and completing his veiled or absent references. Did he make the same assumption about his scientific imagery—that is, that we would also recognize the metaphors and concepts of nineteenth-century German science?² We are just beginning to learn about this, and our modesty, at least, is quite correct.

Freud said that he was justifying all independent research when he wrote, "One who calls on authority in a contest of opinions is working with his memory instead of his ability to reason and understand."³ Of course, here Freud was

1. For example, see McGrath's (1986) dazzling discussion about Freud's uses of Schiller's play *The Robbers*.

2. Strachey (1966a) raised this question. An attentive reader will notice how often Strachey's translation actually anticipates some problems detailed in this book. We will point these out.

3. "Wer im Streite der Meinungen sich auf die Autorität beruft, der arbeitet mit seinem Gedächtnis, anstatt mit seinem Verstand" (Freud 1910a, 8:194/11:122, his *Sperdruck*, which means spacing single letters as well as single words). Although Freud had carefully explained that in German *Sperdruck* is one way of accentuating language—"If I were talking I would pronounce the same word[s] loud and slow in order to stress my emphasis"—more often than not Strachey disregarded Freud's intentionally underscored intonation (1900, p. 601).

quoting Solmi, who had cited Leonardo, who surely got this adage from someone else. In psychoanalysis, perhaps more than in many other disciplines, it is almost impossible to prove the origin of a phrase, let alone a scientific idea (Andersson 1962). Even if we had open access to Freud's papers, I think it would be pointless to try to reconcile his many contradictions and obvious mistakes until someone comes up with a constructive reason for quoting Freud at all. Radiologists don't cite Röntgen, surgeons don't read Billroth any more, and few physicians could name any of Virchow's accomplishments. Why would someone cut out of context, carry around, and quote the nineteenth-century imagery and ever-varying opinions of Sigmund Freud in any language—including his own?

The first four chapters of this book review some established criticisms of the Standard Edition. Problems of style and wordplay quickly lead to the conception of Freud's ideas, the nature of his language, and, of course, the constitution of technical terms, a problem that continued to trouble Strachey (1966a, p. xviii) and to which each of our contributors inevitably returns.

In chapter 1, I also show that more than latent traces of some modern psychoanalytic ideas are alive and stirring in Freud's writings.

Patrick Mahony, who has published several books about Freud's use of language, composed chapter 2 as a synopsis of his own work and has added many fresh examples. Although Strachey's choices form a consistent background for any discussion of Freud's thought, Mahony shows why Freud's translator is confronted by much more difficult tasks than the mere selection of proper technical terms; he proposes that we need a specifically psychoanalytic translation.

In chapter 3, Helmut Junker, an experienced teacher of psychoanalysis in both German and English, illustrates the way scientific language may be stunted by the powers allowed to an authoritative edition and how Strachey's English translation may have distorted the reading of Freud—even in German-speaking countries.

Chapter 4, the only material in the book that has been published elsewhere in English, is my review of Bruno Bettelheim's (1983) *Freud and Man's Soul*. I have reprinted it here because Bettelheim's complaints about the Standard Edition have been widely attended to, although there is substantial weakness and much unfairness in his rather personal brief against Strachey, and because my review considers a few technical terms—"the soul," in particular—in some detail.

Alex Holder has been studying Freud's terminology and Strachey's

translation for more than thirty years. In chapters 5 and 6, Holder and I describe certain difficulties in producing a critical edition of Freud's works in any language—but specifically in German—using basic contributions by Ilse Grubrich-Simitis and Riccardo Steiner, among others who have studied the history of Freud's publications. In chapter 5 Holder details some of the now-established subtleties that make Strachey's language distinctly different from Freud's and illuminates problems in the composition of several English terms, especially the ever-elusive German notion of "drive"—*Trieb*; Strachey, of course, most often made this "instinct." Chapter 6 also compares available German and English editions and considers some strategies for a truly critical and historical edition.

Inga Villarreal has been teaching Freud to psychoanalytic candidates in Spanish and English for many years. She has used this opportunity to compare the compromises made by his major Spanish translators in favor of either scientific or aesthetic considerations; she says that it matters who does the translating and to whom the translation is directed. In chapter 7 she suggests that Freud was influenced by the philosophy of Romantic medicine more than has been allowed⁴—for example, there is no mention of this mode of medical thought in the Standard Edition. She shows how a translator's own philosophy ineluctably shapes both one's assumptions and one's understanding, and thus the choices one has to make.

For a long time the French have led the way in describing, contemplating, and discussing most of these problems, although there has never been a full edition of Freud's published works in French. The leaders

4. Romantic medicine (circa 1770–1810) was the attempt of a group of German physicians to apply intuitive imagination and creative inference based on one or more empirical observations of disease in order to understand pathological processes and to discern physiological principles applicable to all forms of life. They opposed what they saw as classical rigidity and the exalted notion of pure cognition during the Enlightenment. Their assumptions and wide-ranging attitudes may not have had a parallel in the medical science of other cultures. Some of these men were grandiose and they are remembered. Many were astute scientist clinicians, distinguished by the freedom they took to explore the uses of an organizing idea in order to see where it might lead. They supposed early notions of what Freud continued to describe as "unconscious life," as well as cerebral structure, cell and synapse, conservation of energy, and natural selection long before there was any real evidence, let alone proof, and they are forgotten. Today their corrective concern for understanding a whole person as opposed to studying isolated systems sounds quite modern. Many of these physicians were more moderate (Lenoir 1982) than they have been portrayed by psychoanalysts (Bernfeld 1944). In Freud's time what was useful had been absorbed into orthodox medicine—at least in Vienna. Freud's discovery of transference was clearly teleological (Ornston 1985d), and there are some florid examples of Romantic inference among works he chose to publish (1920, 1923a) and those he forgot (1985, 1986). Although there is a literature, studies about the influence of this movement on his work have not yet been carried very far. For an introduction see Leibbrand 1937, 1956; Ellenberger 1970; Beres 1965; Vermorel and Vermorel 1986.

of the team of scholars and psychoanalysts now at last producing an *Oeuvres complètes* (1988–96) have published an introductory and reference volume entitled *Traduire Freud*. Jean Laplanche and his colleagues explain, in detail and with abundant examples, their rationale for developing a word-for-word translation with minimal annotation and the strategic principles that account for their selection of terms. Their introductory essay is included in this book as chapter 8. Laplanche and I have revised and edited a translation drafted by Maev de la Guardia and Bertrand Vichyn. I believe we have created an English version that is both readable and accurate; in our “Translating Freud” we have gone to some trouble to reproduce many of the abundant examples in the French original and to compare them with corresponding passages from the English Standard Edition.

The French team intends to create for the reader of French the experience of a person who can enjoy Freud’s engaging style in German. Echoing James Strachey’s (1966a) last word on the conflict between style and faithfulness, they resolve to obey “the twofold obligation of entirety and accuracy . . . the text, the whole text, and nothing but the text” (p. 143, this vol.). We have already learned much from this rigorous project. They have been criticized for rigidity—for forcing their carefully constructed program into a language that is a little “strange”—and they have been enthusiastically praised, by Patrick Mahony among others. “Realizing the ultimately inscrutable nature of the unconscious and the thereto responsive psychodynamic aspects of Freud’s discourse, our French translators have stressed the signifier to convey the psychically mysterious of the source text. They are to be congratulated for producing raw Freud, sheer joy” (Mahony 1992a). Does Freud himself, as they claim, occasionally sound a little “strange,” even in his own language and culture? They reason that any adequate translation should recreate this experience for the reader.

The contributors to this volume have some clear disagreements. Can a re-creative translation really enable foreign readers to have the same experience as that of German readers, but in their own tongue, or is any and every translation inherently an interpretation?

Did Freud really aspire to be the founder of an organized and hierarchically structured movement in which his work would play the same cohesive role as the sacred writ does for a church? Did he ever say anything like that?

Must one have a complete and well-edited German edition before trying to make a reliable translation into any other language? Are translations of single works valid as explorations of Freud’s allegedly fluctuant

use of technical terminology and as experiments in bringing Freud's thought across? Or is it necessary for the same person or team to produce the entire collected works in order to move with the ebb and flow of Freud's ever-developing wording?

Holder and Junker favor a strategy that is logically thought through, but Holder goes further, arguing for a firm commitment to certain terms as equivalent in both source and target languages. On the other hand, Junker and Villarreal illustrate the tumbling domino effect, the confounding inconsistencies cascading from such stringency, in both the Standard Edition and one carefully planned and word-for-word consistent *Obras completas*.

Chapter 9 is my account of some of the problems that have obstructed research and waylaid alternatives to the Standard Edition. These have been legal and institutional, mercantile and financial, political and practical, as well as exquisitely personal.

Patrick Mahony and I have composed an appendix listing research materials, some of which have not been fully developed and published, although they have been accessible to scholars for many years.

I have three cautions for the monolingual reader. At least the first time through, do not stumble over the detailed examples; instead, come back later and think about how one might present these conundrums. Second, remember that this book is about translation and is only indirectly concerned with psychoanalytic theory: therefore the same psychoanalytic term may be discussed in several different chapters to illustrate several different points about translation. Finally, remember that Freud explores ideas imaginatively and dialectically: for example, he often writes ambiguously about both mind and body, or about both logic and passion. Although he is palpably delighted when he finds a clear conceptual polarity, more often he induces an uncertain tension in his reader. This is one essential element of Romantic science and may be traditionally, even distinctively, German. It may be as much an attitude toward one's own work as it is a formal scientific strategy, but a person educated in an English-speaking country is more likely to look for positive hypotheses and discern "operational definitions" and then to mistake these findings for the hallmarks of serious science (Hirschmüller 1978; Feldt 1990).

Any translation not otherwise identified is the contributor's own. When citing Freud's work, we usually identify a book or paper by the year it was first published and then give the volume and page numbers in the *Gesammelte Werke* (GW) followed by the corresponding citation in

whatever translation we are comparing. Unless otherwise specified, the default will be the Standard Edition. For example, a reference to a footnote in Strachey's *The Interpretation of Dreams* looks like this: Freud 1900, 2-3:103-04 n. 1/4:99-100 n. 1. Some references to the *Oeuvres complètes* give only the planned volume number but no page numbers because as of this writing these volumes are scheduled for publication through 1996.

This volume now amounts to a fair account of some problems that may never be settled, let alone resolved. In saying that, we have already articulated one more of the controversial questions, recognized if not explored by our contributors.

There is no way to thank everyone who has added to this compilation of what we know so far about translating Freud, but over the years a few people stand out. All the contributors have been patient and generous in allowing me to cut their work in order to shape this book into an integrated and coherent whole: although repetition would be tedious, limited redundancy may be useful as confirmation or as alternative wording.

Ilse Grubrich-Simitis, psychoanalyst and editor of Freud's works in German, responded readily and generously to innumerable inquiries. Lottie Maury Newman made many valuable interventions from the start. For critical readings of my own chapters, I thank Patrick Mahony, Stanley Leavy, and Braxton McKee. These chapters would have been impossible without the steady assistance of Ferenc Gyorgyey, historical librarian of the splendid Library of the History of Medicine at Yale University.

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Other libraries extending their services included the Library of the

Western New England Association for Psychoanalysis, the A. A. Brill Library of the New York Psychoanalytic Institute, the Universitätsbibliothek and the Österreichische Nationalbibliothek in Vienna, the British Library, the Joseph Regenstein Library at the University of Chicago, the Library of the University of Iowa, the Robert Hutchings Goddard Library at Clark University, the Elmer Holmes Bobst Library at New York University, the Wilson Library of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, and the University Archives in the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign.

Gladys Topkis, my editor at Yale University Press, has been the voice of insistent reason, nutritive while demanding, and a tireless spirit sustaining me through several drafts. Karen Gangel is an ideal manuscript editor. She was especially helpful with our adaptation of chapter 8 from the French original.

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Finally, I am able to thank Ann Wills, my secretary, for old-school loyalty and informed protection and Helene Marie Riley, my wife, for constant love and patient collegiality.

Darius Gray Ornston, Jr.

Abbreviations

- AE:** Sigmund Freud, *Obras completas*, 24 vols., tr. José Etcheverry. Buenos Aires: Amorrortu Editores (1978–82).
- BN:** Sigmund Freud, *Obras completas*, 3 vols., ed. and tr. Luis López-Ballesteros. Madrid: Biblioteca Nueva (1948).
- GW:** Sigmund Freud, *Gesammelte Werke*, 18 vols., ed. Anna Freud, Edward Bibring, Willi Hoffer, Ernst Kris, and Otto Isakower, in collaboration with Marie Bonaparte. Frankfurt am Main: S. Fischer (1940–68). *Nachtragsband: Texte aus den Jahren 1885–1938*, ed. Angela Richards, assisted by Ilse Grubrich-Simitis (1987).
- OC:** Sigmund Freud: *Oeuvres complètes*, 21 vols., ed. and tr. directed by André Bourguignon, Pierre Cotet, and Jean Laplanche. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France (1988–in preparation).
- SA:** Sigmund Freud, *Studienausgabe*, 10 vols., ed. Alexander Mitscherlich, Angela Richards, and James Strachey; *Ergänzungsband*, ed. Alexander Mitscherlich, Angela Richards, and Ilse Grubrich-Simitis. Frankfurt am Main: S. Fischer (1969–75).
- SE:** *Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud*, 24 vols., tr. under the general editorship of James Strachey, in collaboration with Anna Freud, assisted by Alix Strachey and Alan Tyson. London: Hogarth Press (1953–74).
- SR:** Sigmund Freud, *Obras completas*, 22 vols., ed. and tr. Ludovico Rosenthal. Buenos Aires: Santiago Rueda (1952–56).

Improving Strachey's Freud

DARIUS GRAY ORNSTON, JR., M.D.

The contributors to this book all agree that the Standard Edition is a magnificent work. Even a person who does not know about James Strachey's brave spirit and the discouraging circumstances in which he worked has to admire his industry, tenacity, and consistently readable style (Strachey 1966a; Holroyd 1973; Strachey and Strachey 1985; Ornston 1985a, pp. 405–09; Grubrich-Simitis 1989). Surely among the reasons that complaints about Strachey's version were sparse until a few years ago are that his editorial apparatus is so magisterial and his fluency so persuasive.

Strachey took command of a disorderly enterprise and turned it into a smoothly articulated and clear reference work that was gratefully recognized by the psychoanalytic authorities of his era. Ernest Jones, for example, touted Strachey's "colloquial knowledge of German" (1955b, p. 1192)¹ and boasted that "we have here a classic model of how an important scientific work should be presented." "Under James Strachey's able leadership" he said, "the English translation of Freud's works under the name of the Standard Edition will from an editorial point of view be considerably more trustworthy than any German version" (Jones 1957, vol. 3, p. 37). Anna Freud seemed to agree: "Strachey's achievement... [has] entered into surprising competition with the author's original text" (A. Freud 1974, p. vii). She acknowledged that she had gone over some of the translations, but Jones did not reveal that he too

1. Strachey, however, disclaimed any special knowledge of colloquial German.

had had a hand in many of the choices Strachey had to make (Strachey and Strachey 1985; Steiner 1987).

Jones and Anna Freud each had a valid point. There is still no adequately edited and annotated German edition. Books and journals in the English language conventionally cite Strachey instead of Freud. Even now that we can begin to see some consistent and pervasive differences between Freud and Strachey—that is, alternative tone, style, understanding, and perhaps intent—Strachey continues to influence all of us, even those who would suggest other phrasing or a shift in Strachey's emphasis. An alternative translation may be quite correct without being any better. It is all too easy to modify or enrich a phrase of Strachey's here and there but devilishly difficult to find a more inclusive term or a more fitting set of metaphors if one takes an entire passage or context into consideration.

Probably Strachey's self-assured style will always form a coherent, if not an elegant, background for any English version of what Freud wrote, not only because Strachey sounds right but also because he usually is right. Although our respect for Strachey's achievement may confuse some readers who are expecting an attack on the Standard Edition, we intend to present a balanced view.

Freud usually engages his reader in imagining what may go on unconsciously. Alternative English metaphors might bring over a nuance Strachey did not catch or might shift his tone and emphasis. How much should a translator silently decide for the reader?

Freud's wordplay often leads his reader to finish a point. Consider one trivial but typically subtle pattern as Freud calls forth a child trying to grasp how parents make a baby.

Dass die Genitalien etwas damit zu tun haben, scheint beim Kinde festzustehen, wenngleich seine grübelnde Tätigkeit das Wesen der zwischen den Eltern vorausgesetzten Intimität in andersartigen Beziehungen suchen mag, zum Beispiel im Beisammenschlafen, in gemeinsamer Harnentleerung und dergleichen und solcher Inhalt eher in Wortvorstellungen erfasst werden kann als das Dunkle, das mit dem Genitalen zusammenhängt.

Strachey usually fills in the gaps that I believe Freud carefully crafted for his reader:

The child seems to be convinced that the genitals have something to do with the matter, even though in its constant brooding

it may look for the essence of the presumed intimacy between its parents in relations of another sort, such as in their sleeping together, micturating in each other's presence, etc.; and material of the latter kind can be more easily apprehended in verbal images than the mystery that is connected with the genitals (Freud 1919a, 12:207/17:188).

A literal translation is necessary to show Freud's subtly seductive wording:

The child seems sure that the genitals have something to do with it, even when its brooding activity is searching for the essence of this presumed parental intimacy in relationships of another kind—for example in sleeping together, in emptying their urine together and the like. Such content is easier to grasp in verbal imagery than that dark [something] which hangs together with the genital [something].

Freud's wording is unusual, and as usual, Strachey comes close. *Das Dunkle* and *das Genitale* are adjectives acting as nouns; that is, Freud's own phrasing is incomplete. In this sentence, Freud chose not to use the conventional noun *Dunkel* ("darkness") and actually to shift away from the proper noun *Genitalien* ("genitals"), which he had been using. Freud's reader is therefore drawn into the role of a curious child, peering but not seeing, in order to complete Freud's alluring act on a dark (something) by grasping Freud's allusion.

Strachey made *gemeinsame Harnentleerung* ("emptying their urine together") into "micturating in each other's presence," a distinctly different fantasy in Strachey's characteristic phrasing. Where Freud used common words in uncommon ways, Strachey chose some words that are merely peculiar—if not too correct. He rarely tried to convey Freud's bemused wit and dry humor; nor did he try to explain Freud's mesmerizing ambiguity.

Of course, Freud's intentions are sometimes obscure. Often he carries a sexual theme just to the point where the meaning "is clearly intended to be understood by the trained reader and to remain vague to the untrained one" (Erikson 1954, p. 15). Freud explains why he does not try to tell his reader everything or to publish a complete interpretation of his own dreams as he recalls Mephistopheles clinching the compact with Faust and then cynically taking over Faust's role as student adviser:

Das Beste, was du wissen kannst,
Darfst du den Buben doch nicht sagen (Goethe, *Faust*, lines 1840–41).

For sure, the best of what you know
You may not tell to boys.

Freud challenges those who criticize his apparent reserve to dare more than he does,² and Erikson's judgment still seems fair: "No man has ever consciously and knowingly revealed more of himself, for the sake of human advance, than did Freud" (Erikson 1954, p. 7).

Then there is the problem of his conversational tone. Freud is never bawdy or salacious, but he is sensibly matter-of-fact and down-to-earth. Often he sounds as if he were tentatively picturing either a clinical observation or an abstract conception for his audience, trusting the reader to fulfill the other end of this exchange (Schönau 1968; Ornston 1985a; Mahony 1987a). Strachey sounds didactic and remote.

English readers now take Strachey's proprietary for granted—any alternative may sound improper, if not false. Would it not take time for people to get used to Freud in a plain English or American voice? Trained on Strachey, wouldn't they be put off by Freud's dry humor, puzzled by his irony, and confused by his many contradictions and fruitful variations? I think it will take substantial research and experimentation to develop ways of getting Freud's scientific style across.

The problem is that Strachey's stone-cold syntheses sometimes make Freud neat and abstract in just those contexts where his writing ambiguously approximates our real problems and is therefore clinically useful. For the time being, telling people about the differences emerging from scholarly studies of Freud's sources and style will have to do, because this work is far from finished.

Patrick Mahony (1984a, pp. 852–53) has shown that Freud often engages his reader by writing as if "we" were thinking out loud, combining exposition with enactment; and I have just given an example of the way his wordplay stirs some semblance of a situation in his reader who then wants, or even needs, to understand (Ornston 1982, 1985b). Freud said that he intended to do this.³

2. Freud 1900, 2–3:110n/4:105n; 2–3:116n/4:111n; 2–3:123n/4:118n; 2–3:142/4:147; 2–3:456/5:453. See also Freud's typically clear but subtle allusion to this passage (1920, 13:35/18:34).

3. "My works only intend to get the reader to gain for himself the experiences of which I speak, and until now my hope has not disappointed me that one who does this will reach the same results as I have done on the important points. I certainly do not want or expect a reader to believe me altogether unless and until he himself has descended into the sources of observation"—

The inevitable conflict between literary style and consistent terminology is only a little clearer than it was in Strachey's time and still confronts anyone who plans a new edition with some disturbing decisions. Consider the comparatively easy problem of technical terms. Because Freud drew on everyday language and conventional psychologies for most of his descriptive terms, it is sometimes difficult to tell when his uses of a word are unique to psychoanalysis. I think Freud engaged his contemporaries with words and images that were easy for them to grasp and then gradually filled in all manner of intricacies, inconsistencies, and qualifications (Holt 1965–66; Mahony 1987a, 1987b).

Ernest Jones, on the other hand, believed that Freud was ill-informed about contemporary psychology and therefore forged his own terminology "largely by taking over concepts from other branches of science and giving them fresh meanings appropriate to their new context" (Jones 1953, p. 371; 1924; 1959). We now know that Jones had command over Strachey's choices⁴ and that Strachey wrote as if Freud had already defined his terms. Implicitly, then, Strachey tended to exaggerate the differences between psychoanalytic concepts and those of Freud's teachers and contemporaries outside the psychoanalytic movement. Gradually a set of English terms was codified with meanings peculiar to psychoanalysis. Jones and Strachey might have found considerable support for their naïve view that scientists always use the same word for the same thing—even among literary people (Wimsatt 1954, personal communication via Mahony). Interest in Freud's relatively neglected cultural context and scientific continuity is growing. Knowing more about the numerous psychobiologies of Freud's time should help us understand more of what Freud was describing when he chose to evoke a given image. Finding and developing these apparent correlations is hard work because Freud uses common nineteenth-century metaphors like "psychic energy" for occasional theoretical accounts, because he often implies several kinds of simultaneous activity (drives, conflicting needs, conscience, and compromise), and because he sometimes treats his artificial

"Meine Arbeiten wollen nichts anderes, als den Leser veranlassen, sich selbst die Erfahrungen zu holen, von denen ich spreche, und bis jetzt hat mich die Hoffnung nicht getäuscht, dass, wer dies thut, in den wichtigen Punkten zu den gleichen Ergebnissen kommen wird wie ich. Ich verlange und erwarte gar nicht, dass mir ein Leser vollkommen Glauben schenke, ohne und eher selbst zu den Quellen der Beobachtung herabstiegen ist." Freud's letter to Putnam, 5 Dec. 1909, is printed in Hale (1971, p. 351), and see an alternative translation by Judith Bernays Heller on p. 90.

4. Roazen 1971; Strachey 1963a, 1963b; Strachey and Strachey 1985; Ornston 1982, 1985a, 1985b; Steiner 1987, 1988a, 1988b; Gay 1988; Freud-Jones, in preparation; and see *die Rundbriefe* and other unpublished correspondence in the Archives of the Sigmund Freud Copyrights, Ltd.

imagery—his ever-changing spatial or topographical “image” (*Vorstellung*) of what he called mental life—as if this were an explanation, the pleasure principle (Freud 1920, 1923a; Grossman and Ornston 1986).

Usually, Freud appears diffident about his English and almost indifferent to individual technical terms. Rather, he seems fascinated by the problems inherent in picturing his conceptions and getting his ideas across. “Anyone who has tried to compile a subject index of one of Freud’s works will know how difficult it is to capture the essentials in single terms. The essence evaporates in trying to filter it from the dynamic flow of the German sentence” (Grubrich-Simitis 1986, p. 290).

Others have suggested that we should study the ways in which the German language enabled Freud to use poetic ambiguity while shaping his accounts of his fluid mode of conception (Federn 1978; Mahony, chap. 2, this vol.). Freud told James Jackson Putnam that he looked forward to learning from Putnam what the correct English translations were and that Putnam was not to worry overmuch about the names for concepts and fitting terms because “we feel our way toward scientific progress by pouring new wine into old bottles”—“Namen brauchen nicht passend zu sein, u. uns bleibt im Fortschritt der Wissenschaft nichts übrig, als den neuen Wein in die alten Schläuche einzufüllen” [Freud to Putnam, letter, 10 Mar. 1910, in Hale 1971, pp. 353–54; Freud, 1914a, 10: 142/14:77]).

The difference I see between Jones’s belief that Freud forged his own terminology and what Freud himself said is that flexibility—*Geschmeidigkeit* (Jones 1955a, p. 401)—meant more to Freud as he turned a conception over in his mind; therefore, rather than define his terms, Freud described a given idea in as many ways as he could. Mahony (1987a) says Freud’s style is spontaneous when not impulsive. If this turns out to have been his strategy, it would help us understand why he seldom quibbled about terms and why he continued to encourage many different English translators (Freud-Jones, in preparation; Ornston, chap. 9, this vol.).

Because Freud often portrayed even his most abstract imagery in language that is poetically compact and resounds with everyday life, his abundantly overdetermined wordplay is often essential to his scientific description. As Freud (1930a, 14:426–29/21:69–71) laid it out for us, language is linear while psychological life is simultaneous: “Freud came back again and again to the basic challenge psychic reality poses for exposition: psychic events are overdetermined and draw simultaneously from various strata, whereas in verbal exposition these superimposed strata are flattened out into a verbal string; if linearity is the essence of language, superimposition is the keynote of psychic events” (Mahony

1987a, p. 7). A person who experiences Freud in German can shift and sift through several concurrent—and even contradictory—images at the same time (Mahony 1986).

Strachey (1966a) said he felt a recurrent conflict because he was trying to re-create Freud's work in the style of a widely educated nineteenth-century Englishman, which meant to him that his own English terms must be both correct and consistent. Therefore Strachey tidied up (Ornston 1982, pp. 411–12). Any translator must make choices, as Strachey did; he or she should also carefully explain these selections, as Strachey often failed to do. Furthermore, Strachey seldom discusses any views that differ from his own, and this may be his major flaw, although, as I have said, Freud's subtly stirring wordplay does dissolve in almost any translation (Kaufmann 1980; Mahony 1982, 1986, 1987b, 1989a; Ornston 1985a).

Apparently Strachey had license to decide when Freud's use of an ordinary German word was technical and when the same word flowed within the broader stream of everyday expressions. With unobtrusive composure, Strachey did this for his reader. For example, by gleaning and distilling his own notion of psychoanalytic "transference" out of the many contexts in which Freud continued to use the ambiguous word *Übertragung* (one of several German words that can mean "translation"),⁵ Strachey was able to crystallize a relatively pure concept, clear enough for sharp definition. But once more this raises the bothersome question: Which of Freud's common nineteenth-century scientific metaphors deserve to be distinguished with a special term? *Struktur*? *Energie*?

And for that matter, just what amounts to a technical term? Many were either invented or else purified and propagated after Freud's death, again allowing distinct questions about Freud's terminological ambitions and intentions—at one time or another. An obvious example is Freud's surprisingly rare and sometimes skeptical use of the term *Metapsychologie* (Guttman 1980a), which became a psychoanalytic buzzword during the yeasty years right after Freud died. We should learn to distinguish Freud's own usage from the still-slippery argot that has developed informally among psychoanalysts.

Jones did foresee some of the disadvantages in premature standardization and did distinguish his own lists of "equivalent" terms in various languages from binding definitions. He also knew, however, that the

5. *Übertragene Bedeutung* means "metaphorical meaning" and *übertragene Sinne* means "metaphorical sense." Freud used these ordinary phrases and many more like them; Strachey picked these off by translating them differently.

person who dictates the terms usually controls the outcome. "The advantage of increasing intelligibility given by uniformity has, of course, to be balanced with the disadvantage of perhaps prematurely fixing the mould into which fluid ideas are being cast. This disadvantage, however, would be much greater in an attempt to fix rigid definitions to the terms than in the mere task of suggesting the best words with which to render the German equivalents" (Jones 1924, p. 1). This now sounds naïve if not ingenuous.

Psychoanalytic reference works have begun to show due respect for the differences between Freud's overlapping conceptions and the precision of some interpreters. Following the French, writers in other languages have learned to appreciate the incredible linguistic intricacies that emerge while translating Freud's overdetermined and descriptive wording (Laplanche and Pontalis 1967; Mosher 1987; Moore and Fine 1990).

If everyone clearly understood this evolving process and if it were possible to conserve the living difference between lists of rough equivalents to certain German words and the uniform definitions that I believe Freud quite conscientiously deferred, then most of the apparent synonyms would be good enough and would arouse little serious controversy. I would hope that we could pare down the list of Freud's terms that can be translated word for word.

Even if it were possible, however, to reduce the list of words with meanings peculiar to psychoanalysis, the translator would still have serious problems. Is a designated technical term to be translated word for word even when it makes Freud sound wooden or weird? One of the reasons Strachey's illusion works is that at least on first reading his language appears seamless and user friendly (Strachey 1966a, dedication; and see chap. 8 of this vol. on domesticating and acclimatizing translations of Freud).

Freud is compelling because he sounds so earnest and reasonable. Most of his wording is anything but strange because most of his language is conventional, albeit often conventionally vague. Freud's everyday imagery and many of his psychological portrayals are quite German—that is, plain nineteenth-century German—in which it is often possible to do several different things with the same words at the same time.

In psychoanalytic psychology technical terms can be defined only operationally, that is, somewhat arbitrarily (Moore and Fine 1990). They do guide most of us to the same address or get us into the same ballpark, but even the most rigorously defined terms are only crude directions; they cannot tell us what the rules are or how to play the game (Freud 1913b). In different contexts, not to speak of different languages, they call up different intuitive feelings and patterns of ideas. Strachey knew

that some English words have meanings distinctly different from their apparent German counterparts, and these are not interchangeable. He may not have understood that the very manner of English scientific conception may diverge from the German; there are even a few differences about what counts as real science. In German, for example, it is still quite acceptable to describe an indefinite idea indefinitely, whereas in English stark definitions of "testable" hypotheses are often expected no matter what the data look like.⁶

In any human psychology, most ideas remain useful only as long as they are somewhat pliant and adaptable. Evidence that Freud understood this includes his tirelessly variegated descriptions of his own conceptions, his endless doubts and qualifications, his lack of concern about inconsistencies, as well as the gentle irony, engaging personification, and willful speculation that lighten some of his most abstract work. It is harder to construe his mobile imagery and vivid portrayals of his conceptions as if he were naming substantive things, because he continued to weave alternative contexts, shifting the meaning of some terms back and forth until the very end of his published work. He never made any systematic attempt to integrate his ways of picturing unconscious life. Instead, he tuned his adroit language to the specific needs of each audience. This may be another reason that Freud never put together a synthetic overview of psychoanalytic theory. From Clark University (1910b), through his *Introductory Lectures* (1916–17), as in the *Outline* (1940a) he was working on when he died, the form of every piece (*Stück*) he wrote is intentionally fragmentary—"properly understood . . . psychoanalytic theory must be recognized as essentially incomplete, undogmatic and processive."⁷ Furthermore, Freud read Breuer: "It is much too easy to slip into habits of thought which suppose that behind every substantive there must be some actual substance."⁸

UNCONSCIOUSLY SHIFTING/SHUTTling AND COMPOSING A TRANSLATION

Freud called one of his best-known works of scientific fiction *Jenseits des Lustprinzips*. His wry skepticism about his psychobiological speculations

6. Naturally and inevitably, throughout this book we shall return to the invention, identification, translation, and editorial presentation of technical terms.

7. Here Mahony (1987a, p. 11) is paraphrasing Jacques Schotte, the eminent Belgian philosopher and psychoanalyst. In his own books Mahony soundly summarizes the evidence.

8. Breuer 1895, p. 183–84; Thomä and Kächele 1985; and cf. Faust in the last few pages of *Studierzimmer, ein Schüler tritt auf*.

even comes across in the Standard Edition version, *Beyond the Pleasure Principle*. Nonetheless, Strachey's text sounds more rigorous than Freud's, however subtle these differences may be.

Strachey, for example, begins his fifth chapter with "The fact that . . .," although Freud does not imply that he is describing or accounting for any facts. To the contrary, throughout this essay Freud goes to some trouble to convey his profound doubts about the value of his "extremely farfetched speculations."⁹ Cell theories were self-evident and constructive in Freud's age, just as synaptic, specific receptor, and ion channel theories offer convenient imagery in ours. I do not think Strachey clearly understood that when such elegant cartoons and Romantic fables are mistaken for sober developmental neurophysiology or, worse, puffed into "facts," they come to nonsense. In the passage I am about to discuss, Freud provides one of several somewhat contradictory fantasies for which he has no evidence other than that both human skin and central nervous system originate in embryonic ectoderm.

Freud imagines that throughout evolution the most primitive forms of life were continuously bombarded by stimuli from the outside. This caused them to harden the surface of their cell walls into an inorganic crust that served as a protective shield. Freud then pictures unhampered drives continually and directly stimulating an infant's fragile central nervous system from within. He tries to compare *Übertragung* ("translation" or "transfer" or "transmission") of these raw internal needs with outside stimuli that, for no apparent reason other than his analogy, he also supposes have weathered the next-to-outermost layers of the central nervous system into an exquisitely sensory cortex. Thus, in the manner of Romantic medicine, he imagines the cerebral cortex forming under the first, primitive shield against stimuli.

Strachey reads Freud's biopsychological fantasy as if this were simply a matter of direct "transmissions" that are then, quite naturally, "transmitted." Apparently it was perfectly clear to Strachey that Freud meant to distinguish such putative "transmissions" from "translation" and "transference," although Freud often chose to use the same German word, *Übertragung*, to describe all three, and any one of these three English words might serve as an equally legitimate option.¹⁰ Because Strachey did not reveal to his readers that he was choosing one of several equally

9. See, for example, the opening paragraph of chapter 4 in Freud's *Jenseits des Lustprinzips* (1920, 13:23/18:24). Strachey added a lot of superfluous scientific language, but he inserted the English word "fact" into Freud's texts more often than any other (Ornston 1982, 1985a).

10. Other problems in selectively translating the crucial term *Übertragung* and its various grammatical forms have already been mentioned and will be clarified below in chaps. 2, 8, and 9.

sound alternatives, I suppose he perceived neither ambiguity nor word-play. Here, as so often, Strachey silently chose to distinguish what Freud had described with the same term, even if Freud's meanings are not explicitly the same (Freud 1920, 13:35/18:34).

Then, on the same page, Freud summarizes what could be distinctive about the unconscious in general and about dream work in particular. In this scheme, because there is no cortical shield to protect the (now suddenly psychological) apparatus against burgeoning drives from within,

[können] im Unbewussten Besetzungen leicht vollständig übertragen, verschoben, verdichtet werden.

Apparently, Strachey had no doubt that

in the unconscious, cathexes can easily be completely transferred, displaced and condensed.

Strachey's choice is legitimate and correct; any alternative will sound strange if not outright wrong to a person who has learned psychoanalytic theory by studying the Standard Edition or one of its many derivative translations. However, an equally legitimate and correct alternative would be:

in the unconscious, one's interests can easily be completely translated, shifted, or shuttled about and poetically composed.

A reader who found value in the mechanistic metapsychology of Strachey's time might feel that such an alternative to Strachey's wording is at least bewildering if not offensive to one's sensibilities and a blot on the memory of one's teachers. Such a reader might well point to Freud's occasional use of the metaphor *Kompression*, which means nothing if not "compression" or "condensation"; over the years many knowledgeable authorities have been satisfied with that (Freud 1900, 2-3:285/4:279).

On the other hand, a person who knew the wide range of Freud's reading and recognized his constant interest in the psychology of language and who was aware that language and speech were popular topics in the prodigious laboratories and prolific letters of Freud's teachers might prefer to see other ways of rendering what Freud wrote.

In any case, both English translations are correct, and both may hover in the mind of a thoughtful reader who has some tolerance for ambiguity as well as for the creative tension that any educated German appreciates

in an equally valid and simultaneous contradiction. This reader might have read Freud's book about the interpretation of dreams and perhaps a chunk of Wilhelm Wundt's 53,735 published pages.¹¹

Therefore, Freud's contemporary and colleague might have known that Wundt (1893) had already described the natural selection of language in his *Grundzüge der physiologischen Psychologie* (vol. 2, pp. 466–87), where he italicized *Verdichtung* and *Verschiebung*, the very terms Freud later chose as essential to understanding the evolution of language.

Freud frequently cites Wundt's *Grundzüge* in the *Traumdeutung*—much more often than he cites his own Romantic hero, Gustav Fechner. Occasionally Freud uses Wundt as a foil, arguing that he himself has found the missing link, that his own accounts of motivation fill the gap in Wundt's conception.

However, Freud never says how he came up with this notion of *Verdichtung* ("poetic intensification" or "verbal composition") and *Verschiebung* ("shoving and shifting things around" and even "smuggling"), which Strachey codified into the English words "condensation" and "displacement."¹² *Verschiebung*¹³ also means a "postponement" or a "delay" and is essential in understanding Freud's attempts to disentangle a primary from a secondary process. These connotations of "underhanded exchange" and "putting something off till later" are both missing from the English term "displacement," although here and there (and without comment) Strachey did translate *Verschiebung* into a simple temporal delay.

To judge from some of the reactions already voiced to my alternative translation, ponderous documentation may be required before some can accept that Freud may have been using what he saw as descriptive terms in everyday language. *Dichtung* still means "poetry," and throughout *Jenseits* Freud quotes a wide variety of *Dichter* ("poets") as examples, as evidence, and as irrefutable authorities on human psychology.

Here the prefix *ver-* is an intensifier, as in "the plot thickens" (*verdichtet*

11. Boring (1950, p. 345) made this tongue-in-cheek calculation. Not counting his letters, Freud's psychoanalytic works come to "only" about seven thousand pages.

12. Another complication is that *Verdrängung*, now usually translated into English as "repression"—perhaps at Freud's suggestion—also meant and continues to mean "displacement." However, no native German speaker would confuse these two ideas.

13. Kaufmann 1980, p. 124; Steiner 1988a, 1988b. Again, a literate German scientist is not afraid to describe a vague problem or an obscure idea clearly, avoiding artificial precision, even when writing in English. For example: "It may be that we can advance our understanding of what we mean when we speak of psychic structures if we consider the possibility of their mode of organization as a temporal one, even though we do not as yet understand the nature of such organization" (Loewald 1962, p. 502; Laplanche and Pontalis 1967; Thomä and Cheshire 1991).

sich) or "Freud blends (*verdichtet*) several themes into the same phrase." Writers from Goethe and Clemens Brentano through Immanuel Kant (via Gottfried Diener 1971, p. 148 n. 3), Richard Wagner, and Thomas Mann (Platen 1984, p. 76) used *verdichtet* in this way. It is in everyday use by contemporary authors and readily understood by the general public (Liedke 1966; Hugo Ellenberger 1968, p. vi; *Die Presse*, Vienna, 29 Aug. 1984). This common usage is sustained by standard dictionaries (Eisler 1904; Wahrig 1968; Duden 1981) and, finally, it is quite explicit as well as tirelessly paraphrased in Freud's other writings (for example, *Summation* in 1900, 2-3:586-87 n., and *gedichteten Szenen* in 1913a, 8:399/13:172-73; or read 1900, chap. 6, pt. A, *Die Verdichtungsarbeit*, with this second meaning in mind).

If further evidence for this alternative reading of Freud's conception is necessary, it is there in his hints—*Hinweise*—at the work of other psychologists (Freud 1900, p. 286n). See, for example, his vivid analogy to Francis Galton's composition—*Verdichtung*—of projected family photographs, by means of which common facial features strengthen one another and stand out while divergent traits become less clear and then fade away (Freud 1900, 2-3:144, 298-99/4:139, 293). Wundt had explicitly described the same vivid image of this process through which most verbal mutants carry no adaptive advantage and therefore suffer a "fading away" (*Verdunkelung*) and "disappearing" (*Verschwindung*). Both men conceived *Verdichtung* in this way, but Wundt was describing the natural selection of words; he did not use Freud's graphic illustration of Galton's device.¹⁴

There are German-speaking analysts who simply declare that the alternative I am suggesting is wrong and that in Freud's work *Verdichtung* "is not 'poetically composed' because it really does evoke the notion of condensation and tightening up" (anonymous reader). Of course it does, but, as so often in Freud's writings, that is not all it means.

Perhaps Freud did not discuss his sources because these ideas were already in the public domain.¹⁵ Or perhaps he forgot. Or perhaps he was for the moment back on the psychological ground from which he had already launched so many trial balloons (Freud 1900, 2-3:541/5:536). Is it fair to ask a prolific writer to keep track of such things?

14. In Wundt's associationist analogy the constant flow of psychological experience and the natural selection of language come across more clearly than in Freud's allusion. On the other hand, Freud does, as he himself says, offer a theory of motivation.

15. For a discussion of scientific influences on Freud and some of his apparent sources, see Dorer's exposé and more sober views by Henri Ellenberger (1970), Hirschmüller (1978, especially pp. 194-218), and Sulloway (1979).

Could Freud have accomplished so much if he had always taken the trouble to compare his own work with the imagery, language, and ideas used by his predecessors and contemporaries? No one has denied that Freud was ambitious; Josef Breuer was only the first to describe him as flying high and fast. I think that Freud would certainly have stalled if he had tried to keep track of his sources, not to mention making it clear when he was writing psychology and when he meant psychobiology, let alone when he intended some simultaneous combination of the two (Hirschmüller 1978, p. 195; Rubenstein 1967, p. 65 n. 17; Feldt 1990).

In the Hapsburg Empire scientific style was often literary. An educated contemporary would have found it condescending if Freud had identified and explained his constant allusions to Goethe and Shakespeare. Freud could assume that long before getting to the university, his reader had learned most of these passages by heart. Freud needed do no more than mention a phrase to conjure up a whole character, context, traditional conflict, or ironic attitude. Similarly, bench scientists alluded to well-known works, both literary and scientific, by quoting without explicitly naming an obvious source. This is just one more way to engage a reader by leaving a text incomplete with space for a reader to work between the lines (Ornston 1985b, p. 395).

In any case, Freud's abundant roots in the literature and flourishing biopsychological science of his time have been neglected. By demonstrating Freud's sources in the work of his teachers and contemporaries modern editors may enable us to see what Freud could take for granted: in this way they may enrich our understanding of Freud's writings, as James Strachey was the first to propose (Strachey 1966a, p. xvi; Ornston 1982).

Perhaps one can see the translators' predicament more clearly by trying to understand Strachey's earnest and inadvertent concoction of the concept he called "cathexis" (Ornston 1985b). Cathexis signifies something different from the vague imagery implied in Freud's thrumming pattern of everyday words about psychological organization based on the common word stem *-setz-* ("set"). Most people now understand that *besetzen* is a colorless term that is usually defined by its context and that Freud's teachers used this pliable word as a scientific metaphor. Read in context, Freud's *besetzen* harmonizes with *auseinandersetzen* ("explain" or "disagree"), *zusammensetzen* ("compose"), *übersetzen* ("translate"), and many more words built on this root.¹⁶

16. In the same months when Freud (1910b) was laboring over these lectures in German, he

A similar example is the common German word *Vorstellung*, which often means an "idea" and simultaneously calls up a somewhat subjective sense of "imagining" or "picturing" that idea. A personal introduction may be called a *Vorstellung*—that is, a visible presentation of somebody or something to a person. There are many German words based on the stem *-stell-*, or "put"—for example, *Darstellung*, "portrayal" or "performance"; *Entstellung*, "distortion" or "disfiguring"; *Herstellung*, "making something" or "setting it up"; and so on. Again, the precise meanings are determined by context, and Freud exploited all of them. For entirely natural reasons, then, words built on the stem *-stell-* turn up in almost everything Freud wrote about psychological recall. They form a resonating network of rhythmic sounds and implications that tend to disappear in any translation (Wilden 1968, via Mahony).

For intricate and convincing evidence that Freud was very much aware of the sounds and patterns in his scientifically descriptive wordplay, one must study Mahony's books. Reviewing the third volume of the new French *Oeuvres complètes*, Mahony (1992a) gives a clear example from one of Freud's earliest psychoanalytic papers about "'*Deckerinnerungen*,' unfortunately rendered by Strachey as 'Screen Memories' rather than as 'Cover Memories.' The word 'cover'—*Decke*—appears throughout the German essay as a kind of leitmotif, a feature carefully respected in the French edition but somewhat concealed in the Standard Edition. To make this thesis self-evident, I cite Strachey's translation, beginning with Freud's reference to a cover memory of a

table laid for a meal [*gedeckten*, set with covers] . . . I have often succeeded by means of psychoanalytic treatment, in uncovering [*auf-*

revised the English translation by H. W. Chase (Freud and Jung 1974). Freud was describing the way hysterical conversion diverts the course of a patient's emotions:

eines mit Affekt besetzten seelischen Vorganges . . .

which he and Chase translated into English as

a mental process which is emotionally colored . . . ;

fifty years later Strachey made it

an emotionally cathected mental process.

Freud and Chase also translated

eine Gruppe von zusammengehörigen, mit Affekt besetzten Vorstellungselementen

as

a group of ideas which belong together and have a common emotive tone

and Strachey put this as

a group of interdependent ideational elements cathected with affect (8:14 and 30/11:18 and 31; 1910c, pp. 31, 44).

Although Freud disliked this term, he did use it once, fifteen years later, in a short article he wrote for a British encyclopedia (Strachey 1962b, p. 63 n. 2).

decken] the missing portions of a childhood experience . . . So the phantasy does not coincide [*deckt sich*] completely with the childhood scene . . . what provides the intermediate step between a screen memory [*Deckerinnerung*, cover memory] and what it conceals [*gedeckten*] is likely to be a verbal expression . . . A screen memory [*Deckerinnerung*] may be described as 'retrogressive' or as having 'pushed forward' according as the one chronological relation or the other holds between the screen [*Deckendem*, the covering element] and the thing screened-off [*Gedektem*, the thing covered up] (Freud 1899, 1:535–51/3:306–20)."

As a proud stylist, Freud felt that repetition of the same word in rapid succession sounded ugly and should be avoided (Ornston 1982). In this short essay, however, he insistently integrated a specifically psychoanalytic conception of a "cover" function exemplified by a "cover memory." Mahony shows why Freud's language is both compelling and so very difficult to translate.¹⁷

DIACHRONIC EXPLANATION AND SYNCHRONIC UNDERSTANDING

Hans Loewald conserved the language of the Standard Edition in order to present some apparently new ideas—for example, that mental life begins with interactions rather than with "instincts" (drives) and that the analyst works by being an emotionally related object (Cooper 1988).

Diachronic reconstruction (development explained as the sequential repetition of unconscious patterns throughout one or more lifetimes) was an enduring passion for Freud, and for a while the recovery of repressed memories even seemed to be what psychoanalysis was all about.

Theory does stumble along behind more flexible developments in psychoanalytic technique. The structural canon of postwar metapsychology has been superseded by clinically rooted and practical tenets. Analysts show a new respect for the power of clear and descriptive language and, like Freud, little urgency for a grand synthesis. Patient and therapist both become involved now and both develop in a two-person mode of in-

17. For another clear example, see Freud's use of words based on *herstellen* in the first few pages of his 1937 paper concerning psychoanalytic constructions. In this volume, see chap. 7 on the problems in translating *Vorstellung* and chap. 2 on Freud as a visual writer; see also Mahony (1989b) for the clinical relevance of this observation.

teraction. They shape an investigative interpretation within a therapeutic relationship. Recent theories of synchronic understanding (making sense of contemporaneous activities and events) are less tidy and more ambiguous. Because many of the old metapsychological terms have been conserved, it is hard to see the ways in which both psychoanalytic technique and theory have changed.¹⁸

Although interpretation of the patient and analytic therapist interacting in the here-and-now transference relationship may appear to be a radical departure from both classical technique and theory, Freud was probably a very interactive psychoanalyst (Lipton 1977). It was Strachey (1934) who made a strong case for the patient and analyst interacting in a way that replaces a patient's vicious circles with more benign self-perspectives, and Thomä (1983) ingeniously showed that here-and-now interpretation has always been a crucial element, if not the essence, of psychoanalytic technique, even in the case of the most abstemious and metapsychologically minded classical psychoanalytic therapist.

Furthermore, Freud finished his paper about cover memories by concluding:

A falsified memory is the first of which we know. The memory traces, the material from which a memory is forged, remain in their original form unknown to us.

Through such insight our reckoning of the distance between cover memories and the rest of memories from childhood is shrinking. Perhaps it is altogether doubtful that we have conscious memories from childhood and more likely we just have memories about childhood. Our childhood memories show us the first years of life not as they were but rather as they appeared in times of later waking. Although we are used to saying that childhood memories *emerge* at these times of waking, instead they are *formed* at these times and a whole series of motives, which are remote from any

18. For a clear discussion of this conflict see Cooper (1984, 1987a, 1988). From this point of view, Schafer's (1976) "new language," Kernberg's (1976) "object relations theory," Kohut's (1977) "self psychology," and Ogden's (1979) "projective identification" are clarifications of ideas that have been around for a long time and now flow in the mainstream. How much of this can be traced back to Freud's language? For example, "All our relationships with the world have an intersubjective dimension. . . . The intersubjective structure of desire is the profound truth of the Freudian libido theory; even in the period of the Project and Chapter 7 of his book on dreams, Freud never described instincts [i.e., drives] outside of an intersubjective context" (Ricoeur 1970, pp. 386–88); and "most human motive systems are interpersonal"—as they are in Freud's case histories (Holt 1973, p. 17).

intent on historical truth, has influenced both the selection of these memories and their formation.¹⁹

Freud (1937a) wrote about the archaeological recovery of repressed memories often enough that this apparent aim and result of psychoanalytic work once seemed essential, especially to many immediately post-Freudian metapsychologists. However, forty years after he wrote "Screen Memories" and in the midst of his book about Moses, he returned to the same simplistic misapprehension, describing psychoanalytic work as "the only way one can gain knowledge of forgotten experiences or, more stridently and incorrectly expressed, can bring them back into memory."²⁰

This is the confounding problem Freud described as an *Erinnerungsspur* ("memory trace"), which even in nonpsychoanalytic English became a putative "engram" (Jacobson 1964). This lucid but misleading imagery of particulate memories was advanced in part because it echoed common sense and everyday experience, in part because Freud's cartoons were mistaken for models of the mind, and in part because Strachey often, but not always, boiled down Freud's conventional but allusive language and descriptive psychological terms into his own assumed "mental representation" (Ornston 1982). The nineteenth-century German scientific literature on this problem is extensive and distinctly different from traditional English categories; there is no way to make a concise presentation here—indeed Strachey had to bypass this kind of illuminating diversion in order to get his job done.

From early on Freud (1891) not only doubted our ability to conserve pure and particulate memories but also provided the inherent assumptions and language of a two-person theory by often describing the analyst's psychological activity and experience in the same words he used to depict a patient's unconscious psychology. Once again, he cited those

19. "Die gefälschte Erinnerung [ist] die erste, von der wir wissen; das Material an Erinnerungsspuren, aus dem sie geschmiedet wurde, blieb uns in seiner ursprünglichen Form unbekannt.

"Durch solche Einsicht verringert sich in unserer Schätzung der Abstand zwischen den Deck-erinnerungen und den übrigen Erinnerungen aus der Kindheit. Vielleicht ist es überhaupt zweifelhaft, ob wir bewusste Erinnerungen aus der Kindheit haben, oder nicht vielmehr bloss an die Kindheit. Unsere Kindheitserinnerungen zeigen uns die ersten Lebensjahre, nicht wie sie waren, sondern wie sie späteren Erweckungszeiten erschienen sind. Zu diesen Zeiten der Erweckung sind die Kindheitserinnerungen nicht, wie man zu sagen gewohnt ist, aufgetaucht, sondern sie sind damals gebildet worden, und eine Reihe von Motiven, denen die Absicht historischer Treue fern liegt, hat diese Bildung sowie die Auswahl der Erinnerungen mitbeeinflusst" (Freud 1899, 1:553–54/3:322; my translation, *Spendruck* in original).

20. "[Analytische Arbeit allein kann] eine Kenntnis der vergessenen Erlebnisse vermitteln, greller, aber auch inkorrekt ausgedrückt, sie in die Erinnerung zurückbringen" (Freud 1939, 16:179/23:74, my translation).

favorite lines from *Faust*, "Das Beste, was du wissen kannst, / Darfst du den Buben doch nicht sagen" (1900, 2-3:147, 456/4:142 & 5:453). And once again, Strachey erased Freud's steady implication by choosing different English words for what Freud had presented as very much the same (Ornston 1988).

I am not suggesting that Freud consciously laid out an explicit theory of psychoanalytic "empathy"—*Einfühlung*²¹—and interactional development. I am saying that he chose plain and sometimes evocative language and often used the same words in the same passage to describe his experience or activity and that of his patient and his reader. In this way he opened the ground for, and still sustains the growth of, both theory and technique. As far as I know, Freud never wrote of a psychoanalysis as two emotionally related human beings developing together in a therapeutic context, with little but professional roles and, perhaps, a vital gradient of organizational maturity to differentiate them (Cooper 1988).

Does today's conception of psychoanalysis influence the way I read Freud? Surely, just as Strachey was caught up in the ambitious metapsychological schemes of his era. If there were any doubt about the invisible might of the zeitgeist, how would we explain the simultaneous "discovery" of systematically patterned shifts in Strachey's translation by four authors working in four different places and traditions and, though aware of earlier criticisms of the Standard version, oblivious to one another's contemporary studies?²²

QUANTITATIVE LANGUAGE

The evidence thus far suggests that Ernest Jones had a cocksure notion of proper English as well as a puzzling control over James Strachey and that they both wrote for the compliant audience of their time, which passively accepted the conventional style of London or Cambridge as a standard. I think Jones was at best naïve both in assuming that Freud's evocative, ever-changeable, and descriptive metaphors might have neat

21. The Standard Edition translation of this word is one clear example. "Freud chose a descriptive term for the way we all recall and sort apart our own experience in order uns einzufühlen—'to feel our way' into another person's psychic life. Writing to his wife in English and also at certain places in his formal translation, Strachey chose to use a literal translation of this descriptive German word, *Einfühlung*, although Jones would insist that 'empathy' was the 'recognised official psychological word for it' " (Strachey and Strachey 1985, pp. 170-71, 177, 248; cited in Ornston 1988, pp. 197, 206).

22. Cf. Bettelheim 1983; Mahony 1982; Ornston 1982; and Steiner 1987. I cannot speak for Bettelheim, but the others were very much aware that the French had been studying Freud's language for decades.

English "equivalents" (Jones 1924, p. 1) and in supposing that he could purify and contain the fermenting language of a flourishing science. As the archives become increasingly accessible and publication of the correspondence between Freud and Jones nears, we may learn more about how these decisions were made and who made them (Strachey 1963a, 1963b; Strachey and Strachey 1985; Ornston 1985b; Steiner 1987, 1988a, 1988b; Freud-Jones, in preparation).

Artificial language does carry its own misleading connotations, among them a dry and "inorganic" synthetic exactitude about psychological problems that we still cannot even describe clearly. Werner Heisenberg said that physicists relinquish reality in order to develop ideal concepts with sharp definitions; even so, they cannot avoid contradictions. Any true understanding requires a translation into "natural language because it is only there that we can be certain to touch reality."²³

MATHEMATICAL DESCRIPTION

One clear example of this problem is quantitative metaphor. Scientists use mathematical language in three ways: to make an initial observation, to measure an apparent difference, and to construct a statistical proof.

Usually one begins with the kind of rough comparison we all make when we first notice a similarity or try to grasp a difference, such as "Strachey seems simpler and clearer than Freud" or "Many of Freud's own accounts feel quite fluid and ambiguous." Most of these relative estimates are implicit comparisons, as when we say that "Freud is an engaging writer," tacitly suggesting that we can begin to account for his frequent tone of credible irony as we discover that he is more forthcoming, reflective, flexible, and skeptical than many other psychoanalytic writers. The second kind of quantitative description appears to be more exact because it implies the possibility of a measurement, as when we say that Strachey preferred a more consistent, if not more quantitative, language or that Freud more often shifts his imagery and context for the same kind of conception. Finally, scientists use numbers to describe the statistical chance that a phenomenon may recur, that an observation may be reliable and perhaps even valid.

Freud's quantitative accounts rarely go beyond the first of these; that

23. Heisenberg 1958, pp. 201-02, original in English; Rycroft 1968; Leavy 1973; and see Gipper 1956. For an admirable but futile effort to put Freud's economic imagery into precise and verifiable terms see Bernfeld and Feitelberg (1930a, 1934) and Bernfeld (1937, 1944). For good examples of Freud's favoring conceptual clarity over balancing his accounts and for Strachey's silent tendency to make Freud more consistent see chaps. 5 and 8 of this volume.

is, he may say that a person seems relatively "straightforward" or "deceitful," or that a given drive is "powerful" or "insufficient"; but almost all of his comparisons are similarly implicit. Early on, Freud (1894, p. 74) recognized that he had no way to measure anything useful about unconscious life, not even in his most primitive and, at times, apparently materialistic notions, such as his intentionally vague fantasies about some kind of "psychic energy" or "quantity," "interest" or "investment," "intensity" or "activation," and (clearly psychological) "color" or "tone."

When Freud wrote the following lines he was trying, one more time, to picture the kinds of psychological relationships—*Verhältnisse*—that Strachey and others were to codify into a "structural theory" (Ormston 1985a, 1988): "In psychology we can only describe with the help of comparisons [*Vergleichungen*]. There is nothing special about that and it is also true elsewhere. However, we must forever change these comparisons [*Vergleiche*] because none of them lasts us long enough" (Freud 1926b, 14:222/20:195).

Did Freud realize that almost all quantitative language comes down to ordinary and descriptive comparisons? Would Freud have agreed with Charles Brenner (1968) that in our work mathematical language may be less useful than verbal language?

This is not merely a matter of superseding notions of psychic energy and the economical point of view in psychoanalytic theory. Here we have a clinical principle: "Every time we accept or offer an explanation in terms of a shift in intensities, we are failing to see change in a qualitative pattern that would be a more specific and illuminating explanation" (Gill 1977, p. 594; Schur 1966, p. 116). Did Freud appreciate that in psychoanalytic psychology the hardest part is verbal description rather than measuring or simply counting things?

Freud said almost exactly that, as he prepared to do what his English editors called "The Metapsychological Papers." He compared the smooth and logically sacrosanct foundations of speculative science or philosophy with the basic motifs and abstract principles of psychoanalysis, which are so often murky and hard to grasp—and also quite dispensable. Abstract ideas are the most superficial elements of our theoretical construction; they can therefore be discarded and replaced without doing damage. Like any competent teacher, Freud exaggerated this difference as he tried to contrast his science with philosophy (Freud 1914a, 10:142/14:77; 1925a, 14:85–87/20:58–61).

Many have observed that he used optimally evocative imagery to bring his case reports alive. He was not cowed by the naïve reverence for mathematical expression that was so clearly stated by Lord Kelvin

and is still pervasive in our time: if you cannot measure something in numbers, your knowledge of it is not really scientific.²⁴ Perhaps Freud is a great scientific writer because, with few exceptions, he resolutely refused to define his terms and to quantify his hypotheses. Instead he found many telling analogies to outline his conceptions. Psychoanalytic descriptive precision and clinical validity are verbally asymptotic.

Is this not true? Psychoanalytic psychology differs from most sciences in that any quantitative account is no more than a necessary preliminary observation and can only serve us well if it points the way to more clinically useful and convincing qualitative descriptions.²⁵ Why did Freud avoid mathematical reasoning and arguments? And how are we to understand his wistful quest for "a quantitative view, a sort of economics of nerve force," which surfaced so rarely in over fifty years of analytic writing? (Freud 1986, p. 130; 1937b, 16:70–72/23:226–28; 1925a, 14:85/20:58–59). What are we to make of his credulous enthusiasm for the naïve and sometimes nutty numerology of Wilhelm Fliess, which Freud sporadically indulged long after he had ended their relationship? It is not enough to say that he confined most of what looks to us like superstition to their intimate correspondence. And finally, how does Freud's disdain for statistical methods fit in here?

To start with the easiest question, the numerology makes sense to me only insofar as I can understand Johannes Kepler's casting horoscopes for his patrons and Isaac Newton's stubbornly devoting himself to alchemy. This is a test of one's historical imagination. As for statistics, as far as I know, Freud rarely published statistical evidence for his views. Early in his career, for example, he found that he was probably wrong about most of his famous but undocumented series of eighteen patients with hysteria, all of whom had told him about actual sexual experiences remembered from early childhood. Suddenly he saw that he had deceived himself by counting cases and that his patients' "recovered memories" were, no less meaningfully, fantasies (Freud 1896a, 1:444/3:207; 1986, p. 283–84; 1914b, 1925a, 1926a, 1926c).

Every once in a while, Freud recognized that he tended to neglect

24. "It may be hoped in a short time . . . that mathematical learning will be the distinguishing mark of a physician from a quack" (Richard Mead 1767, p. 5, cited in Feldt 1990, p. 126).

25. Ornston 1982, p. 422; 1985a, p. 399; 1985b, p. 395. Freud's statistical claims are rhetorical—that is, persuasive rather than logical attempts to prove or disprove anything (Holt 1973). "It is not unusual for him to have as his sole objective making himself understood and to disdain any formal research" (chap. 8, p. 157, this vol.).

quantitative factors in his theoretical imagery.²⁶ Toward the end of his life he offered an "economic" explanation that is characteristically both vivid and vague. If he thought that the real success of analytic treatment lay in putting an end to overpowering quantitative factors by discerning their many tributaries—among others, the collateral influence of the drives (*kol-laterale Beeinflussungen der Triebe*)—then perhaps we owe Freud a fresh reading of his quantitative figures of speech and we can accept these analogies as nothing more than rubrics. They await the kind of painstaking verbal detail and qualitative analysis that may end, or at least moderate, apparently massive but hitherto ineffective and infantile dams of repression. Freud recalled his early acceptance of *Verdrängung* as a psychological term as well as a commonplace and personified figure of speech.

Die Verdrängungen benehmen sich wie Dämme gegen den Andrang der Gewässer (1937b, GW 16:70).

The repressions behave like dams against the pressure of water (SE 23:226).

As is so often the case, Strachey's noun "pressure" is correct but static when compared to Freud's fluid *Andrang*, which implies an ongoing "rush" or "surge." Freud used cognates on the stem *-drang-* to picture a swirling tide and enduring conflict (see chaps. 7 and 8, this vol.). In the rest of his "Unending Psychoanalysis" (Freud 1937b) he went on to detail and develop the conventional metaphors or quantitative cartoons that he used to captivate and anchor the attention of his audience.

I have reviewed certain failings, insertions, and omissions in one stylish, commanding, very readable, and apparently literal translation. Just as Strachey made a reading conventional for his time, so today we may be ready for a Freud who pictures unconscious life poetically and describes ways of understanding a therapeutic, or any other, human relationship. Tendentious translation is difficult to avoid, especially when trying to convey the works of a gifted descriptive psychologist who often relies on a pattern of words or a range of concepts to stir his reader rather than on a sharp or consistent definition of a technical term. Freud recognized the indomitable human yearning for simplified, if not quantifiable, truth. What Freud (1933) once called the organizing conceptions of psychoanalysis are verbal. Therefore, in psychoanalysis mathematical descriptions and quantitative metaphors remain nothing more than rough approximations.

26. "Dass wir in unseren theoretischen Vorstellungen [den ökonomischen Gesichtspunkt] zumeist versäumt haben . . ." (1937b, 16:70–71/23:226).

A Psychoanalytic Translation of Freud

PATRICK J. MAHONY

According to Benjamin Whorf (1942), our conception of the world is largely, if not entirely, determined by the structure of our mother tongue. Most linguists, however, reject this hypothesis and its implications: according primacy to the formal properties of language over its content, they claim, would radically estrange peoples. Whorf's critics declare that human experience can be expressed in any language, regardless of its formal properties. Given this proposition, we may cautiously proceed to a useful distinction: the specific structure of a language may in fact lead native speakers to conceptualize in certain ways.

With this notion in mind, we can appreciate Ilse Grubrich-Simitis's speculation that some basic grammatical qualities of the German language "furthered Freud's psychoanalytical thinking and perhaps made it easier for him to adapt linguistically to the dynamics of unconscious and preconscious processes" (1986, p. 289).¹ To that effect, she refers to various traits of the

1. From this position of relativity and facilitation, Grubrich-Simitis seems to go on to adopt the Whorfian hypothesis: "Under the motto 'structure versus process' Strachey is reproached with having rendered Freud's thinking in a more static, more conceptual and would-be more precise form than the original, and thereby with falsifying it. It is well worth considering whether these critics have perhaps not paid enough attention to the differences in the basic grammatical structures of German and English—differences nowadays being systematically studied in 'contrastive linguistics.' Freud had a good mastery of English. With his language genius he could have been sufficiently aware of these insurmountable differences to have approved of Strachey's manner of translating" (Grubrich-Simitis 1986, p. 290). In this passage Grubrich-Simitis is talking about more than the ultimate infidelity of any translation; she is tending to consign mentalational experiences to different linguistic reserves.

German language: the many verb forms to express the passive mode, the ready convertibility of the passive sentence into the active, and vice versa, and the existence of certain passive forms that actually obscure the notions of active and passive. In addition, the flexibility in German to convert one part of speech into another softens the demarcation between verb, noun, and adjective, with the result that a primary-process flow may be evoked within a strictly maintained secondary-process discourse. To this list we might add the vitality of numerous German nouns, which can describe both activity and the result of that activity (for example, *Erinnerung* is both remembering and memory; *Wunscherfüllung*, both wish fulfilling and wish fulfillment; *Phantasie*, both fantasizing and fantasy). We might also mention the distinctive capacity of German syntax to relate and stress ideas; the lexical frequency of *her* and *hin* in German, which spatially relate utterances to the speaker; and the wealth of compound nouns whose components may interact, thus creating a lexical construct propitious for condensation and displacement. In a general sense, the phenomenological and dynamic expressivity of German has been strongly underlined (compare Schotte 1959, pp. 116, 120–21; and Malbanc 1968). That is, the internal dialectics characterizing the German language are a significant part of its facility to render process.

Beyond the question of the influence of the German language on Freud, there is the more specific issue of Freud's use of it, a use somewhat obfuscated by Strachey's translation. This chapter will focus on various aspects of Freud's discourse that have been modified by Strachey. My coverage, however, is partial, and, what is more, in keeping with my somewhat random procedure, the length and number of my clarifying examples may not be proportionate to the importance of the point under discussion. We might offer some useful background to this examination of Strachey's translation by first discussing Freud's conception and use of language in psychoanalysis as well as the nature of psychoanalysis.

FREUD, LANGUAGE, AND PSYCHOANALYSIS

Freud's understanding of psychoanalytic language figured centrally in his writing. Regardless of the scientific nature of psychoanalysis, he considered the language of its theory figurative, not literal. Only by means of such distorting figurative language could he be aware of unconscious processes, which was further complicated by the fact that the distorting nature of the language itself can never be fully known. Even after labeling as figurative such psychological terms as *drive* and *ego*, he said that the alter-

nate choice of physiological or chemical terms would also involve us in figurative language, albeit in a simpler and more familiar vocabulary (Freud 1920, 13:65/18:60). But psychoanalysis as Freud could have understood it was bound by the figurative in both its therapeutic and theoretical spheres. Thus if we turn to the empirical base of psychoanalysis—the clinical setting—we realize how Freud could have conceived the presence of language as figurative. That is, the central determinant of the patient's associations is transference, whose verbalization is by its very nature figurative. The earlier Freud used to spell this out, calling transference “a false connection”—*eine falsche Verknüpfung*—hence a kind of relation definable by the past participle of the German word now used for the English term transference—*Übertragung*. Used as an adjective, *übertragen* may also mean figurative (Breuer and Freud 1895, 1:308–09/2:302–03).

Involved here is an unappreciated psychoanalytic contribution to stylistics: even though a patient may report some casual external event in matter-of-fact and literal language, insofar as that report is affected by transference it is also figurative—*übertragen*. And if the patient's story is already in figurative language, transference phenomena make it doubly figurative. The current debate over the place of transference versus the therapeutic alliance must also be seen as a debate over the nature of the patient's language!

Apart from its inevitability in Freud's theorization, figurative language emerged increasingly in his prose because of the way he wrote. By and large he composed in an exploratory manner, registering what had already been said, ought to be said, and was trying to be said and in sum producing a fluid investigative discourse attuned to the dynamic nature of psychic activity. This processive quality was central, not peripheral, to his writing; in this way Freud presented the complexities of the mind and language on the move. The how of saying was also the what; the message was inseparable from its form. Freud's discourse can be further understood when we realize that to some degree it anticipated a change in the curriculum in North America: whereas “composition” was traditionally taught as a means of attaining grammatically and logically sound expression, college English professors today no longer speak of composition but of “writing.” And writing, rather than being a technique of communication, is now seen as a means of inquiry and self-scrutiny, of discovering what one thinks, and of generating meaning rather than of deciding or imposing closure. This writing, to start with, helps the writer to interpret and read, enlarge his horizons, and appreciate the relationship of language to himself, the social order, and social change.

Part and parcel of Freud's exploratory writing—his emphasis on process and avoidance of closure—was his reliance on language that was evocative and tentative. His language evokes multilevel experience: we enjoy the supple tone, the modulations of empathic rapprochement with patient and reader, and the resonant personifications, which ward off chilling reification (Loewald 1978, pp. 33–34). Intimately bound with Freud's evocativeness was his penchant for the tentative. Given his bracketing of clear, unambiguous concepts with self-indulgent speculative and philosophical systems, he would have subscribed to Karl Popper's tenet that "every scientific tenet must remain tentative forever" (1965, p. 280). It follows that Freud strove for an approximative quality in language that was appropriate for psychoanalysis as a developing discipline, for the ultimately unknowable unconscious, for the facilitation of his writing under impulse, and for stimulation of the reader's conscious and unconscious responses to the text. Accordingly, Freud employed flexible definitions and favored the use of vital, everyday German words for exposition—not only because "in every language the concrete terms, as a result of their development, are richer in associations than abstract ones" (Freud 1900, 2–3:345/5:340) but also because of the ever-increasing resonance of concrete terms in current life. In that sense, if Judge Daniel Paul Schreber had a *Grundsprache* ("basic language"), Freud (1911) had one too.

Freud's tentativeness is also found in his dialogic appeal, through which he engages his readers to participate with him in an ongoing venture of research. As I have often stated, Freud's texts have the qualities of a do-it-yourself kit. For a helpful gloss one need only refer to Freud's essay "The Moses of Michelangelo" (1914c). Of the many statues Freud possessed and the thousands more he had seen, the only one he chose to write about at length presents the bearded Moses in "the remainder of a movement that has elapsed" (10:194/14:229)—a dynamic spectacle leaving us room to make inferences and to fill in the scene of the movement from our imagination. Within this vein, Freud's writings are sometimes explicitly dialogic, inviting us to fill out or mentally emend some local passage (Freud 1923a, 13:251–52/19:24–25; 1933, 15:85/22:78–79). On a grander scale, we are invited to continue the unending task left by Freud, who consistently avoided comprehensiveness in favor of a fragmentary, nomadic discourse.

If Freud's discourse has a democratically participatory element, it also contains a directive rhetorical force that overwhelms the reader. Witness the following non sequitur, quoted from Strachey's translation of "Analysis Terminable and Interminable." Freud (1937b) actually wrote:

Aus dem ungestillten Wunsch nach dem Penis soll der Wunsch nach dem Kind und nach dem Manne werden, der den Penis trägt (GW 16:97).

But Strachey put it this way:

The [woman's] appeased wish for a penis is destined to be converted into a wish for a baby and for a husband, who possesses a penis (SE 23:251).

In the original text, however, Freud speaks of the woman's "unappeased wish"—*ungestillten Wunsch*. Why, in the countless readings given to Strachey's translation, has this glaring error been undetected up to now? We can be assured that it would have been readily spotted had it been cited out of context or written by someone other than Freud. I can attribute readers' overlooking this error to its being contextually set within the blinding power of Freud's rhetorical genius, helped, to be sure, by the all too easy clarity and declarative simplicity of Strachey's rendering. All this calls for a history of psychoanalytic styles of reading.

Any adopted style of reading affects our understanding of the nature of psychoanalysis and has attendant implications for translating Freud. In my opinion, this crux about the nature of psychoanalysis will always trouble us to some degree. As early as 1895 Freud attempted to draw up an unadulterated picture of psychoanalysis as a natural science; but shortly thereafter, he set "The Project" (1950) aside and never resumed uninterrupted work on it (see chap. 6, this vol.). A modern debate, with terminological confusion of its own, rages as to whether Freud, despite his intentions, developed a clinical theory that was hermeneutic rather than scientific; at other times, the debate about the status of psychoanalysis is carried on with minimal reference to Freud. In Loewald's (1980, p. 5) moderating opinion, psychoanalysis is a therapeutic art, a branch of the humanities, and a natural science—the last often explicitly claimed by Freud. Bettelheim (1983), however, places Freud squarely within the hermeneutic field, although he never uses the term as such, preferring the humanistic label. By contrast, some critics would see Freud as a natural scientist but differ as to whether metapsychology is essential to the nature of psychoanalysis as a natural science. An added complexity here involves the fact, as Robert Holt (1972, 1978) repeated, that the humanistic picture of man underlies much natural science. In the camp of the hermeneutic proponents, on the other hand, differences also obtain: Roy Schafer (1976) is one of many who would do without metapsychology, but Paul Ricoeur (1965, 1970) retains it in his novel de-

scription of the unconscious as comprised of a verbal and energetic discourse. We might also bear in mind three other considerations: first, Freud himself estimated that he had no talent at all for natural sciences (Jones 1955a, p. 397); second, Freud's conception of the field was broad enough for him to call works of applied psychoanalysis, including his own hermeneutic study of *Gradiva*, a mixture of exact investigation and speculation (Freud 1907b, pp. 695–96/9:248); third, throughout his writings, he often quoted literary authors as evidence for his propositions, but rarely did he quote natural scientists or even physicians unless they had become psychoanalysts (Bettelheim 1983, p. 38).

What are we to make of all this? Did Freud after 1895 use the terminology of natural science only in an ironical mode or unreflectively and inconsistently? Another paradigmatic answer is that he employed such terminology nonironically but in a tentative and anticipatory way, hoping that his verbal formulations were lying in wait for a firm biological and chemical base in the future—that is, that his claims about psychoanalysis as a natural science were a serious aspiration about the future of his discipline rather than a present realization. Accordingly, Freud would have felt that his physicalistic models, expressed in verbal approximations about the unconscious never to be fully known, added up to a gesture of hope within the very development of natural science as a whole. In one sense we can agree with Emmett Wilson (1987, p. 308) that the notion of a scientific Freud was hardly due exclusively to the influence of the Standard Edition—Freud himself made many explicit assertions about his scientific aims in his public and private communications.

Is Freud's language in the *Gesammelte Werke* more scientific or humanistic? Ongoing research has shed a great deal of light on that question in primary-source texts. Early in this century, a combination of political, economic, and other ideological motives guided Jones in his program for translating Freud, a program that, together with its subsequent elaborations, greatly influenced Strachey's translation. Ideology underlay Jones's advocacy of a "true, uniform and definitive" psychoanalytic terminology: thus, a univocal reduction of Freud's texts that, in Jones's mind, would serve as a most efficient tool for the institutionalization of psychoanalysis (Jones 1924, quoted in Ornston 1985b; Jones 1974; Steiner 1986, 1987, 1988, esp. pp. 181–84 and 187–91.) Summarily, "a particular interpretation of psychoanalysis [existed] from its inception.... Psychoanalysis, for Jones, was a science, a scientific psychology to be related to the other natural sciences, primarily biology and physiology" (Steiner 1987, p. 53).

Thus the designed policy of Jones, Brill, and Strachey was to resort to Latinizing and Grecizing Freud's language in order that, so ennobled, it would be endowed with greater scientific credibility (Steiner 1986, p. 110; 1987, pp. 80–81). This is not to say, of course, that the suggestive, conversational, and Germanic quality of Freud's language was devoid of Greek or Latin roots (Wilson 1987, p. 304), but it remains an important difference between the target and derivative texts.

STRACHEY'S EDITION

The Standard Edition sometimes obfuscates capital psychoanalytic terms. In Riccardo Steiner's judgment (1986, p. 111), Strachey's translation not only contributed to a sterile and dogmatic form of psychoanalysis in the United States but also influenced the English Middle Group² to deny the death drive. Wilson (1987, p. 301) opines that Strachey's rendering of *Nachträglichkeit* as "deferred action" led to the neglect of this notion in Anglo-American psychoanalysis, owing to the fact that Strachey's choice does not entice the reader to wonder what Freud was trying to say; deferred action does not include the very important note of retrospection (Mahony 1984b, pp. 92–96, 117–20). For my part, I would prefer "subsequent supplementary response," which, although wordy, captures the double adjectival sense of *nachträglich*.³ Next, let us bring up the term *aufheben*, which Freud (1909b) uses in the Rat Man case as a synonym for *ungeschehenmachen* ("to make unhappen," thus a more powerful verb than "to undo"). Strachey translates *aufheben* both as "undoing" (7:452/10:235 and 7:458/10:243) and as "neutralized" (7:414/10:192). Actually, in its double meaning of annulling and conserving, *aufheben* is dynamically more suitable than *ungeschehenmachen* to describe such compulsive acts

2. The Middle Group of nonaligned analysts refused to side with either Anna Freud or Melanie Klein during prolonged and bitter disagreements within the British Psycho-Analytical Society (Steiner 1985).

3. D.G.O.—Freud's *Nachträglichkeit* contradicts and sometimes supersedes his own accounts about discrete memories of an original event that were molded and integrated into a whole when they first occurred and then simply set aside or "deferred" until a time, often many years later, when they might be resumed, recovered, reconstructed, or "completed." The difference is *nachträglich* implies that in recollecting what we conveniently call "a memory" we tend to complement our remembrance, shaping it to suit both intervening and present experience. Freud went back and forth on this essential psychoanalytic concept (Freud 1891, 1899, 1937a; Laplanche and Pontalis 1967). The *International Review of Psychoanalysis* (1991, vol. 18, pt. 3) contains a detailed consideration of *nachträglich*, among other papers on translating Freud, but arrived too late for integration into this book. Thomä and Cheshire (1991) agree with us about this term while appearing to disagree with us about Freud as a scientific writer. See my forthcoming book review in *Austrian Studies* (1992).

of the Rat Man as removing a stone from the road over which his lady was to pass in a carriage and then feeling forced to put the stone back.

Farther afield, we come upon the magisterial effort of Jean Laplanche to show that Freud's term *Anlehnung*, which is the simple German word for "dependence," is central in Freud's first theory of the drives (Laplanche 1970; Laplanche and Pontalis 1967). Unfortunately, Strachey's substantival rendering of *Anlehnung* by "anaclysis" and his diverse translations of the word in its other forms have obscured its pivotal importance to the English reader (an *Wand gelehnt*, "leaning up against the wall" [Freud 1909c, p. 112/SE 10:267]; *Anlehnung*, "attachment" [10:153/14:87]).

Under the heading of principal psychoanalytic terms, I shall limit myself to one more example. *Übersetzung* enjoys a comprehensive scope in the Freudian corpus and has the value of giving an imposing coherence to seemingly disparate phenomena. Neuroses and symptoms for Freud are translations of unconscious material, and the manifest or pictorial dream is nothing but a kind of translation, in one internalized medium, from that of the previous latent dream. The analyst's interpretations manifest his "arts of translation"—*Übersetzungskünste*—a more pointed epithet than Strachey's "explanatory arts" (Freud 1905a, 5:280/7:116). If the movement of material in the psychic apparatus is conceived of as translation, repression is a failure—*Versagung*—of translation. Clearly, Freud's literal use of *Übersetzung* as translation and transposition (the English word was often used in that double sense during the Renaissance) demonstrates that he understood as a concomitant unifying activity the translation of ideas and affects into words and the translation or transposition of psychic materials from the unconscious to the conscious level. Translation "downward" allows that the choice of fetish and the means of attempted suicide may also be considered as translations (Mahony 1982). To quote a final, prominent typographic instance: in Freud's major work on obsessional neurosis, he used the subheading *Einige Zwangsvorstellungen und deren Übersetzung* ("Some Obsessional Presentations and Their Translation"). Once more, however, Strachey gives this as "explanation" (Freud 1909b, 7:409/10:186).

We shall go on to Freud's processive and tentative language, which in the Standard Edition tends to give way to closure and stasis. In particular, Strachey was apt to hone down Freud's subtle wording that informed the modest claims in the titles of his works. To select one among many examples, *Neue Folge der Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Psychoanalyse* might be given as a "New Series of Lectures toward Introducing Psychoanalysis." In this treatise, we can appreciate how Freud's processiveness is encapsulated in an aphorism, which itself has become a ral-

lying cry for Lacanians, with their own particular twist. Freud wrote with emphasis,

Wo Es war, soll Ich werden (GW 15:86).

Removing Freud's accentuation (spaced words instead of full *Sperdruck*), Strachey translated:

Where id was, there ego shall be (SE 20:88).

Restored to its epigrammatic vim, emphasis, and dynamic movement, Freud's wording might be italicized and read,

Where id was, ego shall become.

To exemplify Freud's (1915a) evocative language, we begin by returning to a title, this time of the metapsychological essay "Triebe und Trieb-schicksale," or "Drives and Destinies of Drives." The common term *Schicksale* ("destinies") has a certain deterministic note that is missing in Strachey's jump to an erudite level of language in the second half of his title: "Instincts and Their Vicissitudes." On another score, Strachey's "adhesiveness" of the libido neutralizes the suggestive effect of *Klebrigkeit* (Freud 1916–17, 11:360–61/16:348), which is more frequently used in the pejorative sense of "stickiness." Here, on the other hand, is a specimen of Freud's playful tone as he discusses the serious topic of an analyst's unilateral termination of treatment:

Es bleibt dem Takt überlassen. Ein Missgriff ist nicht mehr gutzu-machen. Das Sprichwort, dass der Löwe nur einmal springt, muss recht behalten (Freud 1937b, 16:62),

which Strachey translates,

The decision must be left to the analyst's tact. A miscalculation cannot be rectified. The saying that a lion only springs once must apply here (SE 23:219).

Because of linguistic limits, the English "tact" gives but one sense of the German *Takt*, which can also refer to musical time or measure. Strachey's "miscalculation" in the present context does not fully reflect the German *Missgriff*, whose literal translation ("erroneous grasp") looks forward to the kinesthetic notes of the following sentence: "The saying that the lion springs only once necessarily takes hold here" (*muss recht behalten* is given more abstractly by Strachey as "must apply here"). Let us not conclude, however, that Strachey was chronically inattentive to nuance. As a matter of fact, it is likely that Strachey could pay more attention to

the signifier than Freud did; there is solid evidence that when Freud was translating, his attention to meanings led him to neglect signifiers (Pollak-Cornillot 1986).

As part of his evocative style, Freud repeatedly folded metalanguage back into language and undercut the difference between them; the most significant instances of this practice are not limited to a passage but echo throughout a whole work. A choice example is "The Interpretation of Dreams," whose expository progress Freud (1900) describes as journeying through the natural landscape. Because for Freud the landscape often symbolizes woman, we can appreciate his progress through dream interpretation as a simultaneous exploration of the woman's body (Mahony 1987a). A small sampling of that magnificent multiple meaning consists of the association of the dream with the navel that is suggestively intensified in the journey from chapters 2 to 7, the respective sites of the following quotations:

Jeder Traum hat mindestens eine Stelle . . . gleichsam einen Nabel, durch den er mit dem Unerkannten zusammenhängt. (Freud 1900, 2-3:116n/4:111n)

Dies ist dann der Nabel des Traums, die Stelle, an der er dem Unerkannten aufsitzt. (2-3:530/5:525)

I would translate these lines,

Every dream has at least one place . . . a navel, as it were, by which it joins with the unknown.

This is then the dream's navel, the place at which it straddles the unknown.

The word "straddles" (see Weber 1982, p. 75), translated by Strachey as "reaches down into" (SE 5:525), suggestively leads to the verbal noun *Unerkannten*. This is derived from the verb *erkennen*, which, like the English "to know," can be used in the carnal sense of the Bible (compare Anzieu 1975, 1:215).

Visual references constitute a unique area in which he blends language and metalanguage, and these allusions in turn fuse or intersect with his well-recognized use of archaeological, sexual, and landscape images, creating a running intertextual multiple meaning. One should remember that Freud was a visualist—*Augenmensch*—(see also Nunberg and Federn 1962, pp. xxvi–xxvii), as manifested in the pictorial elements that saturate his writings. Understandably, he always remembered the counsel of Jean-Martin Charcot, another well-known visualist: "to look at the same

things again and again until from themselves they begin to say something."⁴

One may speculate about the impact of Strachey's worsening blindness on his translation, for he does not always reproduce the visual references in the original text. This possible failing acquires added complexity in the case of Freud's introduction of the Oedipus complex, in the course of which he thrice cited a German translation of *Oedipus Rex* that is insistent in its visual references. Strachey (1966a), striving for elegance here as elsewhere, resorts to an accepted English translation of the classic instead of translating Freud's quotation into English himself. Freud cites,

Wo findet sich
die schwer erkennbar dunkle Spur der alten Schuld?
... sehet, das ist Oedipus
der entwirrt die hohen Rätsel und der erste war an Macht,
dessen Glück die Bürger alle priesen und beneideten;
Seht, in welches Missgeschickes grause Wogen er versank ...

Denn viele Menschen sahen auch in
Träumen schon
Sich zugesellt der Mutter: Doch wer alles dies
Für nichtig achet, trägt die Last des Lebens leicht.
(Freud 1900, 2–3:268–70)

For these passages Strachey quotes Lewis Campbell's (1883) translation, ignoring Freud's *Sperrdruck*,

But he, where is he? Where shall now be read
The fading record of this ancient guilt?
... Fix on Oedipus your eyes
Who resolved the dark enigma, noblest champion and most wise.
Like a star his envied fortune mounted beaming far and wide.
Now he sinks in seas of anguish, whelmed beneath a raging
tide ...
Many a man ere now in dreams hath lain
With her who bare him. He hath least annoy
Who with such omens troubleth not his mind.
(SE 4:261–64)

4. Freud 1914b, 10:60/14:22; 1893a, 1:22/3:12; 1924b, 13:446/19:290. Rodin gave Rilke uncannily similar counsel by suggesting that the poet go to the Jardin des Plantes and just look. Rilke followed the counsel and thereupon wrote the immortal *Neue Gedichte* (Lepmann 1982, pp. 257–58).

In this translation, the English “fading record” pales beside the German *schwer erkennbar dunkle Spur* (“the hardly knowable dark trace”). The double command *sehet/seht* (“see”) is reduced to one in English: “Fix on Oedipus your eyes.” And finally, in the German text, “many men see also in dreams that they already have lain with their mother”; the implication that a male may see his mother incestuously in real-life experiences, in fantasies and dreams, is restricted and dimmed in the translation used by Strachey.

Oedipus Rex aside, an important aspect of Freud’s visual terminology is his reference to the theater. We notice this also in his use of significant common words: *Probe* may mean trial, experiment, and demonstration but also rehearsal; if *Darstellung* stands for description, it also stands for an actor’s impersonation: *Vorstellung*, a lexical crux in the Freudian corpus, also signifies a theatrical performance. And, not unexpectedly, Freud can dramatically elaborate on the primal scene (*Urszene*): hence, when he describes his construction of a final part of the primal scene as a *Schlussakt*, or concluding act, we must take the work literally as a theatrical reference (Freud 1918, 12:112/17:80).

In a visual category by itself is Freud’s (1910f) essay “The Psychoanalytic View of Psychogenic Disturbance of Vision,” addressed to Viennese ophthalmologists. Here we are treated to the priceless experience of seeing Freud’s deftness at uniting theme, addressee, and expository expression, all in soft focus. Sometimes that focus is eclipsed in Strachey’s translation. Compare, for example,

Ja, wenn wir sehen, dass ein Organ . . .
und die anderen Untersuchungsweisen . . .
den Gesichtspunkt der Sexualität ausser acht gelassen [haben] (8:101)

and Strachey,

Indeed, if we find that an organ . . .
and other methods of research have left
the standpoint of sexuality out of account (11:218)

with my translation,

Indeed, if we see that an organ . . .
and the other ways of research have not paid attention to
the viewpoint of sexuality . . .

Such soft focusing is in keeping with Freud’s fluid investigative style. Elsewhere, for example, he is given to sometimes indeterminate use of

Ich and Phantasie. Strachey's differential rendition of Ich as "ego," "self," and "I" (see chaps. 4 and 6, this vol.) and Susan Isaacs's (1948) proposal that Freud's condensed *Phantasie* be orthographically distinguished into conscious and unconscious manifestations (fantasy and phantasy, respectively) violate the free-floatingness of Freud's texts, which both talk about and enact free association.

A comparison of Freud's practice with Darwin's is enlightening to illustrate the value of this investigative style. In the first edition of *On the Origin of Species by Means of Natural Selection*, Darwin's language and practice are congruent in that his use of words is oriented to expressiveness, mobility, and power to indicate relations and transformations rather than limits. But in subsequent editions of his masterpiece, Darwin strove to pare away verbal implications and arrive at univocal terms; still, the exuberant force of his language resisted such rigid limits. The textual movement of *Origin* is away from stabilization and toward expansion and engages its author, who could not resort entirely to experimental methods, to emphasize creativity. In short, Darwin's text "has a progenitive power. He seeks to express the equivalence of man with all other forms of life, but the power of his writing and the novelty of his narrative make it appear that Darwin, man's representative, has created as much as described" (Beer 1983, p. 103).

Yet that creativity should be nuanced insofar as Darwin resembled those Victorian novelists who sought "a role for themselves within the language of the text as observer or experimenter, rather than as designer or god. Omniscience goes, omnipotence is concealed. The loss of omniscience is felt particularly in fiction where the design of the narrative and the activity of the narration would seem to imply an organizing power. Writers could no longer share the Shaftesburyian ethic that an artist is imitating God" (p. 45; compare pp. 38, 100, 102). Much like Darwin's, Freud's thoughtful texts possess a progenitive power, but they seldom show any hesitancy in the expressive use of language.

A striking example of such language in the Freudian corpus is his insightful use of compound nouns, which he creates on the spot, page after page. Although in German, as opposed to English, it is customary to create such words, even in ordinary conversation, Freud's inventiveness is a distinctive feature of his discourse. Consider, for example, *Schaulust*: the first component, *Schau*, if taken as a noun, has the passive meaning of showing or exposing; but if this component is taken as a verb, it assumes the active meaning of looking; the second component, *Lust*, can signify both desire and pleasure (akin to wish and its fulfillment). *Schaulust*, therefore, demonstrates what Freud once called

sprachliches Entgegenkommen, “linguistic compliance,” or, better yet, “accommodation” (Freud 1901, 4:247/6:222), the counterpart of the more common epithet “somatic compliance.” We are not surprised, then, to come upon Freud’s usage of *Schaulust* in a general sense, to include both its active and passive forms (Freud 1909a, 7:341/10:106), and also in a particular sense, with his contrasting *Schaulust* and *Zeigelust* (“sexual exhibitionism,” Freud 1905c, 5:92/7:192). Elsewhere, Freud’s succinctness, as evidenced in

für seine unbewusste Liebesbedingung (Freud 1918, 12:69)

is radically diluted by Strachey,

which showed the basis of the unconscious condition upon which his falling into love depended. (SE 17:41)

I might phrase this,

for his unconscious condition of love . . .

Strachey is wordy.

In another passage, we find that Strachey translated the compound *Wunschleben* as “wishes,” thereby undercutting the richness of Freud’s thought:

Allein diese Ewigkeitsforderung ist zu deutlich ein Erfolg unseres Wunschlebens. (Freud 1916, 10:358)

But this demand for immortality is a product of our wishes too unmistakable to lay claim to reality. (SE 14:305)

One alternate is

But this demand for everlastingness is all too clearly the result of our life of wishes.

Hence, the original text uses a more dynamic sequence in that “our life of wishes” includes the wish for life itself. A more technical matter is involved in the composite *Bedürfnisspannungen*, or “need-tensions,” rendered by Strachey as “tensions caused by the needs of the id” (Freud 1940a, 17:70/23:148). As Loewald (1980) acutely remarks, Strachey notwithstanding, Freud is not saying that there is a cause-and-effect relationship between id needs and tensions; rather, the id needs in themselves constitute one kind of tension (p. 129n).

Freud’s use of tense, though not resonant in itself, is vivid in his discourse. Within this broad category I shall restrict myself to his use of

the present tense, beginning with a historical anecdote. In analyzing the Irma dream (dreamt in 1895) for his masterpiece, Freud wrote:

Er [Fliess] leidet aber selbst an Naseneiterungen. (Freud 1900, 2–3:122)

But he suffered himself from suppurative rhinitis. (SE 4:117)

Strachey's translation of *leidet* by the past tense instead of the present would prevent the reader from following Fliess's reaction to Freud's text and its particular presentation of time. When Freud in 1899 sent Fliess the draft version of his analysis of the Irma dream containing this sentence, Fliess replied by objecting to Freud's use of the present tense, with its implication that the rhinitic condition was continuing four years later. Freud answered acquiescently: "No correction could so delight me as your first one, saying that I confused the dates of the suppuration. But it's merely related there in the present tense—should I actually correct it in a note? The result seems to me so typical and so distinctive of the person who doesn't stop to break off his train of thought before coming to where his account had led him" (Freud 1986, p. 404 and n. 2).

This penitential stance was mostly pose, however, for Freud did not change the tense—and he had good reason not to. Throughout his life, Freud tended to write about dreams (his own and others') and the associations to them in the present tense, thus scriptively (re)presenting their hallucinatory nature. According to Freud's oneiric grammar, the optative mode of the latent dream was changed into the indicative present tense characterizing the hallucinatory nature of the dream dreamt. More briefly, "the present tense is the temporal form in which the wish is represented as fulfilled" (Freud 1900, 2–3:540/5:535, 2–3:660/5:647; 1905b, 6:185/8:162). Unfortunately, Strachey habitually translated dreams in the past tense, thus flying in the face of Freudian dream theory. To grasp the importance of this point, the reader might consider the care needed to translate this comment by Freud on oneiric grammar:

Dann ist das vorhin mitgeteilte Traumfragment "i c h s e h e m e i n e n B r u d e r i n e i n e m K a s t e n" also nicht zu übersetzen "mein Bruder schränkt sich ein," sondern "ich möchte, dass mein Bruder sich einschränke." (Freud 1916–17, 11:128)

The fragment of dream which I reported to you earlier, "I saw my brother in a box," is not to be translated, "my brother is restricting himself" but "I should like my brother to restrict himself." (15:129)

The earlier fragment reads “I see” (*ich sehe*), not “I saw,” as Strachey has it. In Freud’s conception, we must translate the necessarily hallucinatory present of the manifest dream back into its motivating wish; Strachey, however, undercuts the hallucinatory impact of the dream by a temporal displacement in his translation. Although a presentational immediacy characterized much of Freud’s case histories, Strachey once more was given to temporal displacements in his translations (Mahony 1984b, p. 14; 1982, pp. 126–27, 139–40 n. 18). And again, Strachey ignored Freud’s emphasis. The Rat Man stands apart as a case history because it contains what I have called Freud’s stereophonic style: writing in the present tense Freud can render as copresent the patient’s life, the analytic treatment, the writing of the process notes, their revision, and the public reading experience—an overall effect radically undermined in Strachey’s translation (Mahony 1986, pp. 183–87, 222 and n.).

These contrasts between Strachey and Freud lead us to draw some weighty conclusions. Bearing in mind that a relatively small number of narratives are written in the present, we can speak of a genre difference between many pages of the *Gesammelte Werke* and the Standard Edition: a dramatic enactment in one, a narrative distancing and novelizing by means of the past tense in the other. Read in German, Freud’s prose is able not only to describe but to enact and perform; in other words, the difference between description and event is minimized. The English translations take away from that. Freud’s here and now was turned into Strachey’s there and then, perception was changed into memory, and the exploratory nature of an ongoing investigation was transformed into a *post facto* hardening and even prescriptive retrospection.

Freud’s use of the present tense is in fact part of his overall strategy with deictics, or words that serve as orienting elements of language and refer to the situation of utterance; frequently used deictics are certain adverbs of time and place (*here, there, now*), demonstrative pronouns (*this, that*), and personal pronouns (*I, you, they*). Apparently Strachey was not very aware of the accumulative impact of deictics; hence they did not figure into his principles of textual fidelity as a translator. The deictic effect is evident in Freud’s usage of pronouns in the Wolf Man case. Freud is personal, Strachey impersonal:

Wenn wir von diesen pathologischen Phänomenen absehen, können wir sagen . . . (Freud 1918, 12:150)

Apart from these pathological phenomena, it may be said . . . (SE 17:114)

instead of,

If we disregard these pathological phenomena, we can say...

A little later, Strachey again vitiates Freud's personalizing expression:

Aber der vorherige Bestand einer starken Hysterie macht unseren Fall in dieser Hinsicht undurchsichtiger. Ich will die Übersicht über die Sexualentwicklung unseres Kranken beschliessen... (Freud 1918, 12:153)

The previous existence, however, of a severe hysteria in the present case makes it more obscure in this respect. I will conclude my survey of the patient's sexual development... (SE 17:117)

or,

But in this regard, the previous existence of a severe hysteria makes our case harder to see through. I will close this overview of our patient's sexual development...

For the most convenient instance of how deictics subtly indicate Freud's overdetermined rapprochement, empathy, and distance as therapist and writer, I recommend to the bilingual reader a scrutiny of Freud's case of Katharina, the shortest of his case histories (Mahony 1989, chap. 2). Any critic who disregards the value of deictics does so at his or her own cost. After all, the current psychoanalytic debate over transference versus reconstruction can in part be reformulated into the deictic contrast between the here and now and the there and then.

We must now deal with another class of terms—editorial ones—of more or less moment. I begin with the subject of the textual tinkering that Strachey indulged in, apparently to protect Freud. Because of the gravity of this claim, I shall furnish a pentad of instances with sustained commentary.

1) The first concerns Anna O., around whom Breuer, Freud, and Jones all created a series of myths. We now know that this prototype of a cathartic cure enjoyed neither a full catharsis nor a cure; we have also been told, Jones's story to the contrary, that prior to Anna O.'s intense transferential manifestation toward the end of the treatment, Breuer had become so involved with her that his own wife, struck by jealousy, tried to commit suicide.⁵ In short, the story embroiled even Freud (1925a)

5. These new details come from Marie Bonaparte's diary (Goleman 1985). One should compare Hirschmüller's (1978) fine biography of Josef Breuer.

in conflict, traces of which emerged in his retrospective account of the case:

Nachdem die kathartische Arbeit erledigt schien, hatte sich bei dem Mädchen plötzlich ein Zustand von "Übertragungsliebe" eingestellt, den er nicht mehr mit ihren Kranksein in Beziehung brachte, so dass er sich bestürzt von ihr zurückzog. (GW 14:51)

or,

After the cathartic work seemed settled, a condition of "transference love" had suddenly occurred in the girl which Breuer no longer related to her illness, so that he withdrew himself from her in dismay.

This passage contains the grammatical error (rare with Freud) of putting the initial action in the past tense ("seemed") and the subsequent one in the past perfect ("had occurred"). But even more striking is Freud's use of "no longer," for it implies that Breuer had been aware of transference issues before the cathartic work was over. One may suspect that the grammatical error and the verbal slip were indications of Freud's malaise about what he knew concerning the case and what he was publicly pretending in his published account. Strachey eliminates both the error and the slip in his translation:

After the work of catharsis had seemed to be completed, the girl had suddenly developed a condition of "transference love"; he had not connected this with her illness, and had therefore retired in dismay. (20:26)

2) In his process notes on the Rat Man case, Freud privately remembered one of his interventions this way:

Wobei ich mein sehr günstiges Urteil über ihn ausspreche, das ihn offenbar sehr erfreut. (Freud 1909c, p. 70)

or,

I express my very favorable judgment of him, which obviously pleases him very much.

In his public write-up, Freud scaled down both his judgment and his patient's reaction:

wobei ich ein anerkennendes Urteil über ihn ausspreche, das ihn sichtlich erfreut. (1909b, 7:402)

I said a word or two upon the good opinion I had formed of him, and this gave him visible pleasure. (10:178)

or,

I express an appreciative judgment of him, and this pleases him visibly.

The reader cannot fail to notice how Strachey followed suit and added a further change that covered up Freud's supportive technique by paring down "appreciative judgment" to "a word or two."

3) The Wolf Man at eighteen months observed his parents in coitus three times. In response to his patient's protest that the detail of three times was not his own association, Freud tells us:

Es war ein spontaner . . . Einfall, den er nach seiner Gewohnheit mir zuschob und ihn durch diese Projektion vertrauenswürdig machte. (Freud 1918, 12:64 n. 3)

It was a spontaneous association . . . in his usual way he passed it off onto me, and by this projection tried to make it seem more trustworthy. (17:37n)

or,

It was a spontaneous association . . . which in his usual way he passed off onto me and by projection made it trustworthy.

Comparing these passages, we observe that Strachey added the words "seem more," thus mitigating the patient's low self-esteem and enormous transference dependence during the treatment. That is, the Wolf Man was so doubtful of his own assertions that he projected them onto Freud so as to lend them basic credibility.

4) Elsewhere in this case Strachey suppressed the same word, "more," but the result of this pair of meddlings is the same, a doctoring up of the case. In the second example, Strachey's Freud states that he also treated the subject of primal scenes in his *Introductory Lectures*, "with no controversial aim in view." In reality, Freud maintained that his discussion of primal scenes in the *Introductory Lectures* was "no longer with a polemical aim in view"—*nicht mehr in polemischer Absicht* (Freud 1918, 12:86). The clear implication of the phrase dropped from Strachey's version is that the Wolf Man case was indeed written with a polemical aim; but Strachey's silent erasure succeeds in eliminating Freud's self-contradiction. In his first footnote to the Wolf Man case, Freud (1918, 12:29n) declares that "an objective estimation of the analytic material"

in this case “supplements the polemic” and “personal character” of his “On the History of the Psychoanalytic Movement” (Mahony 1984b).

5) Finally, we come to “Analysis Terminable and Interminable,” in which, while discussing Empedocles, with whom he strongly identified (Mahony 1989a), Freud lays bare his preoccupation with ideas of doubleness and precedence. He first states that in his new dual theory of the drives as “equally authorized partners”—*gleichberechtigte Partner*—(Freud 1937b, 16:90/23:244), we happen to find “concord”—*Anklang*—among fellow analysts. Then, after stating that he “found our theory again”—*wieder fand*—in Empedocles’ writings, he muses about whether in fact he has succumbed to cryptomnesia. But “found again” is an ambiguous phrasing and may indicate that Freud found the theory twice in Empedocles’ works. Strachey does a double take on the important nuance contained in “again”; by omitting it, he attributes the drive theory to Freud: “Not long ago I came upon this theory of mine in the writings of one of the great thinkers of ancient Greece.”

The five instances described demonstrate that Strachey did some “translating out” in every sense of the expression—though without the comfort of a present answer, we might wonder about the place of translation in Strachey’s ongoing self-analysis as a kind of parallel to the place of writing in Freud’s continual self-analysis. A different sort of translating out occurs in Strachey’s inconsistent attention to such editorial matters as paragraphing and punctuation. To begin with paragraphing: a fusion of Freud’s paragraphs may have the effect not only of tightening up his logical presentation but even of eliminating an unconscious trace from the text. Thus, in the following excerpt we observe how Strachey erases any indication that Freud began a new paragraph after the quotation from Heine:

Für den Gegensatz von Feuer und Wasser, der das ganze Gebiet dieser Mythen beherrscht, ist ausser dem historischen und dem symbolisch-phantastischen noch ein drittes Moment aufzeigbar, eine physiologische Tatsache, die der Dichter in den Zeilen beschreibt:

“Was dem Menschen dient zum Seichen,
Damit schafft er Seinesgleichen.” (Heine).

Das Glied des Mannes hat zwei Funktionen. . . .⁶

6. Freud 1932, 16:8/22:192. Heine’s verses may be rendered this way: “What serves man for pissing / He uses to create his kind.”

In the antithesis between fire and water, which dominates the entire field of these myths, yet a third can be demonstrated in addition to the historical factor and the factor of symbolic phantasy. This is a physiological fact, which the poet Heine describes in the following lines:—

Was dem Menschen dient zum Seichen,
Damit schafft er Seinesgleichen.

The sexual organ of the male has two functions. . . .

Given Freud's preference for writing under impulse and the influence of unconscious associations, it is noteworthy that he introduced the function of the male organ with a scriptive indentation, all the more because *Einzug*, the German word for a typographic indentation, also means entering and entrance.

Punctuation is also a significant feature that one must heed in any fine rendering of Freud's style. For selective exemplification, I shall concentrate on his use of the period, a tricky matter in bilingual equivalence, for German syntax to some degree facilitates the creation of lengthy sentences. In the following excerpt, the aim of which is perhaps to stimulate both his and the reader's associative and critical responses, Freud employs syntax as a flexible instrument for a subject whose accumulative nature is reinforced by its being mimetically expressed in one long sentence. Strachey does not respect this; he breaks it up into two. My translation, which follows, respects the original syntax:

Wenn unsere erste Beschreibung der Libidoentwicklung gelaute hat, eine ursprüngliche orale Phase mache der sadistisch-analen und diese der phallisch-genitalen Platz, so hat spätere Forschung dem nicht etwa widersprochen, sondern zur Korrektur hinzugefügt, dass diese Ersetzungen nicht plötzlich, sondern allmählich erfolgen, so dass jederzeit Stücke der früheren Organisation neben der neueren fortbestehen, und dass selbst bei normaler Entwicklung die Umwandlung nie vollständig geschieht, so dass noch in der endgültigen Gestaltung Reste der früheren Libidofixierungen erhalten bleiben können.

If our first description of the libidinal development held that an original oral phase gave way to a sadistic-anal phase and that the latter gave way to a phallic-genital one, yet subsequent research has perhaps not contradicted this point but added the correction that these replacements follow gradually, not suddenly, with the result

that portions of the earlier organization always persist alongside the more recent one and that even in normal development the transformation is never complete so that residues of earlier libidinal fixations could still be retained in the final arrangement.⁷

Loewald's overview may serve as an insightful gloss on Freud's discourse, provided that we recall Freud's more supple conception of scientific language:

Our scientific conceptual language—function of a specially developed, highly differentiated form of secondary-process mentation—appears to be particularly inadequate for statements about early mental functioning and about primary-process in general. . . . The much maligned anthropomorphisms and metaphors, not infrequently used in theoretical psychoanalytic writings, in many instances serve this corrective function. They often are closer to the phenomena in question in having an evocative quality. Just because such language is more influenced by the primary-process aspects of words, by the evocative-magical qualities of language, it often constitutes a more adequate formulation of primary-process phenomena. . . . In great poetry and creative prose—in much of modern literature quite consciously—there is an interweaving of primary and secondary process by virtue of which language functions as a transitional mode encompassing both. (1978, pp. 245, 268–69)

We recognize that Freud is distinguished among psychoanalytic writers in edging toward the primary process of great creative artists.

Although the six-volume *Concordance to the Standard Edition* (Guttman,

7. This is my own translation of Freud (1937b, 16:73/23:229). For the same mimetic play, readers might readily scrutinize two other examples. In the first, Freud expatiates on the length of treatment, the mass of material, and incurred resistance in a single, aptly long sentence. Strachey dissolves this impact into a pair of sentences: "Thus the course. . . resistance" (Freud 1918, 12:34/17:11–12). The other specimen is a lengthy sentence that appropriately relates a series of events, the epic scope of which is syntactically undercut by Strachey's chopping it up into three short sentences: "Well, she. . . pregnant" (Breuer and Freud 1895, 1:189/2:129). We should note that the epic quality of the original passage is much more significant insofar as its content, the subject of adultery, occasions parental arguments that themselves are brilliantly conveyed by Freud in terms of the commonly dual sensory observation of the primal scene: "the children came to hear a number of things which opened their eyes in many ways and which it would have been better for them not to have heard." If Strachey unnecessarily breaks up Freud's suggestively lengthy sentences, on other occasions he carelessly combines terse sentences in the source text and thereby undercuts their epigrammatic pungency. For further analyses of punctuation see Mahony 1986, pp. 207–09; 1987b, p. 118.

Jones, and Parrish 1980) is useful for the study of Strachey's translation, it is less so for the study of Freud's language and remains a treacherous instrument for the monolingual consultant. Thousands of words listed in the *Concordance* are examples of Strachey's inaccurate or unnecessarily elaborate translations. On the other hand, according to my rough estimation, Strachey overlooked or deliberately dropped several thousand words here and there.⁸ In that a concordance for the *Gesammelte Werke* has not yet been published, the existence of one for the English translation of Freud runs the danger of conferring canonicity upon it. Another ticklish issue in this matter is Strachey's choosing, often arbitrarily, to translate only one meaning of a multilayered word. The new French translation of Freud does let the reader choose among meanings of ambiguous terms and thus responds to the nature of Freud's text like the do-it-yourself kit I mentioned earlier.

Perhaps the time has come to recognize the noncanonical status of Strachey's translation and to attempt some psychoanalysis of its defensive aspects and limitations. The patient and analyst whom Freud lexically joined, Strachey has put asunder by using different words for the patient and for the analyst (Ornston 1982, 1985, 1988); such a practice might qualify as undoing. As well, Strachey's lexicality repeatedly strips affect from the original text. What is at stake for us here is not only how to read Freud but also how to read Strachey. If Freud's theory has been deformed by the translation, so also has the English reader's sentient encounter with that theory. The *Gesammelte Werke*, with its marked quality of affect and person, affords a different intrapsychic and interpsychic experience in reading Freud. The object relations are different.

Finally, I think that ideally a psychoanalytic translation should be distinct from any other translation. It should identify in footnotes the meanings of words in the original text that might have escaped the conscious awareness of the author. I am aware that such a notational enterprise about the unconscious is risky and at any event should be carried out selectively. It will suffice to mention a pair of examples. In his article "Fetishism," Freud talks of a patient whose disavowal of female castration was linked with the memory of a fig leaf—*Feigenblatt*—yet Freud does not state the pertinent fact that in Viennese dialect *Feige* was a term for vagina (Stekel 1929, p. 195). A more assuring and sustained example is found in the case history of the Wolf Man. Although Freud gives several historical explanations for the patient's dream, the one that re-

8. For other examples, see Mahony 1984b, pp. 15, 72 n. 47; 1986, pp. 123, 175; 1987a, pp. 51 n. 9, 52 n. 13, 53 n. 24.

ceives the most elaborate treatment is the reconstructed primal scene and its *coitus a tergo*. In the course of proposing his fantastical reconstruction, Freud uses the word *überzeugen* ("to convince") with exceptional frequency—an indication that he was embroiled in persuasive discourse with both his patient and his reader. But insofar as the root of *überzeugen* means both to procreate and to witness (the dual activities of the primal scene itself), the very frequency with which Freud used the word suggests that his case history was invaded by his own unconscious derivatives (Mahony 1984b, pp. 99–101). If such unconscious derivatives tend to subvert Freud's original text, they also confirm his psychoanalytic tenet about interminability. The siren call of the inexhaustible unconscious lures every psychoanalyst, monolingual or not, into being both translator and traitor.

Standard Translation and Complete Analysis

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Using the Standard Edition to teach psychoanalysis in an English-speaking country led me to some surprises (Junker 1987). Strachey's translation often seems easier to understand than the original. His clear and didactic flow is quickly understood and sounds more reliable, even more correct, than Freud's own German wording. I could almost say that when I read Strachey I am reading a tamed Freud.

This paradox—that Strachey seems more correct than Freud—may be a result of Strachey's having worked his way through Freud's texts, doctoring them up and even critically revising them in the process. Although Strachey (1966a, p. xix) maintained that he had kept to "the rule of uniform translation . . . extended to phrases and indeed to whole passages," we now know that he was quite inconsistent in his choice of terms. He did eliminate some of Freud's ambiguities and obscurities, but my own words are already misleading. Many German words as Freud used them in his struggle to discover meaning do not immediately reveal all their connotations. A translator may be uncomfortable about leaving Freud's meaning suspended and tend to take distance from a particular expression in order to define this word and give it a logical frame, thus remodeling the chosen term while letting the original contexts fade away. Many critics have worked on this problem. For example, Freud uses a constellation of different expressions for a necessarily vague idea, whereas Strachey combines many of Freud's different and descriptive words into his own single term,

“structure.”¹ Can a general term such as “structure” really incorporate more than a dozen German words that obviously are not synonymous? Is this one way in which Strachey made his English Freud appear not only simpler but also more scientific (Ornston 1982, 1985a, 1988: Steiner 1987)?

Different conceptions necessarily stress different aspects of the primary text. For example, Freud’s own literal, philosophical, mythological, or other basic assumptions, and the interplay among them, sometimes shift within a single sentence. Then rereadings by several generations of analysts have produced a secondary literature about a given text that has engraved certain words like “structure.” Each generation sets these terms into the language of the day. Although intending to do no more than clarify an earlier version or correct an imbalance, one stresses other connotations that may indeed be in Freud’s text. All too often, however, Freud’s German words seem far from the central meaning a foreign reader or translator has given to them. Over time, even the most earnest endeavors may continue to unbalance any translation. Of course, nobody can ever know what Freud’s thoughts were as he wrote a given sentence or how he thought about the same work later on.

A translator should probably write out a formal account—his or her own understanding of a given work—before getting into the dictionaries, because it is so easy to be led by silent assumptions and contemporary views. Strachey did do this at times; as described elsewhere in this book, recent French and Spanish introductions do this rather well.

I disagree with the French team, however, in that I think every translation is only one version and therefore of necessity an interpretation. Many translations of a work are needed, because as an ensemble they can cover a wider range of meaning and open up connotations rather than restrict and precisely define certain terms. As long as psychoanalysis is a living science interwoven with culture, history, and unforeseen events, the work of translation can never be finished. In fact, the processes we describe in this book can occur every time one returns to study the original.

A single adage from Freud’s (1937b) “Die endliche und unendliche Analyse” (“Analysis Terminable and Interminable”) has undergone several changes and variations among German-speaking analysts. Every-

1. *Der Aufbau, der Bau, der Überbau, die Bildung, die Gliederung, das Gebäude, das Gebilde, das Gefüge, die Ordnung, die Struktur, and der Träger* are among the words Strachey translated as “structure” (Ornston 1985a, p. 409).

body knows this slogan—it is murmured about during almost every congress and business meeting. We are accustomed to say, “Psychoanalysis is an impossible profession.” But many analysts no longer know the context in which Freud used this maxim. He described psychoanalysis as one of the three impossible professions, along with educating and governing. However, I think this is not a real quotation, not even an inaccurate one.

In his preface to August Aichhorn’s “Verwahrloste Jugend” (“Wayward Youth”) Freud (1925d) briefly compared psychoanalysis to bringing up and managing difficult children, although he acknowledged that his own contributions to these applications of psychoanalytic knowledge were sparse.

Ich hatte mir frühzeitig das Scherzwort von den drei unmöglichen Berufen—als da sind: Erziehen, Kurieren, Regieren—zu eigen gemacht, war auch von der mittleren dieser Aufgaben hinreichend in Anspruch genommen. (14:565)

Freud’s own wording may be a surprise because Strachey’s standard translation runs:

At an early stage I had accepted the *bon mot* which lays it down that there are three impossible professions—educating, healing and governing—and I was already fully occupied with the second of them. (19:273)

With dry irony, a dozen years later Freud (1937b) described the endless personal development necessary for an apprentice—*Lehrling*—who was no longer in a formal analysis as a patient. Experience acquired in his personal analysis does no more than enable him to continue this process on his own, and, insofar as this really happens, this may make him fit to become a psychoanalyst.

Machen wir einen Moment halt, um den Analytiker unserer aufrichtigen Anteilnahme zu versichern, dass er bei Ausübung seiner Tätigkeit so schwere Anforderungen erfüllen soll. Es hat doch beinahe den Anschein, als wäre das Analysieren der dritte jener “unmöglichen” Berufe, in denen man des ungenügenden Erfolgs von vornherein sicher sein kann. Die beiden anderen, weit länger bekannten, sind das Erziehen und das Regieren. Dass der zukünftige Analytiker ein vollkommener Mensch sei, ehe er sich mit der Analyse beschäftigt hat, also dass nur Personen von so hoher und so seltener Vollendung sich diesem Beruf zuwenden, kann man offen-

bar nicht verlangen. Wo und wie soll aber der Ärmste sich jene ideale Eignung erwerben, die er in seinem Berufe brauchen wird? (16:94)

Strachey's translation is,

Here let us pause for a moment to assure the analyst that he has our sincere sympathy in the very exacting demands he has to fulfill in carrying out his activities. It almost looks as if analysis were the third of those "impossible" professions in which one can be sure beforehand of achieving unsatisfying results. The other two, which have been known much longer, are education and government. Obviously we cannot demand that the prospective analyst should be a perfect being before he takes up analysis, in other words that only persons of such high and rare perfection should enter the profession. But where and how is the poor wretch to acquire the ideal qualifications which he will need in his profession? (23:248)

The German *Scherzwort* means a jocular phrase that already has a rich colloquial tradition, so when Freud says that from early on he had made this jest his own—*zu eigen gemacht*—he disavows any suggestion that it was his own idea.

What has become of this phrase? It can be read as ranging from a free and playful thought (but still open to multiple interpretations, as I think Freud used it) to an almost lexicographical dogma. Freud began by using a familiar saying that would be readily recognized by any German reader. As he speaks of the three impossible professions, he sounds doubtful and his simile is vague. You may hear this in his text when he says, "It almost looks as if," but then this saying was taken out of context. Unlike psychoanalysis, governing and educating were established professions, commonly accepted without any deliberation.

Arnold Cooper (1987b) is only one of the more recent writers to describe psychoanalysis in this way: "At its best psychoanalysis is not a comfortable profession. In fact, it's an 'impossible' one" (p. 129). Ralph Greenson (1966) gave it a demonstrative pronoun and even titled his paper "That 'Impossible' Profession." Psychoanalysis was further isolated in Janet Malcolm's (1980) book *Psychoanalysis: The Impossible Profession*, and more recently Marie Langer (1982) wrote about the work of the training analyst as "the most impossible profession," overriding the now-conventional analytic superlative with a second one of her own—"Das Unmöglichste dieser an sich schon unmöglichen Tätigkeit, ist dem Lehranalytiker vorbehalten" (p. 17). And finally, in the German index of his

Collected Works, the “impossible profession” has even earned special citations, as if the term had been coined by Freud (GW 18:917).

How many times have you heard the “impossible profession” mentioned in psychoanalytic circles, and what was implied? Because this phrase has been completely removed from the contexts Freud provided, I believe it has become a cliché or slogan, most often used earnestly and defensively. Usually I understand it to mean that although psychoanalysis is an impossible profession, we do it nevertheless. A heroic tone replaces Freud’s dry irony. The analyst is contrasted to and demarcated from the members of other professions, even the psychotherapies, and inflated into a figure of inaccessible grandeur. He or she toils in this impossible profession, while everybody else happily goes about some altogether ordinary and possible job. There can no longer be any discussion of equality between analysts and nonanalysts, not to speak of those analysts who are declared to be nonanalysts. Thus one’s own errors or failures can be defended without much logical consideration, let alone consultation, but with a grim pride of isolation. Also, if analysts build up and sustain a vain notion of themselves as an elite, they have a good rationalization for retreat from colleagues in other disciplines.

What does this have to do with my original question about those three professions, healing, governing, and “raising” people in the sense that one “brings up” children? Freud’s word *Erziehen* certainly includes much more than education. Reading Strachey’s version carefully, one finds that the object of his sentence is that one can be sure from early on “of achieving unsatisfactory results.” Actually, Freud’s own word, *Erfolg*, literally means “success.” Thus, Freud said we can be sure beforehand of “achieving unsatisfying success” rather than “results”—that is, Strachey muffled Freud’s inherent contradiction or oxymoron. Freud’s invented word, *Fehlleistung*, may be a more familiar example of the same thought (see chap. 4, this vol.).

In my opinion, Freud says that these three professions have the following in common: a successful outcome cannot be defined beforehand; a precisely tailored treatment plan or method cannot be effected; and a later evaluation of the whole process is very difficult. Freud seems to intend that the analyst not overburden himself and not divert the analysis toward achieving some clearly defined “success.” I think Freud was convinced psychoanalysis would bring results but believed the outcome could not be predicted as neatly as in the optimal treatment and final cure of an infectious illness. Reading the whole passage, one finds that Freud is addressing the three people who are most concerned: the analyst, the patient (who may be a prospective analyst), and the analytic

candidate: "But where and how is the poor thing supposed to earn for himself the ideal qualifications of his own which he is going to need in his profession?"

Freud immediately answers his rhetorical question. He says that earning these qualifications depends on the personal analysis of any apprentice—*Lehrling*—and even more on the novice analyst's ability to continue this work on his own. A candidate is fit to be a psychoanalyst only insofar as he continues to develop by using what he has learned about his own repressed and unconscious life and through the analytic technique which enables him to gain otherwise unbelievable self-perceptions.

Can an analysis ever be brought to a natural end? Although analysts may suggest this possibility when they criticize someone by saying, "her analysis was not finished" or "he is incompletely analyzed," Freud is skeptical. He says all this depends on what one means by "the end of an analysis" (16:63/23:216).

As he does so often, in these pages Freud refers to the analysand in humane and mutual terms rather than setting him apart as "the patient." Read in context, Freud is typically ambiguous about whether he is referring to analytic "apprentices," to all psychoanalysts, or perhaps to everyone who gains from a personal analysis. Freud begins the passage I just quoted, for example, by alluding to both a patient and a person who is becoming an analyst:

ein in seiner Unvollkommenheit erkanntes Menschenkind.

In the Standard Edition one finds,

the recognized imperfections of some fellow-mortal,
which I read as,

a child of man, whose imperfections have been recognized.

As I understand him, Freud is stressing the imperfections more than the child of man. He begins the long passage quoted earlier by pausing so that we—*wir*—can assure the analyst of "our sincere sympathy"—*unserer aufrichtigen Anteilnahme*. A literal translation would be that the analyst is assured of "our upright participation." Freud's word *aufrichtig* does mean "sincere" or "true" and has the further connotation of being admired, a person worthy of genuine trust.

Freud gives each of the people involved in the analytic process a decent role and writes in the first person plural, in a way that compels his reader to "take part." The analyst is a poor wretch and also, like his

patient, a child of man, with recognizable imperfections. Both are “persons.” These are not the words of an uninvolved and impersonal scientist, nor are they the words one would use to describe an aloof candidate or a dangerous patient (Ornston 1988, p. 206).

Reading Freud’s texts requires a flexible mind; one must follow the movements of a dialectic process without stopping at some simpler and seemingly certain point well before the end of his argument. Such an openness is not easy for any reader, nor is it easy to obtain just by reading Freud in the original. Rather, this is a continuous task for anyone who wants an enriched understanding of Freud’s work, because his style invites one to join him in deliberations that are both vague and sometimes artificially precise. While reading, teaching, or translating, one must reach for and sustain an identification with the intense attention Freud offers and demands. Like analysis itself, this is “an unending process”—*ein unendlicher Vorgang*. Freud (1937b) describes it in the first sentence of *Die endliche und die unendliche Analyse* as “a tedious or even wearisome work”—*eine langwierige Arbeit*—not as a “time-consuming business,” as Strachey put it (16:59/23:216).

FREUD’S *GESUCHTE AUFKLÄRUNG* IN TWO ENGLISH TRANSLATIONS

Any conception that the translator already has in mind necessarily presumes a certain understanding of the text as a whole—all the more so if the translator or reader is unaware of this preconception. A comparison of an excerpt from Freud’s (1925b) short paper on negation, with English translations by Joan Riviere and James Strachey, will illustrate this point. *Die Aufklärung* is almost untranslatable because of its enormous range of meanings, starting with the everyday “clearing up” or “clarification” and stretching to the historical-philosophical “enlightenment.” Even solving a murder is a kind of *Aufklärung*. Therefore when Freud says that a patient presents a thought occurring to him in negative form, as in “I certainly wasn’t thinking of my mother,”

Gelegentlich kann man sich eine gesuchte Aufklärung über das unbewusste Verdrängte auf eine sehr bequeme Weise verschaffen (14:11),

Freud is describing how an analyst can enable a patient to gain a long-sought clarification of what is both unconscious and repressed by asking him what he believes is the most improbable of all possibilities in a given situation. Riviere puts this,

There is a most convenient method by which one can sometimes obtain a necessary light upon a piece of unconscious and repressed material. (Freud 1925b, p. 181)

Strachey revised her translation for his Standard Edition:

There is a very convenient method by which we can sometimes obtain a piece of information we want about unconscious repressed material. (19:235)

One of the differences is striking and leads to a central dilemma when translating; that is, does one empathize with the author, or does one try to render lexicographical truth? Riviere tries to bring over Freud's metaphor as in *der Himmel klärt sich auf*, or the sky clears up, the sky opens, the sky is freed from clouds or darkness so that it is now full of light. Riviere is with Freud the explorer, who draws back a curtain so that light will fall upon a scene.

A prepared reader is disappointed in Strachey's translation because where Freud sought "enlightening" Strachey saw "a piece of information." Similarly, both Riviere and Strachey insert the unnecessary word "material." A sad resignation comes to a German reader who understands this, because "information" is given at airports, where facts are exchanged, and town halls, where "material" is distributed. Where and when can one take the train to Munich? Strachey changed Freud's description of the way one searches the unconscious. By combining the words "information" and "unconscious," two different modes of thought are jumbled in an unfortunately confusing way, as if the unconscious might belong to the world of knowledge alone—that is, the materialistic world, which can be verbalized, put into the computer, and processed properly. The reader limited to Strachey's version is misled into another realm, because his "piece of information" and "material" reify the original.

Furthermore, Strachey modified the activity of both patient and analyst by leaving out Freud's *das Gesuchte* ("what they are seeking"). That is, Strachey replaced Freud's participle of the verb *suchen* with a noun that is "a piece of." Even the context is distorted. Why only "a piece" of information? Here Strachey's modest "piece" is different from Freud's suggestion. There is no process of searching and seeking in Strachey's translation because his text implies that the search is finished—the piece of material has already been found. Instead, the text should get across the ongoing and endless process of searching the repressed that Freud described. This is not visible in the Standard Edition.

Even Joan Riviere slips into a pitfall of the English language when she abstracts Freud's "light one is seeking" into her own "necessary light." Why couldn't she use an English word that would carry over Freud's tireless quest for clarification of what is unconsciously repressed?

Beyond lexicographic meanings, words evoke ideas and images, like white clouds that for a moment may map the sky even though they are always in motion. A forever-shifting formation is not easy to capture in words, but what cannot be reflected by one translator working alone may be more closely approximated by a team. This will be especially useful if members of such a team can realize and reveal their basic assumptions beforehand, as did Etcheverry for his edition of the *Obras completas* and the French group now producing the *Oeuvres complètes*. The problem remains one of selecting translators who are homogeneous enough to work with one another yet heterogeneous enough to perceive and portray their differences.

A translator's prior understanding of a work may lead to the selection of sets of words before the actual translation has begun. As an example, I offer two words from "Analysis Terminable and Interminable."

Freud (1937b) writes about the *Wohlbefinden* of a former patient. This is a common term that comprises different modes of well-being, both physical and mental, and could be rendered as "ease and comfort," thus even mimicking the sound and rhythm of Freud's four-syllable word. Strachey does not pay attention to such poetic considerations but rather uses the word "health," a clear-cut and monosyllabic term. Obviously Strachey's choice gives a more restricted meaning than the original. Once an idiom with its specific connotations has been employed, the next choice must fit in order to avoid a mixed metaphor. Meticulously enough, Strachey goes on to deal with the compound word *Heilungsgeschichte*, literally "history of healing." *Heilung* means to heal or to cure in the widest possible sense, including any and all processes that might be regarded as leading to a healthy wholeness of body and mind. All too logically, Strachey translated Freud's *Heilung* into his own conception, "recovery" (16:61–62/23:218–19).

A translator is often committed with his or her very first word, just as *Wohlbefinden* leads to *Heilung*. Often when Freud chooses philosophically oriented and humanistic words, Strachey confines himself to medical language; so his "health" leads to "recovery" (Bettelheim 1983). Any modern translator should follow the pattern of Freud's own metaphors and modes of thought. I am sure Freud would have written *Gesundheit* if "health" were what he meant to say.

One might respond that the English language does not enable a writer

to render the same tone and rhythm such as “ease and comfort” for Freud’s *Wohlbefinden*. But is there really less poetry in everyday English than in German?

Would it be worthwhile to teach Freud to students who have little or no German by using excerpts from several different translations? If we did this, dogmatism might be avoided, dialectic motion might come alive, and the search for multiple meanings and understandings might actually be encouraged as in the psychoanalytic process itself.

The Montreal Congress papers centering on “Analysis Terminable and Interminable” were first published in 1987. I think they give a convincing picture of the way a Freudian text can be influenced by the assumed validity of English translations made fifty years earlier. Furthermore, because Strachey revised some of the original translations for an English edition of Freud’s *Collected Papers* in 1950 and then modified his own texts once more for his Standard Edition a few years later, one might compare these three translations with Freud’s paper in order to learn more about what Strachey was trying to do and how he meant to do it (Ornston 1982).

Strachey combined all three roles; translator, editor, and commentator. In his note we hear the now well known and conventional opinion that Freud’s work “gives an impression of pessimism in regard to the therapeutic efficacy of psychoanalysis” (Strachey 1964a, p. 211). When did Strachey make this observation? Was this view widely accepted among British psychoanalysts before the war? We do know that when Freud’s text appeared, the Nazis were already burning his books and the *Anschluss* threatened not only his work but also his life. Did Strachey merely reflect an assumed view from the postwar era? This constant reading of Freud as pessimistic is taken for granted by the modern psychoanalyst. Freud’s essay “is a work which several generations of analysts have found engrossing, puzzling, rich in ideas as well as disturbing because of its apparent pessimism” (Cooper 1987b, p. 127). This seems similar to the dogmatization of Freud’s references to “three perhaps impossible professions” which then gradually became “the most impossible profession.” How did Freud’s reputation for pessimism come about?

I may be exaggerating to clarify this point, but I believe that Freud’s (1937b) essay is read as pessimistic predominantly in the Anglo-American countries, largely because of the final authority accorded to Strachey’s team and the reading instructions Strachey provided in his numerous notes and introductions. Freud is not nearly so pessimistic

in the Portuguese, Spanish, and French discussions of the same essay. The Brazilian writers David Zimmermann and A. L. Mostardeiro (1987) did not need to stamp Freud's essay as pessimistic, although they begin their account with a summary of Freud's circumstances in 1937—his illness, unhappiness, and severe political predicament—and even though the Portuguese *Obras psicológicas completas* attempts to follow the English Standard Edition almost word for word. Writing in Spanish, Terttu Eskelinen de Folch (1987) begins similarly. In French, André Green (1987) had the courage to venture an interpretation of authors who cling to this reading of Freud as pessimistic. He describes Freud's "wider speculative range" and says that this "causes many of his colleagues to disagree with him and to put his opinions down to his pessimism" (p. 150).

Freud's alleged pessimism has become not only a prejudice but also a slogan if not an instruction about how to read Freud properly. I am not surprised that even my Austrian colleague, Harald Leupold-Löwenthal (1987), refers to Strachey as he confesses that he "cannot escape an impression of pessimism" (p. 48). Is pessimism really a significant feature of Freud's "Die endliche und unendliche Analyse"? Or might this be a result of Strachey's masterly interpretation—*herrschender Lesart*? In scientifically rigorous if not rigid Germany, this exacting phrase, the "dominant way of reading," explicitly echoes the *Herr* or "master"—but now times have changed.

Having in mind the common belief in Freud's pessimism and looking back at the text Freud published in 1937, I wish to summarize what I take to be his topics. It is relatively easy to outline the structure of this essay, because each of its eight short chapters refers to a distinctly different subject concerning analysis, always seen as both ending and unending, opposing poles that at the same time constitute each other. These are miniatures of Freud's condensed thinking about his major topics.

1. Is it possible to accelerate the slow process of analysis?
2. Is there a natural end to an analysis?
3. Does analysis provide permanent healing?
4. What are the limits of psychoanalysis?
5. Which alterations of the ego influence analysis (the question of "normality")?
6. What prevents analysis from therapeutic success (the archaic heritage and the death instincts)?

7. How is analysis influenced by the distinctive personality of the analyst?
8. When bringing an analysis to an end, which resistances are the strongest (penis envy and the castration complex)?

All these chapters touch on psychoanalytic problems that exist today just as they did at the time Freud wrote them. They show why real psychoanalysis is unending and interminable. I do not see Freud setting rules or substantiating dogmas; rather, I think he entices his readers to participate in considering unsolved questions (Mahony 1987a). How can this be mistaken as pessimistic?²

Freud always speaks to an audience, so that his writing often plays with the rhetorical figure of an imagined partner in a dialogue. The text of this single essay illustrates a few of Freud's many modes, some of which are concurrent. Freud cites source material, discusses, lectures, speculates, fantasizes, polemicizes, makes autobiographical remarks, tells stories and anecdotes, and describes according to the clinical method of reporting a case.³

Freud's text abounds in relationships between writer and reader. As many modern analytic writers have shown, one can regard this process as quite similar to what goes on between patient and analyst, a reading that becomes a little different after every session. Of course, this holds true only if one assumes that Freud is inviting these mobile views of developing and overlapping ideas rather than laying down definitions. By combining contradictions, he transcends logical clarity and in this way opens up an oscillation between two or more possibilities, enabling one to take what one will from the various, at times simultaneous, meanings. Again, can this vivid and eternal interaction be read as pessimistic?

Comprehending Strachey is different from understanding Freud. Strachey worked with an apparently euphoric certainty which allowed analysts of his time to believe that his particular kind of medical orthodoxy had won and would reign over psychoanalysis forever. A historically outdated idea may remain a powerful convention or traditional

2. D.G.O.—When Freud described our "determinism and scepticism—what most people would call pessimism," he was writing to Arthur Schnitzler about the uncanny familiarity he had found in their mutual assumptions, interests, and findings (letter, 14 May 1922, in Freud 1955, p. 97).

3. D.G.O.—Laplanche and his colleagues supply a more comprehensive list of Freud's manifold genre at the beginning of chap. 8, this vol.

reading until something better comes along. Thus far, Strachey's capable but tendentious and self-assured commentaries have allowed him to have the last word and therefore to prevail. It is appalling how easy it is to think in Strachey's terms while reading what Freud wrote.

I agree with Inga Villarreal (chap. 7, this vol.) that what analysts "know" is strongly influenced by informal communication, by psychoanalytic practice, by teaching, as well as by participation in professional groups. Every new generation of psychoanalytic candidates adopts some new oral conventions that then evolve, as do their ways of understanding both their colleagues and themselves.

Even an experienced analyst, knowing a certain Freud perhaps too well, cannot escape from this process. However often one may have read the primary texts, one has lived for a long time within a psychoanalytic society and has inevitably been swayed by its currents. Perhaps unwittingly, reluctantly, or enthusiastically, one tends to follow the conventions on which psychoanalysis is every bit as dependent as is any other science or social movement. Therefore, analytic knowledge cannot be pure. These habits and more or less informal customs can be compared to the annual rings of a tree: each new layer conforms overall yet has developed uniquely in different climates and circumstances. Psychoanalysts have both private (informal) and professional or public (formal) ways of describing and using their ideas.

Because similar "'dangers of analysis' . . . threaten [both active and passive partners in the analytic situation] each analyst should periodically—perhaps after a free run of five years or so—arrange to become the object of analysis again, without being ashamed of this step. This means that not only the therapeutic analysis of the patient but also the analyst's own personal and terminable analysis would have to become an interminable assignment" (Freud 1937b, 16:95–96/23:249, my translation).

How difficult it would be to go back into a formal analysis every five years while knowing almost all of one's colleagues! However, I see two other ways in which analysts continue their own analyses. First, there is the steady stream of patients who come and go. Through the analytic process each patient reveals in a singular way the flaws of his or her analyst as "a child of man." Therefore, if the analyst wants the patient to develop, the analyst, too, must take part in a similar and simultaneous process of personal development. And I believe that just as every analyst changes during five years, in part because of this personal growth, Freud's works will also have become different and have more to say. It is their inevitable

fate, owing perhaps to their greatness as literary works, that Freud's writings remain alive: I mean that they continue to develop in various editions and in accord with a reader's past or present circumstances. If one reads Freud both with the inquisitiveness of an earnest student and with the self-confidence of an experienced adult, one may be surprised by the variety of Freud's personal effects. The true psychoanalyst will escape mere intellectual curiosity, which, as Freud says, is of very little use.

We are not about to abandon Strachey nor to replace him. Rather, we would like to put a few new counselors by his side. Various conceptions of the translation process that have already been developed should be studied and carried further. This will mean new translations (I deliberately use the plural) for at least some of Freud's publications. We should compare the cultural assumptions and conventions of different languages in different countries at different times. These new editions should compare alternative ways of expressing Freud's lines of thought in at least two languages—I mean bilingual or trilingual texts of at least some shorter pieces—and, of course, the editors must provide full explanatory notes.

I would emphasize that psychoanalysis is a movement as well as a science with an ongoing history; therefore I disagree with Laplanche and his colleagues: I think that straining to turn time back to a "pure Freud" is illusory. Instead, a careful understanding of the histories of, and developments within, psychoanalysis will be more useful. The contrasts and confirmations between new and traditional translations can serve to stimulate the scientific spirit and to center this endless work around the primary texts—that is, around Freud's own writings.

There is no such thing as a complete or final translation. I have heard that some one hundred scholars have been engaged to prepare the ground for the translation of James Joyce's *Finnegans Wake* into different languages. German readers urgently need a new translation of Shakespeare in order to escape from, and to enrich, the rhymes and rhythms of our nineteenth-century translations. I sometimes think it might be most efficacious for a foreign reader to sit down and begin to learn German instead of worrying over various translations. I say this because Freud could be quite skeptical about, as well as grateful for, translations of his works. He was especially wary of those who wanted to produce excerpted or simplified versions. Writing to Carl Jung in 1908, he says he would feel differently about this if Dr. A. A. Brill wanted to translate

an entire book.⁴ And indeed, a few years later Brill may have won Freud over with his English *Interpretation of Dreams*.⁵

Freud had different opinions at different times and said many contradictory things to many different people. In 1908 Freud wrote,

Die "Traumdeutung" ist leider unübersetzbar und müsste in jeder Sprache neu gemacht werden, was eine verdienstvolle Aufgabe für einen Englishman abgäbe.

At the moment and in the context of his entire letter, I read this as,

Unfortunately, "The Interpretation of Dreams" is not translatable and would have to be made anew in every language, which might be a worthwhile job for an Englishman.⁶

4. Freud to Jung, letter 70, 17 Feb. 1908, in Freud and Jung 1974, p. 120.

5. Freud 1900, 2-3:104/4:99; n. added 1930a, but compare Freud's letter to S. Lorand in 1928, cited by Gay (1988, p. 465n).

6. Freud used this English word in the same letter to Jung (Freud and Jung 1974, p. 120).

Bruno Bettelheim's *Freud and Man's Soul*

DARIUS GRAY ORNSTON, JR., M.D.

After coming to the United States from Vienna as a young man, Bruno Bettelheim did a series of books on psychoanalytic topics for the general reader. In 1982 he gathered some hitherto scattered criticisms of James Strachey's Standard Edition and added some of his own for a magazine article,¹ which was expanded and made into a book in 1983.

Bettelheim feels that because of his background and education he "is closely acquainted with the language as Freud himself used it" (p. viii). He sets two goals for himself: he intends "to correct the mistranslations of some of the most important psychoanalytic concepts; and to show how deeply humane a person Freud was" (p. xi). He argues that Freud grew away from natural science and should be classified as a "humanist" (pp. 37-49). He believes that Strachey obscured Freud's humanism by translating his vividly descriptive language into medical jargon. Although Bettelheim uses the euphemism "Freud's translators," he says that he means Strachey's Edition (p. 51).

Bettelheim's complaint is nowhere clearer than in his attempt to capture Freud's supple soul.

Translating is dispiriting work, and forcing Freud's easy idiom and animated word play into consistent En-

This book review, written in 1983, was published in the book supplement of the *Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association*, 33 (1985):189-200. I have made minor changes.

1. *New Yorker*, 1 Mar. 1982, pp. 52-93. I published a comparable paper at about the same time (Ornston 1982).

glish phrases is altogether frustrating. Most people who try it become aware that they are rendering poetry in pieces. Gradually they get distracted by their own little piles and then possessed by an irresistible urge to tidy up. The most difficult thing to understand is that word-for-word translation of Freud just does not work.² Although Strachey said that throughout his edition he had followed his own "rule of uniform translation" (1966a, p. xix), he nodded quite often, and this is especially evident in Strachey's selection of technical terms (Ornston 1982). It follows that his reader is dependent on some of Strachey's views and assumptions.

Freud almost always shifts and enriches his way of using any word as soon as one moves a bit farther down the page. He uses the same term in many different ways and a wealth of descriptive language to sketch the same concept. Formal categories usually come unstrung as Freud compels one to think. Furthermore, our names for things in English do not match the informal categories of Freud's everyday German. For example, what are Freud's words for "mind" and "mental"? We could say either that there is no German word for the vague English notion of "mind," or just as correctly put it that there are many distinctly different German words. These all have varying nuances in different contexts and shift from one catch phrase to another. Freud used all of them. Most people do not want to hear that because they want an authoritative and simple answer. Bettelheim has one.

Freud used *die Seele* and its adjective *seelisch* often and in many combinations: Strachey usually translated *die Seele* into "the mind" and *seelisch* into "mental." Bettelheim objects that when Strachey did this he left a profoundly pervasive sense of human unity and continuity behind. So far, Bettelheim is absolutely right. *Die Seele* claims a different domain than the English "mind," and *die Seele* flows from ancient sources. *Die Seele* was an animistic understanding and originally meant "coming from and belonging to a sacred lake or inland sea"—*dem See* (Kluge 1975). Long before the Romans imposed their deadening Latin, everyone knew that *die Seelen*, of the yet unborn and all the dead, dwelt in the water. Freud (1926b) said he liked to use common words for his concepts because they conserve so much human psychology. He was explaining his choice of the word *Seele* to describe his method of therapy when he said that "the words of our everyday speech are nothing other than faded magic"—*die Worte unserer täglichen Reden sind nichts anderes als abgeblasster Zauber* (Freud

2. The new *Oeuvres complètes* directly challenges this "fact" and makes astoundingly few compromises (chap. 8, this vol.).

1905d, 5:289/7:283). A modern German needs no etymology to feel this transcendent constancy of the *Seele*.

However, like many others who have looked into psychoanalytic usage of a term, Bettelheim comes up both exasperated and dogmatically prescriptive. He feels that Strachey cut the soul out of Freud's psychology. This is no metaphor; Bettelheim is quite taken with the "soul" and he wants to put this word for word into—or, as he sees it, back into—both Freud's psychology and psychoanalytic usage.

Bettelheim knows that the German word *Seele* has also evolved and is now somewhat different from its modern English cognate "soul," but he would make them mean the same. I doubt that he will get very far. Although the English "soul" has stayed spiritual, by Freud's time *die Seele* had a scientific use: *Seelenkunde* and *Seelenlehre* meant "psychology." When Freud describes a *Seelentätigkeit*, he surely does not mean "activity of the soul"; I think he means what most of us would call psychological activity.

It is handy to have some grab-bag word for everything human that is not plainly somatic. Both "the mind" and *die Seele* can serve this purpose, but "the mind" frequently has a connotation of cognition and occasional material ambitions which *die Seele* always disdains. A "mental" deficiency means that something is wrong with a person's brain; for example, Americans expect their National Institute of Mental Health to support psychobiology. Even when psychoanalysis was popular, the NIMH was not about to fund what Bettelheim calls the "science of the soul" (p. 75) because that phrase would make no more sense to an American than to an Englishman. In the United States, "soul" is used by some who feel enthusiastic about their own intuition and who experience a compelling commonality. The proudly unreflective and spontaneous sympathy of a "soul brother," however, makes demands that are different from the patient empathy of a therapist (Aring 1958). I think that Freud's down-to-earth and descriptive psychology would sound either deceptively easy or supernatural if it were consistently translated into a psychology of the soul.

I do feel brash writing so cursorily about what these words mean. Probably everybody has a somewhat personal sense of them. Those who spend much time with Freud and Strachey are likely to believe that human beings cast their lives to fit unconscious needs and fantasies; "mind" and "mental" will imply feelings and motives to them. However, British usage is different from American, and "the soul" is only sometimes like *die Seele*. *Die Seele* is steadfastly either spiritual or psychological, like the English word "psyche."

In fact, Freud (1905d) said that he used *Seele* to describe hypnosis

because it was the ordinary German word for the Greek term *psyche*: hypnosis is a psychological way of treating both psychic (*seelische*) and somatic (*körperliche*) symptoms. Strachey was discussing this passage when he said the believed that Freud used *psychisch* and *seelisch* "as precise synonyms" (Strachey 1966a, p. xxiv). In the German dictionary that Bettelheim uses (Duden), *Psychologie* is defined as "die Wissenschaft von den bewussten und unbewussten seelischen Vorgängen," or "the science of conscious and unconscious psychic processes." And "psychic" would even be acceptable to Bettelheim (pp. 11–15, 73–75). In Britain, "psychic" and "psychical" connote a more conventional kind of research than the "parapsychology" studied in the United States. Strachey (1963a) said that he first learned about Freud from a paper Freud (1912) wrote in English for the relatively staid Society for Psychical Research: Freud described "psychical" activity and wrote about the "mind," but he made no mention of the "soul." I think it follows that Freud's words *die Seele* and *seelisch* should have been translated as "the psyche" and "psychic/psychical."

Bettelheim contrasts the adjectives *seelisch* and *geistig*: he says that *geistig* is an exact equivalent of "mental" or "intellectual" (pp. 72, 76–77). Bettelheim must know better. Although *Geist* and the adjective *geistig* often do refer to a person's ability to think, in Freud's work, as in everyday German, they mean much more than that. Freud's language defies the easy separation of thoughts from everything else. He intentionally and thoroughly discredited our vain presumption that we have pure thoughts. We know that we are always swayed by darker reasons, especially when we insist that we are being rational. *Geistig* also means "spiritual," and *der Heilige Geist* is "the Holy Ghost." Mephistopheles calls himself *der Geist der stets verneint*—"the spirit who steadily says no" (Goethe, *Faust* 1:1338). And Bettelheim himself translates *Geisteswissenschaft* as "science of the spirit" (p. 41). When Freud said that the spirit—*der Geist*—of people comes down to their readiness to be remembered and imagined after they are gone, he clearly meant something more than "intellect." But when Bettelheim paraphrased this line, he dropped Freud's word *Geist*: Strachey's translation of *Geist* as "spirit" and *Seele* as "soul" would have contradicted Bettelheim's argument.³ In Freud's spirited discussion of *Seelen* and *Geister* as projected reflections of our psychology, these two words become nearly synonymous. A *Geisteskrankheit* is a mental

3. Freud 1913c, 8:115/13:94. "If anything endures after us, it is other people's memories of us—and what we create" (Bettelheim, p. 77). Bettelheim's treatment of Strachey will trouble a person who knows Strachey's work. Compare, for example, Strachey's reflections on the translation of these words (SE 1:xix, xxiv) with Bettelheim's (pp. 39, 73–75).

illness in Freud's work, not a specifically cognitive dementia. I think that when Freud (1900, 1923a) wanted an explicit word for "intellectual," he used *intellektuell*. This problem requires more thought than Bettelheim allows.

In his own single-minded quest for "the soul," Bettelheim bypasses a different observation that may enable us to find more of Freud's descriptive psychology than what comes through in Strachey's version. Bettelheim complains that Strachey translated *im seelischen Unbewussten* as "in the unconscious mind"; and, in the same sentence, *gewisse Seiten des Seelenlebens* as "certain aspects of the mind" (p. 73). While pounding his point that Freud must have meant "the soul," Bettelheim does not notice that, here and there, Strachey silently bundled dozens of Freud's varied descriptions of unconscious mental activity into his own single term "mind." For example, *Erinnerung* means "memory" and not "mind" (Freud 1936, 6:250/22:239), and *das seelische Unterdrückte* refers to what is psychically suppressed and not to Strachey's "suppressed material in the mind" (Freud 1900, 2-3:613/5:608). Just as Bettelheim would like to do with his own idea of "the soul," Strachey connected Freud's concepts as he understood them by making much of "the mind."

Because Strachey's work is the best we will have for a long time to come, what matters now is how we read and teach his version to people who know little German. We do not yet know if, by writing about "the mind," Strachey changed Freud's theory; but I think we have two points worth bearing in mind. First, Strachey's "mind" and "mental" have a more cognitive ring than most of Freud's words do. And second, Strachey used a very free hand in composing his own conception of "the mind" and what is "mental."

Bettelheim seldom discusses the problems confronting a person who dares to translate Freud. There are always many choices, each of which cuts off some meaning.⁴ Bettelheim makes little of Strachey's substantial annotation, although this would be one way to find out what Strachey took for granted precisely because Strachey tried to be candid about his own beliefs. Naively, he thought that he could withhold his own opinions, "especially on matters of theory" (1966a, pp. xvii, xxv), and therefore he reveals a great deal in his cross-references and in what he chooses to explain.

Bettelheim simply announces his "corrections." When he gives evi-

4. Although Freud sometimes does indeed leave his reader with several legitimate choices, "always" is now an overstatement. In 1983 it seemed true.

dence, it is often idiosyncratic—for example, his selective use of his own versions of myths to justify his constant certainty about “what Freud had in mind.” For Bettelheim, Sophocles’ play is the Oedipus myth, even though Freud’s version became ever more varied and complex.

Bettelheim is better when he is summarizing other people’s work, but even here his memory is his own. Quoting from Walter Schönau’s study of Freud’s style as a writer, Bettelheim translates Hermann Hesse’s description of the exquisite research instrument Freud created—that is, Freud’s “magnificently incisive and precisely defining . . . language”—*prachtvoll scharfe und genau definierende . . . Sprache*. Bettelheim makes this into language that is “beautifully concise and exact in its definitions” (p. 8). This may not look like much of a change, but Bettelheim has turned Hesse’s observation upside down.

Even in translation, Freud’s descriptive and understanding psychology is the bane of those who crave definitions. Freud (1914a, 1915a) thought that his strategy of deferring definitions was essential to psychoanalysis as a descriptive science. He often explained that delineating unconscious activity would be hampered by premature definition of psychoanalytic conceptions—*Auffassungen*—or ways of imagining what we cannot see and do not understand. Freud describes his own conceptions every bit as vividly and variously as when he is sketching a clinical vignette. He keeps his approximations and personified portrayals of unconscious activity flexible by putting them in as many ways as he can. One of the admirable things about Strachey’s edition is that he managed to preserve some of Freud’s rich inconsistency and steady skepticism.

Bettelheim reversed what Hesse had said about Freud’s descriptive method by changing Hesse’s active “defining” into Bettelheim’s own idea of an “exact definition.” No matter how well intended, people who think that they are using Freud’s “definition” of a concept are not to be trusted.

Freud was eighty years old when he analyzed a recurrent memory in an open letter to Romain Rolland, published as “A Memory Disturbance on the Acropolis”—*Eine Erinnerungsstörung auf der Akropolis*. The disturbing event had occurred in 1904, eight years after Freud’s father died and while Freud was still the only psychoanalyst. Freud was forty-eight and his brother ten years younger—Rolland’s age, as Freud says. They had been unable to discuss their feelings at that time, but as he and his brother actually stood on the Acropolis, Freud felt estrangement—*Entfremdung*. Freud reasons that he must have felt that this thrill was “too good to be true” and that he did not deserve such grace. At the time,

he had been unable to recognize even his own incredulity, let alone his unconscious guilt. Reaching out to Rolland, Freud says that he had suddenly felt so distant from his own past and cut off from both his brother and their poor uneducated father, to whom Athens could not have meant very much. Freud analyzed his own estrangement as a feeling that he had overreached himself and was lost.

Freud chose the verb *stören*, which is very much like the English word "disturb," to describe how he had felt about what he now regards as a stirring of piety—*Regung der P i e t ä t*. He is old, says Freud, cannot travel, and himself needs forbearance—*Nachsicht*; it is no surprise that the remembrance of this event so often "comes home to me"—*mich heimsucht*. Strachey made this "troubled me," and Bettelheim insists that Freud meant beatifically "visited." Both are probably true, and Bettelheim's point would be trivial if he did not carry on about Strachey's choice as a "mistranslation." Bettelheim's own dictionary would support Strachey's choice. A *Heimsuchung* may be an unpleasantly intrusive thought or any natural disaster. William Niederland (1969) read Freud to mean "torment" or "torture" in this passage, and a few years earlier Freud had used the same word unambiguously to mean being raided by the enemy (1930a, p. 429). Bettelheim does not mention this. His evidence is, typically, his own interesting associations. Bettelheim says that Freud used *heimsuchen* to allude to the Catholic holiday still observed in Vienna that celebrates the Virgin Mary's learning that she was carrying Jesus—*die Maria Heimsuchung*. Bettelheim insists that he knows "what Freud had in mind" because he too grew up in Vienna.

I think Bettelheim's stance is clear. He infers that what he judges to be defective, inadequate, blatant, gobbledygook, clumsy, slipshod, grievous, coarse, and perversions of the original is intentional.⁵ "There really was no reason—apart from a wish to interpret psychoanalysis as a medical specialty—for this corruption of Freud's references to the soul" (p. 76). I wonder if Bettelheim is aware how harsh and offensive these words sound. He repeats his charges quite often, and perhaps he explains. Bettelheim is angry because membership in the American Psychoanalytic Association has been controlled by and restricted to physicians (pp. 33–34). Of course, Freud consistently argued that this was a mistake. My own sympathies are with Freud and Bettelheim on this issue,⁶ but that

5. These words are all Bettelheim's.

6. In 1982 the battle between lay analysts and the American Psychoanalytic Association was just heating up again.

does not bear on the translation of the Standard Edition. Bettelheim mixes this old quarrel into his assessment of Strachey's work. He clearly suggests that the two most eminent lay analysts of all time, James Strachey and Anna Freud (pp. viii, 51), both of whom were loyal to Freud to a fault, connived with the Americans against Freud's (1926b) explicit arguments. Motivated by a "deliberate wish to perceive Freud within the framework of medicine" (p. 32), they systematically "replaced words in ordinary use with medical terms and learned borrowings from the Greek and Latin" (p. 51). This intrigue has been protected for many years by the Freud family and their publishers (pp. viii, 50).

Bettelheim is intemperate. He says that Freud's concepts "were translated not into English but into a language whose most familiar use today may be for writing prescriptions" (p. 53). Bettelheim must know that there are very few analysts who could write out a simple sentence in Latin, let alone a whole prescription; and psychoanalysts are as confused by their own technical language as everybody else is. But Bettelheim is again half right; Strachey did consciously strain for classical wording. When Freud described a thoroughly moistened—*durchfeuchtetes*—genital, Strachey had it "humected" (1914a, 10:150/14:84). Dora's *zweiblättriges Täschchen*—that is, two-leaved, or, knowing how Freud felt about her, "double-bladed"—little purse was for Strachey "her reticule which came apart at the top in the usual way" (1905a, 5:239/7:77). Strachey is often coy or precious where Freud is clear and straightforward. "Scotophilia" may have been a blunder, but then "Greek terminology was all the rage," said Strachey (1963, p. 229). Freud's plain German is much like Anglo-Saxon English, but Strachey (1966a) was striving to make Freud's candid observations and intentionally evocative conceptions nice enough for his fellow Victorians. So Bettelheim's secondary point about Strachey's Greek and Latin is valid: "Freud's choice of words and his direct style serve the purpose of making the reader apply psychoanalytic insights to himself, because only from his inner experience can he fully understand what Freud was writing about"; and "the original gives us a clear sense of the emotion that was involved, and the translation does not. [Strachey's] penchant for understatement . . . weakens Freud's meaning beyond recognition and deprives his statements of their emotional impact" (pp. 7, 81). Bettelheim's examples are fair, and anyone can quickly find many more.

Bettelheim's description of Freud's terms *Ich*, *Es*, and *Über-Ich* is clear, although I think his source does this better (Brandt 1961, 1966). Bettelheim objects to Strachey's terms "ego," "id," and "super-ego," of course, and says that "where Freud selected a word that, used in daily parlance,

makes us feel vibrantly alive, the translations present us with a term from a dead language that reeks of erudition precisely when it should emanate vitality" (p. 55). That is well said and very true, but it is not clear what we can do after we appreciate the difference. I doubt that "the I," "the It," and "the above-I" will catch on, which is a shame because these plain English words are much more like Freud's own.

On the other hand, Bettelheim's idiosyncratic version of Freud's theory will mislead anyone who is not already well versed. He mistakes *das Ich* for the "reasonable, conscious aspects of our mind" (p. 55) and views *das Es* as the "term for the unconscious" (pp. 57, 76). Freud (1923a) went to some trouble to get past this misconception and to show that the most complicated of our regrettably characteristic and frustrating activities can be performed flawlessly while altogether unconsciously. In Freud's theory, *das Ich* may dither helplessly while *das Es* murmurs, blurts, or surges and saves the day. Many of us look to our "it" for essential delights, but the unconscious remains "a cauldron" for Bettelheim (p. 17).

As he did while in blind pursuit of "the soul," Bettelheim distorts Strachey's translating and misses a useful point. Bettelheim insists that *das Ich* should be "the I" (p. 61), but he does not mention that in the passage he is disputing, Strachey used just that term. Quite uncharacteristically, Strachey even gave Freud's own words in square brackets. Bettelheim ignores Strachey's notes and is again unfair.

Bettelheim also misses more valid criticisms that might bolster his case, but not his quarrel. Strachey usually took it upon himself to divide Freud's single word *das Ich* into either "the self" or "the ego." Strachey does this within a single paragraph and gives no warning that he is breaking up Freud's term. Here Bettelheim missed a clear difference between Freud's loosely unified theory of *das Ich* and Strachey's own interest in structural distinctions between "the I," "the self," and "the ego."

Strachey inadvertently isolated Freud from science by exaggerating Freud's originality. Bettelheim would do the same (p. 87) although *das Ich* and *das Es* were not original with Freud (p. 53). He chose to develop the psychological language that was already familiar to his colleagues and would be readily understood by his readers. Bettelheim even credits Freud with the field of developmental psychology and attacks Dr. Benjamin Spock for plagiarizing and trivializing Freud's ideas (pp. 18-20): here I think the link is supposed to be something like permissiveness. In the heat of the moment, Bettelheim says that Freud did not value "adaptation or adjustment to the requirements of society" (pp. 40, 107).

Bettelheim ignores Freud's good-humored discussion of this problem in the fifth and final of his 1910 lectures to an American audience, which Bettelheim alludes to as he inveighs against misunderstanding Freud. I think that Spock and Bettelheim had a common end in view: they both tried to make more psychoanalytic thinking available to a general audience.

In that same set of lectures, Freud (1910b) sometimes described an *Einfall*, which is the everyday word for what suddenly "falls in" to one's mind, as a *freien Einfall* and also as a *freie Assoziation*. Bettelheim, however, declares "free association" to be "incorrect" (Mahony 1979a).

Writing in English, Freud distinguished "a feeling of repulsion" from unconscious "repression" (1912, pp. 264–65), and he may have suggested the English word "repression" for the traditional German psychological *Verdrängung* (Jones 1959, p. 169). However, Bettelheim is so sure about what "Freud had intended" that he would make *Verdrängung* into "repulsion" (p. 94).

Similarly, Bettelheim would translate *Trieb* as either "impulse" or "drive" (pp. 104–05). Both of these English words are more like Freud's choice than Strachey's "instinct," but that is now well understood, and "drive" is in common use. Bettelheim does not mention that when Freud (1900, 1913c) wanted to refer to an "impulse" he used the word *Impuls*.

On the other hand, Bettelheim's discussion of Strachey's artificial word "parapraxis" is well informed. Bettelheim recommends "faulty achievement" (p. 87) for Freud's characteristically descriptive term *Fehlleistung*. Of course, Freud preferred many precise and varied descriptions rather than any one technical term, and I think that the need for any special word is mooted now by general acceptance of the doctrine of absolute overdetermination. If we do have a use for a loose rubric, then "slips" is one clear and common word. "Slips" is what Strachey (1966a, p. xvii) and Riviere called their own mistakes as well as Freud's (1959, p. 30n).

Bettelheim may not be aware that some of his views are unusual. He declares, for example, that Freud modeled his style on Goethe (pp. 9, 64), although Freud had said that his conscious and deliberate model was G. E. Lessing (Schönau 1968), and we still know little about Freud's sources. Similarly, and without any evidence, Bettelheim pronounces the earlier translations of Freud "inferior" to Strachey's (p. 51), although many of us find that Joan Riviere and Cecil Baines, among a host of other translators, brought over more of Freud's clinical immediacy, especially in the theoretical papers. Bettelheim often offers neither sources nor

evidence, just as he fails to distinguish his own opinions from "what Freud had in mind."

Where Freud tries to understand, Bettelheim thinks in old-fashioned terms of good and evil. Bettelheim's view of "the soul" is that it embodies what "is most spiritual and worthy in man . . . that which is most valuable in man while he is alive" (pp. 76-77). In contrast, Bettelheim's "narcissism" is nothing but "destructive" (pp. 15, 101-03): he ignores Freud's (1914a) careful description of narcissism as ubiquitous and necessary to loving. Bettelheim also believes that "the death drive" explains both the Nazi era and the suicides of affluent American adolescents, but he does not say how (p. 107).

Bettelheim's verve is engaging, but he has tried to do too much in this small book. He does not approach either of his own goals: if his "corrections" are taken as enriching alternatives to Strachey's wording, then some of them are useful; but I think he adds little to the common sense of Freud as "deeply humane" or to the chronic debate about what kind of scientist Freud was. Bettelheim's essay reads more like an occasional notebook or a personal memoir than a careful study of these problems.

Bettelheim sidesteps a troublesome question: although Freud died long before Strachey's Edition began to come out, Strachey had begun publishing Freud's work in English twenty years earlier, and Freud's English was good. If what Bettelheim says was true, why did Freud himself not object?

Bettelheim needs forbearance because he spins a mingled yarn; some good ideas get fluffed in bombast or tangled in bitterness. Although Bettelheim is plainly as indebted to Strachey as are the rest of us, he is quite high-handed about Strachey's massive scholarship and very readable accomplishment. Because Bettelheim's knowledge of Freud's work is spotty, because his own citations are incredibly scant, and because he provides no table of contents and no chapter headings, no index and no bibliography, a serious student would have a lot of trouble using this book.

I have said Strachey's translation will be the standard English Edition for a long time to come. Thoughtful readers will continue to publish criticism and commentary. And readers with a knowledge of classical German science and literature will surely find much to enrich our reading. Gradually we will be able to see the mistakes that are inevitable in any long translation.

Strachey's consistent trends will be more useful than single slips. We are beginning to sort out the beliefs that led Strachey to translate Freud

as he did. When he was aware of his own assumptions, Strachey said a lot about what he thought was important. We do need spade work and clear hypotheses about what changes Strachey tended to make in Freud's work. These patterns must be carefully documented so that other scholars can test and improve them. For the same reason, any term worth translating differently must be completely indexed. And in this way we will prepare the ground for a revised English edition.

A Historical-Critical Edition

ALEX HOLDER

I am one of those who have argued for a new English translation of Freud's works on several occasions. Here I shall mainly discuss three issues that must be considered and resolved before alternatives to Strachey's Standard Edition can be envisaged.

WHAT FREUD ACTUALLY WROTE

This is not as strange a topic as it may at first appear, because there are so very few properly edited Freud texts to date. These include Elza Hawelka's (1974) publication of the complete notes on the case history of the Rat Man and the exemplary edition by Ilse Grubrich-Simitis (1985) of Freud's draft for his metapsychological paper on the transference neuroses, with the facsimile printed on opposite pages, followed by generous annotation. In her introductory note, Grubrich-Simitis draws attention to Freud's frequent abbreviations, especially of word endings. For the sake of readability, these abbreviations have been resolved in the edited version, except in cases of uncertainty, which are indicated by square brackets. Brackets are also used to indicate words added by the editor to aid comprehension. Referring to counter-cathexis, for example, Freud wrote

Inner sichert sie Vdgg entsp Anteil des Vbw.

which would be translated literally as,

It always secures repression corr part of the Pcs.

The meaning of this telegraphic sentence is made clearer in the edited version, which reads

Immer sichert sie [der] Verdrängung [den] entsp[rechenden] Anteil des Vbw.

or,

It always secures the corresponding part of the Pcs. for repression.

The editorial emendations are immediately apparent and leave open the possibility of agreement, disagreement, or uncertainty (Freud 1985, pp. 18, 67).

The edited version also includes many footnotes which call attention to words in the original that could not be deciphered with certainty, to single letters or words crossed out by Freud in the original and replaced by others, to obvious mistakes in Freud's handwritten texts which have been amended, to words added by Freud in the margin without clear indication of where in the text they are to be inserted, and to explanatory notes about sentences whose meaning is unclear for one reason or another. For example, Freud wrote:

Unsere Aufgabe wäre natürlich sehr erleichtert, wenn uns die Entwicklungsgeschichte des Ichs anderswoher gegeben wäre, die Neurosen zu verstehen, anstatt dass wir jetzt umgekehrt verfahren müssen.

Our task would obviously be very simplified if the developmental history of the ego were provided for us elsewhere to understand the neuroses instead of having to proceed in the opposite direction.

In her editorial comment Grubrich-Simitis points out that it was Freud's custom to add parts of sentences subsequently and to indicate by means of a sign where the added part ought to be inserted in the text. This was probably the case with "to understand the neuroses" above, although he may have omitted the sign because this manuscript was not meant for the printer. The sentence would make more sense if it read:

Our task of understanding the neuroses would obviously be very simplified if the developmental history of the ego were provided for us elsewhere instead of our having to proceed in the opposite direction.

As this stands, Freud says that we draw inferences about the developmental history of the ego from the study of the neuroses (p. 71).

Such editions make us painfully aware of the need for comparable editions of Freud's work in German, based on the original manuscripts. Only such editions would enable us to know where there are uncer-

ainties in deciphering Freud's handwriting and where editorial changes or inferences have been made. Grubrich-Simitis (1989, p. 789 n. 40) distinguishes three types.¹ Reading editions simply introduce a text or make it more widely known with minimum commentary. Critical editions are meant to serve as a basis for teaching and research. Scientific introductions, appendices, and annotations construe the development of a given text, explain allusions, and inform the reader with cross-references to other works by the same author, to intellectual currents of his time, and so on. Critical editions may consist of a single publication or larger sections of a person's work. Historical-critical editions use a critical apparatus to integrate the complete works left by an author. They take into consideration all works—including handwritten manuscripts, sketches, and demonstrable variants from different editions—as well as collected letters, diaries, memoranda, lecture series, formal discussions, and any other available evidence about the author's life. In this classification, editions published during the author's lifetime without editorial commentary by another person would be reading editions; the Standard Edition would be a critical edition; and I think the quality of scholarship in Grubrich-Simitis's own editions of Freud's work meet most of her criteria for what we should expect in an eventual historical-critical edition.² By her definition, however, such an edition must include the author's complete works.

Strachey himself lamented the unsatisfactory nature of the German texts he was using for his translations. In his preface to the Standard Edition, he wrote: "The translations in this edition are in general based on the last German editions published in Freud's lifetime. One of my main difficulties, however, has been the unsatisfactory nature of the German texts. The original publications, brought out under Freud's immediate supervision, are as a rule trustworthy; but, as time went on and responsibility was delegated to other hands, errors began to creep in." Nevertheless, Strachey rarely bothered to consult the existing manuscripts. He himself states: "From 1908 onwards Freud preserved his manuscripts; but in the case of works published in his lifetime I have

1. Grubrich-Simitis emphasizes that original manuscripts are the most valid texts only when final proofs were read by Freud himself. Often he left this chore to others. She is preparing a much more detailed consideration of an eventual and essential historical-critical edition in Freud's own language. [D.G.O.—This study is scheduled to appear in the German journal *Psyche* some time in 1992 and is referred to in our references as "in preparation."]

2. D.G.O.—See also: the revised edition of Freud's (1925a) *Selbstdarstellung*, ed. Ilse Grubrich-Simitis, 1971; the relatively complete edition of Freud's (1986) letters to Fliess; the *Nachtragsband*, the supplemental volume to Freud's (1987) *Gesammelte Werke*; and the facsimile edition of Freud's (1913e) *Das Motiv der Kästchenwahl*, ed. Ilse Grubrich-Simitis, 1977.

not consulted them except in a few cases of doubt. Where writings have been published posthumously the position is different, and, in a few instances, especially in the case of the *Project* . . . the translation has been made direct from the photostat of the manuscript" (Strachey 1966a, p. xv).

It would seem that at least a complete and critical German edition of Freud's publications along the lines of Grubrich-Simitis's exemplary work is necessary before we can make any serious new attempt to translate Freud into English or any other language. To take the *Gesammelte Werke* or any other editions published during Freud's lifetime—and even more, those published after his death—as a basis for a translation is bound to perpetuate errors.

Grubrich-Simitis has also pointed out that Freud made changes in the substance and style of his works right up until publication.³ Therefore, the latest editions of those works actually revised by him, rather than the manuscripts, ought to be considered the definitive texts. Nevertheless, it seems to me that a careful record of the changes Freud made, starting from the original manuscript and ending in a first, second, or later edition, would be most revealing and of inestimable value for future scholars. In some instances, however, the printer's proofs corrected by Freud are no longer available, so we cannot be absolutely certain that the printed version of the text fully reflects Freud's intentions.

WHAT FREUD MAY HAVE MEANT

Freud's writing style—which Patrick Mahony has described as a "multitrack stereophonic expression" (1986, p. 222)—makes it difficult to grasp all the implications at first acquaintance. It is indeed like listening to Bach's music: at each reading one discovers new things. It is hard to convey this style in a brief example because it generally spans a succession of paragraphs or even entire works. Nevertheless, I shall quote one paragraph near the beginning of Freud's (1914a) "On Narcissism: An Introduction."

Ein dritter Zufluss zu dieser, wie ich meine, legitimen Weiterbildung der Libidotheorie ergibt sich aus unseren Beobachtungen und Auf-

3. Grubrich-Simitis, in a paper presented at the Thirty-fifth Congress of the International Psychoanalytical Association, Montreal, 1987.

fassungen des Seelenlebens von Kindern und von primitiven Völkern. Wir finden bei diesen letzteren Züge, welche, wenn sie vereinzelt wären, dem Grössenwahn zugerechnet werden könnten, eine Überschätzung der Macht ihrer Wünsche und psychischen Akte, die "Allmacht der Gedanken," einen Glauben an die Zauberkraft der Worte, eine Technik gegen die Aussenwelt, die "Magie," welche als konsequente Anwendung dieser grössensüchtigen Voraussetzungen erscheint.⁴ Wir erwarten eine ganz analoge Einstellung zur Aussenwelt beim Kinde unserer Zeit, dessen Entwicklung für uns weit undurchsichtiger ist.⁵ Wir bilden so die Vorstellung einer ursprünglichen Libidobesetzung des Ichs, von der später an die Objekte abgegeben wird, die aber, im Grunde genommen, verbleibt und sich zu den Objektbesetzungen verhält wie der Körper eines Protoplasmatierchens zu den von ihm ausgeschickten Pseudopodien. Dieses Stück der Libidounterbringung musste für unsere von den neurotischen Symptomen ausgehende Forschung zunächst verdeckt bleiben. Die Emanationen dieser Libido, die Objektbesetzungen, die ausgeschickt und wieder zurückgezogen werden können, wurden uns allein auffällig. Wir sehen auch im groben einen Gegensatz zwischen der Ichlibido und der Objektlibido. Je mehr die eine verbraucht, desto mehr verarmt die andere. Als die höchste Entwicklungsphase, zu der es die letztere bringt, erscheint uns der Zustand der Verliebtheit, der sich uns wie ein Aufgeben der eigenen Persönlichkeit gegen die Objektbesetzung darstellt und seinen Gegensatz in der Phantasie (oder Selbstwahrnehmung) der Paranoiker vom Weltuntergang findet.⁶ Endlich folgern wir für die Unterscheidung der psychischen Energien, dass sie zunächst im Zustande des Narzissmus beisammen und für unsere grobe Analyse ununterscheidbar sind, und dass es erst mit der Objektbesetzung möglich wird, eine Sexualenergie, die Libido, von einer Energie der Ichtriebe zu unterscheiden. (pp. 140–41)

Strachey's translation of this paragraph reads as follows:

4. Freud's (1913c) footnote, a cross-reference to his book *Totem und Tabu*. [D.G.O.—All notes in this chapter are in a single sequential series that includes Freud's notes, Strachey's translations and notes, my notes, and notes added by the editor.]

5. Freud's footnote, a reference to Ferenczi's "Developmental Stages in the Sense of Reality."

6. Freud's footnote: "Es gibt zwei Mechanismen dieses Weltunterganges, wenn alle Libidobesetzung auf das geliebte Objekt abströmt, und wenn alle in das Ich zurückfliesst." See note 11 below for Strachey's translation.

This extension of the libido theory—in my opinion a legitimate one—receives reinforcement from a third quarter, namely, from our observations and views on the mental life of children and primitive peoples. In the latter we find characteristics which, if they occurred singly, might be put down to megalomania: an over-estimation of the power of their wishes and mental acts, the “omnipotence of thoughts,” a belief in the thaumaturgic force of words, and a technique for dealing with the external world—“magic”—which appears to be a logical application of these grandiose premises.⁷ In the children of today, whose development is much more obscure to us, we expect to find an exactly analogous attitude towards the external world.⁸ Thus we form the idea of there being an original libidinal cathexis of the ego, from which some is later given off to objects, but which fundamentally persists and is related to the object-cathexes much as the body of an amoeba is related to the pseudopodia which it puts out.⁹ In our researches, taking, as they did, neurotic symptoms for their starting-point, this part of the allocation of libido necessarily remained hidden from us at the outset. All that we noticed were the emanations of this libido—the object-cathexes, which can be sent out and drawn back again. We see also, broadly speaking, an antithesis between ego-libido and object-libido.¹⁰ The more of the one is employed, the more the other becomes depleted. The highest phase of development of which object-libido is capable is seen in the state of being in love, when the subject seems to give up his own personality in favour of an object-cathexis; while we have the opposite condition in the paranoid's phantasy (or self-perception) of the “end of the world.”¹¹ Finally, as regards the differentiation of psychical energies, we are led to the conclusion that to begin with, during the state of narcissism, they exist together and that our analysis is too coarse

7. Freud's footnote, retained in Strachey's translation.

8. Freud's footnote, retained in Strachey's translation.

9. This is Strachey's footnote about Freud's use of similar analogies elsewhere and Strachey's reference to his own belief that Freud's use of the term *das Ich* was imprecise at first but took on “a very much more definite and narrow meaning” in his later writings (Strachey 1957, p. 71).

10. Strachey's footnote, in which he states that Freud drew this distinction here for the first time.

11. Strachey's translation of Freud's footnote (see note 6 above): “There are two mechanisms of this ‘end of the world’ idea: in the one case, the whole libidinal cathexis flows off to the loved object; in the other, it all flows back into the ego.” Strachey adds a cross-reference to Freud's discussion of Schreber's “Memoirs” and to a paper by Abraham on sexual differences between hysteria and dementia praecox.

to distinguish between them; not until there is object-cathexis is it possible to discriminate a sexual energy—the libido—from an energy of the ego-instincts.¹² (pp. 75–76)

In this passage, Freud compresses an extraordinary number of ideas into a single paragraph, first in the form of related or similar themes (the comparison between the self-centered, magical thinking and beliefs of primitive peoples and small children); then in the form of presenting an abstract notion (the transformation of ego-libido into object-libido and its possible retransformation) in the concrete picture of an amoeba that puts out pseudopodia and then withdraws them; and finally in the form of a counterpoint, when he contrasts the state of being in love with the “end of the world” fantasy of a paranoid person. At a different, deeper level the picture of the body of an amoeba extending its pseudopodia into another substance (object) is suggestive of the interpenetration of two bodies in sexual interaction. One might also say that after raising the subject of the magical thinking of primitive people and children, Freud introduces his own bit of magic in comparing human object relationships and sexual life to the functioning of a primitive organism such as an amoeba.

That paragraph also builds bridges from intrapsychic functioning (primitive, magical thinking and narcissistic investment of the self at the beginning of life) to interpersonal functioning (being in love, relating to others) and from normal developmental phenomena (primary narcissism, magic-omnipotent thinking in early childhood) to pathological phenomena (neurotic symptoms, paranoid fantasies).

It is difficult, of course, to convey to readers who are not fluent in both German and English where something may be lost in Strachey’s translation. The first sentence is a single breath in the original. Strachey’s apposition between dashes cuts it into two. The original starts off with *inem dritten Zufluss*, which conjures up an image of powerful converging streams. Is any of this suggestive quality left in Strachey’s “receives reinforcement from a third quarter”?

I wonder how many readers of Strachey’s translation will have to turn to a dictionary to look up the meaning of “thaumaturgic.” No German reader will have any problems with *Zauber*, a common word linked with magic and magicians. One wonders, indeed, why Strachey did not opt for “magic force” to render Freud’s *Zauberkraft*. To me,

12. Strachey’s footnote. In it, he refers to his own account of the development of Freud’s views on the instincts, which Strachey discussed in his Editor’s Note to his translation of “Instincts and Their Vicissitudes” (SE 14:111–16).

“thaumaturgic” is a foreign body, a wrong note disturbing the polyphony.

There is at least one sentence in this paragraph where Strachey's translation subtly changes the meaning of Freud's original. Referring to ego-libido and object-libido, Freud states literally that “the more the one uses up, the more the other gets impoverished.” Strachey makes Freud logically consistent: “The more of the one is employed, the more the other becomes depleted.” The phrase that follows—*Als die höchste Entwicklungsphase* (“the highest phase of development”)—is a good example of how Strachey's translation not only alters the rhythm of the original but also states as a fact (“is seen”) what Freud puts as a possibility (*erscheint uns*, “appears to us”), not to mention his deletion of the more direct and personal *uns* in the original. The polyphony of Freud's style is precisely what gives his writings a suggestive richness of ideas and unconscious implications. In the original German, this polyphony may be a problem for a reader who is trying to grasp Freud's meaning at different levels and who arrives at his own understanding according to his knowledge and sensitivity to more hidden and unconscious implications. It may also be a problem for an editor who is trying to shed light on obscure passages in the original. But in critical editions these problems should not arise because such editions leave the reader free to agree or disagree with the editor's view.

Let me give another example from the recent edition of Freud's (1985) draft on the transference neuroses. In the section dealing with regression, we come across the following sentence:

In der Tat fällt hier erster Schritt der Abwehr der Regression zu, wo es sich mehr um Regression als auf Entwicklungshemmung handelt.
(p. 69)

Indeed, here the first step of the defense falls to regression, where it is more a case of regression than on developmental inhibition.

As it stands, Freud's preposition *auf* (“on”) obviously does not make sense. The editor therefore rightly draws attention to the “dark” second part of the sentence and suggests that it might make more sense if the sequence of the words were altered as follows:

wo es sich um mehr als Regression auf Entwicklungshemmung handelt.

where it is more than a case of regression to developmental inhibition.

From the context, one might equally argue that Freud is juxtaposing regression and developmental inhibition and that he mistakenly wrote *auf* instead of *um*, so that this part of the sentence could be read to mean: “where it is more a case of regression than of developmental inhibition.”¹³

Most of Freud’s readers are probably not interested in these fine points, especially about passages that are somewhat obscure and ambiguous. Many really do prefer to be told how “things are.” Therefore I think that the so-called reading editions of Freud’s works will continue to be produced and will serve a useful purpose in disseminating Freud’s ideas. Freud scholarship, on the other hand, will eventually need a German edition that is as “critical” as it can be.

A translator of Freud has an infinitely more difficult task in trying to retain some of the suggestive richness of the original. Often one must decide how to understand or interpret certain terms, sentences, or passages before being able to translate them as faithfully as possible. We know that Strachey made many “interpretations” of this kind, but there have been repeated questions concerning how idiosyncratic or tendentious these were and how much of the richness and ambiguity of the original were lost in the process, especially in those instances where he willfully decided to omit or add words (Ornston 1982, p. 414).

To illustrate this point I shall cite a few examples, all taken from Strachey’s translation of Freud’s “Die Verdrängung” (“Repression”; 1915b, 10:248/14:146). In the first paragraph Freud’s *Triebregung* becomes “instinctual impulse.” Strachey’s choice of “instinct” for *Trieb* is in the nature of an interpretation, and moreover, a misleading one. The choice of “impulse” for *Regung* is also open to question because “impulse” conveys something much more definite and peremptory than *Regung*,

13. In a personal letter to me (1987), Ilse Grubrich-Simitis comments on this argument as follows: “Indeed, at first I also understood this passage as you did—at a first glance this sounds logical and obvious. But if one considers the context, one notices that in sections c, e, and f Freud nowhere really juxtaposes regression and developmental inhibition but rather sees them as a sequence. Thus he emphasizes among other things that: ‘the problems of fixation and disposition are hidden behind regression’ and in ‘The Disposition to Obsessional Neurosis’ (1913d) we read: ‘our dispositions are therefore developmental inhibitions.’ In the passage discussed by us Freud starts to describe a defensive process which does not end with regression, so to speak, but involves a further step, namely ‘the regressive libidinal organisation is only then subjected to a typical repression.’ In this sense he describes an instance ‘where it is more than a case of regression to developmental inhibition,’ i.e., regression plus subsequent repression. It seems to me that the uncertainty is ultimately due to the fact that fixation and developmental inhibition are not always clearly differentiated” (my translation).

which literally means a “stirring.” One may say, for example, that “something is stirring in my mind” (Ornston 1982, pp. 413–14).

At the beginning of the second paragraph Freud speaks of “Die Möglichkeit einer Verdrängung.” The literal translation would be, “the possibility of a repression.” Strachey has it as, “the possibility of such a thing as repression.” His addition of these three words (“such a thing”) gives the English text a reification that does not exist in the German original. In the third paragraph Freud refers to ein Organ (“an organ”), which Strachey makes into “some bodily organ.” Neither his choice of “some” for ein nor his addition of “bodily” seems warranted.

In the same paragraph Freud speaks very simply and actively of “wir ... empfinden” (“we ... experience or sense”): Strachey’s version (“is experienced by us”) changes the meaning in the direction of something endured more passively. At the end of the same paragraph we come across the word psychisch. Was Strachey justified in using several terms with very different connotations to translate *Psyche*? Does this not amount to an interpretation of Freud’s text? (The translation of these two words was discussed in chapter 4.)

These few examples illustrate “deviations” from the German original that can be found in almost every paragraph of Strachey’s translation. Many are minor and do not distort the text, but others are significant.

I think that a new translation, analogous to a historical-critical German edition, must include copious commentaries on passages that present difficulties in translation, possibly with the original text and alternative readings. This would be a safeguard against presenting the reader with a translation that does not draw attention to problematic issues. It would also ensure that one be able to make up one’s own mind about which reading—or readings—makes the most sense, especially if one knows some German.

With reference to Strachey’s translation, Patrick Mahony has pointed out that “time and time again he silently embellishes and even tidies up the ideas in the original German. . . . Surely Freud can stand on his own, his foibles included; his stature does not require distorting idealizations, even if they be hidden in translation” (1984a, p. 848).

WHAT WE CAN LEARN FROM STRACHEY’S TRANSLATION

I was born and grew up in Switzerland, learned German as a second language in early childhood, and it was the language I was taught in school. I began to read Freud in the original German, as contained in the *Gesammelte Werke*. But when I moved to London at the end of the

1950s to undergo psychoanalytic training, the Standard Edition became my daily bread.

I found Strachey very clear, his language elegant, his commentaries illuminating, and his cross-references most helpful. Only where his translation did not seem clear to me did I go back to the original for enlightenment. I did not do this often because I took it for granted that Strachey's Freud was as good as Freud himself. Why should I have had any doubts when Anna Freud, at whose clinic I was studying and working, fully endorsed the Standard Edition? Perhaps it is no coincidence that the criticisms of this translation gained so much momentum after her death in 1982.

I think that one of the apparent merits of Strachey's translation is its presentation of a streamlined Freud—Freud shorn of the polyphony of his style, of the ambiguities, uncertainties, and imaginative ponderings that are so characteristic of the original. This may make for more coherence and ease of understanding, but it presses Freud into a peculiar scientific framework, the historical reasons for which Riccardo Steiner (1987) has begun to elucidate and document.

Among the relevant points in an exhaustive paper, Steiner raises "the question of just what role other translators played, from the 1920s onwards if not before, in the early phases of building up what, many years later, would become the Standard Edition" (p. 39). He refers to Joan Riviere and Ernest Jones in particular. He also makes the important point that James Strachey was a member of an institution, so that his "personal interest as translator was concurrent with a public, professional role" (p. 40). Therefore, he believes that the role of the Institute of Psycho-Analysis in the production of the translation, especially in the linguistic choices, has to be taken into account. Steiner quotes from a key letter written by Jones in September 1939, in which he invites Strachey to translate the *Gesammelte Schriften* into English in order to "secure a definitive edition for generations to come: if it is done after our time, it can never be done so well" (p. 42, italics added by Steiner). He then shows the enormous influence Jones had on the Standard Edition, especially in the translation of technical terms and the "reduction of the mental to biological terms" (p. 53). As Steiner notes, "Jones's anti-metaphysical education . . . played a vital role in the interpretation he was subsequently to give Freud, and in the way he would eventually translate him" (p. 54).

When Jones, Brill, and Freud met in 1908, they talked about translation (p. 57), and Freud chose the two as translators (p. 59). "However, wherever possible, Brill and Jones (in particular) opted for a procedure of

assimilation, Latinizing and Graecizing Freud's text to an enormous extent" (p. 80). Steiner concludes that "these first attempts to translate Freud were caught up in the dawning need to institutionalize psychoanalysis and the organs of its administration outside Austro-Hungarian borders and the importance of Jones's role in instrumentalizing these emerges quite clearly even at that early date" (p. 84, italics omitted). In fact, Steiner believes that "the translation done by Brill and Jones increased very significantly the 'scientificity' of Freud's [own] language at that time" (p. 90), thus introducing an element quite foreign to the original.¹⁴

The losses entailed in this way of translating Freud are too great because the liberties Strachey took in his style, his choice of terms, and his omissions were too extensive. This is again the fundamental problem for any translator: whether to produce as literal a translation as possible or to opt for a "poetic" translation. The latter solution will almost certainly sound better and be more readable, but the inherent danger is that it may depart so far from the original text that some nuances and implications are lost.

A literal translation, on the other hand, may be more successful in retaining the meaning of the original, though at the expense of style and readability. As an example, here are the first three paragraphs from Freud's (1915b) paper on repression, followed by Strachey's translation and then by my literal version.

Es kann das Schicksal einer Triebregung werden, dass sie auf Widerstände stösst, welche sie unwirksam machen wollen. Unter Bedingungen, deren nähere Untersuchung uns bevorsteht, gelangt sie dann in den Zustand der Verdrängung. Handelte es sich um die Wirkung eines äusseren Reizes, so wäre offenbar die Flucht das geeignete Mittel. Im Falle des Triebes kann die Flucht nichts nützen, denn das Ich kann sich nicht selbst entfliehen. Später einmal wird in der Urteilsverwerfung (*V e r u r t e i l u n g*) ein gutes Mittel gegen die Triebregung gefunden werden. Eine Vorstufe der Verurteilung, ein Mittelding zwischen Flucht und Verurteilung ist die Verdrängung, deren Begriff in der Zeit vor den psychoanalytischen Studien nicht aufgestellt werden konnte.

Die Möglichkeit einer Verdrängung ist theoretisch nicht leicht abzuleiten. Warum sollte eine Triebregung einem solchen Schicksal

14. D.G.O.—Steiner believes that Brill and Jones influenced Freud's language, that is, Freud's selection of German terms, but he provides no evidence.

verfallen? Offenbar muss hier die Bedingung erfüllt sein, dass die Erreichung des Triebzieles Unlust an Stelle von Lust bereitet. Aber dieser Fall ist nicht gut denkbar. Solche Triebe gibt es nicht, eine Triebbefriedigung ist immer lustvoll. Es müssten besondere Verhältnisse anzunehmen sein, irgend ein Vorgang, durch den die Befriedigungslust in Unlust verwandelt wird.

Wir können zur besseren Abgrenzung der Verdrängung einige andere Triebssituationen in Erörterung ziehen. Es kann vorkommen, dass sich ein äusserer Reiz, z. B. dadurch, dass er ein Organ anätzt und zerstört, verinnerlicht und so eine neue Quelle beständiger Erregung und Spannungsvermehrung ergibt. Er erwirbt damit eine weitgehende Ähnlichkeit mit einem Trieb. Wir wissen, dass wir diesen Fall als Schmerz empfinden. Das Ziel dieses Pseudotriebes ist aber nur das Aufhören der Organveränderung und der mit ihr verbundenen Unlust. Andere, direkte Lust kann aus dem Aufhören des Schmerzes nicht gewonnen werden. Der Schmerz ist auch imperativ; er unterliegt nur noch der Einwirkung einer toxischen Aufhebung und der Beeinflussung durch psychische Ablenkung. (Freud 1915b, 10:248–49)

After one reads through that passage, the virtue if not the classical beauty of Strachey's accomplishment may be clearer.

One of the vicissitudes an instinctual impulse may undergo is to meet with resistances which seek to make it inoperative. Under certain conditions, which we shall presently investigate more closely, the impulse then passes into the state of "repression" [Verdrängung]. If what was in question was the operation of an external stimulus, the appropriate method to adopt would obviously be flight; with an instinct, flight is of no avail, for the ego cannot escape from itself. At some later period, rejection based on judgment (condemnation) will be found to be a good method to adopt against an instinctual impulse. Repression is a preliminary stage of condemnation, something between flight and condemnation; it is a concept which could not have been formulated before the time of psychoanalytic studies.

It is not easy in theory to deduce the possibility of such a thing as repression. Why should an instinctual impulse undergo a vicissitude like this? A necessary condition of its happening must clearly be that the instinct's attainment of its aim should produce unpleasure instead of pleasure. But we cannot well imagine such a contingency. There are no such instincts; satisfaction of an instinct is

always pleasurable. We should have to assume certain peculiar circumstances, some sort of process by which the pleasure of satisfaction is changed into unpleasure.

In order the better to delimit repression, let us discuss some other instinctual situations. It may happen that an external stimulus becomes internalized—for example, by eating into and destroying some bodily organ—so that a new source of constant excitation and increase of tension arises. The stimulus thereby acquires a far-reaching similarity to an instinct. We know that a case of this sort is experienced as pain. The aim of this pseudo-instinct, however, is simply the cessation of the change in the organ and of the unpleasure accompanying it. There is no other direct pleasure to be attained by cessation of pain. Further, pain is imperative; the only things to which it can yield are removal by some toxic agent or the influence of mental distraction. (SE 14:146)

A literal translation will sound relatively rough and still must compromise certain German terms and concepts for which there are no English equivalents.¹⁵

It may be the fate of a drive urge to meet with resistances that attempt to render it ineffective. Under certain conditions, which still require more precise investigation, it enters into the state of repression. Were we dealing with the impact of an external stimulus, flight would obviously be the appropriate remedy. In the case of a drive, flight is of no avail since the self cannot take flight from itself. At a later time a good remedy against the drive urge will be found by way of rejection through judgment (*condemnation*). A pre-stage of condemnation, something between flight and condemnation, is repression, a concept that could not have been postulated at a time prior to psychoanalytic studies.

The possibility of repression is not easy to deduce theoretically. Why should any drive urge suffer such a fate? The condition which must evidently be met here is that the attainment of the drive aim produces unpleasure in the place of pleasure, but it is not easy to think of such a case. There are no such drives: a drive satisfaction is always pleasurable. One would have to assume special circumstances, some sort of process through which the pleasure of satisfaction gets transformed into unpleasure.

15. D.G.O.—One of Strachey's (1966a, p. xix) examples of this problem is his choice of "unpleasure" for *Unlust* and "pain" for *Schmerz* (Grossman and Ornston 1986).

We can consider a few other drive situations in order to better delimit repression. It may happen that an external stimulus gets internalized, for instance by way of eating into or destroying an organ, and thus it becomes a new source of permanent excitation and increasing tension. In this way it acquires a far-reaching similarity to a drive. We know that we experience this case as pain but the sole aim of this pseudo-drive is the cessation of organ change and the pleasure connected with it. Any other direct pleasure cannot be gained from the cessation of pain. Pain is also imperative: it will yield only to a toxic suspension and the influence of psychic distraction.

Strachey discussed the translator's dilemma in his preface to the Standard Edition:

In considering a revised translation of Freud, the primary aim was bound to be the rendering of his meaning with the greatest possible accuracy. But another, and perhaps more difficult problem could not be evaded: the problem of style. The literary merits of Freud's writing cannot possibly be dismissed. . . . These merits could scarcely be expected to survive translation, but some effort had to be made in that direction. . . . If I turn now to the primary question of the correct rendering of Freud's meaning, I must come into conflict with what I have just said. For wherever Freud becomes difficult or obscure it is necessary to move closer to a literal translation at the cost of any stylistic elegance. For the same reason, too, it is necessary to swallow whole into the translation quite a number of technical terms, stereotyped phrases and neologisms which cannot with the best will in the world be regarded as "English." (Strachey 1966a, pp. xviii-xix)

To find a happy medium between the literal and the poetic approach, between "accuracy" and "stylistic elegance," appears to be a nearly impossible task, especially if one also wishes to convey something of the inherent rhythm, processive method, and improvisational qualities of the original. Freud was a great master of this, as Patrick Mahony (1984a, 1987a) in particular has shown. This first dilemma refers to the grand design of any translation.

Lewis Brandt (1966) noted that "Freud's English translators have rather consistently replaced affect-laden German terms by neutral English words and dynamic, active constructions by static, more passive ones.

In this way, something Freud described as a process became in the English translation a structure" (p. 50).

W. H. Gillespie (personal communication) gave the following examples of Strachey's shifts from active to passive processes and remoteness, all taken from "A Child Is Being Beaten" (Freud 1919a):

Man musste die Frage aufwerfen (Freud, 12:199)
the question was bound to arise (Strachey, 17:180)
one had to raise the question (literally)

man konnte nicht sagen, warum (Freud, p. 201)
it was impossible to say why (Strachey, p. 182)
one could not say why (literally)

aber man konnte ihre Bedeutung darin suchen (Freud, p. 201)
it was possible, however, to look for their significance in the
fact that (Strachey, p. 182)
however, one could look for their significance in (literally)

man darf in dieser Statistik keine Enttäuschung erblicken
(Freud, p. 201)
there is no need for feeling disappointed over these statistics
(Strachey, p. 182)
one should not regard these statistics as a disappointment
(literally)

Man möchte brauchbare Erfolge in kürzester Zeit und mit
geringerer Mühe erzielen (Freud, p. 202)
it would be desirable to obtain practical results in a shorter
period and with less trouble (Strachey, p. 183)
one would like to obtain usable successes in a shorter time and
with less effort (literally).

The point here is that Freud is more forceful than Strachey.

Then there is the matter of the wide variety of words Freud used to convey similar content while expressing shades of meaning. Should a translation try to retain this richness as much as possible or reduce it to a common denominator, as was often Strachey's practice? For instance, the German equivalents of the verbs "to correspond," "to render," "to represent," "to describe," and "to put" were at once reduced to a single word, "to represent," in Strachey's translation (Ornston 1982, p. 416). Darius Ornston (1985a) has drawn attention to many other examples of Strachey's condensing the variety and richness of Freud's expressions

through his choice of a single term; the English word “discharge,” for example, stands for at least nine different words in Freud’s original.¹⁶ Perhaps the clearest example comes from Freud’s paper on constructions, in which he variously refers to “the analysand,” “the individual,” “the patient,” “the point,” “the content,” and “the theme,” all of which became “the subject” in the Standard Edition, a term that Freud himself does not employ at all in this short paper (Ornston 1988), although in many other contexts he places great importance on the distinction between *Subjekt* and *Objekt*.

It seems to me that Strachey’s attempts at unification—if not to say superimposition—lead to far greater losses than gains. They also entail a form of “interpretation” that distorts the original.

This applies even more when Strachey does the opposite—that is, when he interprets a word used by Freud in different ways, depending on the context. I mentioned earlier Freud’s word *Regung* (literally, “stirring”) and its verbal form *regen*. Where Freud uses this noun in the context of drives, Strachey’s choice is “impulse”; where Freud uses the same word with reference to patients, it becomes “excitement”; when he speaks of a *Regung* in the reader, Strachey makes it “expectation”; and when the analyst has a *Regung*, this is turned into a reflective “suspicion” (Ornston 1982, pp. 413–14). I think these are examples of a misguided attempt to introduce variety where Freud not only refrained from suggesting qualitative differences but also implied a connection, if not some meaning in common. With reference to such changes Ornston writes:

In Freud’s portrayals the analyst is a person working with another “person” to bring the past alive in order to try to understand. Freud developed “a radically new definition of the doctor and patient relationship” (Grubrich-Simitis, 1971 p. 9). Because he saw their psychological processes as the same, Freud chose to use the same words to describe them. Strachey did not see this. Therefore, and silently, Strachey separates Freud’s choice of the same words to describe the psychology of both analyst and patient. He does this all the time. (Ornston 1988, p. 206)

The use of technical terms is a controversial subject. It is much easier to criticize Strachey’s choices than to come up with more acceptable terms. For instance, Brandt’s suggestions for alternative translations

16. Abfließen, ableiten, entladen, entlasten, abführen, abstossen, ablaufen, abströmen, and verlaufen.

(1961, p. 333; 1977, p. 1047) drew the rebuttal that it was really immaterial whether the Standard Edition contained some unfortunate or misleading terms because we were by now all used to the terms chosen by Strachey.

The choice of "mind" for *Seele* and of "ego," "id," and "superego" for *Ich*, *Es*, and *Überich* are adequately discussed in other chapters of this book, although I would emphasize that there is a dilemma in any translation of *das Ich*. Unlike *das Es* and *das Überich*, which Freud introduced as concepts only in 1923, *das Ich* made its appearance in Freud's earliest publications. Therefore, it has different meanings or connotations in Freud's writings at different times. In some of Freud's (1894, 1896b) earliest works the term is used in a way that is much closer to the meaning Freud emphasized in 1923, and occasionally he continued to use *das Ich* to refer to "the self" throughout his works.

"Cathexis" is one of the more extreme examples of Jones's "classical nomenclature" and could be replaced, as could the word "instinct," without major problems. This might make it possible to approximate Freud's German more closely. For example, a different term than "cathexis" could reestablish the now-lost links between *Besetzung* (literally, "occupation") and Freud's favorite and often-used metaphor about advancing and retreating troops in discussing libidinal progressions or processes of regression and fixation. Nevertheless, the choice of a more satisfactory term is problematic. "Investment" was used by Joan Riviere, but this word has unfortunate financial connotations that are absent from the German *Besetzung*. "Occupation," the literal translation, does not seem satisfactory either because it may connote a profession or a job. At least in one context Freud's own preference was "interest" (Freud to Jones, letter, 20 Nov. 1908; quoted in Gay 1988, p. 465n).

A solution that might be worth considering in this and similarly problematic instances would be to retain certain German terms in the English translation. After all, every language borrows and then appropriates words from other languages because there is no adequate equivalent. In German, for instance, we use words and expressions like "stress," "puzzle," "feedback," and "point of no return" quite freely. Conversely, in English we find *leitmotiv*, *weltschmerz*, *gestalt*, and *sturm und drang*. Why not stick to *Besetzung* and *besetzt* in an English version, with an extensive explanatory note somewhere in the commentary? Ornston (1985a) has drawn attention to Strachey's bold vow to "fall back on square brackets and footnotes, for we are bound by the fundamental rule: Freud, the whole of Freud and nothing but Freud." However,

“there are very few square brackets in Strachey’s polished text” because, in Ornston’s view, “Strachey could only have kept that promise if he had realized he was making constant changes and innumerable insertions” (pp. 379–80).

Trieb frequently appears in compound forms: *Triebregung* (literally, “drive urge”), *Triebmischung* (“drive fusion”), *Triebentmischung* (“drive defusion”), *Lebenstrieb* (“life drive”), *Todestrieb* (“death drive”), *Triebabfuhr* (“drive discharge”), *Triebstauung* (“drive congestion”), and many more. “Instinct” is a rather unfortunate choice for *Trieb*, notwithstanding Strachey’s attempt to justify it. In his “Notes on Some Technical Terms” he objects to translating *Trieb* as “drive” because this “is not an English word,” because it has many different meanings, because Freud used *Trieb* in different ways, and because of “the impossibility of finding an adjectival form for ‘drive.’” Strachey concludes that “the only rational thing to do in such a case seems to me to be to choose an obviously vague and indeterminate word and stick to it.” He dismisses “the only slight complication”—namely, the fact that “in some half-dozen instances Freud himself uses the German *Instinkt*, always, perhaps, in the sense of instinct in animals” (Strachey 1966a, pp. xxiv–xxvi).

Indeed, studying the few places where Freud himself used the terms *Instinkt* or *instinktiv* leaves no doubt that he made a clear and decisive distinction between *Instinkt* and *Trieb*. In his paper on “The Unconscious,” for instance, he writes:

Den Inhalt des Ubw kann man einer psychischen Urbevölkerung vergleichen. Wenn es beim Menschen ererbte psychische Bildungen, etwas dem Instinkt der Tiere Analoges gibt, so macht dies den Kern des Ubw aus. Dazu kommt später das während der Kindheitsentwicklung als unbrauchbar Beseitigte hinzu, was seiner Natur nach von dem Ererbten nicht verschieden zu sein braucht. (GW 10:294)

The content of the Ucs. may be compared with an aboriginal population in the mind. If inherited mental formations exist in the human being—something analogous to instinct in animals—these constitute the nucleus of the Ucs. Later there is added to them what is discarded from childhood development as unserviceable; and this need not differ in its nature from what is inherited. (SE 14:195)

And in “The Question of Lay Analysis,” Freud (1926b) remarks with some pride that the German language possesses such a term as *Trieb*, a word “for which we are envied by many modern languages” (14:227/20:200).

In each of Freud's few references to *Instinkte* he links them to phenomena that can be observed in the animal world. If there were anything comparable to them in man, one would have to think in terms of "inherited psychic constellations." *Triebe*, on the other hand, are to be understood provisionally as the psychic representatives of endosomatic, continuously flowing sources of stimulation, a concept lying on the frontier between the mental and the physical. Whereas *Triebe* may be regarded "as a measure of the demand made upon the mind [*das Seelenleben*, or 'psychic life'] for work" and their source seen in an excitatory process with "the immediate aim" being the lifting "of this organic stimulus" (Freud 1905c, 5:67/7:167), *Instinkte* are characterized neither by continuous internal excitation nor by demands made upon the psychic apparatus. Their chief aim seems to reside in preservation of the self or the species rather than in the elimination of an organic excitation. The peremptory quality of drives and their constant endeavor to find channels for discharge are other characteristics which, for Freud, differentiate them from instincts (Holder 1970).

Jean Laplanche and J.-B. Pontalis, in *The Language of Psychoanalysis*, also drew attention to the distinction Freud made between *Instinkte* and *Triebe* and the misunderstandings that may arise from using the same term ("instinct") to render both in translation:

Thus Freud makes use of two terms that it is quite possible to contrast with each other.... The distinction has hardly ever been drawn in the psychoanalytic literature, however, especially since "instinct" is used to translate both words. There is consequently a risk that the Freudian theory of the instincts may be confused with the psychological conceptions of animal instinct, and the unique aspects of Freud's approach may be blurred, particularly the thesis of the relatively undetermined nature of the motive force in question, and the notions of contingency of object and variability of aim. (1973, pp. 214-15)

As Laplanche and Pontalis point out, an "instinct" is "a hereditary behavior pattern peculiar to an animal species, varying little from one member of the species to another and unfolding in accordance with a temporal scheme which is generally resistant to change and apparently geared to a purpose" (p. 214). This lack of variability among individual expressions of an *Instinkt* is crucial because variation of expression from individual to individual is one of the hallmarks of a *Trieb*. I think this is one reason Freud chose to speak of *Lebenstrieb* and *Todestrieb* rather than of *Lebensinstinkt* and *Todesinstinkt*. This distinction is particularly important

when one comes across passages in Freud's writings that may sound as if he were writing about an *Instinkt* when he uses the word *Trieb*, as he does in "Beyond the Pleasure Principle" (1920, 13:38–39/18:36–38) and in his "New Introductory Lectures" (1933, 15:113/22:106). In both of these works and in the context of his theory of the death drive Freud addresses the conservative nature of drives and their being subject to the compulsion to repeat. Indeed, in these passages the distinction between drives and instincts is blurred even in the German original. This is apparent, for instance, in the following passage from the "New Introductory Lectures":

Die Laichwanderungen der Fische, vielleicht die Vögel Flüge, möglicherweise alles, was wir bei den Tieren als Instinktäußerung bezeichnen, erfolgt unter dem Gebot des Wiederholungszwangs, der die konservative Natur der Triebe zum Ausdruck bringt. (1933, 15:113)

The spawning migrations of fishes, the migratory flights of birds, and possibly all that we describe as manifestations of instinct in animals take place under the orders of the compulsion to repeat, which expresses the conservative nature of the instincts. (22:106)

Freud is comparing certain characteristics of drives similar to instinctive behavior patterns found in the animal world. This does not invalidate the distinction he made between instincts and drives. Strachey's translation of *Trieb* into "instinct" further obscures a distinction that may already be difficult to grasp in Freud's own wording. Strachey does indicate in a footnote whenever an English "instinct" corresponds to *Instinkt* in the original, but this by no means undoes the confusion.

If an English term for *Trieb* has to be chosen, rather than retaining the German term in the translation, then "drive" is certainly preferable to "instinct," for the reasons just outlined. During recent years "instinctual drive" seems to have been widely accepted as a compromise.¹⁷

I have tried to show that the lack of a historical-critical edition of Freud's works in German is a serious drawback for any attempt at an

17. D.G.O.—However, Strachey dismissed "instinctual drive" as a translation even of *Triebregung* because this "is a mistranslation as well as a surrender" (Strachey 1966a, 1:xxvi). Jones (1955a, p. 317) did consider "the more colloquial and expressive American 'drive'" but ended up, as always, in apparent agreement with Strachey. Since Strachey's time, "drive" has naturalized itself and become a plain English word, if it was not one before. Surprisingly, Strachey's intentionally peculiar word "cathexis" also has been absorbed into the newspapers and dictionaries (Ornston 1985b).

adequately accurate translation. On the other hand, some editions are beginning to appear that do meet stringent scholarly demands and therefore could serve as a basis for a new English translation. I have also tried to confirm the hypothesis that Strachey's translation introduces a number of more or less serious deviations from the original which, in their cumulative effect, distort not only what Freud was conveying but even more how he did it. We are beginning to understand why the English Freud sounds so very different from the German Freud.

Alternatives to a Standard Edition

DARIUS GRAY ORNSTON, JR., M.D.

As Helmut Junker and Alex Holder have shown, translating Freud would be intimidating even if there were a domestic critical apparatus to work from. Until recently, however, only a few German scholars (Schönau 1968; Pörksen 1973) had investigated Freud's versatile prose. Ilse Grubrich-Simitis has described some of the factors that explain why the Standard Edition was so fatefully put together in the wrong language. That decision made sense in Europe during and after World War II, although Freud's German editors were as aware as anyone of what James Strachey described as an absurd paradox—that is, "for a couple of unknown English people to set themselves up as editors of a German classic" (Grubrich-Simitis 1989, pp. 894, 896 n. 96).

In the late 1960s Alexander Mitscherlich began to form a team to produce a historical-critical edition of Freud's complete works in German. That earnest effort failed because no one of Strachey's stature was available to lead the project through many years of arduous work and because Freud's heirs refused open access to Freud's papers (p. 900).

Therefore, for a student or practitioner the best edition so far is probably the teaching edition, or the *Studienausgabe*. This ten-volume set is useful because the editors took their texts from the *Collected Works*—*Gesammelte Werke*—and translated much of Strachey's thoughtful, though occasionally tendentious, annotation into German. Furthermore, the *Studienausgabe*, recently revised by Grubrich-Simitis, costs about one-quarter the price of the *Gesammelte Werke*.

Each volume of the *Gesammelte Werke* does contain a

bibliography of German editions and translations published before the war but gives no information about what else Freud was writing at the same time, where Freud developed an idea he mentioned only in passing, or what parts Freud added later on. The Standard Edition does attempt to do this and places his works in chronological order—but with several major exceptions, because “Freud’s writings would not fit comfortably into categories, and strict chronology meant interrupting close sequences in his ideas.” Strachey’s order is based mostly on the date of composition, which occasionally differs markedly from the year of publication, although he usually gives his best estimate of both dates (Strachey 1966a, p. xiv). Although Strachey’s extensive notes have turned out to be incomplete and now seem heavily slanted to sustain his own metapsychological views, we have had few critical alternatives with which to compare them.¹

Both the Index Volume of the Standard Edition and the German General Index to the *Gesammelte Werke*, the *Gesamtregister* (vol. 18), were finished after Strachey died. The *Gesamtregister* is far more diverse and therefore much more useful than the narrow and overly predictable categories Strachey selected for his indexes.² Although each volume of the *Studienausgabe* contains a superior index, there is no general index to this edition; some people therefore buy the *Gesamtregister* separately for this purpose.

Both the *Gesammelte Werke* and the Standard Edition contain almost everything Freud published after his *Studies on Hysteria* in 1895, but the Supplemental Volume—*Nachtragsband*—to the *Gesammelte Werke*, published in 1987, surpasses the current English edition in relative completeness and quality of annotation.

The editors of the *Studienausgabe* chose to keep the price down by leaving out Freud’s less popular works as well as books that were readily available in paperback.³ Although for many years it has been an easy custom in many languages, including German, to swallow Strachey’s

1. Another reader’s edition equipped with commentaries and cross-references is the *Werkausgabe* (Freud 1978), two volumes of selected papers, with chapters and excerpts edited by Anna Freud and Ilse Grubrich-Simitis.

2. Although shortly before he died in 1967 Strachey had a hand in choosing and correcting the indexes for the Standard Edition, which were published in 1974, he was unable to consider the more thoroughly cross-indexed and useful categories of the *Gesamtregister*, published by Lilla Veszy-Wagner in 1968. Strachey’s stalwart aide, Angela Richards Harris, finished Strachey’s indexing (Richards 1974).

3. *Studien über Hysterie* (Breuer and Freud 1895), *Zur Psychopathologie des Alltagslebens* (1901), *Selbstdarstellung* (1925a), and the *Abriss der Psychoanalyse* (1940a). For more detail see Grubrich-Simitis (1989), the English translation of which will soon appear in the *International Review of Psychoanalysis*.

editorial apparatus and commentaries whole, without considering alternative readings, the editors of the *Studienausgabe* did quietly drop some of Strachey's farfetched references to preanalytic works that Freud had disavowed (see chap. 9, this vol.).

Both major German editions have the advantage that they consist for the most part of Freud's own wording, although modern scholars will insist on a variorum transcription from the original manuscript whenever it can be found. A variorum will account for all Freud's manuscripts and "should furnish a thorough bibliographical description of all source texts, identify where they are to be found, reproduce all textual revisions and variants, and justify final textual choices" (Mahony 1984a, p. 850; compare Strachey 1953, pp. xx-xxi, Grubrich-Simitis 1989, and Fichtner 1986, 1989). Again, this will be quite costly.

There may not seem to be much point in publishing the same primary German transcription from Freud's rapid and scratchy "running hand"—*Kurrentschrift*—more than once. Even the most careful transcriptions, however, contain a bit of interpretation and therefore leave room for disagreement about what Freud actually wrote. As Holder discussed in chapter 5, at times Freud worked almost as quickly as he spoke, using many idiosyncratic abbreviations and even a telegraphic shorthand for intimate correspondents like Sándor Ferenczi and Wilhelm Fliess (Jones 1957, vol. 3, p. 130; Strachey 1966b; Grubrich-Simitis 1985; Fichtner 1986; Mahony 1987b). Concerned about Freud's dignity, a few loyalists polished his prose and expurgated his letters and other documents that they saw as unseemly, but we have no way of knowing how much of this is trivial. Strachey, for example, said that he had "silently corrected" some of Freud's slips, underlinings, and mistakes (McGuire 1974; Strachey 1966b; Mahony 1989c). Therefore, the more critical versions and annotated translations, the better.

None of the three major editions includes much of Freud's correspondence, although his copious letters are an essential record for understanding how he worked and what he was trying to do. From what we have been allowed to see of Freud's letters so far, we know that they are one way of learning how Freud understood scientific method and which scientific conventions he thought he could take for granted. These letters reveal him consciously developing a unique style, tell us something about his all-important views of language and translation, and exemplify his ever-shifting intentions as well as his opinions of his various works at one time or another. Some are even drafts of later papers (Freud 1986).

Our limited access to Freud's papers also means that his biographies

are distorted. Although Siegfried Bernfeld did not live to complete his own book, he hoped that there would be many scholarly biographies of Freud—"the more the better" (Grubrich-Simitis 1981, p. 41). We know that Jones gave Bernfeld very little credit either for his own liberal use of Bernfeld's published as well as unpublished contributions or for Bernfeld's detailed suggestions for Jones's biography of Freud. Bernfeld had many misgivings about the final version of Jones's three-volume work (p. 43n).

Freud's (1891) book on the aphasias is the most obvious example of a basic text that Freud himself decided to exclude from his collected psychoanalytic publications.⁴ Mark Solms is preparing an English edition of *The Complete Neuroscientific Works of Sigmund Freud* in four volumes. He will include all Freud's published preanalytic writings, supported by a small selection of previously unpublished material. Solms will do the English translations and entirely revise English versions already in existence. These volumes will be issued as a supplement to the psychological Standard Edition, as it were, a "standard edition" of Freud's neuroscientific writings. By including extensive editorial commentary on the biographical context of the individual works, their neuroscientific merit, their historical importance, and the implications for psychoanalysis, Solms intends to bring us a step closer to the ideal of a "complete" edition of Freud's works. The publishers feel that these volumes should not only be read as a supplement to the psychological works; they should also stand in their own right. There will therefore be some overlap with the existing Standard Edition. The *Neuroscientific Works* will be completed first in English, although negotiations are under way for editions in German and other languages (Solms, personal communication).

As of this writing the British Institute of Psycho-Analysis plans to preserve its entire Standard Edition as "a second edition," including new translations of the psychoanalytic papers that are now available only in the *Gesammelte Werke*. Their editors will correct misprints, but only those outright errors noted either by Strachey himself (SE 24:407-68) or by Angela Richards Harris in her unpublished notes. In widened page margins they will probably print some forty of Freud's German words as they occur in his own text, referring the reader to a glossary in which they will discuss key points and provide their "preferred translation" for those choices of Strachey's that have drawn the most criticism. They

4. Freud's explicit wish was that all of his preanalytic works be excluded from his *Gesammelte Werke* (A. Freud 1952, p. vi).

have put off actually revising Strachey's translation because they believe his text cannot be tampered with (Malcolm Pines, Clifford Yorke, personal communications).

Daniel Lagache (1967) accredited a few hundred international terms among the modern schools of psychoanalysis, and the European Psychoanalytical Federation is working with a list of some 430 words that it intends as close "equivalents" in German, English, and French (*Instinkt* = "instinct" = *instinct*, while *Trieb* = "drive" = *pulsion*). Although most of these terms appear to be consensually acceptable, the editor of this glossary, Joseph Sandler, has repeated Jones's warning that such lists are meant to serve only as reference points for professional translators and are not intended for scientific use—that is, a person searching for the "right word" in another language—as if Freud's resourceful German had simple equivalents—would be mistaken.

On the other hand, the French team that is currently producing the *Oeuvres complètes* estimates that Freud may have created and used several hundred terms. Their German-French glossary of important nontechnical terms contains more than five thousand words in each language.

English paperback editions of Freud's works vary because they were derived from several different clothbound translations. The Norton paperbacks reproduce much of Strachey's Standard Edition and have been reissued with a capsule biography of Freud and a few lines by Peter Gay to supplement Strachey's introductions. The recently published Penguin paperbacks contain edited versions of the Standard Edition, including unspecified "corrections . . . and some new material." We have not been told if, let alone how, any of those changes matter (Dickson 1985, p. 7). Both of these series are organized thematically rather than chronologically. Copyright licenses, which amount to a marketing agreement, prevent the sale of the Penguin edition in the United States. Both the Norton and the Penguin volumes are crunched into smaller pages than Strachey's edition, and of course the page numbers are different from Strachey's—a major drawback if one tries to use these as classroom texts. Of all the English paperbacks so far, only the Basic Books reproduction of Strachey's *The Interpretation of Dreams* has full-size working margins and page numbers that correspond to the fourth and fifth volumes of the Standard Edition.

Along the same lines, Fischer Verlag plans to publish about thirty paperbacks in German, with new introductions by well-known analysts, historians, and other scholars. Although these books are to be relatively inexpensive, they will be printed in large type and on full-size pages (Grubrich-Simitis, personal communication).

In short, we do not have anything like a complete or reliable edition of Freud's published works in any language. Systematic comparisons of major editions in various languages have barely begun, although Inga Villarreal provides a nice example of this kind of work (see chap. 7, this vol.). Volumes designed for students are not uniform because they come from various parent editions. Paperback agreements and sales turf are hotly defended because publishers make their money by selling lots of books.

"A SINGLE HAND"

As soon as Freud died, Jones began to mobilize for a definitive English edition. Until we have reviewed Freud's copious correspondence with his many translators, we can only wonder whether he was able to temper Jones's grand ambition. Although they had once agreed that premature definitions of evolving conceptions would be a drawback to any descriptive science, differences of opinion about the translation of terms, as well as tactics and timing, became a nasty struggle for political power.⁵

Strachey said that for the sake of terminologic uniformity and stylistic elegance, he had reshaped some of the earlier English translations so that most of the Standard Edition would come out in "a single hand." Although acknowledging that many of these earlier versions were "excellent in themselves," he said that uniformity was preferred.⁶ He never said by whom or why. Strachey had been translating Freud since 1920; after the war he closed his practice and devoted the rest of his life to the Standard Edition. He went blind and then died while trying to finish the index volume (Grinstein 1967, p. 372; A. Freud 1974; A. Richards 1974; Ornston 1985a, p. 405; Grubrich-Simitis 1987a, 1989). Strachey did not have time to study Freud's manuscripts or to begin to trace his ideas and allusions back to their sources.

The Stracheys apparently agreed that Freud was "excruciating" to translate because his abstract variations were difficult to understand and also because they believed that Freud must be made to come across as "awe-

5. Freud 1914b, 1915a, 1925a; Jones 1924; Ornston 1985b, 1988; Steiner 1987 (pp. 42-43, 59, 62), 1988a, 1988b; Freud-Jones, in preparation. I thank Mark Paterson, Esq., of the Sigmund Freud Archives, Ltd., for permission to read the *Rundbriefe*, which is in their collection.

6. Strachey 1966a, pp. xviii-xix. As we learn more about the production of Strachey's translation, this increasingly appears to have been a team effort involving a series of competent English and American translators whose work Strachey was able to use as drafts. He usually acknowledges this on the first page of his editorial introduction to a given essay or book.

some" (Strachey and Strachey 1985, p. 271). In chapter 5, Holder reviewed the way they resolved some of these problems by collecting, combining, and uniformly translating what they regarded as Freud's technical terms and scattering his uses of the same words in a given context when they decided that these words were no longer technical. I believe that they succeeded all too well in this—perhaps unconscious—simplification. They also used the translator's trick of slipping into a style that is just a bit out of date (Savory 1968). This furthers the comforting illusion that one is actually communing with Freud and studying a genuine "classic" instead of perplexedly trailing along behind a foreign interpreter.

Of course, the disadvantage of a single voice is that a standard nomenclature suppresses alternative readings because that is what it is meant to do. Lewis Thomas was referring to any scientific enterprise, not specifically translation, when he wrote: "You cannot make choices in this matter, selecting things you think you're going to like and shutting off the lines that make for discomfort. You either have science or you do not" (Thomas 1978, p. 1462).

Scientific development dries up without open discussion about various ways of putting things, and centralized power risks everything on the chance that the few people it is entrusted to will encourage the balanced presentation of views with which they disagree; that is, the editors must be prudent and fair as well as productive.

The Stracheys were tirelessly devoted to their Freud edition, and in a very difficult situation, they got the job done. Unfortunately, they kept most of their disagreements about various English alternatives for Freud's language to themselves. Like most human virtues, discretion has its drawbacks; in this case, it perpetuates the illusion of a complete and uniformly valid translation.

The Committee

Although Ernest Jones did invite the Stracheys and Joan Riviere to meet with him as a Glossary Committee, we know next to nothing about their deliberations. All we have to go on so far is their published glossary (Jones, 1924, revised by Alix Strachey in 1943) and some of the Stracheys' (1985) letters, which reveal a few disagreements.

Once that has been said, one should know that a vigorous public debate about any scientific or literary work in progress is disruptive and time-consuming. It is indeed "easier for eight or nine elderly men to feel their way towards unanimity if they are not compelled to conduct

their converging maneuvers under the microscopes and telescopes of the press, but are permitted to shuffle about a little in slippers.”⁷

It is hard enough for ordinary people to change their minds in private; once an authority has taken a public stance, it may seem humiliating or impossible to step back into a compromise, perhaps especially for one’s favorite technical terms. As we saw earlier, Jones believed that his uniform and international glossary would be free of emotional connotations and would therefore make it easier to confine a term to one definite meaning. He thought that contrived words could escape the kind of personal associations inevitable in any spoken language. Meanwhile, there has been much discussion of such terms, and few would maintain that they are neutral now—if they ever were (Ornston 1988).

Of course, there are many ways to avoid both the single-mindedness of a secretive editorial authority and the discord of a broadly informed but unruly and open committee. Remember that Freud never attempted a textbook, let alone a systematic or standard presentation. Instead, he often shaped a piece to fit the needs of a more or less specific audience and occasion, while letting many obscurities and outright contradictions lie where they fell (Strachey 1963c, p. 6; Hale 1971b; Mahony 1987a, pp. 118–19, 170). Therefore, editing Freud’s pliable wording is a little like editing a book on a set of common problems, with parts written by different authors who come from different disciplines at different times with different contexts and purposes—even different languages—in mind. The brave new French edition that is now being produced through a system of committees may turn out to be a successful example of creative synthesis between wise leaders and a wide-ranging team.

This kind of collaborative tension is nothing new. The publication of Albert Einstein’s papers, for example, was delayed for years by his executor’s insistence that “the breadth of interests reflected in Einstein’s writing was too great to be dealt with successfully by a single editor.” Although the publisher won in court, the editor of the first volume was so exhausted by his administrative and fund-raising chores that he immediately resigned to “a secondary position in the project” (Walsh 1988, p. 278).

7. H. A. L. Fisher 1921, via W. C. DeVries, “The Physician, the Media, and the ‘Spectacular’ Case,” *J. Amer. Medical Assn.* 259(1988):887. Dr. William DeVries, a highly publicized heart-transplant surgeon, cited Fisher’s remark about another bold failure, the League of Nations, in describing the difficulties suffered by surgeons who live at the cutting edge because they are not trained and prepared to deal with the press. Perhaps some covenants cannot be openly arrived at? Cf. La-planche, Cotet, and Bourguignon: “once our choice is made, we spare the reader our inner debates and trust him to follow us” (chap. 8, pp. 145, this vol.). These French authors do provide their rationale, that is, a summary of their discussions that they composed after making most of their decisions.

I have compared several available editions of Freud's psychoanalytic publications in German and in English, discussed advantages and hindrances in both private and public decisions that may encumber any committee, and finally, touched on the problem of psychoanalytic authority—to which I shall return. I believe that a canny and judicious editor can meld and mold the somewhat contradictory work of many scholars or translators into a single voice (as Strachey usually did) and at the same time clarify alternatives and explain uncertainties (as Strachey usually did not do).

The Right Word

Some people talk about revising Strachey's edition for "accuracy," as if we merely had to find Strachey's mistakes and plug in the right words. Strachey dryly described this vanity, so common among Anglo-Americans—"they seemed to think that if they could be told the 'right' translation the meaning would automatically be conveyed to them"—but there are many who still assume that to get Freud across all one needs to do is find the correct and equivalent term in a standard German-English dictionary (Strachey to Jones, letter, 27 Nov. 1921, in Ornston 1985b).

The German Gambit

In stark contrast to the many diffident Austrians and Germans who accepted or privately and courteously countered the judgments of Jones's Glossary Committee, we all know people whose mother tongue may, or may not, be German and who are quite ready to say "what Freud meant" right off the tops of their heads. They should know better. The crucial distinction here is between scholars who make it clear that they are offering alternative interpretations in a given context and those who present their views as simple matters of fact. As the British Institute of Psycho-Analysis begins to correct some of the actual and factual errors in their Standard Edition, the editors must seize this opportunity to show us what choices they have discerned and how they have reasoned.

The Anglo-American variant of the German gambit is to invoke the names and favorite technical terms of one's teachers or personal therapists. Some can trace their lineage back to one of the fabled Austrians, and until recently the peculiar genealogies and metapsychological litanies of the early years prevailed. Even experienced clinicians would translate their own observations and feelings into a bewildering "formulation," rit-

ualistically larded with tendentious quotations often taken out of context from the Standard Edition. In some circles this sort of presentation was regarded as well grounded scientifically, if not profound.

During World War II German psychoanalysis was badly misunderstood by the Nazis and therefore briefly exploited and tainted before it was destroyed. After the war, as psychoanalysis was imported back into the devastated German-speaking countries, the proper English reading was extremely influential, often decisive. Paradoxically, many German analysts and other readers may have regarded Ernest Jones's "international vocabulary" as relatively precise and scientific because it was so different from the descriptive language in which Freud wrote (Jones 1924, p. 2).⁸ Lottie Newman (personal communication) has suggested that Freud's extraordinary use of ordinary language probably will turn out to be much less time-bound than Strachey's simplified and proper style, although, again, any translation tends to be an artifact of its era.

Many people are more skeptical of technical language now. Useful ideas must stand on their own, no matter how Freud may have pictured them—or cherished them—at one time or another. The psychological ideas behind his cartooned metaphors sound a lot less strange and concrete, or less crazy (Freud 1911, 8:315/12:78–79), when described as ambiguous psychological conceptions of simultaneous feeling-fantasy experiences between two or more people rather than as oscillating, sequential, or even topologically or biologically spaced activities of single persons with "objects" moving about in a nearly closed system (see chap. 1, this vol.). In the standard English version it is much easier to mistake Freud's verbal, and sometimes pictorial, diagrams for theories about real things (Freud 1900, 1923a, 1933).

Over the past century, many of the connotations, contexts, and quarrels that Freud may have taken for granted have faded away, and within diverse psychoanalytic groups the conventional meanings of certain privileged concepts and peculiar terms continue to evolve. According to Loewald, "What psychoanalysis needs might not be a 'new language'

8. The historical development of the intricate attitudes that Germans have toward English as well as their own language deserves further study. After World War I, Freud (1923b) described the craving addiction to authority in Germany—in dem autoritätssüchtigen Deutschland—which hurt the reputation of German science (13:223/18:247) and slowed down the acceptance of psychoanalysis in the German-speaking countries. The National Socialists exploited and perverted not only the language but many traditional German folkways. Peters (1988) asks how psychoanalysis might have emerged and evolved if the culture in which Freud flourished had not been destroyed. For different points of view about Strachey's influence in Germany after the war, cf. Thomä (1969) and Thomä and Kächele (1985) with Junker (1987 and chap. 3, this vol.) and Grubrich-Simitis (1987a, 1989); and see Timms and Segal (1988).

but a less inhibited, less pedantic and narrow understanding and interpretation of its current language, leading to elaborations and transformations of the meanings of concepts, theoretical formulations, or definitions that may or may not have been envisaged by Freud. Words, including concepts used in science, are living and enlivening entities in their authentic function" (1978, p. 193).

If modern German readers must be taught what we know about Freud's sources, subliminal motifs, and patterns of sound, psychological simultaneity and apparent contradiction, as well as the forever-shifting contexts he provides as he describes and portrays his flexible conceptions, how can a scholarly edition in any other language explain several legitimate ways of understanding a given passage while at the same time providing a tolerably readable text?

It is still true that some people cannot abide alternative translations of Freud's works. They seem to believe that a standard language as well as a whole standard edition is scientifically necessary, for the reasons Jones gave in 1924:

The advantages of the classical nomenclature are: (1) There is no other way of securing terms free from the numerous accessory connotations and associations inevitable in a spoken language, and hence of escaping possibilities of misunderstanding. . . . It is much easier to confine a new classical term to one definite meaning. The fact that this meaning may not at first sight be obvious, particularly to the uneducated, is a further notable advantage for it replaces the temptation to a casual and vague apprehension by the necessity of serious and precise study. (2) It renders far easier the interchange of thought among scientific workers in different countries. Of all civilized countries Germany is the only one that eschews this international vocabulary, a fact that has called forth much spleen among foreign readers of that language. . . . (3) In most cases the classically formed term is much handier. (Jones 1924, p. 2)

I think Jones's strategy was a mistake because his terminology implies a conceptual consistency and dessicated validity that is quite different from Freud's lively, because asymptotically descriptive, kind of science (Rycroft 1968; Leavy 1973).

Obviously the next major edition of Freud's works must be based on a reliable version of what Freud chose to say, or at least on as credible a set of transcriptions and revisions as can be patched together (chap. 5, this vol.). This is only one of the reasons a complete and depend-

able English version of Freud's works is still out of sight. The Standard Edition, wrote Strachey, "is a piece of pioneering work, with all the inevitable errors and blunders that involves. . . . A whole number of fundamental decisions had to be made before the first volume was published . . . [involving] both questions of format and the choice of technical terms, and, once made, they had in general to be adhered to throughout the edition. And some of them, of course, were likely to be regretted later" (1966a, pp. xvii-xviii).

Yet Strachey did not specify which "fundamental decisions" and choices of technical terms he regretted, let alone why: his only mention is "trivial . . . today I should probably suppress the tiresome hyphen in the word 'psycho-analysis'" (Strachey 1966a, p. xviii n.; Holroyd 1973). Almost all of the "addenda and corrigenda" at the end of volume 24 are just as meaningless; meticulous scholarship is one fair measure of a critical edition, but I have never found there anything I needed or could use.

Some of Strachey's significant misgivings are also beginning to emerge. For example, he, Alix Strachey, John Rickman, and Leonard Woolf all favored "The I and the It" instead of Ernest Jones's misleading "The Ego and the Id." Writing to his wife in the midst of this dispute, Strachey complained about decisions made by Riviere and Jones:

The little beast . . . is really most irritating. . . . They want to call "das Es" "the Id." I said I thought everyone would say "the Yidd."

So Jones said there was no such word in English: "There's 'Yid-dish,' you know. And in German 'Jude.' But there is no such word as 'Yidd.'"

"Pardon me, doctor, 'Yidd' is a current slang word for a Jew."

"Ah! A slang expression. It cannot be in very widespread use then."

Simply because that l.b. hasn't ever heard of it.⁹

Because the Stracheys were discreet team players, they suppressed their disagreements once these decisions had been made.

Do we want innumerable footnotes? To be handy a critical edition must have concise notes on the relevant page rather than in tiny type at the back of the book. If we are going to make a case for alternative readings, however, how do we avoid Rapaportian (1951) commentary

9. Letter, 9 Oct. 1924, Strachey and Strachey 1985, pp. 83, 176. I infer that Jones's "l.b." means "little beast."

that may exceed or overwhelm the original text? And how do we keep from repeating the same point many times over?

Alex Holder and I have said that the recent German editions by Ilse Grubrich-Simitis (Freud 1977, 1985, 1987) could serve as models for the format of critical translations. But instead of a facsimile of Freud's handwritten draft, we could have a German transcript running parallel to the translation on the facing page. Freud (1925a) said he had learned to read with the Philippson Bible, which is laid out in this way. Philippson's commentary is often so long, however, that on many pages there is room for no more than a few lines of parallel Hebrew and German text (McGrath 1986). In contrast, the Luther Bible is set in large type with wide margins that are used for paraphrasing and alternative wording, as well as for cross-indexing and references to historical accounts. Full discussions are put into formal appendices.

In a historical-critical edition of Freud's work, essential identifications, explanations, informative translations into languages other than German, and editorial cross-indexing, as well as Freud's own references, meaningful errors, and revisions, would appear at the bottom of the appropriate page. Lengthier commentary such as provenance, context, conflicting evidence, and discussion of contrary readings could be deferred to companion essays. Reiterative textual details would go into separate notes and appendices.

No matter how these new texts are done, at first they will be expensive to produce, though over time perhaps not as costly as one might think. The complete Weimar Edition of Goethe's works includes his correspondence and runs to 143 volumes, with 3 supplementary books. Now reprinted in Japan, it costs \$1,105. Few sets are sold, but there are innumerable popular derivatives and scholarly offshoots. At the moment Strachey's Standard Edition costs about \$950 in the United States. When more of Freud's correspondence is made available, why not plan, for the longterm, a series of asymptotically complete, historical and critical editions in both German and the target languages?

A pared-down student edition, like a scholarly one, should allow space in the margins for the reader to reflect and respond to a personally engaging and chimerical writer like Freud. And another way to increase the reader's awareness, if not understanding, of problematic German terms is to print them without commentary in the margins (as the French are doing and the British intend to do); the reader could then be referred to separate discussions of alternative ways of putting Freud's words into the target language (as the French are also doing, though

the British say they plan not much more than a glossary of “preferred translations”). When done well, these tactics may enable the translators of different editions to avoid the frequently awful syntax of literal translation, while at the same time presenting the words that Freud saw fit to use here or there. Translators who are reworking Freud’s conceptions into their mother tongues may be able to create various contexts for figures of speech that seem to render his imagery and ideas: perhaps one can word the same conception in several different ways.¹⁰ It may be possible to bring more of Freud’s descriptive style across and to learn how to illuminate his psychological simultaneity as well as his self-contradictions.

Strachey (1966a) meant to do something like this, but we have seen that he rarely used the square brackets he promised. Brackets do spoil the illusion that one is actually reading Freud; they also leave the reader in the lurch—even one who knows German—because a bracketed German phrase cannot explain Freud’s surprising turns or his allusive word-play. To do that will take much additional study and annotation in any language, including German.

Many of the English translators who preceded Strachey included Freud’s German words or phrases in their English texts—as one often does in ordinary conversation. This animated courtesy is still cultivated, and brackets are not needed if one consistently reserves a distinctive typeface for German. Peter Gay (1988), for example, italicizes all German words in his recent biography of Freud. Whenever he thinks the translation matters, Gay puts Freud’s German phrase directly into the reader’s flow. He discusses moot readings and his sources in concise footnotes and copious endnotes that are keyed to Freud’s ambiguous wording—*zweideutigem Wortlaut*. Therefore, Gay’s book is both scholarly and easy to read.

The great disadvantage to sometimes printing selected German words in the margin of a foreign edition is that modern editors and translators are once again fixing Freud by deciding which of his metaphors to set apart and in which contexts these words are to be read as technical terms. People who find the German language offensive in and of itself may gain little from single German words, however they are provided. People who love Freud’s language but teach and write in English may have to pause, reflect, and then study a whole passage or book in the

10. Jones says that Freud translated rather freely, and in this instance we do have evidence for Jones’s report. Cf. chap. 1, n. 16, and chap. 7, this vol., with Jones (1953, p. 55; 1955, p. 45); but see Pollak-Cornilliot (1986, 1989).

original before they can begin to sense the patterns or feel the resonating webs Freud sets with his rhythmic stems, sounds, and allusions. For example, the various compound words that he threaded through the same stems (as described in chaps. 1 and 2, this vol.) would still be impossible to follow.

The French team explains the more subtle and consistent way they have devised to convey the patterns of assonant terms Freud assembled (see chap. 8). In their forthcoming *Oeuvres complètes* they are making a bold but thoughtfully planned experiment. Having carefully delineated some radical differences between Freud's terminology and the derivatives favored among various psychoanalytic societies, they accomplish a nearly word-for-word translation based on a rigorous rationale as well as on their own meticulous lexical and linguistic achievements. This is the first edition I know of to respect some of Freud's demonically redundant word stems. Although the French are using what we know so far about his intricate verbal harmonics, they know they are taking a risk in trying to translate all technical terms word for word—"therefore the translation will be more scientific than literary because, for us, terminologic precision comes ahead of elegance" (A. Bourguignon, personal communication). Even if their language is occasionally awkward, so was Freud's, and those who are called to revise Strachey's edition will learn a lot from the *Oeuvres complètes*.

An effective translator-editor probably should be as transparent and unobtrusive as any other creative writer. Grubrich-Simitis aptly pictures this conflict: if the commentary is conspicuous, a reader who wants to see what Freud has to say may feel that a babbling tour guide is forever getting in the way.

Freud was a scientist. Among other things, this means that sometimes he was confused and unable to see past the assumptions of his contemporaries, that he was often imprecise or inconsistent, and that he made his fair share of outright mistakes. Unfortunately, any attempt to develop a historical perspective on Freud is still regarded by some as either a personal attack or an attempt to discredit his enduring accomplishments.¹¹

I have said that Freud is difficult to translate not only because his language is rousing, curiously intimate, and complex, but also because he sometimes confused descriptive and explanatory uses of the same

11. Now the same confusion may be stirring those who feel called to defend Strachey and his work; see Wilson (1987).

words—for example, *Lust*, which Strachey usually translated as “pleasure.” No one knows how much philosophical baggage Freud meant to carry over when he invoked Gustav Fechner’s amorphous notions about a *Lustprinzip* in one context or another. At times, Freud described the *Lustprinzip* merely as the tendency of people to do what they expect will feel good; at other times, he supposed that this ancient notion might gain the status of a regulatory principle of the same order as the laws of thermodynamics; and occasionally he wrote as if he could have it both ways at once. No wonder that his early translators and expositors had difficulty trying to distill a single and consistent meaning from Freud’s worn-out concatenation of metaphors and psychic “energies” (Ellenberger 1956; Watson 1958; Holt 1962, 1967; Rosenblatt and Thieckstun 1970; Applegarth 1971; Smith 1977; Swanson 1977; Grossman and Ornston 1986; Ornston 1985b).

Whatever happens, a fine and scholarly translation will never be anything more than that. There is only one way to get at Freud’s protean portrayals of his own conceptions, and that is to get into his own relatively uncertain language.

In summary, at times Freud’s German is extraordinarily intricate and difficult to render in a foreign tongue. He may shift the meaning of a term by changing context, make several contradictory observations at the same time, or use the same term in several logically incompatible ways. It is no wonder that Freud is inconsistent, because his style is explicitly meant to engage a variety of readers or listeners for a variety of reasons. On top of that, Freud’s tone may at times be read as ironic, witty, allusive, tentative, phantasmagoric, or even whimsical.

Strachey seldom acknowledges that he is selecting among Freud’s different uses of a word, often within the same paragraph or passage, and he hardly ever explains his choices. Although Strachey does carry over some of Freud’s variations, he usually simplifies, and he does so silently. Apparently this means that he found it self-evident when Freud was using an ordinary German word as a figure of speech in one place and as a technical term in another. Strachey did invent some new terms, and, by exaggerating what he saw as Freud’s “discoveries,” he also exposed some conceptual problems that remain relatively obscure in Freud’s writings, in part because Freud sometimes muddles descriptive and explanatory uses of the same idea. Indeed, in German scientific tradition, conceptions may have been used more descriptively and definitions enforced less stringently than in the apparent rigors of English “positivism” (Thomä and Kächele 1985).

A modern editor should not only identify more of Freud’s sources in

the course of explaining the language and science that Freud may have taken for granted but also use Freud's copious and critical correspondence in order to delineate and illuminate his ever-shifting tone and steady indeterminacy. There are many relatively unobtrusive ways to lay out some of the legitimate choices while composing a readable text.

Spanish Translations of Freud

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Freud began psychoanalysis with an extensive knowledge of nineteenth-century medicine and classical German literature, as well as a familiarity with Greek and German philosophy. Although many of his sources are still obscure, every reader of Freud's language will recognize some of his allusions and appreciate the beauty of his writing.

Every translator, necessarily working in a different language and cultural context, must struggle to put Freud's ideas correctly and at the same time to imitate his eloquent style. And ultimately every translator must decide whether to render Freud literally and word for word with detailed explanations of his nineteenth-century terminology or to re-create a relatively free and poetic version of Freud's elegant language. As Alex Holder has demonstrated, James Strachey appreciated and described this inherent conflict.

I shall begin by describing and commenting on the two complete editions of Freud's works in Spanish, the *Obras Completas* of Luis López-Ballesteros (1948) and Ludovico Rosenthal (1952–56) and the more recent edition by José Etcheverry (1978–82).¹ Then I shall focus on certain problems that are unique to translating Freud's work into Spanish.

THE LÓPEZ-BALLESTEROS AND ROSENTHAL EDITIONS

Luis López-Ballesteros translated Freud into Spanish between 1922 and 1934. This early and extensive trans-

1. For more details on the history of the translation of Freud into Spanish, see Etcheverry 1978, pp. 120–22.

lation of Freud's writings has to be seen within the historical context of the cultural and literary renaissance that took place in Spain at that time. José Ortega y Gasset, the Spanish philosopher and humanist, was the driving force behind this opening up of Spain to the influence of contemporary and especially German thought. Freud's works were among many other German texts translated for a Spanish-speaking audience. The López-Ballesteros translation is written in the classical Spanish that appealed to the readers of that time. Freud wrote to his translator:

As a young student, my wish to read the immortal *Don Quijote* in Cervantes' own language induced me to learn—without teachers—the beautiful Spanish language. Thanks to this interest of my youth I can now, even at my advanced age, verify the success of your Spanish version of my writings, the reading of which always gives me great pleasure owing to your very correct interpretation of my thoughts [*correctísima interpretación de mi pensamiento*] and elegance of style [*elegancia del estilo*]. Especially, I admire how you, being neither a physician nor a psychiatrist by profession, have been able to reach such total and precise command of a subject matter so intricate and at times so obscure.²

This Spanish edition of Freud's writings, published between 1924 and 1934—almost simultaneously with the *Gesammelte Schriften*³—contributed to the spread of Freudian ideas in the Spanish-speaking world. López-Ballesteros did not attempt a literal version of the texts, and this begins to explain the serious flaws in his version, although these flaws do not appear to have bothered Freud. In my judgment, this translation is often much too free and therefore not suitable for any in-depth study of Freud's language. López-Ballesteros is easy to read—at times too easy, in that he does not always reflect the depth of Freudian thinking but, rather, simplifies conceptual difficulties present in the original version. Some of Freud's ideas do not come across as coherent concepts, for example, because the same German word is translated in several different ways; on the other hand, the same Spanish term is often used for a

2. Freud to López-Ballesteros, letter, 7 May 1923, in Freud 1923c, vol. 1, p. 9. My translation from Spanish. The original letter was probably written in German, but I have not been able to verify this. Strachey (SE 19:289) said that no German text existed, and he too made his translation from the Spanish, having surmised that Freud could have written the original letter in that language. The *Gesammelte Werke* (13:442) printed the letter in Spanish, as usual without any explanation.

3. Freud's *Gesammelte Schriften*, or *Collected Papers*, were published between 1924 and 1934. Although the textual volumes of the Standard Edition were completed and published between 1953 and 1966, the final volume (no. 24), containing indexes and bibliographies, did not appear until 1974. Both GW and SE were therefore produced after Freud's death in 1939.

variety of German words that have somewhat different meanings. (We have already seen that the Standard Edition is similarly flawed.) Some words that are difficult to translate or would cause problems in the flow of Spanish are simply left out. The dates of articles and the enumeration of chapters are not always rigorously respected and some sentences express the opposite of what Freud said or are missing altogether. As an illustration, Freud says,

Eine Tendenz zur intakten Herstellung der verdrängten Vorstellung ist meist unverkennbar.

López-Ballesteros translates,

La mayor parte de las veces no se descubre tendencia ninguna a la reconstitución exacta de la representación reprimida.

Retranslated into English this would be,

In most instances no tendency whatsoever for an exact re-establishment of the repressed idea/image can be discovered.

Strachey's version is correct:

A tendency to a complete re-establishment of the repressed idea is as a rule unmistakably present.

Thus Freud's sentence means exactly the opposite of the López-Ballesteros version.⁴

In spite of these seemingly harsh criticisms, on the whole the spirit and even the beauty of Freud's writings are transmitted to the reader in classical Spanish. This can be appreciated in the following example taken from Freud's "Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis":

Seien Sie nun nicht böse wenn ich Sie zunächst ähnlich behandle wie diese neurotischen Kranken. Ich rate Ihnen eigentlich ab mich ein zweites Mal anzuhören. Ich werde Ihnen in dieser Absicht vorführen welche Unvollkommenheiten notwendigerweise dem Unterricht in der Psychoanalyse anhaften und welche Schwierigkeiten der Erwerbung eines eigenen Urteils entgegenstehen. Ich werde Ihnen zeigen wie die ganze Richtung Ihrer Vorbildung und alle Ihre Denkgewohnheiten Sie unvermeidlich zu Gegnern der Psychoanalyse machen müssten und wieviel Sie in sich zu über-

4. Freud 1915b, 10:260/14:157/SA 3:117/BN 1:1063. [D.G.O.: Again, Strachey's tendency to reify is subtle but steady as he adds words that make Freud's "ist meist unverkennbar" ("is usually unmistakable") into an idea that "is as a rule unmistakably present."]

winden hatten um dieser instinktiven Gegnerschaft Herr zu werden.⁵

Os ruego que no me toméis a mal el que al principio de mis lecciones observe con vosotros esta misma norma de conducta, tratándoos como el médico trata al enfermo neurótico que acude a su consulta. Mis primeras palabras han de equivaler al consejo de que no vengáis a oírme por segunda vez, pues en ellas os señalaré la inevitable imperfección de una enseñanza del psicoanálisis y las dificultades que se oponen a la formación de un juicio personal en estas materias. Os mostraré también cómo la orientación de vuestra cultura personal y todos los hábitos de vuestro pensamiento os han de inclinar en contra del psicoanálisis, y cuantas cosas deberéis vencer en vosotros mismos para dominar tal hostilidad. (BN 1948, vol. 2, p. 60)

Strachey's version reads,

Do not be annoyed, then, if I begin by treating you in the same way as these neurotic patients. I seriously advise you not to join my audience a second time. To support this advice, I will explain to you how incomplete any instruction in psycho-analysis must necessarily be and what difficulties stand in the way of forming a judgment of your own upon it. I will show you how the whole trend of your previous education and all your habits of thought are inevitably bound to make you into opponents of psycho-analysis, and how much you would have to overcome in yourselves in order to get the better of this instinctive opposition. (SE 15:15-16)

The Spanish-speaking reader immediately understands López-Ballesteros, much as a German-speaking reader grasps the original, at least on a superficial level, because Freud used ordinary language. I agree that "there is much more to Freud's ordinary words because they resonate with the ways we all first learned to think and to talk about anything that really matters" (Ornston 1985a, p. 385). When a reader immediately understands language, his thoughts and associations represent a mental activity very different from the intellectual effort required to comprehend the studied meanings of a text.

The original López-Ballesteros translation, published in Madrid by the

5. Freud 1916-17, 11-8/SA 1:41. I removed two commas before Freud's word *und* (a misprint), which were also removed from the SA.

Biblioteca Nueva, did not include many of Freud's early works or any of those written after 1933; beginning in 1943, an Argentinian publisher, Santiago Rueda, completed this task. Ludovico Rosenthal was both the editor and the main translator of these works. In his translations he resolved some of the flaws I have described yet provided continuity by retaining some of the stylistic virtues in the López-Ballesteros translation. Unfortunately, many of Freud's most important works were available only in the first, and less accurate, part of this edition.

Thus, a nearly complete edition of Freud's psychoanalytic works became available to the Spanish-speaking community in 1956, preceding the completion of the standard English text in 1966. As Rosenthal pointed out, the Spanish edition represented "an enterprise only rarely achieved in the history of books—that is, to publish the work of an author in a more complete form in translation than in the original language" (SR 1955, vol. 21, p. 7). In spite of having this complete translation at their disposal, however, many Spanish-speaking readers consulted the English version as well to achieve a better understanding of Freud's ideas. Some years later, the Spanish edition of the *Vocabulaire de la psychanalyse* (Laplanche and Pontalis 1971) became an indispensable aid for studying and teaching Freud, not only because it contains thoughtful discussions of Freudian concepts but also because it can be used as a dictionary, providing a uniform translation of key words and concepts.⁶

THE ETCHEVERRY EDITION

Some fifty years after the first Spanish edition, the Argentinian publisher Amorrortu Editores commissioned José Etcheverry to do a new translation of Freud's complete works. These *Obras completas* appeared between 1978 and 1982. Why was this huge production necessary, and to whom was this new translation directed?

Argentina has a psychoanalytic tradition dating back to the 1930s. This enduring interest in Freudian thought had enabled Rosenthal to complete what López-Ballesteros began; Rosenthal's translations then drew even more attention to the shortcomings of López-Ballesteros. Many analysts felt the need for a Spanish version of the Standard Edition, including Strachey's editorial notes. The growing demand for a more rigorous, literal, and internally consistent translation was also stirred by the "Back to Freud" movement among French analysts, who empha-

6. The Spanish vocabulary was taken from translations that existed at that time—that is, mostly from the López-Ballesteros/Rosenthal Edition.

sized word roots to obtain a deeper understanding of Freud's wording and who were widely studied in the Argentinian psychoanalytic community. Moreover, in Argentina there has been a long-standing interest in the epistemology of psychoanalysis—that is, the theory of knowledge that studies the place of psychoanalysis and its specific methods within the field of science. In this sense Etcheverry's translation was a response to a demand from analysts and others in the Argentinian psychoanalytic community.

In his supplemental volume to the *Obras Completas*, entitled "On the Spanish Translation," Etcheverry stated his main concerns: "not only to be rigorous about the principal concepts of psychoanalysis but to give equally strict attention to the roots of Freud's work in the basic problems of anthropology and in the philosophy of German thought" (1978, p. 3). Unlike the editors of the first Spanish edition and the English Standard Edition, Etcheverry provides extensive explanations for his chosen Spanish terms in short articles for the supplemental volume, showing how this translator's mind works when he is interpreting a Freudian text.

The advantages of the Etcheverry edition are that it is nearly complete and that it was translated directly from the *Gesammelte Werke*. Concepts and key words are translated consistently, as are the various grammatical forms of a single term whenever possible. When he had difficulty with a word or expression, Etcheverry inserted Freud's German term in square brackets; he also provided a German-Spanish glossary of more than three hundred words. Otherwise, Etcheverry followed the organization of the Standard Edition, including all of Strachey's editorial notes and nearly all of his footnotes. One also can see Strachey's influence in Etcheverry's construction of sentences, in his choice of words, and often in his adoption of Strachey's ways of conveying meaning. For example, Freud entitled the first chapter of *Das Unbewusste*

Die Rechtfertigung des Unbewussten.

Strachey added the word "concept,"

Justification for the Concept of the Unconscious.

Etcheverry took this over quite literally:

Justificación del concepto de lo inconciente. (Freud 1915c, 10:264/14:166/SA 3:125/AE 14:163).

If one carefully compares Etcheverry's Spanish with Strachey's English, many deliberate differences become apparent, some of which

Etcheverry explains in detail. He investigated the background that some of Freud's terms have in German philosophy and decided to give them a consistent translation. As an example, Kant believed that imagination functions through *Darstellung* (Etcheverry 1978, p. 23)—this is one of several different German words that Strachey combined into "representation." Etcheverry translates *Darstellung* and its derivatives in a uniform way: for *Darstellung* he uses *figuración*, and for *Darstellbarkeit* ("representability"), *figurabilidad*. Freud's terms *Assoziation* and *Einfall*, both rendered by Strachey as "association" (although occasionally he read an *Einfall* as an "idea"), are consistently translated as *asociación*, or "association" (*Assoziation*), and *ocurrencia*, or "occurrence," which allows one to distinguish clearly between these two distinct ideas in the translated text.⁷

Characteristic elements of Freud's style, such as his use of subjunctives, are on the whole respected in this translation. Certain of Freud's phrases indicate movement: those translated by Strachey into passive or static forms are brought back to life in this Spanish version. For example, Freud says,

Die drei seelischen Polaritäten gehen die bedeutsamsten Verknüpfungen miteinander ein.

Strachey translates this as:

The three polarities of the mind are connected with one another in various highly significant ways.

Ornston suggests:

The three psychological polarities engage each other in the most meaningful combinations.

Etcheverry's translation is very similar:

Las tres polaridades del alma entran en los mas significativos enlaces reciprocos. (Freud 1915a, 10:227/14:134/SA 3:97/AE 14:129)

In certain ways, Freud's complex image of the human being is better transmitted in the Etcheverry translation than in the Standard Edition. It has become a commonplace to say that this image was deeply influenced

7. D.G.O.—Strachey's footnotes on the difference between a preexisting *Assoziation* and an *Einfall* or sometimes a *freie Assoziation* are a good example of the kind of annotation that gets to the heart of psychoanalytic assumptions and clarifies one of the typically lingering ambiguities in Freud's psychology (SE 11:29n, 15:47n; and see Mahony 1979a).

by his culture. The cultural historian Friedrich Heer assigns Freud a place in German philosophy as one of the last great representatives of Romantic medicine—*romantischer Arztschule*—to which Novalis and Carl Gustav Carus also contributed (Heer 1953, p. 608). Long before Freud, Carus wrote that the key to recognizing the essence—*Wesen*—of conscious psychic life lies in the unconscious.

Henri and Madeleine Vermorel describe the Romantic heritage in Freud's work and even go as far as to speak of "*an amputation of the romantic dimension of psychoanalysis*" by those who disregard one of the main sources of Freud's thought (1986, pp. 15–16, italics in original). Their references provide an entry into the literature on Freud as a Romantic medical writer.

Freud shared many interests with Romantic physicians: dreams, the depths of the human soul, and death, to name a few. His way of understanding illness had antecedence in Romantic medicine. I agree with the Vermorels that "in this philosophy symptoms were never a matter of organ pathology but were symbols of an over-all situation in which something was wrong" (1986, p. 24). There is, however, a fundamental difference between Freud and the Romantics. His attitude, the way he approached the elucidation of these human phenomena, was that of a medical investigator deeply influenced by the materialist-positivist thinking of his time. Explanations for manifestations of psychic life had to be found within the individual human being; this conviction made his discoveries possible. Freud examined the soul or psyche and discovered its laws of functioning—showing, for example, that projective mechanisms are at work in many Romantic conceptions. The descriptive detail in his psychological understanding of some of the Romantic experiences is illustrated by his well-known analysis of the "oceanic feeling," of which he says: "I cannot discover this 'oceanic' feeling in myself." He did, however, describe the "ideational content which is most readily associated" with this feeling as "an indissoluble bond, of being one with the external world as a whole."⁸ This feeling of oneness with the world is a typical Romantic experience. Freud, characteristically, attempts to explain it psychoanalytically and points out that the ego- or self-feeling—*Ichgefühl*—is subject to disturbances and, moreover, that an adult's ego-feeling has gone through a process of development.

I do not see Freud as a Romantic, and I think Heer's view may be based more on a similarity of interests than on an understanding of the depth of Freud's discoveries, which represent a fundamental break with

8. "Ein Gefühl der unauflösbaren Verbundenheit, der Zusammengehörigkeit mit dem Ganzen der Aussenwelt" (Freud 1930a, 14:421–23/21:64–66/SA 9:198).

the Romantic view of life. Nevertheless, Freud did often express his thinking in words like *Trieb* ("drive"), *Todestrieb* ("death-drive"), *Seele* ("soul"), and *Drang* ("pressure"), which have an elaborate tradition in Romantic medical writing as well as in German philosophy and psychology. These words are difficult to translate into a target language that lacks this specific cultural background.

Strachey's choices of "mind" for *Seele*, "instinct" for *Trieb*, and "idea" for *Vorstellung* do not convey Freud's complex image of the human being. Etcheverry's Spanish terms *alma*, *pulsión*, and *representación* do more justice to Freud's imagery. This matters because Freud used these words and their innumerable compounds so frequently.

Vorstellung is not one of those German words with several meanings whose translation may vary according to context. In everyday German it is used to refer to an intrapsychic act that combines both idea and image. In ordinary English one may use "personal view" for *Vorstellung*, and the nearest match for the verb *vorstellen* is "to imagine." It is one more term used frequently in German philosophy and psychology. To fail to render it in its complexity and richness flattens the meaning of any Freudian text. A *Vorstellung* in philosophic and psychologic usage may be defined as a person's reproduction of a total sensory image of a thing (in the sense that Freud uses the word *Ding*), which includes its characteristics, its relationships, and the word itself (Klaus and Buhr 1975). As with other common German concepts, however, Freud used *Vorstellung* in a somewhat original way, as Laplanche and Pontalis (1971) have pointed out. It is not exactly the "subjective presenting of an object" as in classical philosophy but "that which is inscribed of the object in the mnemonic systems" (p. 383). In Freud's words,

"Vorstellungen [sind] Besetzungen—im Grunde von Erinnerungsspuren,"

which Strachey translated as

Ideas are cathexes—basically of memory-traces. (Freud 1915c, 10:277/14:178/SA 3:137)

As is well known, Freud used *Vorstellung* and *Affekt* ("affect") and their different *Schicksale* ("destinies" or, in Strachey's version, "vicissitudes") in the process of repression as basic concepts to describe psychic functioning.

Strachey was aware of serious problems in his translation of *Vorstellung*, as two footnotes in "The Unconscious" demonstrate. In the first he explains: "The German word here is '*Vorstellung*,' which covers the English

terms 'idea,' 'image' and 'presentation'" (Strachey 1957, p. 174n). The second footnote reads: "'*Vorstellung*.' This word has as a rule been translated by 'idea.' From this point till the end of the paper, '*Vorstellung*' is uniformly translated by 'presentation'—'*Wortvorstellung*' 'presentation of the word' or 'word-presentation'; '*Sachvorstellung*' 'presentation of the thing' or 'thing-presentation' " (Strachey 1957, p. 201n).

Strachey goes on to explain that his previous translation of these last words has been somewhat misleading. Although by far his most common translation of *Vorstellung* is "idea," he also used "presentation" and "image," and on some occasions "concept," "conception," or "expression." The switch from "idea" to "presentation" occurs in "The Unconscious" as Freud enters into a discussion of psychosis. Another systematic switch from "idea" to "presentation," this time not pointed out by the editor, can be found in "Negation." Strachey switches over when Freud (1925b) begins to discuss difficult and important issues of theory that can be understood only when the complexity of his *Vorstellung* conception is fully taken into account. Strachey decomposes this complex concept, which is essential in Freudian thought, into its elements. His preference for "idea" omits the sensory qualities of a *Vorstellung*, among them the important visual activities that are derived from perception. Only when the texts show the inadequacy of the word "idea" does he quietly switch to "presentation" (14:11–15/19:235–39). The concept of *Zielvorstellung* also lost much of its meaning when translated into "purposive idea."⁹

There is a cumulative avalanche of problems for the translator resulting from the decision to translate *Vorstellung* into an "idea." When Freud used the German word *Idee* ("idea") Strachey sometimes had to translate it as "concept" to avoid confusion. It would have been better, however, to reserve "concept" for *Begriff*. Freud (1912) used the word "conception" in "A Note on the Unconscious in Psycho-Analysis," which he wrote in English. Hanns Sachs translated this article into German, using *Vorstellung* for Freud's "conception."¹⁰ The Latin word *repraesentatio* is the basis for the translation of *Vorstellung* into Romance languages. The equivalent in English would be "representation"; but Strachey had already reserved this word for another, very visual German word, *Darstellung*, which may mean "depiction" as well as "presentation" and "representation" (see p. 15, this vol.).

9. Ornston suggests an alternative translation: "the end one has in view" (personal communication).

10. Strachey discusses the problems he had in translating this article because he disagreed with Freud "about Freud's choice of the English word 'conception'" (Strachey 1958, p. 258; Ornston 1985a, p. 389).

This set of off-center approximations illustrates two of the translator's dilemmas. First, some concepts that Freud could take for granted in his cultural environment and some common German words that gradually came to refer to relatively distinct concepts in Freud's thought do not have matching equivalents in the target languages; and second, if one does choose to translate a given term consistently, then that key word in Spanish or in English is no longer available for the transmission of other key words and concepts, many of which are related to one another. Holder's suggestion that English translators use Freud's word *Besetzung* instead of the invented word "cathexis" is not altogether satisfactory, because Freud used so many other different words based on the same stem—*setzen*, or "set." Therefore the best compromise may be not to translate certain key concepts, or perhaps to provide Freud's term constantly, both by translating crucial terms word for word and by giving Freud's German term in a footnote or in the margin.

In the Spanish versions, *Vorstellung* has been translated consistently as *representación* ("representation"), with the exception of cases in which *idea* ("idea") was used. Strachey translated Freud's expression *physiologische Vorstellung* as "physiological concept," one of the instances in which Strachey uses "concept" for *Vorstellung*. Etcheverry expressed this as an *idea fisiológica* ("physiologic idea")—a revealing shift in his systematic way of translating *Vorstellung* as *representación* ("representation") (Freud 1915c, 10:266/14:168/SA 3:127/AE 14:164). It seems that the translator could not conceive of putting together the words *physiologisch* ("physiologic") and *Vorstellung*, which would not have presented problems for someone with a medical background. At any rate, Freud did do this, and the range of his usage could deepen a reader's understanding of this term.

WORDS THAT ARE EASIER TO TRANSLATE INTO SPANISH

There are other English terms that have caused some controversy, and if we compare them with Etcheverry's translations, we can see that some of his choices are more adequate than Strachey's. In the first Spanish edition, López-Ballesteros translated *Trieb* by *instinto*, equivalent to Strachey's choice of "instinct." Etcheverry changed to *pulsión* for *Trieb* or "drive," and the new term has now found wide acceptance among psychoanalysts. *Das Ich*, *das Es*, and *das Über-Ich* are translated with their exact equivalents of *yo*, *ello*, and *super-yo* because the difficulties in translating *das Ich* into "the I" or "the ego" in English do not exist in Spanish. *Besetzung* did cause problems, and former translations such as *carga de energía psíquica*, or "charge of psychic energy," have been changed to *investidura*, which

does not have the unfortunate economic overtones of the English word "investment." *Anlehnung*, for which Strachey invented "anaclysis," was formerly translated by *aposición* (and by *apoyar* for the verb form), which re-creates Freud's metaphor *Anlehnung*, or "leaning on" and thus "depending on." Etcheverry introduced *apuntalamiento* and *apuntalar*, which mean "propping" and "to prop"; these words transmit a more active image closer to Freud's own.

Etcheverry paid special attention to the translation of other significant words such as *Beobachtung* (*observación*; "observation"), *Erfahrung* (*experiencia*; "experience" or "observation"),¹¹ *Ursache* (*causa*; "cause" or "motive"), *Verursachung* (*causación*; "causation"), *Ziel* (*meta*; "aim" or "purpose"), *Zweck* (*fin*; "purpose"). He translated these in a systematic way even when they form the stem of related words and also when they are part of compound words. Etcheverry's way of translating is much more consistent than Strachey's.

Etcheverry's very literal translation was a response to demands for a more rigorous text by analysts dissatisfied with the free and erratic version of López-Ballesteros. In this sense, Etcheverry's work is a reaction. His decision to give some of the words I have discussed special attention also reflects the Spanish-speaking community's interest in the epistemology of psychoanalysis. And Etcheverry was certainly influenced by the modern and ever-increasing interest in the linguistic investigation of texts, which places so much emphasis on clearly distinguishing the significant word from its signified referent. In this tradition, whenever the translator is in doubt he "orients himself more after the *signifier* [what Freud explicitly states] than after the *signified* [what he is presumed to have meant]" (chap. 8, this vol.).

Etcheverry's literal way of translating key words, his respect for Freud's philosophic tradition, and his systematic translation of a German term with the same Spanish word do more justice to Freud's complex image of the human being than does the Standard Edition. Etcheverry's texts are more suitable for the study of the continuity in Freud's words, expressions, and concepts.

11. D.G.O.—For a nice example of the translator's craft, see Strachey's translation of the first few pages in Freud's (1937a) "Constructions in Analysis." Strachey saw that he had only one English word for "experience," although in German one may "live through" or "endure" an *Erlebnis* and then may "learn" from that *Erlebnis*, whereupon an *Erlebnis* becomes an *Erfahrung*. Probably because this distinction matters so much to a psychoanalyst, Strachey fashioned several contrasting contexts for "experience" and in this way brought over a difference that is perfectly clear in German. Yet Strachey did not indicate in any way that he was doing this (Freud 1937a, 16:43–45/23:257–59/SA, *Ergänzungsband*:395–96/AE 23:259–61).

But Etcheverry's version also has certain disadvantages and problems. For one, although Freud can often be understood immediately, Etcheverry's verbatim translation is heavy reading, and his text must be studied carefully, frequently with a dictionary in hand.

Strachey has been criticized for rendering the common German language that Freud used into a sophisticated English, but this observation applies much more to Etcheverry's Spanish. I think he either did not recognize or did not value the importance of transmitting Freud's thought in words that evoke basic human experience. Some of the artificiality in his language is due to his strict adherence to the literal translation of certain words because he carried this program through many common expressions that contain the same word stem. When *Zweck* ("purpose" or "aim") is consistently translated as *fin*, then *zweckdienlich* ("effective") becomes: *para conseguir ciertos fines* ("to obtain certain purposes"). The German phrase

durch welches wir den Ablauf der bewussten Vorgänge zweckdienlich beeinflussen,

in Strachey's version is

by which we can exert an effective influence upon the course of conscious processes,

and is translated into Spanish as

que nos permite influir con éxito sobre el decurso de los procesos concientes para conseguir fines.

In English this would be

by which we can successfully influence the course of the conscious processes to obtain certain aims. (Freud 1915c, 10:265/14:167/SA 3:126/AE 14:163)

This is ungainly, at least in Spanish.

Similar effects are produced with the translation of *zweckmässig* ("expedient" or "useful") as *acorde a fines* ("according to aims"). This kind of literalness is awkward, wordy, and cumbersome, as is Etcheverry's frequent use of unusual Spanish words for common German ones. Even given his plan for a literal translation, it would have been possible to choose more everyday words.

I have said that Etcheverry's version often requires an intellectual effort on a language level that makes Freud's ideas difficult to grasp and, more important, detracts from the engaging experience of reading Freud.

Many of us became analysts in an attempt at a deeper understanding of ourselves; and, of course, we are strongly motivated to understand our patients. To some extent our needs determine our associations and trains of thought while reading Freud. For Mahony, "an authentic comprehension of Freud requires a specifically psychoanalytic reading which includes, though not exclusively, free association and a free-floating attention" (1984a, p. 856). A highly technical language may guide us toward a more intellectual kind of mental activity. Ornston refers to something similar; "The artificial language of the literati . . . is acquired quite late and has superficial roots in human experience" (1985a, p. 385). But there are more specific problems in using the Etcheverry edition.

Errors are unavoidable in the translation of any large and complex text. Many are trivial (Strachey 1966a; Ornston 1985b), but some do change Freud's meaning. One set of key words built onto the same stem—*Wandlung*, *Verwandlung*, and *Umwandlung*—was correctly translated by Strachey into "change" or "transformation," and similar words were used in the early Spanish versions. Etcheverry, however, translates *Verwandlung* as *mudanza* and *Umwandlung* as *trasmudación*, words that imply a change of place more than a change of form (Etcheverry 1978, p. 75). Although he does discuss his choice, he seems to have mistaken *wandeln*, which can mean "to walk or wander" but usually means "to transform," for *wandern*, which always means "to wander" or "to migrate" (*migrar*) (Etcheverry 1978, p. 75).

On occasion, tracing the linguistic roots of a word helps to deepen our understanding. But in many instances German words have already evolved variously in German, not to speak of other tongues, like English, that carry many words based on the same etymologic roots as German ones. Thus even in German some derivatives have acquired specific everyday meanings that cannot be deduced from the word stem; that is to say, cognates diverge. Some examples: *Äussere*, *Äusserung*, and *äussern* contain the word *aussen* (*afuera*, *externo*; "outside"). Strachey translates "*Das Äussere*" as "the external world" (Etcheverry, *lo exterior*), but *Äusserung* and *äussern* ("expression" and "to express") are common words in German, and Freud uses them in their common meaning in his writings. Etcheverry translates these consistently as *exteriorizar* and *exteriorización* ("exteriorization" instead of "expression" or "manifestation"). *Rücksicht* ("consideration") is translated as *miramiento* (*mirar* is "to look"); *Einfluss* ("influence") as *influjo* ("inflow"); *überblickt* ("surveyed") as *se abarca con la mirada* ("comprising with a look"); *überbestimmt* ("overdetermined") as

hipercomandado, ("overcommanded") because of *Stimme*, for which the English word is "voice"; and, of course, *zweckmässig* ("useful") as *acorde a fines* ("according to aim").

In Freud's works, *der Drang* is a vivid concept. Strachey translates it as "pressure"—that is, pressure of the instinct—and rarely as "impulsion" (1920, p. 42). Laplanche and Pontalis (1971, p. 113) use *empuje* ("push" or "pressure") for the Spanish translation. *Drang* also appears as the stem of important concepts such as *Verdrängung* ("repression"), *Nachdrängen* ("afterpressure"), and in the verbs *drängen* ("to pressure" or "to impel"), *nachdrängen* ("to pursue or press after"), *hinausdrängen*, ("to pressure toward the outside" or "to expel"), *hindrängen*, ("to pressure toward"), *aufdrängen*, ("to force to accept" or "to impose"), *abdrängen*, ("to pressure away"), and others. Etcheverry's choice for the translation of *Drang* is *esfuerzo* (and *esforzar* for the verb). This common word was used in previous Spanish versions, in my opinion very adequately, for *Bemühung* ("effort"). This new way of translating *Drang* with *esfuerzo* ("effort") is uniformly carried out for all the words that include this stem (*drängen*, *esforzar* ["to exert oneself"]; *nachdrängen*, *esfuerzo en dar caza* ["effort to pursue"] and so on). However, Etcheverry retains *represión* as the main translation for *Verdrängung* ("repression") because the use of this word is too widespread to change; he does suggest *esfuerzo de desalojo* ("effort to displace") as an alternative.

It is interesting to try to maintain a systematic version of a word family throughout a long translation, but in this case it results in some forced and obscure sentences. For example, Freud wrote:

Die anfänglich gute Verdrängung hält aber nicht stand, im weiteren Verlauf drängt sich das Missglücken der Verdrängung immer mehr vor.

Strachey puts this phrase:

But the repression which was at first successful, does not hold firm; in the further course of things its failure becomes increasingly marked.

Etcheverry translates:

Esa represión inicialmente buena no resiste, empero: en el circuito ulterior, su fracaso se esfuerza resaltando (sich vordrängen) cada vez más.

Etcheverry's phrase translated into similarly literal English would be:

This initially good repression doesn't resist, however; in the ulterior circuit, its failure forces itself to stand out more every time. (Freud 1915b, 10:260/14:157/SA 3:117/AE 14:151)

I have given these examples of extremely literal translations that involve the linguistic roots of words because many modern translators use word stems to emphasize the significance of a text. In my opinion the result may be a kind of overtranslation, with the danger that personal interpretations of a Freudian text will distort the translated version.

Common Spanish Words Used for Specific Freudian Concepts

Etcheverry justifies his choice of *esfuerzo* ("effort") for *Drang* (1978, pp. 56–63) by pointing to the frequent use of *Drang* in German philosophy. I agree that this word has a rich tradition and is used frequently in German literature. *Drang* is difficult to translate comprehensively but can be described as a person's perception of some impelling urge from within that is frequently ascribed to biology and is always beyond conscious choice. *Drang* carries a connotation of active and unconscious internal pressure in a person who experiences his own *Drang* passively. This word is comparable to two other terms that Freud often used, *Trieb* ("drive") and *Zwang* ("compulsion"). In Spanish, the use of *esfuerzo* ("effort") for *Drang* omits the sense of urgency Freud described and mistakenly implies conscious mental activity.

Verkehrung means "reversal," as in "reversal into its opposite" (*transformación*), and is translated as *trastorno* (*trastorno hacia lo contrario*), a good literal rendering of the word. The problem here is that the word *trastorno* is also widely used in psychoanalysis and in common speech for "disturbance"—for example, a neurotic "disturbance."

There are no easy solutions, because when everyday words that already have an established meaning are used for the translation of specific Freudian concepts, these too may cause misunderstandings.

Any translator's specific interests are bound to shape a view of Freud's writings. Remember how Freud praised López-Ballesteros. Freud implied that someone with a medical background might have easier access to his ideas. I do not think this is so. The multiple influences that converged in his thinking and from which he created psychoanalysis are expressed in a language that has only some features in common with the usual scientific papers of his time. When Freud realized that his ideas

might have been influenced by the wide extent of his readings in his early years, he wondered if what he took for a new idea might not be the effect of cryptomnesia (Freud 1937b, p. 91). Yet I think Freud did not appreciate the deep and pervasive influence of his cultural environment and zeitgeist and the many ways in which these determined both his ideas and the vocabulary he used to express them. One needs distance to distinguish more clearly the specific cultural context of a creative thinker, and in this sense it is easier for us to appreciate the environment in which Freud created psychoanalysis. The translation of Freud by someone like Etcheverry, who is well acquainted with German philosophy, emphasizes these roots, and while this is of great interest, there are some drawbacks.

In "Instincts and Their Vicissitudes," Freud begins a paragraph:

Stellen wir uns auf den Standpunkt eines fast völlig hilflosen Lebewesens.

Etcheverry translates:

Imaginemos un ser vivo casi por completo inerme,

which translated from Spanish into English reads:

Let us imagine a nearly completely defenseless living being.

Strachey's very adequate translation is:

Let us imagine ourselves in the situation of an almost entirely helpless living organism. (Freud 1915a,10:212/14:119/SA 3:82/AE 14:114)

Phrases like this one are valued by psychoanalysts because they transmit some sense of the way Freud's mind worked. By omitting the words "ourselves in the situation of," however, Etcheverry's sentence makes Freud's observation more remote.

Furthermore, Etcheverry persisted in his attempt to translate Freud's *Wesen* consistently as *esencia*, or "essence." Although his well-founded philosophic investigation of Freudian texts (Etcheverry 1978, pp. 103–06) justified his use of the word "*esencia*," the result is that the phrase

Das Ich ist vor allem ein körperliches, es ist nicht nur ein Oberfläch-
enwesen, sondern selbst die Projektion einer Oberfläche

becomes in Etcheverry's version

El yo es sobre todo una esencia-cuerpo: no es solo una esencia-
superficie, sino el mismo, la proyección de una superficie.

Strachey put this,

The ego is first and foremost a bodily ego; it is not merely a surface entity, but is itself the projection of a surface. (Freud 1923a, 13:253–54/19:26/SA 3:294/AE 19:27)

But when this epigram, which is cherished and quoted by many analysts, is translated from Etcheverry into English it reads:

The ego is above all a body-essence: it is not only a surface-essence, but is itself the projection of a surface.

This translation sounds peculiar, especially to a reader with a medical background.

Another example of a translation that might not have occurred to a psychoanalyst is *Schmerzlust* as *el placer (gusto) de recibir dolor*, which translates into “the pleasure in receiving pain.” This misses the very essence of the term. Strachey’s choice is better: “pleasure in pain” (Freud 1924a, 12:313/19:161/SA 3:345/AE 19:167).

Etcheverry’s translation of expressions from medical and related fields is sometimes very free, in distinct contrast to his strict rules for a literal version. It seems that in a more medical context these rules became less important. The following examples are taken from *Die Verdrängung* (“Repression”). Strachey translates *Anätzt* and *zerstört* as “by eating into and destroying.” Etcheverry puts this as *ataca o destruye*, which translates as “attacks or destroys.” *Toxische Aufhebung*, which Strachey puts as “removal by some toxic agent,” becomes *por la acción de una droga*, “by the action of a drug” (Freud 1915b, 10:248–49/14:146/SA 3:107/AE 14:141). *Vermengung* and *Verschmelzung* (“mixture” and “merging”), images taken from physics, are both translated as *contaminación*, or “contamination.” It is interesting to note that the free version of López-Ballesteros renders such words in a much more literal and adequate way. Often a translator does not give equal attention to terms outside his area of special interest.

There is a specific interpretation of the text at work when *Wechsel des Objekts* is translated into *cambio de vía del objeto*. Strachey’s literal version is “change of the object.” Etcheverry adds a few words, transforming this important concept into “change of the path of the object” (Freud 1915a, 10:220/14:127/SA 3:90/AE 14:122).

Etcheverry tends to choose everyday Spanish words that describe conscious mental activity for the translation of complex Freudian concepts that imply unconscious functioning. I have already pointed this out for the translation of *Drang* (“pressure”) as *esfuerzo* (“effort”), but there are many other examples: *Ablehnung* (“rejection”) was translated as *de-*

sautorización ("withdrawal of authority"); *Verleugnung* ("disavowal") as *desmentida* ("act of giving the lie"); *Verwerfung* ("repudiation") as *desestimación* ("disesteem"); *Bedeutung* ("significance") as *significatividad*, or at times *intencionalidad* ("intentionality"); and finally *Einsicht* ("understanding" or "insight") as *intelección* ("intellection"). This last word is used mainly in philosophic texts.

These examples illustrate problems stemming from the philosophic orientation and specific interests of the translator. My main concern is a subtle shifting away from a personal understanding of unconscious psychic processes toward a more intellectual comprehension of the texts. My analysis of the merits and faults in the two main Spanish versions of Freud is based on my perception of the specific difficulties my Spanish-reading students have had in understanding Freud's writings. During the early years of my teaching, at a time when candidates used the López-Ballesteros translation, one of the main problems was to convey the meaning of certain concepts that they could not clearly capture because of inconsistent translation. I had to insist on a more uniform vocabulary and clarification of concepts. Now, teaching from Etcheverry, I have to convey Freudian ideas in a more customary and common language, counteracting the tendency to intellectualize that is induced by Etcheverry's way of translating Freud.

I have contrasted free and literal translations in comparing the work of López-Ballesteros with that of Rosenthal, Etcheverry, and Strachey. While describing some advantages and problems inherent in each strategy, I have also shown that in certain instances the version given by the free translator turns out to be more exact and that the wording of the literal translator may be more imaginative: all translators compromise.

My examples of the different ways in which metaphors that Freud had borrowed from medicine and related fields are translated in the two Spanish editions highlight the influence that the specific content of a text may have on a translator's attitude. I have also pointed out that some intellectualizing effects of the Etcheverry version are attributable to his literal way of translating and his philosophic interests.

It does not follow that any free translation is necessarily less abstract than a literal one. Whether or not the reader is led to a more intellectualized understanding of Freud probably depends much more on the basic interests, aims, and background of both the translator and the reader than on the technique of translation itself. I have given examples of the ways in which a translator's own interests come across in choosing certain families of words or word patterns. Depending on a translator's

command of both languages, discipline, choices, and skill, the result may lead to a deeper understanding of some undercurrents in Freud's texts or into forced and obscure sentences that are merely confusing. In any case, the translator's decisions form an interpretation of the text.

The two major Spanish editions of Freud's work were produced some fifty years apart, and in comparing them one sees how much a translator is affected by the *zeitgeist*. I think the late twentieth-century psychoanalytic *zeitgeist* favors more literal translation. Analysts and many others want to know what Freud actually said and how he said it. This wish for a relatively word-for-word rendition may be naïve, but I think it is legitimate. Any good translation will clarify the choices and to some degree let one make one's own interpretations. To cite just one example, the reader should be enabled to consider both a hermeneutic and a biological-causal reading of Freud, much as one can do when reading the original.

It is difficult to produce a literal version that is also readable because Freud conveys his meaning not only through words and sentences but also through the effects of his language on a reader. We have mentioned that he often relies on families of closely related German words that are readily understood within the pattern of his everyday language. It is easier to transmit a similar effect in a relatively free translation. A literal translation almost always trades off some of the beauty and rhythm of Freud's natural wording for a systematic consistency that enforces the translator's own pattern of terms, which are almost always relatively remote from elemental human experience.

There are parallels in Freud's reactions to the French, English, and Spanish translations. Laplanche remarks that although the early Freud translations into French were outrageously unfaithful, Freud himself supported them; and Ornston shows that Freud was loyal to a variety of English and American translators. We have seen that Freud also endorsed the López-Ballesteros edition.

There are both problems and advantages to having these two very different Spanish editions of Freud's writing. On the one hand, if a writer chooses to rely solely on either one, incompatible terms and a variety of meanings may lead to misunderstandings and hinder scientific communication. On the other hand, there is a clear scientific advantage in having two versions to compare because this stimulates one to think anew; of course, comparing these translations with the original also furthers one's comprehension.

In our time, vast and varied audiences will make extreme demands on any translator, not only to justify a way of translating but also to

explain every significant choice. A translator of Freud needs a wide knowledge of central European history and culture and must write well in the target language—a rare ability unless it is one's mother tongue. This translator should also have a fine feeling for the German language, a gift that is difficult to acquire as an adult; therefore must we also demand that the translator have German as a mother tongue? It follows that any revision or any new translation up to modern standards will probably have to be done by a team. Good translations are essential because Freud's thought and spirit are conveyed in such subtle yet insistent ways.

To what extent can any translation transmit all aspects of Freud's writings in another language? Ornston says translations are not suitable for scientific use or for scholarly investigation. I agree with him about any in-depth study of Freud's texts or the study of Freud as a writer of fine prose. I am sure he will agree, however, that translations have proven their enormous value at a different level of investigation, that of the clinical psychoanalyst, who, often with a translation in hand, has contributed so much to the further development of Freudian thought.

Translating Freud

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OUR POSITION ON THE COMPLETE WORKS OF FREUD IN FRENCH

The first volume of Freud's *Oeuvres complètes* appeared in 1988, seventy-five years after the publication of the first French translation of a text by Freud (1913); that is, it took three quarters of a century to begin to present one of the most important works of our time in a French version that is as faithful, rigorous, and consistent as possible.

Such a translation can qualify as scientific only if the entire work is taken into account and treated as an ensemble. We will show that the problems this raises require so many more clear and coherent choices than those involved in the translation of a novel or a treatise on physics that these enterprises can hardly be compared.

Why now? Until a short time ago it seemed good form either to deplore the absence of an *Oeuvres complètes* or to ridicule it, laying the blame on wrangling among groups, individuals, or publishers. Though it is not our

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intent to present a "chronicle of the translation of Freud into French,"¹ we do think it will be useful to point out some lessons that can be learned from this delay and to outline our own point of view, which, having evolved *a posteriori*, is very different.

The most obvious reason for the delay is that translation rights had been divided among three French publishing houses. Repeated attempts to overcome this obstacle failed until recently, when one publisher took the initiative. It appears that this obstacle was purely editorial because it had been the fate of Freud's works from the start to be parceled out and entrusted piece by piece to a certain translator or given "series."

The difficulty of creating a single unified translation was not simply a question of who was to be the publisher but also of who should direct the work. In England, as we know, it was the perseverance of one man, James Strachey, that allowed the publication of the first complete edition, and the only critical one to date; one is ashamed to recall that it is not in German. Despite some justifiable criticisms, the merits of James Strachey and his translation are enormous. As the work of a single person, it remains a model for unity of style and terminology—and the intelligibility this allows. Having been translators of Freud for decades, we have to admit that it is still indispensable to consult Strachey for some difficult passages: even if he sometimes flattens the meaning, he is hardly ever guilty of mistranslation.

There was no question of responding to the psychoanalytic vulgate the Standard Edition has become—with all the weight of dogmatism and popularization this implies—with a French imitation. A French Strachey, a kind of self-abnegating Benedictine, was nowhere to be found, so we either had to come to terms with the fragmentation of the work or try to find some other form of unity for it. The first apparent solution, a "Selected Works" composed by juxtaposing various individual translations, has been proposed a great many times and even now is the one that governs another new series of translations.² From the outset we rejected this makeshift solution, if not defeat, before the challenge presented by a great conceptual work. It remained for us to find, through the unity of a team working in constant cooperation, something more than a substitute—a real equivalent, an even richer, more inspired resolution than the work of any one in-

1. See Bourguignon and Bourguignon 1983. With regard to the specifically editorial aspect, see Prigent 1988.

2. D.G.O.—Paris: Gallimard.

dividual. We shall indicate at the end of the text how our *e pluribus unum* functions.

In our attempts to analyze the obstacles on this long historical route and to show what was gained by surmounting them, we must not overlook one essential factor: the repeated efforts of the official psychoanalytic bodies to appropriate the *Oeuvres complètes*. This was inevitable if we bear in mind that just as much as being an author or an intellectual leader, Freud aspired to be the founder of an organized and hierarchically structured movement in which his work would play the same cohesive role as sacred writ does for a church. Continuously quoted and referred to, certain passages of his text, as well as the major concepts, have acquired the value of untouchable landmarks in a history whose development is well known: that of the psychoanalytic movement. It was only natural for this "church" to want to maintain total control over the destiny of the text on which it was founded. Even this most recent project, the *Oeuvres complètes*, had to break free of this encumbrance—and not without a certain unavoidable measure of pugnacity.³ It was essential to overcome that obstacle to achieve this: the present project is absolutely independent of any institutional control, overt or concealed. No society and no group of analysts has any right of inspection whatsoever or is even kept informed about our work. This position has far-reaching consequences for the translation itself. At no time do we feel bound by what has become of the text in the hands of its exegetes or practitioners, unofficial or otherwise;⁴ rather, we leave the greatest freedom possible for a multiplicity of readings and critical interpretations. The composition of our teams bears witness to our anti-ecclesiastical stand: for the most part, we are Germanists and "Freudologists"; a small minority are practicing analysts, themselves first and foremost Freudologists.

During this very long latency period, there has been no lack of translations and commentaries. Starting from outrageously unfaithful translations—some of them approved by Freud himself—that at least

3. The International Psychoanalytical Association (IPA) and certain French-speaking societies are implicated here. There is no doubt, however, that the same "will for mastery" could just as easily have come from other quarters. Indeed, is this not the case with regard to publication of Lacan's work, which is also intended as a foundation?

4. During a discussion at the 1987 Congress of the International Psychoanalytical Association, a well-meaning participant explained that *Indifferenz* should be translated not as "indifference" but as "neutrality," "because the ambiguity of the word 'neutrality' makes it particularly fit to capture the unique complexity of the analyst's 'humanist' and objective position" (Hoffer 1989). We see how the need to indoctrinate psychoanalytic practice along certain lines justifies unrepentant modification of Freudian literalness.

had "the advantage of existing," evolution occurred in two complementary directions. The first was a constant, scathing, and ruthless criticism of the existing versions; it sometimes opened up endless discussions but also resulted in increasingly improved translations which, if not perfect, were at least well reasoned and confronted all the difficulties. Some texts, usually short ones, underwent innumerable private or "pirate" translations. To give just one example, *Die Verneinung* ("Negation") has been translated more than ten times! The second direction concentrated on the problems posed by a specifically linguistic expression of the concepts involved—in other words, on questions of terminology—given the fundamental importance they have in Freud's work.

It is said that Minerva's bird does not take wing before nightfall; without any pretensions to supreme wisdom, we intend the present project to draw the greatest possible advantage from its late start: late in editorial history, late in the wake of other, aborted projects, late through having had to fend off repeated bids for control, but also late enough to benefit from an inestimable wealth of commentary, discussions, and partial proposals, many of which we welcome.⁵

GENERAL PRINCIPLES

We shall now set out in the form of principles the outcome of our daily contact with translation, which some of us have been doing—in isolation or, more often, as members of a team—for more than thirty years. These long years of joint research and reflection not only have brought our translators and researchers together but have created a true osmosis between the viewpoints of Freudology and Germanistics. Through the various transformations, discussions, and oscillations (in which each of us could find himself or herself adopting a position we opposed a few days earlier), our options have stabilized at a point where we feel we should place ourselves in relation to the general theory of translation and not in terms of the only translation of Freud.

Even though it was not our source of inspiration, Antoine Berman's (1984) book on the history of translation in Germany, *L'épreuve de l'étranger*,⁶ provides some very useful guidelines. In light of the searching

5. The notion of plagiarism does not apply to fragments of translations. A good solution or an inspiration regarding a particular passage becomes anyone's property. There is no point in pretending ignorance or in going to great lengths to find a different way of saying things.

6. See p. 62. [B.V. and D.G.O.—Literally, Berman's title means "test of the alien." The French

discussions that agitated Germany in the Romantic period, and whatever the important differences among Herder, Goethe, Schlegel, Novalis, Hölderlin, Humboldt, and Schleiermacher may be, what stands out, broadly speaking, is that the "German theory" of translation is set up in conscious opposition to "French-style" translations.

Let us quote just one of many passages from Schlegel on the subject of French translators: "It is as though they wanted every foreigner, when in their country, to behave and dress according to their customs, which means that they never really become acquainted with any foreigner."⁷ Or from Goethe: "Just as he adapts foreign words to his own throat, the Frenchman does the same with feelings, thoughts, and even objects; for every foreign fruit, come what may, he demands an equivalent that grows on his own soil" (Goethe 1819, p. 255).

Antoine Berman evokes that profession of faith very characteristic of a certain "peculiarly French way of stating the problem of translation," which would not be disavowed even today by the great majority of French translators, our critics in particular: "If there is any value in translation, it can only be that of improving the original if possible, embellishing it, appropriating it, giving it a national appearance and in some way naturalizing this foreign plant."⁸

It should be understood that we are not contrasting "French-style" and "German-style" translation as two national characteristics: if we were, we would put Freud among the former, because according to Jones, "Instead of laboriously transcribing from the foreign language, idioms and all, he would read a passage, close the book, and consider how a German writer would have clothed the same thoughts."⁹ On

word *étranger* covers several meanings, including "stranger" and "foreigner" as well. Laplanche, Cotet, and Bourguignon play on this word throughout their text, using some existing derivatives (for example, *étrangéité*, "strangeness") and inventing others (*étrangèreté*, "strangerness"). While not entirely satisfactory, the phrase "test of the alien" seems best to convey this dialectical concept: you discover your own "inside" by "alienating" (or "differentiating") an "outside" (or "not me"). The authors intend that their general principles should be valid for translation from and into any language.]

7. A. W. Schlegel, quoted in Antoine Berman 1984, p. 62. [B.V.—Unfortunately, German quotations from Berman are here "secondhand" translations.]

8. Berman 1984, p. 62 n. 2: "The peculiarly French way of stating the problem of translation was remarkably well summarized by Collardeau at the end of the eighteenth century" (in Van der Meersch, "Traduction française, problèmes de fidélité et de qualité," *Traduzione-tradizione*, lectures 4–5, Dedalo Libri, p. 68).

9. Jones 1953, vol. 1, p. 55. [D.G.O.—Here, Laplanche and his colleagues made their own translation from Jones because, as they put it, "Anne Berman's French translation [of Jones] can itself be considered typical of the 'French' or 'Freudian' style." Anne Berman is one of the "classic" translators of Freud into French.]

the other hand, Chateaubriand, who translated Milton, throughout his *Remarques* unreservedly upholds the opposite position, with which we agree:

If I had only wanted to do an elegant translation of *Paradise Lost*, it will perhaps be granted that my knowledge of the art is sufficient that it would not have been impossible for me to achieve such a translation; but what I undertook to do was a literal translation, in the strongest sense of the term—a translation that a child and a poet will be able to follow, line by line, word by word, like a dictionary open before their eyes.¹⁰

A translation that stands up to “the test of alienness” is one that makes no attempt to domesticate or acclimatize the text in order to provide some sort of analogy readily acceptable to our own expectations. As much as possible it continues to dwell within the text, retaining inflections as well as stylistic, semantic, and conceptual particularities and possibilities.

Let us add something that singularly shifts the question by setting it beyond national frontiers: the terms *ethnocentric* and *the test of alienness* have to be taken in the broadest sense; the translator’s movement of drawing toward oneself or, on the contrary, going toward the other does not apply solely to the genius of each of the languages involved. Drawing toward oneself also means drawing toward one’s own ideologies, whether cultural, psychiatric, or even psychoanalytic. The “alien” is not only the German language but also the “stranger” that Freud reveals: the strangeness of his discovery and of the words he uses to express it. Here we have to pay homage to Jacques Lacan, who in France pioneered the genuine rediscovery of Freud through the literalness of his text. Lacan paid minute attention to terms such as *Trieb*, *Hilfflosigkeit*, *Wunsch*, and *Nachträglichkeit*, provided new commentary on certain passages where the literal word requires precise examination, and subjected Marie Bonaparte’s and Anne Berman’s acclimatizing translations of Freud to acid criticism. By so doing, without ever imposing or even proposing a solution for any specific technical problem, he most assuredly exerted an influence in favor of a method of translation in which concern for the literal text, the “signifier” and the “vocalable,” acts both as a compass and as a safety rail when the illusion

10. Chateaubriand, “*Le Paradis perdu*” de Milton, new translation, 1836. The translator’s *Remarques* are reprinted in *Préfaces*, no. 7 (April–May 1988):112.

of "comprehension"¹¹ might lead the translator into commenting or glossing, rather than translating.

The very expression "test of alienness" raises an essential question for translators: Can they or should they reflect the "alien"—that is, the text to be translated¹²—by a certain "strangeness" in the translation? Antoine Berman, who discusses this question at length with regard to Humboldt's ambiguous positions, reaches the conclusion that "translation is not a makeshift, but the way a foreign work comes to us as such. A good translation retains this foreign quality while making the work accessible to us." "That a translation which smacks of translation should moreover be considered a bad one is a misconception, one that fails to recognize that the writing of a translation is an irreducible form of writing: one that receives into its own language the writing of another language, and which cannot without imposture conceal that it is this very procedure" (A. Berman 1984, pp. 246, 249).

However, the formula that "a translation that does not smack at all of translation is necessarily a bad one" (p. 247) should, in our view, be supplemented by more dynamic and wide-ranging considerations. A translation that succeeds in appropriating the foreign, with strict fidelity to the original text, cannot avoid altering the target language. The indispensable peculiarities, terminological inventions or derivations, and audacities of style eventually mold the language into which they are translated; any translation of a great author, if it abides strictly by the requirement of maintaining constant touch with that author's uniqueness, will necessarily contribute to the enrichment and flexibility of its own language. Countless historical examples could be given: in a translation that succeeds in being recognized as a work in its own right, what is considered strange today will be accepted tomorrow.

We therefore assert from the outset that with regard to his own language the translator has no less creative freedom than the thinker or the poet. Without forcing the target language into arbitrary or unnecessary contortions, one does everything one can to make the utmost use of its frequently unsuspected resources, as much through recourse to multiple stylistic resources (which can hardly be limited to the forms used by Anatole France), constructions, peculiar combinations of terms and so

11. "We repeat to our students: 'beware of understanding' and leave this nauseating category to Messrs. Jaspers and Co.," in *Écrits* (Paris: Seuil, 1966), p. 471.

12. Here again, we are not speaking only of linguistic and national "alienness": a great author is himself alien in his own language and culture. Cf. Berman 1984, pp. 200–01.

on, as through terminological derivations or through the revival of words and usages that have fallen into disuse.¹³

So far, we have set forth only some preliminary statements, which are generally valid for the translation of a great conceptual work, whoever the author and whatever the language; but these principles are eminently applicable to Freud, individual as his work may be.

Here we must take a stance on the question of Germanity. Freud certainly claimed "Teutonic genius" for himself, in somewhat ironic terms, as against a gallicizing tendency, which he often ridiculed.¹⁴ In his *Autobiographical Study* (1925a), he recalls "the introduction of psychoanalysis into France, which was for so long refractory," and responds with sarcasm to the incomprehension shown by the French: "Objections of incredible simplicity are raised, such as the observation that French sensitiveness is offended by the pedantry and crudity of psychoanalytic terminology. . . . Another comment has a more serious ring (even a professor of psychology at the Sorbonne did not think it beneath him): the whole mode of psychoanalytic thought, he declared, is inconsistent with the Latin genius."

Today would anyone dare to reject the "Teutonic genius" of Freud (he treated the term ironically by citing it in French) so as to make for easier reading and ensure the intellectual comfort of those who champion the Latin genius?

If our conception of "alienness" is valid, however, we have to take similar—and perhaps even more—account of Freud's alienness within his own language, which may be greater than the alienness of German in relation to French. This would involve us deeply in the relationship of languages to one another and the thinker's fit within his own language. Suffice it to say that if by its very essence one language cannot be translated into another (automatic translation is no more than a soulless "interpreting"), the author of a conceptual work¹⁵ positions himself within his language and makes choices, particularly conceptual ones, that reduce the polysemy of his own language and in this way authorize the creation of structural equivalents in another language, where again analogous choices have to be made.

13. "As I already said, I used old words from which I made new ones to convey the text more faithfully" (Chateaubriand, *"Le Paradis perdu" de Milton*, p. 114).

14. D.G.O.—*Génie teutonique* is Freud's own phrase in French. Contrast Jones's (1924) earnest arguments in favor of his own "classical nomenclature" (Freud 1925a, 14:88/20:62/OC 17:109–10).

15. Unlike the poet: the fewer choices the poet makes and the greater use of the wealth of latent resources of his language, the less translatable he is.

This applies to Freud. Neither his language nor his culture¹⁶ is “pure” German (if either can be defined); his language is tinged with Viennese, Yiddish, French, Latin, but also and above all with the other “parlances” of technical medicine, psychiatric semiology, and, even more, the particular rationality pervading the end of the nineteenth century. Last but not least, let us stress that Freud’s own language is like the inevitable and compliant force in the psychoanalytic discovery of the unconscious and of sexuality: a radical strangeness or “alienness” that immediately transcends the empirical difference between French and German. For example, the French term *aimance*, proposed by Edouard Pichon,¹⁷ was finally rejected because what it was intended to “translate” and to de-sexualize was not some German word with obscure and romantic resonances but the Latin word *libido*.

Thus, the justification for our project is to translate Freud by inventing and crafting not some kind of “Germanic” French but a “Freudian French,” using all the resources of the French language in the same way that Freud uses the resources of German.

Rigorous faithfulness to the text imposes the twofold obligation of entirety and accuracy. For us these constraints are imperative: the text, the whole text, and nothing but the text.

To convey the whole text means first of all to restore all its variants, in following, in completing if need be, Strachey’s critical edition. When we come right down to the actual translating, however, this entails tasks which, elementary though they may seem, are more often than not neglected; we shall define these in detail in the chapters on style and terminology.

To convey the whole text means deciding to translate everything. The potential danger here is that of overtranslating: there comes a moment when one must choose among all the possible shades of meaning implicit in a word, an expression, or a phrase, and this choice has to be guided by Freud himself. The connotations to be retained are the ones he himself emphasized and possibly even the same ones that are emphasized, without his being aware of it, throughout the work. It is not a matter of translating one language into another but of translating Freud (both explicit and implicit) from one language into the other.

16. “The culture Freud belongs to is incontestably Germanic (as well as Jewish, as many works have shown). His culture of reference is Greco-Latin” (Anzieu 1987, p. 539 n. 48).

17. B.V.—Edouard Pichon, M.D. (1890–1939), was a pioneer French psychoanalyst and grammarian who attempted to gallicize Freudian psychoanalysis through terminology.

"Nothing but the text" means excluding any contraction or dilution and any commentary. What gives one the right to go faster than Freud in coming to the main idea, which he delivers only as its genesis comes to term, or to hasten the unwinding of a discourse whose slow, even groping development is borrowed from the analytic session? By what right is explanation substituted for explicit expression? Strachey occasionally gives in to this tendency, which sometimes leads to distortion. Listen to Freud: "I consider it a wrong practice, however excellent the motive may be, to alter any detail of the presentation of a case. One can never tell what aspect of a case may be picked out by a reader of independent judgment, and one runs the risk of leading him astray" (Freud 1915d, 10:234–35/14:263/OC 13:307). We make every effort to avoid deforming any element of the Freudian text in and by our translation. Grateful as we are to the early translators of Freud for their pioneering work, we find disconcerting the liberties they took with the original, which is stretched or shrunk according to their requirements or their difficulties.

To add any commentary would be an unjustifiable interference not only with thought and thought processes but also (and perhaps above all) with the rendering of terms. This principle goes far beyond what is usually called terminology: almost all of Freud's circumlocutions propose a veritable enigma condensed into words. In chapter 7 of *From the History of an Infantile Neurosis*, Freud (1918) explains how the Wolf Man, imagining the part played by women in coitus, settled on the "cloacal theory." He decided "in favor of the intestine against the vagina," which provided him with "the material for his identification with women," an identification "die später als Angst vor dem Darmtod auftrat." Shall we be satisfied with translating this by "qui devait ultérieurement se faire jour sous la forme de la mort survenant par suite de troubles [?] intestinaux" or "se manifesta comme angoisse de la mort par suite de maladie [?] intestinale"? We keep to the text, whose strength, concision, and boldness we note: "qui plus tard apparut sous forme d'angoisse devant la mort intestinale."¹⁸

Accuracy includes the refusal to embellish or repair. We can only conceive the translator of Freud as one who loves the text in whose

18. GW 12:111. [B.V.—"which was later to appear in the form of death occurring after intestinal disorders" (the French translation cited here in the text is from Presses Universitaires de France, pp. 384–85); "manifested itself as dread of death following an intestinal disease" (Gallimard translation, p. 232); "which made its appearance later as a dread of death in connection with the bowels" (Strachey's translation, SE 17:79); "which later appeared in the form of anxiety in the face of intestinal death" (OC 13:76).]

service he is working in the same way that Montaigne loved Paris—"tenderly, with all its warts and stains." Freud commands a great variety of turns of phrase and an extraordinarily rich vocabulary, so that if he repeats a structure or a word, these repetitions should be respected. They do not diminish his stature. Concealing them would make him less authentic. What matters is that the French reader should be able to take note of them and interpret them, together with the oversights, the ambiguities, and—Freud confronting Freudianism—the slips of the pen.

Freud's many quotations from languages other than German also present a problem of fidelity to the text. Let us leave aside citations Freud himself did not translate, which we translate in footnotes (with the exception of a few common Latin expressions), and focus on the ones he retranslated or for which he quoted an existing German translation. The problem of trilingualism, or retranslation, is particularly acute here: we are familiar with the case of "Leonardo's childhood memory," Freud's (1910a) translation of which (from Italian to German) is faulty. There are other, no less interesting instances, especially *Massenpsychologie und Ich-Analyse*,¹⁹ in which Freud uses Rudolf Eisler's questionable German translation of Gustave Le Bon, rendering the French word *foule* ("crowd") as *Masse*, although Freud himself also translates McDougall's English word "group" (whose connotations are very different from those of the French *foule*) with the same German word *Masse*. All this eventually goes to develop a personal "Freudian" reflection on this concept of *Masse*, which is no more than a hybrid of two erroneous translations from the start. In these and similar cases, the only solution is to retranslate Freud's German text (the "translation") and give the indispensable original text in a footnote.

In a footnote? Does this mean that accuracy and faithfulness cannot be achieved without glossing, justification, or commentary? Absolutely not: the reader will find no narcissistic trace of our state of mind recorded in innumerable notes. Once our choice is made, we spare the reader our inner debates and trust him to follow us in the framework and coherence of the translation as a whole, which provides a real "*tenant lieu*"²⁰ (*locum tenens*) for the original text.

19. B.V. and D.G.O.—Freud 1921a, 13:71–161/18:69–143; see Strachey's note, p. 69.

20. This is our free rendering, using a term introduced by Lacan in another context, of Goethe's precept according to which translation should not "replace" the original but "hold its place"; see Goethe 1819, p. 256.

Language as the Object of the Author,
or What It Is Preferable Not to Translate

There is one specific situation in which translation requires some explanatory comment. Let us take the most schematic example: the translation into French of a German grammar written in German. It will of course be necessary to translate the sentences that state the rules—those that say the verb should be placed at the end of the sentence, for instance—but, by definition, the sentences given as examples will remain untranslated. At most, the translator might juxtapose a word-for-word version, following the forms and the order of the German words.

The German language (as well as others) is often, and in many ways, Freud's object. We must remember each time that here translation finds an absolute limit. This is not a matter of the so-called inevitable "betrayal": if the German author—Freud in this case—presents his object in the text and reflects upon it, the translator can only reproduce Freud's German words just as they stand, provided, of course, that a commentary makes the system of combination peculiar to the German language (its sounds, meanings, plays on words, and so on) accessible to the reader.

This is just what we are talking about when we speak of metalinguistic texts (or passages). When Freud (1917) speaks in these terms: "*Leurs plaintes [Klagen] sont des plaintes portées contre [Anklagen] conformément au vieux sens du mot,*"²¹ our second use of the word *plaintes* obviously refers to the German word *Anklagen* and not to its French translation. The same applies in the famous *Das Unheimliche* text (Freud 1919b) and to all the considerations regarding the double meaning of the word *heimlich* ("uncanny"). It would therefore be absurd not to transcribe this just as is—a German term that is the object of Freudian reflection.

For purposes of demonstration, we have given only a limited number of examples. In reality, a great part of Freud's work deals with language itself, not only in cases where it is taken directly as his object but also where it becomes the indispensable material for psychoanalysis, especially in all its clinical aspects. The analysis of dreams and witticisms, indeed clinical analysis itself, is mostly—though not, as Lacan would have it, exclusively—conducted through verbal associations, chains, and bridges. Moreover, the frontier is clearly marked by Freud with regard to wit. In "conceptual wit" the verbal formulation is of secondary importance, and the witticism can be translated without loss of comic effect, whereas "verbal wit" is inseparably linked to its expression in German.

21. B.V.—"Their complaints are really 'plaints' in the old sense of the word" (10:434/14:248/OC 13:267).

Even if the translator has the luck to find a French (or English) equivalent, the connecting paths will necessarily be different.

What, then, can be said about dreams? Let us remember that Freud, not without reason, advised his first Anglo-Saxon translator to replace the examples given in the German edition by others—dreams dreamt, related, and analyzed in English.

In these and many other cases, the rule of not translating goes hand in hand with another: that of providing the reader with the elements necessary for understanding the German “clinical” object. Thus, the German word *Herr* is indispensable in understanding the mechanism of forgetting names involved in its link with Herzegovina (Freud 1893b). Similarly, in the case of a proper name—which is theoretically untranslatable but is used here because of its significance as a common noun—the translation of *Wolf*, the name of the tutor of the “*Homme aux loups*” (The Wolf Man), has to be supplied in a footnote.

This is not a failure in translation but an objective limit: if the author of a geometry treatise talks about the triangle, no translator is going to attempt the absurd task of translating the figure of the triangle itself but will simply try to give access, in the target language, to the same experiences as those described in the original text.

Finally, however, having learned from psychoanalytic experience, we have to go a step further. Language is both the instrument molded, wrought, and used by Freud with considerable mastery and one of the most favored materials for the deployment of psychoanalysis as a method of exploring the unconscious. How simple it would be if these two aspects did not overlap so often; if Freud’s conceptual creation were not propelled by language at least as much as it controls language; if, on the contrary, the conceptual demons did not insinuate themselves even into dreams, wit, and so much of clinical experience.

The moments when Freud is more or less the hostage of language, as well as its craftsman, can be spotted mainly in the odd text or passage taken in isolation, removed from the general context. This is where “local context” takes over less as spontaneously accessible meaning than as repetitions, conjunctions, and unexpected ways of playing with verbal signifiers. We have been attentive to these as well and have tried to restore them whenever possible.²²

22. One example from among thousands: when in his article on “cover-memories” (*Deckerinnerungen*) [Strachey’s translation: “screen memories”] Freud evokes the table that was set (*der gedeckte Tisch*) [literally, “the covered table”] for fruit, we consider it indispensable to give the reader access to the unexpected latent echo between the theoretical term and the concrete example—an echo

So rather than lament the problem of “untranslatability” in general and the incompatibility of the “geniuses” of languages, we will underline the fact that Freud’s work has renewed and profoundly complicated this problem by imposing on us both the duty to translate without compromise and, in some cases, the duty not to translate but rather to provide direct access to the language mechanisms brought into play by the unconscious, with explanatory notes. Psychoanalytic discovery shows us that the limits of translatability, which are often perfectly easy to see, lie within Freud’s text itself—that is, between what psychic content is conveyed by the meaning, on the one hand, and what is conveyed by the “letter,” on the other.

We shall conclude with the problem of interpretation. Claiming that any translation is a “reading” and that all “reading” is an “interpretation” too often leads to justifying any kind of relativism. At a recent congress, we heard this thesis expressed in the idea that it was absurd to undertake a new English translation of Freud: Strachey’s is an interpretation of Freud, and one could do no more than substitute for his interpretation with another, neither more nor less arbitrary than the Standard Edition. Gradually we would see a Kleinian Freud, a Lacanian Freud, and so forth proposed alongside the International Psychoanalytical Association (IPA) Freud. At the risk of upholding an outdated (or strangely new!) absolutism, we repeat that our ambition is to propose a Freud in French that is . . . Freudian. Interpretation, commentary, and exegetic discussions are an indispensable preliminary to translation if the latter is to render the text’s polysemy as accurately as possible, particularly in the passages that are the most readily pulled to pieces and manipulated in every direction. Translating means making decisions, not in favor of one interpretative option but for a text that allows the foreign reader a freedom comparable to that of the German reader.

This is the case, for example, when Freud talks about the Wolf Man and his position with regard to castration in the following terms: “When I said he rejected it, the first meaning of this expression is that he didn’t want to know anything about it in the sense of repression.”²³

that is not rendered by the option of *souvenirs-écran* (“screen memories”). [D.G.O.—See chap. 1, pp. 15–16, this vol.]

23. B.V.—Our translation. Cf. OC 18:82, while SE 17:84 proposes: “When I speak of his having rejected it, the first meaning of the phrase is that he would have nothing to do with it, in the sense of having repressed it” for “Wenn ich gesagt habe, dass er sie verwarf, so ist die nächste Bedeutung dieses Ausdrucks, dass er von ihr nichts wissen wollte im Sinne der Verdrängung” (GW 12:117).

This passage lends itself to two opposite interpretations: the commonly accepted one, in which “rejecting,” “not wanting to know anything,” and “repressing” would be part of the same psychic attitude, and that of Lacan, according to which repressing is still knowing (knowing “in the sense of repression”) while “rejecting” (“foreclosure”) would be the radical not-knowing (Lacan 1966, p. 386). The slightest inflection in our translation would suffice to tip the balance in one direction or the other. What is more, ignorance of the disputes that raged around this passage can lead any translator who confidently “understands” it to skip over the difficulty.

The same applies to the famous *wo Es war, soll Ich werden*. It is a real deviation to propose translations according to Lacan, according to ego-psychology, and so on. The only acceptable translation is one that is as Freudian as possible and that knows, respects, and restores all the richness and ambiguity of this phrase, thus allowing the exegetes to continue commenting on it to their hearts’ content.²⁴

Restoring Freud to Freud therefore means proposing a Freud open to interpretation, not closed off in the name of a particular ideology.

Here the two essential points developed in our introduction join together: independence from interpretation associated with any “school,” and the fortunate conjunction for our translation of coming late and thus benefiting from the wealth of ideas debated in France for decades. Scholarly debate unfortunately tends to become impoverished when dogmatisms take over and each refuses to relinquish its own Freud. One can understand the turmoil that seizes some circles when instead of their own comfortable certainties, they are confronted with the “naked” Freud, a Freud, we might venture to say, stripped of all the tawdry finery he had been decked up in: the rigid, sophisticated clothing of ideologies, the lazy ready-to-wear of “ethnocentric” translation.²⁵

24. Freud 1933, p. 86. Although Lacan commented on this passage several times, he never gave a single translation that would decide between “the ego” and “the subject.” On the contrary, he explained in a detailed analysis (1966, pp. 416–18) that on the one hand one or another of the phrases he proposed “went against the principles of significative economy that have to govern a translation,” and that on the other hand the essential thing was “to analyze if and how the I and the ego are distinct from each other and overlap in each particular subject.” In our own translation we try to bring into play both this distinction and the overlapping: “Où ça était, je (moi) dois (doit) devenir”; “Where id was, there ego shall be” (SE 22:80).

25. One example of “ethnocentrism” is Marie Bonaparte’s note on p. 8 of her translation of *L’avenir d’une illusion* [The Future of an Illusion]: “In the following, we will more often translate the word culture by civilisation, the latter better rendering for the French reader the notion that Freud understands by culture.” [B.V. and D.G.O.—Culture and civilisation are the words she used in French. Freud’s words are, of course, Kultur and, very rarely, Zivilisation.]

STYLE AND ITS RENDERING

Freud is obviously a writer revered by the greatest and most expert of his fellows.²⁶ His literary repertory is extremely rich: immediacy of language, lack of affectation, demonstrative rigor, eloquence, ease, dramatic impact, exact correspondence between expression and thought, density, lyricism (which surfaces in his outbursts of enthusiasm for psychoanalysis or in his bitterness at incomprehension or injustice), plasticity, and variety. The plasticity relates at once to the "genre scenes" scattered through the most austere texts, his evocations of characters, situations, and landscapes reminiscent of those by Keller or Conrad-Ferdinand Meyer,²⁷ his presentation of the realities of the soul, which acquire substance and come alive with a dynamism that sometimes belongs to the world of films. His variety is evident as he touches every point on a vast continuum ranging from the freedom of a relaxed conversational tone or that of the improviser to the solemnity of the legislator who weighs every word and confers the prestige of a kind of gnomic poetry onto thinking whose every inflection is elaborated in minute detail.

There is no end to the game of definitions. Freud is the philosopher and didactician of *Metapsychology*, the dialectician of *Group Psychology*, the real or imaginary lecturer of *Introductory Lectures* and *New Introductory Lectures*, the essayist who expands the essay on Leonardo da Vinci into a monograph, the orator of "Thoughts for the Times on War and Death," the debater who challenges the reader as his adversary and re-creates the lively bustle of a public meeting in certain passages of *Totem and Taboo* or *Analysis of a Case of Hysteria*, the polemicist of *On the History of the Psycho-Analytic Movement*, the public prosecutor who settles scores with Adler, Janet, and Jung, the panegyrist of Charcot, the biographer or exegete of Moses, his own memorialist in *An Autobiographical Study*, the preface writer of at least fifteen works by fellow authors, the linguist of *The Uncanny*, the poet of the hours of grace accorded by nature (*On Transience*), by the novel (*Gradiva*), or by Shakespearian comedy and tragedy ("The Theme of the Three Caskets"), the chronicler of his own dreams and slips of the pen, prone to confession and confidence, the writer of dialogue

26. Alfred Döblin, Albert Einstein, Herman Hesse, Walter Jens, Rudolf Kayser, Claude Lévi-Strauss, Thomas Mann, Ludwig Marcuse, Alexander Mitscherlich, Viktor von Weizsäcker, and Stefan Zweig, to name but a few.

27. His first study of a literary work, C.-F. Meyer's "Die Richterin," can be found in his letter of 20 June 1898 to Fliess (Freud 1986). Responding in 1906 to Hugo Heller's request that he give the titles of "ten good books," Freud names only two German works: G. Keller's short stories, *Die Leute von Seldwyla*, and C.-F. Meyer's historical scenes in verse, *Huttens letzte Tage* (Freud 1906).

capable of putting words into the mouth of "Little Hans" as well as the learned "Impartial Person" of the *Lay Analysis*, the storyteller of *Screen Memories*, the serialist of bourgeois Vienna, with its streets, dwellings, stairways, and boudoirs, the miniaturist describing the "mystic writing pad" as if for a catalog of rare objects, the humorist who enjoys witticisms and analyzes those of others, exercises his verve on himself and his fiancée, and in *A Difficulty in the Path of Psycho-Analysis* imagines psychoanalysis admonishing the ego, the master of aphorism, of all forms of imagery, comparison, or metaphor, of the simile, the quotation (which he exploits), and the epigraph (which he appropriates).²⁸ This still does not enumerate all the faces of Freud, nor does it mention the entirety of what he produced. But there is no need to go any further to discover the exceptional nature of such a multiform literary talent. Freud has "style" but not one style. Perhaps he has all styles. This is why he can claim kinship with Lessing, though Walter Jens compares him to Kassner and Kraus, and Stefan Zweig to Stendhal. In translating him, we ourselves have sometimes detected the logician's fervor and the truly Jansenist elegance of Schiller's aesthetic writings.

From the viewpoint of style, the same diversity appears not only in the body of his writing as a whole but also from one work to another. Let us consider volume 13 of the *Oeuvres complètes* to compare his *Metapsychology* with "The Wolf Man." As we have said before, the style in *Metapsychology* is didactic, with a demonstrative purpose. The sentences are relatively short and precise. Freud seems to be thinking out loud and inviting us to follow the meanderings of his reflections. Each text begins with definitions, followed by hypotheses that are often proposed in the form of an enquiry and discussed shortly afterward; all objections are considered until an answer to the question emerges, based on evidence usually from psychoanalytic experience. All the metapsychological texts, which are without doubt the ones most revealing of Freud's scientific style, are based on the hypothetical-deductive method of reasoning; but a certain stylistic specificity is apparent in each of them. "Mourning and Melancholia" is more clinical in style than the "Metapsychological Supplement," and "The Unconscious" is livelier, sometimes descriptive and anecdotal. As for the second part of the "Overview of the Transference Neuroses," it bears some resemblance to a work of

28. On Freud as a writer, see Walter Muschg, "Freud als Schriftsteller," in *Die Zerstörung der deutschen Literatur*, 3d ed. (Bern: Francke, 1958), pp. 303-47; and J. Schotte 1959, "Introduction à la lecture de Freud écrivain," pp. 51-68, and notes following his translation of Muschg, pp. 108-24.

science fiction. Imagination is given free rein. Prehistory springs into new existence, and we see our distant ancestors come alive. However, the critical spirit recovers in the end.

"The Wolf Man" presents an even richer stylistic palette. Here again, in places we have a novel—a detective story this time. Freud scrutinizes the mysteries of his patient's remotest past, investigates the famous primal scene,²⁹ and reconstructs reality piece by piece with the tactics of a psychoanalytic Sherlock Holmes—a detective of the soul. In the chapters of this history of an infantile neurosis where he provides a sound basis for the theses advanced earlier in the book, he develops his argument with passionate rhetoric.

When he restores the dreams of Sergei Constantinovich Pankeiev, resuscitates his parents, his sister, their nanny, evokes the different social levels of domestic life on a wealthy estate in southern Russia (an opportunity for so many genre scenes: "La jeune fille à même le sol, occupée à frotter celui-ci, à genoux, les nates saillantes, le dos à l'horizontale"),³⁰ dwells on the torpor of a hot summer day, and suggests the intimacy of the parental couple taking a siesta in lightweight white clothing (white was also the color of the wolves and the trees, "spun all over by caterpillars"—12:102/17:70/OC 13:68), Freud fleetingly indulges in the pleasure of writing prose in the style of Chekhov.

Another style is a very distinctive humor that results from the almost solemn gravity attached to characters, situations, and words that in other circumstances would elicit laughter: the Wolf Man is obliged to exhale at the sight of cripples or "to think of the Holy Trinity whenever he saw three heaps of dung lying together in the road" and tortured by the need to know if "Christ had shat."³¹ Freud reports seriously and scientifically words he would elsewhere have put among the "witticisms." He plays on words (*Durchfall* = failure in exams and diarrhea: a double danger for the candidate) and with words (shit on God/shit something for God;³² Grusha, the nursery maid, and grusha, the word for "pear").

Freud goes further, sometimes breaks with traditional writing in "The Wolf Man," and reaches a kind of surrealism at the very point where

29. B.V.—*Scène originaire* in the French text—the French equivalent of Freud's *Urszene*.

30. OC 13:90/GW 12:126. [B.V.—Strachey's translation fails to reflect Freud's use of the Latin word *nates* for "buttocks"; "the girl on the floor engaged in scrubbing it, and kneeling down, with her buttocks projecting and her back horizontal" (SE 17:92).]

31. B.V.—Strachey translates "ob Christus auch geschissen habe" by "if Christ used to shit too" (12:94/17:63/OC 13:60).

32. "Auf Gott scheissen," "Gott etwas scheissen" (12:116/17:83/OC 13:81).

psyche and soma are tied together. He considers urine, excrement, intestines, genitals, the belly, coitus. He mixes the anatomical and the physiological with philosophical reasoning. This parallel course with possible triviality and speculation running side by side is radically destabilizing, especially in German. The other styles in "The Wolf Man" present no insurmountable translation problems; it is a matter of rendering their variety, accepting the patchwork character of their coexistence, and, whatever the level of the language, always integrating the basic terminology Freud obviously never departs from. But when this same Freud transforms the psychic agencies into characters, mixes the life of the body with that of the soul, when he departs from propriety and creates a scandal so as to give more brilliant impact to his truth (Altounian 1983), audacity has to be rendered with audacity.

Let us examine a passage more closely (the last paragraph of 12:116/17:83–84/OC 13:81–82). The first sentence remains in the medical and clinical sphere (intestinal mucus and vaginal mucus) but already uses a peculiar combination of words (excrement column). The next sentence associates the affects with physiology; it opens with an expression—"Das Hergeben des Kots zu Gunsten (aus Liebe zu) einer anderen Person"—as unexpected in German as in the French translation we propose: "L'abandon de l'excrément en faveur (pour l'amour) d'une autre personne devient, quant à lui, le prototype de la castration, c'est le premier cas de renoncement à un morceau du corps propre pour gagner la faveur d'une autre personne aimée."³³ Here we are prepared for the concept Freud is going to speak about in the next two sentences: "Die sonst narzisstische Liebe zu seinem Penis entbehrt also nicht eines Beitrages von seiten der Analerotik. Der Kot, das Kind, der Penis ergeben also eine Einheit, einen unbewussten Begriff—*sit venia verbo*—, den des vom Körper abtrennbaren Kleinen," or: "L'amour par ailleurs narcissique que l'on porte à son pénis ne va donc pas sans une contribution de la part de l'érotisme anal. L'excrément, l'enfant, le pénis donnent donc une unité, un concept inconscient—*sit venia verbo*—celui de 'petit', séparable du corps."³⁴ With the three Latin words, Freud is in a way apologizing for his boldness of expression. Why would anyone try to

33. "The handing over of feces for the sake of (out of love for) someone else becomes a prototype of castration; it is the first occasion upon which an individual parts with a piece of his own body in order to gain the favor of some other person whom he loves" (SE 17:84).

34. B.V.—"So that a person's love of his own penis, which is in other respects narcissistic, is not without an element of anal eroticism. 'Feces,' 'baby,' and 'penis' thus form a unity, an unconscious concept (*sit venia verbo*)—the concept namely of 'a little one' that can become separated from one's body" (SE 17:84).

play down the crudity of the juxtaposition of the three subjects (*der Kot, das Kind, der Penis*—three singular definite articles) by replacing “excrement” with “feces” or “fecal bolus” when these two terms recur throughout the text and Freud uses them when he wants to or needs to, but precisely not here? Why would one translate *des Kleinen* as “of the little thing,” when the genitive of *das Kleine* could just as well mean the little child, *das Kind*—an implicit polysemy which is the specific intent of Freud’s demonstration? To translate *das Kleine* as *la petite chose* (“the little thing”) would be to deny the French reader the possibility of understanding the meaning of the Freudian equation in its own terms: “L’excrément, l’enfant, le pénis, donnent [...] une unité.” Would this not indicate embarrassment at Freud’s bluntness?

One last example of boldness calling for similar boldness on the part of the translator. In the final chapter of “The Wolf Man,” Freud speaks about cannibalism. “Il apparaît chez notre patient, par régression à partir d’un stade plus élevé, dans l’angoisse: être mangé par le loup.”³⁵ The German text goes on: “Diese Angst mussten wir uns ja übersetzen: von Vater koitiert zu werden.” One of our predecessors translates this as “Nous fûmes obligés de traduire cette peur de la façon suivante: la peur de servir au coït du père.”³⁶ We do not subscribe to this translation, which disrupts the German word order, omits the *uns*, omits the *ja*, waters down the “vom Vater koitiert zu werden,” and deprives the reader of the parallelism between the two verbal forms: to be eaten and to be “coited.” We propose: “Cette angoisse, il fallait bien que nous nous la traduisions: être coïté par le père.”³⁷ The problem here is purely syntactic; terminology is involved only as far as the term *angoisse* (anxiety) is concerned. The unity of two different realities is expressed by the identity of their syntax. It is a style that we are translating, very much aware that it is the style of one man.

Style asserts itself in the earliest writing of Freud, who never confined himself to “a doctor’s German.” He was twenty-eight when Bernfeld attributed the success of the study “On Coca” to its artistic qualities, twenty-nine when Brücke, in a report supporting Freud’s candidacy for

35. B.V.—“Es kommt bei unserem Patienten durch Regression von einer höheren Stufe her in der Angst zum Vorschein: vom Wolf gefressen zu werden”; Strachey, “It makes its appearance with our present patient through regression from a higher stage, in the form of fear of ‘being eaten by the wolf’ ” (12:141/17:106/OC 13:103).

36. In *Cinq psychanalyses* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France), p. 407. [B.V.—“We were obliged to translate this fear in the following way: the fear of serving for the father’s coitus.”]

37. B.V.—Strachey continues, “We were, indeed, obliged to translate this into a fear of being copulated with by his father.”

the title of *Dozent*, remarked that he “possesses the gift of describing his research with elegance and precision” (M. Robert 1964, vol. 1, p. 77).

These gifts were recognized by his contemporaries and by posterity. In 1930, Freud received the Goethe Prize of the City of Frankfurt on Main; in 1964 the Darmstadt *Deutsche Akademie für Sprache und Dichtung* (German Academy for Language and Literary Creation) instituted the “Sigmund Freud Prize for Scientific Prose.”³⁸

The prize founded in memory of Freud may be clear enough (it attracts little public interest in any case), but the prize awarded to Freud created a misunderstanding and nurtured a legend. “Freud is Goethe! Freud should be translated like Goethe!” As though there were only one Goethe. Here again, one has to draw on the texts. The essential document is a letter from Alfons Paquet, secretary of the committee that had awarded this ten-thousand-mark prize every year since 1927. It was Paquet who had the idea of proposing Freud’s nomination; he encountered a certain resistance within the committee but at the final session received the energetic assistance of Alfred Döblin, novelist and neuro-psychiatrist. Paquet wrote to Freud on 26 July 1930:

The regulations stipulate that the Prize should be awarded to a personality whose creative effect [*Wirken*] is worthy of a tribute dedicated to the memory of Goethe. . . . The directing board wishes . . . in conferring it upon you, to express the high value it places on the upheavals in the forces shaping our time brought about by the new forms of research you created.

There follows a literal reproduction of the terms of the official tribute on the diploma:

By a method belonging strictly to the natural sciences, as well as by a bold interpretation of the parables coined by poets, your research has opened access to the driving forces of the soul and thereby created the possibility of understanding the appearance and development of many cultural forms at their roots and healing diseases to which medical art until now did not have the key. Your psy-

38. According to the terms of its statutes, this foundation has as its objective the “promotion of a genre”: “scholarly prose.” The Darmstadt Academy considers that in German, “in comparison with other European literatures,” this genre, which is both literary and scientific, is “neither duly esteemed—by its creators or by its users—nor, consequently, sufficiently developed.” The twenty-seven prizewinners between 1964 and 1990 are a Germanist, two historians, three historians of art and theater, four historians of literature, a jurist, an educator, two philologists, two political scientists, two Romanticists, two physicists, three theologians, a zoologist, and six renowned philosophers.

chology has explored and enriched not only medical science but also the imaginative world of artists, pastors in charge of souls, historians, and educators. Beyond the dangers of monomaniacal self-dissection and all differences of spiritual orientation, your work has provided the foundation of a better and renewed understanding of peoples. Just as, according to your own communication, the very beginnings of your scientific studies go back to a public reading of Goethe's essay "Nature," so, the somewhat Mephistophelian quality favored by your most recent mode of research, which leads to unceremonious tearing of all the veils, in the inseparable companion of Faustian insatiability and a Faustian respect for the powers of plastic creation that lie dormant in the unconscious. The homage rendered to you concerns in equal part the scholar, the writer, and the combatant who, moved by the burning questions of our time, stands firm and points the way to one of the liveliest aspects of the Goethean essence. (GW 14:545, 546n)

Thus defined, the prize is different from and far more than a literary award.³⁹ It links Freud to Goethe the writer, certainly, but also (and above all) to the Goethe who evokes "The Mothers," Goethe the scholar and "citizen of the world." The Freud who recognized himself with amazement and emotion in Paquet's letter—where do you know all that from? No one has ever before recognized my secret intentions with such clarity . . . (GW 14:546)—is essentially the researcher, the "incomparable explorer of human passions," citing a phrase he used to describe a hero of the ancient Greeks in "Thoughts of the Times on War and Death" (Freud 1915e, 10:327/14:278/OC 13:130).

In fact, Freud's literary gifts, which we have insisted on at such length, are the source of a contradiction that has never been entirely overcome. Although Freud discovers the very procedures of psychoanalysis with admiration and envy in a poem by Goethe (the dedication of *Faust*, "To the Moon") or in one of Schnitzler's scenes (*The Merry-Go-Round*), he

39. According to the terms of the prize, the winners should constitute a "spiritual elite," working and creating "in the spirit of Goethe." The first three winners were the poet Stefan George, Albert Schweitzer, and the philosopher Leopold Ziegler. After 1930 the board's choice fell upon dramatists, historians, poets, or novelists, but it also included the architect Walter Gropius, the chemists Carl Bosch and Richard Kuhn, the musician Hans Pfitzner, the philosopher Karl Jaspers, the physicists Max Planck and Carl V. Weizsäcker, and the sculptor Georg Kolbe (see Willi Emrich, *Die Träger des Goethepreises der Stadt Frankfurt-am-Main von 1927 bis 1961* [Verlag August Osterrieth, 1963]). The 1988 prizewinner was the director Peter Stein. [D.G.O.—Since 1952 the prize has been awarded every three years.]

laments being neither poet nor playwright. And novelist? According to a confidence Stekel shared with Wittels, Freud would have liked to become one so as "to pass on to the world what his patients have told him" (Schönau 1968, p. 12). He also knew that by ensuring the survival—including the literary survival—of Dora, Little Hans, the Wolf Man, the Rat Man, and Judge Schreber, he was enriching the family of human comedy just as much as the great novelists had done.

A passage from *Studies on Hysteria* makes this point: "It still strikes me as peculiar that the case histories I write should read like short stories and that, as one might say, they lack the serious stamp of science"; and the "detailed presentation of soul processes is one that we are used to from a poet." But Freud draws no claim to literary glory from this observation. Continuing, he "consoles" himself: "The nature of the subject is evidently responsible for this, rather than any preference of my own."⁴⁰ In reality Freud, who possesses all the resources of a writer, is little concerned about being one, or it is as if he is also a writer. Inasmuch as both artist and scholar dwell within him, as in Leonardo da Vinci (who, according to Freud, never managed to reconcile the two) and, again, in Goethe, who did succeed in making them coexist, it is the scholar who prevails (Freud 1930b). Does he not make the "Impartial Person" of *The Question of Lay Analysis* say, "And do not try to give me literature instead of science" (14:225/20:198/OC, vol. 18)? Did he not write to Lou Andreas-Salomé, "Despite all the phrases, I am not an artist" (Schönau 1968, p. 12)? However, it is not unusual for him to have as his sole objective making himself understood and to disdain any formal research. His writing then becomes in some way instrumental (in the sense Barthes used when speaking about Camus's instrumentality)⁴¹ without ever being colorless or neutral.

Two examples will suffice. First a sentence taken from the essay "On the Grounds for Detaching a Particular Syndrome from Neurasthenia under the Description 'Anxiety Neurosis'":

Ein solcher Angstanfall besteht entweder einzig aus dem Angstgefühle ohne jede assoziierte Vorstellung oder mit der naheliegenden Deutung der Lebensvernichtung, des "Schlagtreffens", des drohenden Wahnsinns, oder aber dem Angstgefühle ist irgendwelche Parästhesie beigemischt (ähnlich der hysterischen Aura), oder end-

40. D. G. O. — Following the German and French texts, I have altered Strachey's translation (1:227/2:160).

41. Cf. Philippe Roger, Roland Barthes, *roman* (Editions Grasset and Fasquelle, 1968), p. 269.

lich mit der Angstepfindung ist eine Störung irgend einer oder mehrerer Körperfunktionen, der Atmung, Hertzthätigkeit, der vaso-motorischen Innervation, der Drüsenthätigkeit verbunden.

Freud, who considers four sets of circumstances in which anxiety crises occur, changes construction in mid-sentence twice, only hints at, or rather omits, *aus dem Angstgefühl*, does not enable the reader to understand immediately what the adverbial *mit* relates to, and creates an ambiguity between the fallacious *ohne jede Vorstellung . . . oder mit* and *entweder . . . , oder*, in accord with the logic of the language. This gives:

Un tel accès d'angoisse consiste, ou bien uniquement dans le sentiment d'angoisse sans aucune représentation associée ou accompagné de la première interprétation à s'offrir, l'anéantissement de la vie, "attaque," folie menaçante, ou bien alors au sentiment d'angoisse est adjointe une quelconque paresthésie (semblable à l'aura hystérique) ou bien enfin à la sensation d'angoisse est relié un trouble d'une quelconque ou de plusieurs fonctions corporelles, de la respiration, de l'activité cardiaque, de l'innervation vaso-motrice, de l'activité glandulaire.⁴²

This sentence betrays no concern for "good writing" on Freud's part. It is not an exceptional case, and failings such as these were distressing to Freud himself. Writing to Fliess on 21 September 1899, while correcting the proofs of his *Interpretation of Dreams* (1900), Freud confides that "the tortuous sentences . . . , with their parading of indirect phrases and squinting at ideas, deeply offended one of my ideals" (Freud 1986, pp. 410–11).

The other example comes from *The Future of an Illusion*:

Wir würden uns nicht entschliessen können, eine für uns so gleichgiltige Tatsache anzunehmen, wie dass Walfische Junge gebären anstatt Eier anzulegen, wenn sie nicht besser erwiesbar wäre.

Or:

Nous ne pourrions nous résoudre à admettre un fait qui nous est à ce point indifférent, comme par exemple que les baleines enfan-

42. "An anxiety attack of this sort may consist of the feeling of anxiety alone, without any associated idea, or accompanied by the interpretation that is nearest to hand, such as ideas of the extinction of life, or of a stroke, or of threat of madness; or else some kind of paraesthesia (similar to the hysterical aura) may be combined with the feeling of anxiety, or finally, the feeling of anxiety may have linked to it a disturbance of one or more of the bodily functions—such as respiration, heart action, vasomotor innervation or glandular activity" (Freud 1895b, 1:319/3:93–94/OC 3:35).

tent des petits au lieu de pondre des oeufs, s'il n'était pas mieux démontrable.⁴³

Lines are slapped together carelessly, which of course indicates not indifference to style (or even to accuracy of expression) on Freud's part but rather a momentary indifference. Other examples can be found in almost every work, lengthy or brief; in almost all of them we find arid notes, all the more muddled in syntax and lax in style if they are elaborated. Repetition of words is not always justified by emphasis or eagerness to convince. Without making a long list of references, let us consider the seven instances of *Kultur* (of which three are in compound form, plus one *kulturell*) that occur in fourteen lines of "Thoughts of the Times on War and Death" (1915e, 10:336/14:284–5/OC 13:137–38), the four *Kind* plus one *kindlich* in nine lines of his preface to *Wayward Youth* (1925d, 14:556/19:274/OC, vol. 17), or this sentence from "The Wolf Man":

An dem Sohne selbst habe ich bei mehrjähriger Beobachtung keinen Stimmungswandel beobachten können,

which there is no reason not to translate as

Chez le fils lui-même, je n'ai pu, l'observant durant plusieurs années, observer aucun changement d'humeur.⁴⁴

Some, adding up Freud's "mistakes" and exaggerating his syntactic complications, might insinuate that he writes like Kant. Accidentally and occasionally, perhaps. But Thomas Mann had already proclaimed that Freud's language usually equals that of Schopenhauer.

On the one hand, then, we have a person who has the power to be a writer and who often is a powerful writer but who does not put his marvelous literary qualities to the service of literature. On the other hand, he is a researcher, an explorer of the soul, who recognizes the writer in himself, does not stifle him, mobilizes him when necessary, but keeps him dependent upon the researcher's thinking. There is no dichotomy here but, rather, agreement, accommodation, and a hierarchical arrangement. Thus the result is a constant, conscious, and essential cohabitation

43. "We should not be able to bring ourselves to accept anything of so little concern to us as the fact that whales bear young instead of laying eggs, if it were not capable of better proof than this" (Freud 1927b, 14:349/21:27/OC, vol. 18).

44. B.V.—The Standard Edition ignores Freud's repetition "observation" and then "observe": "But in the son I was never able, during an observation which lasted several years, to detect any changes of mood" (Freud 1918, 12:30/17:8/OC 13:6).

of the two Freuds, with one dominating the other. Yes, Freud is a proven writer, but a writer in the exclusive service of a thinker, one who is autonomous. If he had such great admiration for Lessing, it was because Lessing knew how to "subordinate his art to his thinking" (Robert 1964, vol. 2, p. 239).

Having so many styles at his disposal could be a poisoned gift. Is Freud's writing kaleidoscopic? Is he a chameleon writer? No, because what he writes is what he has to say ("Here speaks one who has something to say," said Döblin). His words are his thoughts. For him, "language is very precisely what it expresses."⁴⁵ His personal vocabulary, which permeates and nourishes every line of his work, ensures its unity—above all, its literary unity. Philosopher, essayist, poet, storyteller, or whatever else, Freud "does" Freud and never anything else. This vocabulary, whose originality and singularity are beyond dispute, is what makes his writing original and singular, even in the most hurried note or the most trivial letter. Thus the need to hold his vocabulary to account most rigorously—which then establishes it as a terminology. Overall, Freud's purpose is didactic and scientific, even though it bears the stamp of aesthetic pleasure. This is why our translation in no way forsakes the idea of being literary but subordinates all other goals to that of rendering Freud's thinking, with all respect for its thought-word unity, "even in the resonance of every resonance" (Rilke) and Freud's style even when he occasionally repudiates style. In reality, we render the style by rendering his thinking. This means a double perception of the signified and the signifier—which are indissoluble. This means following the school of Goethe (oh, Prize of the City of Frankfurt!), who reminds us in the *Paralipomena* of *Faust* that tenor, substance, and content provide their own form, that form never comes without content.⁴⁶ This means, in our view, being faithful to Freud. How can a distinction be made between form and substance in a work trying to prove that body and soul cannot be dissociated (Altounian 1983)?

We therefore take into account the variety of styles in different texts and in different passages. It is, however, a variety imposed by Freud himself, and rendering one text in a more literary manner and another more philosophically is never a personal choice for the translator.

45. Georges-Arthur Goldschmidt: "La maîtrise de Handke... résulte de ce que le langage est très exactement ce qu'il exprime"; G.-A. Goldschmidt's commentary on Peter Handke's French translation "Bienvenue au conseil d'administration," in *De l'un à l'autre ou l'auteur et les traducteurs* (Paris: Bourgois, 1980), p. 175.

46. "Gehalt bringt die Form mit; Form ist nie ohne Gehalt."

We shall now go into some detail to define our conception of stylistic and syntactic rendering precisely. It results from the principle stated previously: the text, the whole text, and nothing but the text. We meticulously carry out a series of obvious and elementary tasks that turn out to be innovative when practiced consistently. We give the directional and locational words concretely (*sich auf den Standpunkt stellen* [10:265/14:167/OC 13:206]): *se ranger au point de vue* ("to side with the standpoint") and not *s'y tenir* ("to hold to it"; *auf dem Standpunkt bleiben*). *Die auf einen falschen Weg* (in die Körperinnervation) *gedrängte Erregung* is "l'excitation poussée sur une fausse voie (l'innervation corporelle)."⁴⁷ We take into account the suffixes and give due weight, for example, to the -ung: *der Einfluss* (l'influence) and *die Beeinflussung* (l'influence exercée); *mit dieser Wendung* (en prenant ce tournant); *die Erfahrung* (sometimes l'expérience [que j'ai faite]). We differentiate the meanings of the verbal prefixes: *anziehen*, *ausziehen*, *überziehen*, *auseinanderziehen* concentrated in a few lines give *mettre*, *retirer*, *enfiler*, *étirer* in French (10:298–300/14:199–201/OC 13:237–39); the famous *von ihr [der Mutter] zur sexuellen Fröhreife emporgeküsst* becomes "élevé par ses baisers jusqu'à une maturité sexuelle précoce" ("after being kissed by [his mother] into precocious sexual maturity"; 8:204/11:131/OC, vol. 10). We diversify the nuances of compound words, in which the determiner and the determinate do not always have the same relationship or the same weight (see below, pp. 180–83). Whatever the cost, we integrate into our translation the reservation of a *doch* or an *aber*, the acceleration of a *zwar* or a *nämlich*, the scruples of a *denn* or a *nun*, and the insistence of an *auch*, a *ja* or an *überhaupt*. We consider that the frequent and often lengthy quotations Freud borrows from other languages are integral parts of his text. As such, we (re)translate them.

"Nothing but the text" excludes any stretching as well as any shrinking. We do not allow ourselves to cut short a long exposition that will demand an effort of penetration from the reader, or to mutilate the ample sentences, both sinuous and solidly constructed, that keep us breathless and establish between the text and ourselves an "evenly suspended attention" similar to that between analysand and analyst. The patchwork sentence reproduced on pages 157–58 is no more than an unfortunate and really very rare avatar of the Freudian era, which lives and breathes and whose inspiration we jealously preserve. If we have to limit ourselves to a single example, let us refer to the *Introductory Lectures* and a sentence by Otto Rank that Freud enjoyed quoting:

47. Freud, 1:64/3:50/OC 3:7. [D.G.O.—"Excitation forced onto a wrong path, into innervation of the body."]

Gerade das, was sie ihm also bloss leise andeuten möchte, weil sie es eigentlich ihm überhaupt verschweigen sollte, dass sie nämlich schon vor der Wahl ganz die Seine sei und ihn liebe, das lässt der Dichter mit bewundernswertem psychologischen Feingefühl, in dem Versprechen sich offen durchdrängen und weiss durch diesen Kunstgriff die unerträgliche Ungewissheit des Liebenden sowie die gleichgestimmte Spannung des Zuhörers über den Ausgang der Wahl zu beruhigen.

According to Gide's advice, one should try to bend the meaning to the balance of the phrase:⁴⁸

Cela même auquel elle voudrait ne faire qu'une légère allusion, parce qu'à la vérité elle devrait absolument le lui taire, à savoir que dès avant le choix elle est tout entière sienne et l'aime, cela le poète le laisse, avec une admirable délicatesse psychologique, transparaître ouvertement dans la méprise d'élocution et s'entend par ce procédé à calmer l'insupportable incertitude de l'amant tout comme, à l'unisson de celle-ci, la tension du spectateur quant à l'issue du choix.

We do not touch the parentheses. We respect the *dass* and all the subordinate conjunctions with which Freud marks out the course of his thinking. These relay points enable the reasoning to advance; to halt its progress by an erroneous colon would be betrayal.

This brings up the question of the heaviness of Freud's style. It is only accidentally due to Germanic influences and most often expresses the insistence of one who argues passionately and with a desire to convince. We do not attempt to lighten it at all costs (which would be falling into the romanization Freud spurned [Freud and Laforgue 1977]). Furthermore, we do not forget that in spite of everything, some of our requirements as translators tend toward a heaviness that can add to a possible heaviness in Freud himself: those rules governing terminology (see below), infinitives, and substantive participles—even if we keep *le fait que*... ("the fact that") and *ce qui est*... ("that is") to a strict minimum. And the modal verbs: it is preferable to weigh down

48. D.G.O.—Gide meant to render the poetic aspect by bending and balancing the phrase—à son nombre. This is the translation of the original German into the French *Traduire Freud*. Strachey's translation, "The thing of which she wanted to give him only a very subtle hint, because she should have concealed it from him altogether, namely that even before he made his choice she was wholly his and loved him—it is precisely this that the poet, with a wonderful psychological sensitivity, causes to break through openly in her slip of the tongue; and by this artistic device he succeeds in relieving both the lover's unbearable uncertainty and the suspense of the sympathetic audience over the outcome of his choice" (11:32/15:38/OC, vol. 14).

the verb *devoir* ("was supposed to") with a *forcément* ("obligatory") or a *nécessairement* ("necessarily") than to leave room for equivocation between the meanings of *müssen* ("must") and *sollen* ("should"). We do, then, accept some further heaviness when it is indispensable for rendering the most subtle inflections of thought; on the other hand, we do not necessarily exclude a sequence or turn of phrase that is less ponderous than the German. When Freud, referring to the resistance to psychoanalysis put up by his adversaries, writes, "*wozu eine Vermeidung der Nachprüfung die beste Technik schien*," which we translate as "*ce pour quoi la meilleure technique semblait être d'éviter d'en faire l'examen*," we lighten it (not without some scruples) by transforming the first two nouns into verbs.⁴⁹ We reject ineffectual, laboring, word-for-word translation, but we do not propose translations that can be read without sometimes suspending one's line of thought, provoking enquiry, or even confusion.

Like sentence structure, punctuation can serve as a pretext for doing an approximate and unfaithful translation. Of course, we are not unaware that punctuation serves different functions in German and in French—more subordinate to syntactic units in one, more closely linked to meaning, rhetoric, and the sound of the sentence in the other. Although such modification comes spontaneously to our pen, there can be no question of modifying the scansion of Freud's sentences or of cutting them up (as if the French were unaware of the existence of Proustian sentences). Similarly, punctuation can have an interpretive value, and its absence can create ambiguity: we have paid particular attention to this, both in the Freudian text and in our rendering, where it is scrupulously observed.

Accuracy includes, in particular, respecting repetitions. Moreover, repetition is for Freud a feature of style, whether, as Roustang (1980, p. 24) shows so well, it is a matter of concatenation, chiasmus, inclusion, or "pericentering," which consists of "repeating in the center of a paragraph one or several words occurring on the periphery of the previous paragraph." Freud does not expect from us a borrowed elegance obtained by even partial abolition of his repetitions. It is up to the reader to ask himself why, for example, in *The Neuro-psychoses of Defence* (Freud 1894), *Vorstellung* occurs seven times in seven lines, five in the form of *Zwangsvorstellung*.⁵⁰ Again, it is for the reader, just as much as for the translator, to wonder about certain plurals, certain pronouns (what does

49. B.V.—Strachey's translation, "and for this purpose the best technique seemed to be to avoid examining them" (12:31/17:9/OC 13:7).

50. B.V.—Strachey usually translates this term among others as "idea" (1:67/3:53–54/OC 3:10).

this or that “he,” “she,” or “it” refer to?), certain determinatives (why is this definite and that indefinite?), about the logic of certain tenses (why this clash between present and past in the same sentence?), of certain verbal moods (why this overlapping of direct and indirect speech?). It is not our job to deprive the reader of his surprise or to make a judgment for him, except in those infrequent cases where the specificity of the German language comes into play. Even so, we only rarely reflect the possessive or demonstrative value of *der*, *die*, *das* (*der Vater*: *mon père* = “my father”), which we usually render by the French definite article. Neither is it for us to impose on the reader the all-purpose *on* [the indeterminate pronoun “one”] used by nineteenth-century translators and teachers, where Freud, who was not in the least sparing in his use of *man* (seven times in twenty-three lines of “Thoughts for the Times on War and Death” [10:325–26/14:276/OC 13:128]), himself resorts to the passive voice. In one context, for instance, in *From the History of an Infantile Neurosis*, it is impossible to translate *geboren werden* by anything but the passive (to be brought into the world) without being guilty of mis-translation. Didier Anzieu takes the example of “Ein Kind wird geschlagen” (“Un enfant est battu”; “A Child Is Being Beaten”); if translated by “On bat un enfant” (“Someone Is Beating a Child”), the phrase denotes sadism rather than the masochism intended by Freud’s expression (1987, p. 529 n. 48). We observe a rigorous distinction between the personal passive (*er wird vertreten* = *il est représenté* = “he is represented”) and the “subject/verb *sein*/attributive participle” construction (Fourquet 1952) (*er ist vertreten* = *il se trouve représenté* = “he finds himself represented”).

We make every effort, without being fanatical and within the limits imposed by the French language and the above-mentioned concern for balancing heaviness, to translate a verb by a verb, a noun by a noun. Without being innovators, we respect the originality of all Freud’s images, comparisons, and metaphors (“Avec le névrosé on est comme dans un paysage préhistorique, par ex. dans le Jurassique. Les grands sauriens s’ébattent encore et les prêles sont hautes comme des palmiers”).⁵¹

We have not yet explained our conception of syntactic rendering. Here again, our style makes maximum effort to give the most faithful

51. B.V.—Strachey’s translation, “With neurotics it is as though we were in a prehistoric landscape—for instance, in the Jurassic. The great saurians are still running about; the horsetails grow as high as palms” (17:151/23:299/OC, vol. 20).

possible image of Freud's own. It would be a trivial reproach to remind us that the structure of the clause, not to mention the sentence, is different in French and German, as in English. This obvious statement becomes a pretext, however, when it is used to advocate completely rearranging the order of the word groups, chains of reasoning, coordination of clauses, under the illusion of making it look French or English where one is really taking the liberty of "saying things in a different way." The problem of the passage from one syntax to another mainly concerns word order and construction, essentially in subordinate clauses and qualifying phrases, which Freud is particularly fond of and develops at length. Here difficulties are encountered in the overall understanding of a sentence rather than in translation. A facile assumption about the irreducible geniuses of German, French, or English only too often turns out to be a myth. Modern-day French, under the combined influence of generalized polyglotism and translations, has become considerably more flexible. It is now possible, without too much effort or too many accidents, to preserve, if not the whole (verb position prevents that), at least the greater part of the German construction. It was probably because they gave up too quickly that Edwin and Willa Muir, the English translators of Kafka, lamented that the word order of Kafka is naked and infallible; it not only expresses his meaning but is involved as a part of it; only in that order could he have said what he had to say. Yet the fine order has to be disarranged, the original edifice of the sentence dismantled and put up again (via Brower 1966; Cotet and Rauzy 1983). On every page we feel that Freud too could say what he had to say only in the order he used. We do not disturb this order and do not alter the edifice except when absolutely necessary, when it is a matter of avoiding distortion of the meaning or violation of the French language. Our syntactic fidelity to Freud's German sometimes requires doing a certain violence to the French, but however extreme (or even extremist) it may be, this violence is never violating. It leads us to take into account both the "carelessness of unwanted thoughts" and the "work of attention and notation."⁵² It enables us to rescue a great many sentence beginnings by relying as little as possible on the crutches offered by these props. Freud, like Fontane,⁵³

52. Roustang 1980, p. 44. Roustang quotes (p. 32) Freud's letter of 7 July 1898 to Fliess about his own attempt to write a complete "Psychology": "Sie ist ganz dem Unbewussten nachgeschrieben nach dem berühmten Prinzip von Itzig der Sonntagsreiter. 'Itzig, wohin reit'st Du?'—'Weiss ich, frag das Pferd.' " ("It altogether follows the unconscious, following the famous principle of Itzig the Sunday rider. 'Itzig, where are you riding off to?' 'How would I know? Ask the horse.' ")

53. Freud quotes in particular three of Fontane's novels, *Effi Briest* (in the *Introductory Lectures* and in *Civilization and Its Discontents*), *L'Adultera*, and *Avant le tempête* (both in *The Psychopathology of Everyday*

whom he loved and quoted, possesses the sense of attack, the gift of concentrating in the first words of a chapter or a sentence the essentials of a thought he is about to develop. Respect for the stylistic structure, the order of the words, the nature of various complements, is as much an imperative for the translator as is respect for the meaning. It ensures, in an asymptotic way of course, preservation of the Freudian message. This sentence is taken from "The Wolf Man." Freud (1918) congratulates himself on having been able to "in die Beschreibung so frühe Phasen und so tiefe Schichten des Seelenlebens einzuführen," which we put as "introduire dans la description des phases aussi précoces et des strates aussi profondes de la vie d'âme."

The words *Phasen* and *Schichten* ("strata") are direct objects in German; it is important that they retain this status in French. A concern for elegance may have led to the translation: "introduire à la description de phases si précoces et de couches si profondes" or again: "la description de phases aussi précoces et de stratifications aussi profondes."⁵⁴ Thus phases and strata no longer appear as the objects of the research. In German they are not complements of the word for description—*Beschreibung*—but of the verb that submits them to description—that is to say, to the researcher's procedure, bringing them under the searchlight of thought. Freud's style reflects the dynamism of analytic investigation. Only syntactic fidelity allows the same rendering.

François Roustang shows to what extent Freud's "reasoning," his method of persuading and convincing, rests on the concerted, organized appearance of the main concepts on stage. What Roustang calls "parataxis" is nothing but the place given to words independently of the connections required by "syntax," and this place should be respected to the utmost; otherwise "Freud's writing loses all its vigor, and even all its meaning" (Roustang 1980, esp. pp. 34–35).

Finally, because we hope to adhere closely to the text without resorting to jargon, we are aware of offering the French- or English-speaking reader a prose that is sometimes rather unpolished. Far from being ashamed or even uncomfortable about it, we consider that in doing so we are confirming our fidelity to Freud. His work is still received

life). Finding, among other things, an example of "supplementary construction" (*Hilfskonstruktion*) in *Effi Briest* and of "bungled action" (*Fehlleistung*) in "The Adultera," he notes how difficult it is for the researcher "to find something new that a poet had not discovered before him."

54. D.G.O.—Strachey has "the description of such early phases and such deep strata of mental life" as "never before attacked"—*niemals zuvor in Angriff genommen*. He preserves Freud's direct objects and conveys the aggressive tone of Freud's account, literally, "to introduce such phases and strata of psychic life to [scientific] description" (12:138/17:104/OC 13:100–01). Gallimard and PUF are earlier French translations of the Wolf Man.

or perceived by the cultivated German public as original in the double sense of creative innovation and a certain bizarreness. A Freudian idiom exists, and the intermittent roughness of our French version renders one of its specific characteristics.

TERMINOLOGY AND CONCEPTUALIZATION

The fate of any great work of thought hinges on the concepts it creates and the words chosen to designate or circumscribe them. An author may give greater importance to judgment and relationships than to any one concept, but the concept is finally determinative. Even the idea of mobility will, *volens nolens*, pose the concept of that which is "moving." This is how the Platonic "idea," Aristotle's four "causes," Malebranche's "vision in God," or Darwin's "natural selection" are handed down in memory and reflection over generations. Concepts are pinned down—not without some danger of immobility—by, and thanks to, the verbal "signifier," and the reader (not the translator) must know how to restore a certain free play.

Is this priority given to terminology in translation valid only for a conceptual work? A great many translators and theoreticians of translation do not think so: among them Benjamin (1930), for whom the translation of great poetry depends on the "word for word"—*Wörtlichkeit*—not on the "proposition"; likewise Chouraqui, inspired translator of the Bible, attentive above all to the vocable and its resonances. But here, is great conceptual work not closely akin to great *Dichtung* ("poetry")?

Freud, Creator of a Conceptual System and a Linguistic Code

To say that Freud belongs to this tradition is an understatement; he is an immense creator of concepts and terms, probably surpassing all others not only in richness and variety but also in the subtlety and mastery of his distinctions.

The German language notoriously favors a profusion of substantives, if not substances: it allows extreme liberty in deriving nouns from verbs, adjectives, even adverbs (*das Aussen, das Draussen*—"the outside," "the out there"), as well as in forming compound words. Let us postulate at the outset, however, that the supposed irreducibility of any one language into another is not the only issue involved here. It can be shown—and we shall do so presently—on the one hand that Freud carries the possibilities of the German language to their maximum, but on the other,

that French and English are not without resources for the creation of concepts, even if these resources sometimes remain unexploited and, as it were, atrophied.

To say that German is spontaneously inclined to use the noun derived from the verb (in its infinitive form, or with the *-ung* ending) is to ignore the fact that although some of these forms are well established and in common use, others can be considered creations—if not in their form, at least in their frequency and the systematic use made of them. A simple example is *Verleugnung*, which at first appears, as though incidentally, to be derived from a verb (especially *leugnen*) but which quickly acquires its value as a major or even central concept.⁵⁵ Another classic case is the term *Regung*, to which Freud gave an eminent place, which Strachey hardly noticed,⁵⁶ and which in 1964 Laplanche and Pontalis translated into French as *motion*. This term has rarely been used by French psychoanalysts—but no less often than *Regung* is by the Germans! Freud was probably unable to convince his disciples of the usefulness of this concept, but this is no reason for the translator to erase it.

If the ways of Freudian conceptualization are many, their source is almost invariably the same: the use of language, more often ordinary language and less frequently the language of other scientific disciplines. Direct borrowings from a foreign language are very rare; we cannot consider as borrowed terms with Romance-language roots that have always been accepted in German: *Organisation*, for example, or even *Phantasie*. If one excludes words generally accepted in medical language (*dementia praecox*, *coitus interruptus*), very few Latin terms sound foreign in Freud's language: *Libido*, *Narzissmus*, *Autoerotismus*, and perhaps *Noxen*.

Among the forms of derivation he uses, the transposition from verb to noun features most prominently, a transformation so common in German that its significance is likely to remain unrecognized. This is the case with *étayage* (*Anlehnung*—"leaning on"), which was rediscovered as a fundamental concept only by Laplanche and Pontalis (1967). Until then, the term appeared in the index of the *Gesammelte Werke* only in its terminal form: *Anlehnungstypus der Objektwahl* ("leaning-on type of object choice"). The Standard Edition translation of *Anlehnung* ("leaning on") as "*anaclysis*" only darkened this eclipse because an artificially coined term hides the

55. On this point see Laplanche and Pontalis 1973, pp. 118–21, under the heading "Disavowal (Denial)."

56. B.V. and D.G.O.—*Triebregung* is generally translated into English, following the Standard Edition, as "instinctual impulse," a doubly faulty expression since *Trieb* is not "instinct" and *Regung* is much less defined or purposive than "impulse" (as in *Liebesregung*, *Affektregung*, *Gefühlsregung*, and so on). See chap. 5, this vol.

notion's progressive genesis from its starting point in common language. The word first appears in Freud's (1905c) writing, just once and as though by chance, among other related expressions, to show how sexuality is "associated" (*vergesellschaftet*) or "bound" (*verbunden*) to the functions of self-preservation.⁵⁷ Later the notion reappears in grammatically varied forms: a verb (*sich lehn*en an—"to lean oneself on") put into a phrase comprising the noun and used in a very specific way (in *Anlehnung* an—"in a leaning on"). Finally, in 1914–15 Freud definitively retains and underlines the notion, so that it acquires a conceptual independence.⁵⁸

This example is very rich, for it shows the rooting of a descriptive term in everyday use and language, the selection from among several possible terms, the transition to a concept by virtue of a substantive form, the introduction into a very particular syntactic group, and also the formation of compound words. This example also demonstrates a conceptualization that is neither planned nor systematic (unlike *Verdrängung*—"repression") but to a great extent latent, perceptible only in its most highly developed product: *Anlehnungstypus*—"leaning-on-type." Finally, this example instructively shows the function of the translator and of a foreign language in detecting this movement, already too familiar to the German reader (or perhaps even to the Freudologist) for him to pay attention to it.

There are a great many ways to create nouns in German, and Freud uses them all; suffixes and prefixes (*die Bewusstheit*, "the consciousness"), composition with auxiliaries (*das Bewusstwerden*, "the becoming conscious"), with prepositions or adverbs (*das Nachdrängen*, "the after-pressure"; *ein Nichtkönnen*, "a not being able"), and the combined use of different procedures (*das Ungeschehenmachen*, "the making an action or an event not to have happened"; *ein Nichtwissenwollen*, "a wanting to not know").

Here we come imperceptibly to the creation of compound words, so easy in German (see Heidegger), but exploited by Freud to a special degree—almost, it might be said, to excess: there are thousands of them in his language, from the simplest to the most complex, from the most ordinary to the strangest: *Schmerzunlust* ("displeasure of pain"), *Sehnsuchtsangst* ("anxiety of yearning"), *Vorstellungsinhalt der Triebrepräsentanz* ("ideational content of the drive-representative"), *Zufallshandlung* ("chance"

57. GW 5:82/OC, vol. 6. [D.G.O.—Strachey does not use his invented word "anaclysis" here but simply puts it that "sexual activity attaches itself to functions" (SE 7:182).]

58. Cf. Laplanche and Pontalis 1973, pp. 29–33, under the entries "Anaclysis; Analclitic (or Attachment)" and "Anaclytic Type of Object-Choice."

action") [ironic; Freud (1901) is showing that these are "symptomatic actions"], *Vorwurfshandlung* ("action with reproach").

Before going into greater detail, with concrete cases, let us also mention the revival of meaning through etymological breakdown, such as terms with *ver-*, which we deal with in the section entitled "Reasoned Terminology";⁵⁹ etymological kinship allowing the creation of series, such as terms with *Bild* ("picture") or *Bildung* ("picturing" or "formation"), *Drang* ("pressure") or *drängen* ("to press"), the *Hilfe* ("help") and *Hilflosigkeit* ("helplessness") family, and so on; the undoubling of Romance-German doublets; and, finally, the conjugation of all of these procedures.

The Translator Comes Face to Face with Freudian Terminology

This terminology becomes a conceptual universe to the point where "Freudian" can almost be considered an idiomatic form of German, but at the same time this terminology is rooted in, and continues to emanate from, the everyday usages of language: the essential problems facing the "Freudological" translator reside in this juncture of ordinary vocabulary and scientific terminology. Freud's relation to current usage—*Sprachgebrauch*—cannot be invoked as a reason for toning down the translation, which theoretically should be transposable into ready-made French or English expressions. "Usage," as the word implies, shaves off and blunts the resonances of words and pulls metaphors and metonyms downward: it is the catachresis of the ancient writers.⁶⁰ Freud's entire work tends to the contrary, pulling the meaning upward—"anasemy," to use the term coined by Abraham (1978). This incessant attenuation of meaning is constant even for the German reader of Freud, who is, in the literal sense of the word, his "user." A French or English translation must create a new anasemy beginning with degradations of meaning that have run similarly parallel courses in the evolution of both source and target languages. Just translating signifiers as closely as possible "anasemizes" them: this is the intrinsic benefit of such an approach, both for the translator and for the translator's reader, who is thus presented with a more angular, less eroded text than is a German reader.

This does not mean that we are unaware of the fact, elementary for

59. B.V.—The "Reasoned Terminology" and the "Glossary" are substantial sections of *Traduire Freud*, the French volume: they are not included in this translation.

60. D.G.O.—The authors are using *catachresis* to refer to the mistaken use of a word that gradually overextends and obscures both the original metaphor and its specific meaning.

any translator, that vocabularies, the codes of different languages, do not correspond word for word. Even among the different Indo-European languages, terminological systems are organized in very different ways; we know perfectly well that to the British our French *mouton* is "sheep" when in a field and "mutton" when on their plates. This reference to context, and hence to the meaning of the sentence, is elementary in translation. There is no contradiction here in the process of so-called automatic translation either, since a machine is perfectly capable of determining the local context of the sentence in question and making the choice between "sheep" and "mutton."

The difficulties with Freud begin with the question of context. These difficulties can be situated along two lines, two continuums, which are related to each other. The first can be seen as a line reflecting types of usage, extending from the most concrete to the most abstract, from common usage to metapsychology. This is precisely the continuum along which Freud's conceptual creation operates. The second series of contexts would run from the sentence to the single page, through the isolated text to the writings of a particular period, and finally to the whole body of work seen diachronically.

These two series go together, because the local context can impose a given choice for a given word in ordinary language, whereas a term that is meant to be scientific or philosophical can be understood only by reference to the work as a whole, in fact even to its evolution. Within this double series:

current and common usage—abstract "conceptual" terms
phrase or local context—general context or evolution of works
taken as a whole.

The Freudologist translator determines where the point of decision, and therefore the point of rupture, lies. Let us take two examples.

The term *Verdrängung* is normally translated as *refoulement* ("repression"). Freud (1926c) said that throughout a whole period of his work he had used *Verdrängung* in the sense of *Abwehr*. Is this any reason to translate *Verdrängung* as *défense* ("defense") in the contexts Freud refers to? Might this not prevent the reader from noticing the change of meaning Freud himself underlines, which can be appreciated only through the continuity of the word? Although this example may be extreme and paradoxical, it shows at once what we must be wary of: exclusive reference to the local context, fidelity to the supposed sole "meaning," and, last but not least, Freud's own opinion about what he has said.

The term *Übertragung* is universally translated as *transfert* ("transference") in French. No problem so far, especially since Freud himself found the French word *transfert* in Bernheim and translated it as *Übertragung*. One small exception puts us on the alert: in certain texts ("The Etiology of Hysteria," 1896a) there is a comparison between the propagation of psychic disease (through seduction) and *la transmission d'une maladie* ("the transmission of a disease"), normally called *eine Übertragung der Krankheit*. Very well, one might say, this is a nonmetapsychological use, found, moreover, in an archaic text; here we see how our two continuums (nontechnical to technical and local context to general text) conspire to incite us, almost naturally, to vary the translations of a single word. This would be merely a limited example, requiring no more than a footnote, but for the fact that Freud, at the height of his maturity, when the concept of transference was fully developed, devoted a whole text (*Psychoanalysis and Telepathy*, 1921b) to the *Gedankenübertragung* problem. When it refers to occultism, this term is normally and commonly translated as "*transmission de pensée*." But how can the translator refrain from establishing, or better said, reestablishing continuity with the *Übertragung* of the treatment? How could one translate the central affirmation of this article, *es gibt Gedankenübertragung*, other than as "*il y a transfert de pensée*" ("there is thought transference"), even at the cost of doing some violence to the French language?⁶¹

To summarize, the terminological decision can result in giving greater weight either to the more or less local context (for a common term) or to the general context (for a "concept-making" term), but the important thing is that the decision itself should be made by a translator with a perfect knowledge of the work in its entirety, the genesis of the concepts, and even Freud's own incessant reflection on his terminology. If translators allow themselves the liberty of translating *Angst*, *Grausen*, or *Schreck* indiscriminately by *peur* ("fear"), *angoisse* ("anxiety"), *effroi* ("dread"), or *horreur* ("horror"), it is because they are totally ignorant of Freud's constant and diligent efforts to delimit these terms (and some others: *Furcht*, *Grauen*, *Scheu*, *Abscheu*, *Entsetzen*, and so forth).

All this implies the inadequacy, the failure, even the betrayal of any one-shot translation, where a particular book, article, or group of articles is taken as an autonomous unit that can be considered without constant

61. D.G.O.—As shown in chaps. 1 and 2, however, *Übertragung* is still a significant problem in English because Strachey silently translated this word into a wide variety of English terms and phrases when he judged that Freud's meaning was technically not "transference." This is one reason that the very conception of metaphor tends to fade away in his Standard Edition.

reference to the lexicographical bases of Freudian language. We believe that these bases can be sorted out only by considering his work as a whole.

This has been, and still is, the major flaw in translations of Freud published in isolation and without coordination. Each translator tries to stamp the work with a style that is at best no more than the reflection of that person's skill and at worst reveals ignorance of the other texts.

Our general principles for establishing terminological rules (a reasoned glossary) are:

1. To give the French reader the maximum opportunity to discover the identities, continuities, differences, or oppositions of Freudian terms.
2. When in doubt, to have greater trust in the letter, the word that is the signifier, than in any supposed differences or identity of meaning.⁶²
3. Always to consider the broad context of the *Oeuvres complètes* over that of any isolated work and to respect the context of a particular article over that of any single page or isolated sentence.

Among the many problems facing our terminology team, we shall indicate the principal ones, which are in fact interwoven.

A. To indicate as clearly as possible the identity, the repetition, and therefore the evolution in meaning of a term, by using an unequivocal French translation that fits as well as possible.

Integrating this terminology into our work implies locating every "concept-making" word. For several hundred terms created and used by Freud, we, like "eternal weighers of meanings" (V. Hugo), fixed an equivalence between the German term and its French translation. It was often a single translation with some very precise exceptions. In other cases, we defined a range of possible translations according to types of usage—metapsychological or clinical, for example. Once we had found the French equivalents, we had to adhere to them, but not without trial and error and some regrets.⁶³ Intertextual considerations are imperative here because this is the specific justification for our *Oeuvres complètes*. No unabridged and integrated Freud has ever before been attempted. It is not enough to find the French word or combination of words capable of rendering every *Verlesen* in Freud's (1905b) book about unconscious wit, every *Kultur* (together with the numerous combinations in which it appears) in "Thoughts for the Times on War and Death"; the same word

62. Cf. Lacan, who, for instance, firmly maintains the Freudian distinction between *Ichideal* ("ego ideal") and *ideal-Ich* ("ideal ego"): even if "we cannot for all that distinguish their use in this text, which should be somewhat disquieting—the use of the signifier in Freud not being, as far as we know, the least bit oozing [*dégoulinant*]" (1966, p. 672).

63. D.G.O.—Strachey said he had similar regrets (SE 1:xviii–xix).

also must render each *darstellen* in *The Interpretation of Dreams*, each *Verlesen* in the *Introductory Lectures*, each *Kultur* in "The Future of an Illusion" or *Civilization and Its Discontents*. Without this, the evolution of Freud's thinking would escape a foreign reader, who has to be able to follow the path of a concept through Freud's entire work, to detect its emergence or disappearance, to form an opinion as to its permanence or transitoriness, and to recognize its avatars. The translator of an isolated text may not be stirred by the occurrence of the same term two volumes apart: we are. A translator can pass over the fact that French lacks an adjective corresponding to the noun, or that a particular word in French may already be reserved for the translation of a different German word: we do not.

This priority given to conceptual terminology from one text to another does not make us forget the concrete vocabulary or the intratextual lexicon. In "A Case of Paranoia" (Freud 1915d), the verbs or substantival infinitives *Klopfen* (*frapper*, *frappement*; "to knock," "knocking"), *Pochen* (*battre*, *battement*; "to beat," "beating"), *Ticken* (*avoir un dé clic*; "to tick," "ticking") run through the essay like a leitmotiv and are applied to a partition, a camera, a couch, a door, a clock, until the point where it comes to "a beating or a knocking at the level of the clitoris" (10:244/14:270/OC 13:315). What would remain of Freud's demonstration without total lexical coherence in the translation? The same applies, in this text, to the significant alternation of *Beisammensein* (*réunion*; "reunion") and *Zusammenkunft* (*rencontre*; "encounter"), particularly since in a contemporary work, "The Wolf Man," parental coitus is associated with *Beisammensein* ("being together").

B. To indicate as clearly as possible the continuity of any series of terms related through their form (radical or prefix) in the German language. It seems to us elementary that the reader should be able to deduce from the translated text the relationship manifest in German between *entwickeln* (*développer*; "to develop") and *Entwicklung* (*développement*; "development"), *kennen* (*connaître*; "to know") and *Kenntnis* (*connaissance*; "knowledge"), *Erkenntnis* (*connaissance prise*; "knowledge drawn from"), and *Anerkennung* (*reconnaissance*; "acknowledgement"), as well as to grasp the subtle difference between *Drohung* (*menace*; "threat") and *Androhung* (*menace proférée*; "threat uttered"). But far more complex cases arise, where a decision must be made depending on whether this kinship is underlined by Freud himself, whether it is more or less artificial, and, finally, according to the possibilities and limitations of terminological range in the target language.

Freud, we know, gives similar treatment to a whole group of opera-

tions with the prefix *ver-*, so as to designate actions that stray from the initial or conscious aim—*verlesen* (“misreading”), *verschreiben* (“miswriting”), and so on. Obviously, one phrase has to be found that will cover them all. We have used the word *méprise* (“mistake,” “misunderstanding”)—*méprise de lecture* (“reading mistake”), *méprise d’écriture* (“writing mistake”), and so on—to indicate this family of words, essential to the “psychopathology of everyday life.” The case becomes more complicated, however, when Freud himself forces the German language into contortions, either by adding on to this series verbs that no longer exist in the simple form (*verlieren*) or by playing upon their polysemy—*versprechen* (*promettre*; “to promise”), *sich versprechen* (*se méprendre en parlant*; “to make a mistake while speaking”).

In other cases, these terms are no longer related through the prefix but through the radical: this is so for *Druck* (*pression*, “pressure”); *unterdrücken* and *Unterdrückung* (*réprimer*, “to suppress”; *répression*, “suppression”).⁶⁴ Or again, for terms formed with *Hilfe* (*aide*, “help”): in the fabric of Freudian thought, this series (*helfen*, *Hilfe*, *hilfreich*, *hilflos*, *Hilflosigkeit*) appears to be so essential and so constant from its very origins that the unity of a single similar radical, *aide* (“help”), had to be kept in French, even if this meant introducing a slight neologism: *désaide*.⁶⁵

C. To mark the oppositions each time a pair or a group of terms appears or recurs. Here the whole question of homonyms and synonyms arises, which we can develop more fully.

In accordance with common usage, let us call synonyms words that are different but have the same meaning, and homonyms identical words that have different meanings and uses. We cannot assume that in every language terms truly corresponding to these definitions actually exist.

Do true homonyms exist? One can maintain that they do. The French word *étalon*, for example, can refer to animal breeding (“stallion”) or to weights and measures (“standard”). Etymology confirms, in a certain way, that these are two distinct vocables, and dictionaries attest to this by putting them under two headings, not as two meanings of the same word. On a different level, we shall designate as quasi-homonyms terms with two (or several) meanings that are related but quite distinct. The French word *homme* (“man”), for instance, sometimes designates a hu-

64. B.V.—On the one hand, *Verdrängung* is translated in French by *refoulement* and in English by “repression”; on the other hand, *Unterdrückung* by *répression* and “suppression,” respectively, while the new French-Freudian vocabulary has reserved the term *suppression* for *Aufhebung*.

65. B.V.—The translation of *Hilflosigkeit* into English always was easy (“helplessness”), while the classic French equivalent has until now been *état de détresse*.

man being and sometimes a male individual. The test here is that the translator from French into German can at any point and without difficulty decide whether to translate *homme* by *Mensch* ("human being") or *Mann* ("man," "male human being"). Finally, in a third category, one would find false homonyms, terms whose various meanings are deeply related or, to put it another way, whose subdivision into different "meanings," their diffraction, simply results from the necessity of transposing the term into a particular foreign language. This is the case with *Bedeutung*: a French reader hesitates every time between *signification* and *importance*, but for an English reader, the word "significance" covers the whole meaning of *Bedeutung*.

Moreover, our distinctions may turn out to overlap in practice: when "true homonyms" appear in witticisms or dreams, they can function as "verbal bridges" (*étalon*, "a stallion," "stud horse", condensing with *étalon*-or, "gold standard"). Similarly, the quasi-homonyms can sometimes retrieve their unity. This can occur spontaneously: the proposition "*Dieu créa l'homme*" allows no way to decide between *Mensch* and *Mann*,⁶⁶ but any thinker can reunite several meanings that ordinary language distinguishes without difficulty in order to create an original concept: this is what Hegel does explicitly with *aufheben* (with no distinction, for him: "to raise," "to suppress," and "to conserve," "to keep").⁶⁷ Finally, the false homonyms are one of the crosses a translator has to bear. Whenever possible, the best solution is to find a French or an English word that contains the same deceptive double meaning: *Erfolg* in German and in Freud has the double, often undecidable meaning of "result" and "favorable result." In the present translation we have chosen the term *succès*, which also contains the two meanings, if one agrees to revive a usage that is not obsolete but has recently fallen into disuse.

Synonyms pose immense problems, some of which are specific to

66. D.G.O.—Cf. Martin Luther's *Gott schuff den Menschen*. A translator working from German into French or English can distinguish Freud's "human being" from "male"/"man" just as quickly and clearly as one distinguishes both of these ideas from the impersonal pronouns *man* = *on* = "one."

67. Hegel gives detailed explanations, in the name of "speculative thinking," for his fusion of these two opposite meanings, which are clearly distinguished in common language: "to keep or conserve" (*aufbewahren*) and "to put an end to" (*aufhören lassen*) (*Lasson, Wissenschaft der Logik* [Leipzig: Meiner Verlag, 1932], pp. 93–94). Freud (1910d) does not adopt this antithetical sense of the word *aufheben*. His use of it, which could be called antidialectical (and which runs counter to his own article, "The Antithetical Meaning of Primal Words" [GW 8:214–21/SE 11:155–61/OC, vol. 10]), is corroborated by Duden's very official grammar, according to which this is not a single word but "three distinct words, rooted in three distinct semantic fields, which normally do not compete with each other and precisely for that reason can exist side by side in the language without disturbing each other" (Grebe 1972, vol. 4, p. 460).

the German language. German has many “doublets,” the term we have chosen to designate a pair of words, one of Germanic and the other of Romance origin, which are traditionally rendered by a single French or English word: *Vorgang* and *Prozess* (“process”), *Gegenstand* and *Objekt* (“object”), *Gesellschaft* and *Sozietät* (“society”).

Do true synonyms exist? Strictly speaking, the answer is no. The user necessarily has a slightly different reaction to two words whose feel, kinship, and etymology are dissimilar. There is a further element, which is of great importance to the author of a conceptual work: one can choose to ignore the difference or, on the contrary, to extend it in such a way as to give it the value of a subtle shade of meaning or even of conceptual opposition. Freud constantly uses *sittliches Gewissen* and *moralisches Gewissen* indiscriminately to mean “moral conscience,” whereas Hegel differentiates the doublet *Moralität* and *Sittlichkeit* to make it one of the mainsprings of his *Phenomenology of the Mind*.⁶⁸ Moreover, this choice may be either deliberate or latent and, in the latter case, will be detected only by an attentive commentator. The author can sometimes even deny the difference while confirming it in his usage: Freud (1905d, 1915e) explicitly uses *seelisch* and *psychisch* as equivalents; yet for a category as important as that of reality, he will never speak of *seelische Realität*, but always of *psychische Realität*. Above all, we are obliged to safeguard the continuity of the term *Seele*, because it is the guiding thread that enables Freud (1901, 1913c) to show how the conscious and unconscious “processes of the soul” are projected into a “metaphysical” image of the soul and to propose that psychoanalysis should undertake the opposite task of “transposing metaphysics into metapsychology,” or “putting back into the human soul what animism teaches about the nature of things.” The strange alliance of words in metapsychology, *Seelenapparat* (*l'appareil de l'âme*; “soul-apparatus”), bears traces of this two-way movement.

This example, *seelisch* and *psychisch*, is a good illustration of the complementary nature of two problems constantly confronting the translator of Freud: noting the continuities and noting the differences when distinct terms are essential to the author's thinking.

So how shall we deal with doublets and synonyms?

a. When the target language itself possesses two terms, the translator will have no difficulty in allocating their use without further concern

68. Hegel, *La phénoménologie de l'esprit*, tr. Jean Hyppolite (Paris: Aubier-Montaigne, 1939), vol. 1, pp. 289–90 n. 5. We can clarify these options, which give opposite meanings within the same language: for *aufheben*, Hegel merges where Freud separates; for *moralisch-sittlich*, Hegel emphasizes a difference that Freud makes no use of.

about the author's intentions. Thus, *procès* can easily be used exclusively for *Prozess*, and *processus* for *Vorgang*.⁶⁹

b. When the pseudo-synonymy is there in German but the author makes no special issue of it, and if usage in the target language cannot cover the German, we feel that we have neither the obligation nor the right to Germanize the target language. This applies to *Weib* and *Frau* (whose usages are in any case very difficult to codify), which we translate in accordance with the general rules, depending on the local context: woman, lady, wife, Mrs., and so on. It also concerns, although in a slightly different way, the doublet *Körper* and *Leib*. The first word is invariably translated as *corps* ("body"); the second, as *corps* or *ventre* ("belly"), depending on context.

c. When the Freudologist observes that Freud has extended the synonymy so as to confer on it (explicitly or not) the value of a conceptual distinction, we systematically mark the difference, either by the coordinated use of two or more terms in the target language or, in rare cases where there is no alternative, by adding an asterisk.⁷⁰ Let us give two examples out of dozens:

—*Unterschied* and *Verschiedenheit*. The term "noted" by Freud is quite obviously *Unterschied*; the apogee of this distinction is his use of the term to designate the difference between the sexes, which we know, in his view, is definitely binary, signified by the presence or absence of the penis. By definition, an expression such as "*Verschiedenheit der Geschlechter*" cannot be found in Freud's writing. But in fact, this *Unterschied-Verschiedenheit* pairing runs through his works, starting with texts from a far earlier date than the castration theory. Therefore, we opted always to translate *Unterschied* by *différence* (or a related expression) and *Verschiedenheit* by *diversité* or *distinction*.

—*Sexual-* and *Geschlechts-*: especially in compound words. Common usage would normally expect these to be uniformly translated as *sexuel*. But in our view, this would do away with an essential of Freudian theory: on the one hand, the extension of sexuality (*die Sexualität - das Sexuale*) to cover a vast area that ordinary folk consider nonsexual (broadly put, everything that is not genital), and on the other hand, emphasis on the difference between the two sexes, masculine and feminine (*Geschlechts-*

69. B.V. and D.G.O.—French makes a distinction between a "trial" and a "process" seen as a standard series of actions ending in a result. For *procès*, French separates the automatic process (*processus*) and the specific method (*procédé*), which implies reflection. In English a legal "process" is distinguishable only by context.

70. Objekt, "object," and Gegenstand, "object"; Sache, "thing," and Ding, "thing"; vertreten, "to represent," and repräsentieren, "to represent."

unterschied: "sexed difference"), as an opposition with no third word. To put this plainly, an expression such as *orale Geschlechtlichkeit* ("oral gender activity") would be an absurdity and would never have come from Freud's pen. Hence our choice: *sexuel* for the *Sexual-* series, and *sexué* ("sexed") or *des sexes* ("of the sexes") for the other.⁷¹

Having discussed singularity in the translation of conceptual terms, continuity in some series of related terms, as well as homonymies and synonymies, a most important remark has to be made: we have never tried to trace our French over Freud's German, ignoring the fact that polysemy, word relationships, and usages differ in essence from one language to another. As a comparison, we are in the situation of a wall-paper hanger who has to cover, with rolls of paper of a certain width, a wall panel whose size does not correspond to any multiple of that width. In addition, the wallpaper has a pattern and therefore requires vertical adjustments as well. It would be simply impossible to have paper made to fit the dimensions of the panel—especially since it would not fit the measurements of the other panels in the room. The whole skill of the paperhanger lies in putting cuts and joints in the least visible places. The same goes for the Freudologist-translator: when one comes to a particular case in Freud's work, one does not coin a German-like French but understands the practice of splitting signifier from signified in the least awkward places. Take, for instance, the German terms related to *Drang* and *Druck*, for which there are several radicals available in French: *presser* ("to press"), *pousser* ("to push"), *fouler* ("to trample"). No absolute parallel can be made between the series *pousser*, *repousser*, and so on (*Drang*) and *pression*, *répression*, *oppression* (*Druck*). Within the series themselves, nuances and shifts of meaning arise; in short, although *Drang des Triebes* is indeed *poussée de la pulsion* ("the push of the drive"), *Verdrängung* cannot be translated as *repoussement* ("driving back"); falling back on the radical *fouler* ("to trample," "to press") offers an acceptable solution with the use of *refoulement* ("repression"), a term that has been endorsed for a long time. This art of translation,⁷² undoubtedly an art of compromise, should not be likened to acceptance of defeat: we assert that, as for the wallpaper hanger, in each case a better solution is possible. Obviously this does not mean that we always have found it, but we certainly have tried. Breaks in the series, breaks between conceptual meaning, clinical

71. D.G.O.—"Sexual" makes Freud's distinction more difficult to conserve in English because conventionally "gender" is not altogether distinct from "sex." The German word *Geschlecht* ranges from both of those words through "race," "species," "generation," and so forth.

72. On the opposition between the "task of the translator" (Walter Benjamin's [1930] expression) and the liberty of the commentator, see Laplanche 1989, p. 80.

meaning, and ordinary meaning, make it necessary for us to confront these bearing in mind the work as a whole as well as every detail of it, and not with incorrigible shortsightedness—that is, with the nose six inches from a “local” translation.

D. To get one's bearings in the nebula of Freudian compound words, it is indispensable to go back to the original language and its rules of construction.

a) The first case, which is relatively simple, is more or less one of apposition. One can join two nouns together, sometimes with a hyphen but more often without (*Menschentier* “human animal”). The first of the two nouns can sometimes be reduced to part of its radical, so that it can be a delicate matter to distinguish it from an adjective (*Psychoneurose* is *Psychose* + *Neurose*, or is it *psychische Neurose*?). Theoretically, it is easy to stick to the apposition and decide on the word order. More often than not, the rule has it that this is reversed between German and French: *Menschentier* = animal-homme (“man-animal”); *Deckerinnerung* = souvenir-couverture (“cover-memory”); *der Vorstellungsanteil* = la part-représentation (“ideational portion”) of a given process. Only rarely must the French word order follow the German order, *Psychoneurose* = *psychonévrose* (“psychoneurosis”).

b) It is also relatively simple to determine a noun by a preposition⁷³ (*das Über-Ich*, *le sur-moi*, “the superego”; *die Unterart*, *la sous-espèce*, “subspecies”), or by an adjective: this is the case of the so-called agglutinative compound nouns (*Aktual-*, *Genital-*, *Ideal-*, *Partial-*, *Sexual-*, and the like). There are, however, instances (in the series of compound nouns with *Real-*, for example), when the determiner acts as a substantivized adjective, and the compound word must therefore be translated as a compound consisting of nouns (*Realangst*: *angoisse de réel*, “reality-anxiety”), not *angoisse réelle* (“real anxiety”). Finally, curious words such as *Grossindividuen* seem to be constructed on the model of *Grossvater* (“grandfather”) and should be translated along similar lines, as *grands-individus* (“grand-individuals”).

c) Compounds consisting of two or even three⁷⁴ nouns offer an almost

73. The French compounds with *non-* to translate German terms with *un-* deserve comment: the hyphen is indispensable—even if so-called correct spelling disapproves of it—in order to distinguish between meanings as different as in the following sentences: *c'est un objet reconnu et non identifié* (“this is an object that is recognized but not identified”); *c'est un objet bizarre et non-identifié* (“this is a bizarre and unidentified object”). In the first case *non* means “not” and relates to the verb. In the second case it gives the adjective the opposite meaning. Moreover, the pronunciation makes the distinction: there is no liaison between *non* and *identifié* in the first case, while there is one in the second.

74. For example, *Sacherinnerungsspur* (“memory trace of a thing”).

unlimited variety of combinations, among which several patterns can be conveniently distinguished:

(1) The conjunction of two true nouns, of which the first in the German order generally qualifies the second, rather like an adjective:

Triebanspruch: *revendication pulsionnelle*, “drive demand”

Liebesleben: *vie amoureuse*, “love life.”

However, this notion of qualification rapidly reaches its limits when it comes to certain terms: *Todestrieb* should be translated not by *pulsion mortelle* (“deathly drive”) but by *pulsion de mort* (“death drive”).

(2) Modification of a verb-derived noun (usually an -ung derivation) by another noun. This is the most frequent case. A thorough knowledge of the work can more often than not help to decide whether a grammatical relation can be established between the first and second of these nouns when the first is reconverted into a verb. This is what we can call compound nouns with a verbal link; the first of these nouns can be:

- the subject of the verb: *Realitätsforderung*, reality is doing the demanding;
- the direct object of the verb: *Objektwahl*, the object is being chosen;
- the indirect object of the verb: *Übertragungsneigung*, the individual is inclining to transference.

But quite often, even when the second term is derived from a verb, the relation between the two terms is not verbal but qualifying. Thus in *Vorwurfshandlung* (*action à reproche*, “action with reproach”), *Handlung* cannot be reconverted into a verb (“to act”) constituting, with *Vorwurf* (“reproach”), a verbal syntagm.

(3) Finally, and to complicate matters, Freud never made it a strict rule to use any given determined noun consistently in the same type of connection with its determiner. Thus, for *Schranke* (*barrière*, “barrier”), *Inzestschranke* is the barrier opposed to incest, whereas *Ekelschranke* is the barrier opposed by disgust. In certain cases this ambiguity holds even for a single compound word, both of whose terms are identical while the underlying connection is different. In the term *Angstbereitschaft*, for example, *Angst* is sometimes that for which one prepares oneself (“preparedness for anxiety”) and sometimes that which enables one to be ready for danger (“preparedness by anxiety”).

This means that the terminologist will have to respond to a double concern: to discern accurately the relation or, more often, the multiple relations existing between two terms and also to opt for a translation that safeguards the polysemic, sometimes ambiguous value of the com-

positional link. He will therefore choose, depending on the problem at hand:

- the adjective form: *Triebstörung*, *trouble pulsionnel*, "drive disturbance";
- the conjunction *de* ("of"), which will most often be used in the indefinite form: *Todestrieb*, *pulsion de mort*, "death drive"; sometimes in the definite form: *Lebenserhaltung*, *conservation de la vie*, "conservation of life"; *Vatermord*, *meurtre du père*, "father-murder";
- the conjunction *à* ("with"), very useful in many cases: *Zielhandlung*, *action à but*, "action with an aim";
- other types of conjunctions or conjunctive phrases, if necessary: *Vatersehnsucht*, *désirance pour le père*, "longing for the father"; *Vaterverliebtheit*, *état amoureux envers le père*, "being altogether in love with the father."

To conclude, the conjunction *de* ("of"), in its indefinite form, covers a great many cases if one is willing to take its polysemy into account, because it can translate (like the German compound word) the most varied relations: belonging to, quality, matter, species, provenance, and so on. It will therefore very often be preferred to any other link that would substitute interpretation, however plausible, for translation.⁷⁵

(4) As a further related point, the translation of compound words brings up the question of their agreement with a verb or an adjective, this agreement having to be understood by the reader as related to the main term, the determined noun (the second in the German order, the first in French). In fact, this problem is often more artificial than real. The French reader knows perfectly well how this agreement is indicated, especially with the preposition *de*: the phrase *fraise de culture savoureuse*⁷⁶ has never led anyone to believe it was the culture that was to be "tasted." The question arises only in rare instances, particularly when the conjunction includes the definite article and when neither the gender nor the number makes it possible to decide. In these few cases, an appropriately placed dot invites the reader of the *Oeuvres complètes* to read the compound word as a whole: *le contenu • du • rêve manifeste* (it is the content

75. The tedious debate on *Vorstellungsrepräsentanz* acquires another dimension, no longer grammatical but theoretical, if it is translated, as it should be, by *représentance de représentation* [using the indefinite "of"] instead of by *représentance de la représentation* [using the definite form "of the"]. [D.G.O.—The Standard Edition translations of these terms are heterogeneous but have not been studied (Ornston 1982).]

76. B.V.—"The tasty cultivated strawberry." The same problem would arise in English only in such a phrase as "the tasty farm strawberry."

that is manifest, not the dream). This preserves the unity of the concept: *contenu* 'du' *rêve* (dream content).

E. A few words to give a general explanation of our use of neologisms, each of which is justified in our "Terminologie Raisonnée" (Reasoned Terminology). For the most part, these are neological or archaic usages, not arbitrary creations: almost every term we propose has antecedents in some ancient inventory of our language. Sometimes we renew a meaning or the former polysemy of a word so that its extension corresponds to Freudian usage (*Erfolg*—*succès* or "success"); sometimes we believe we have invented a vocable only to find that we have simply rediscovered it and given it only a slightly extended meaning: Buffon used the pretty word *passagèreté*⁷⁷ to denote the action of birds that pass from one country to another. Sometimes we venture a derivation from an adjective, a verb, or another noun, which is in no way contrary to the laws of language: *sur-net* ("overly neat"), *consciencialité* ("the attribute or fact of being conscious"), *l'aimer et le haïr* ("the loving and the hating"), and so on. Similarly, the composition of terms with the prefix *rétro-* ("back-"), which renders exactly the German *zurück-*, is commonly accepted, and the French language has been enriched, without anyone taking umbrage, by *rétropédaler* (1907, "to backpedal"), *rétroviser* (1920, "rearview mirror"), *rétrofusée* (1960, "retrorocket"), *rétroprojecteur* (1967, "overhead projector"). We therefore see no reason why our *rétrofantasier* ("to retrofantasize") should shock anyone.

Rarely, we really do create a word when we feel that its place is already indicated and that it is indispensable. In such a case, however, we never proceed by implanting a foreign term (from German: the Heideggerians' *Dasein*; from Greek: the "cathexis" so dear to Strachey, and the like), but always by finding a derivation that we feel is in harmony with the genius of the French language. There are those who will criticize our *désaide* ("dis-help," or "helplessness") before they come to adopt it;⁷⁸ we would remind them of Lacan's *désêtre* ("beinglessness") and advise them to read Gide, who is so inventive, notably in his *Journal*: "Je n'eusse pas désécrit de toute la journée"; "Il s'est fait beau pour ce revoir"; "cette affreuse vieillissure," and so on.⁷⁹

77. B.V.—This should be translated as "passingness." The French word is proposed in the OC as the translation of the title of the essay "Vergänglichkeit," "On Transience" (10:357/14:303/OC 13:319).

78. Perfectly in accordance with the Old French verb *désaidier* [*aide* = "help"]. The rider who is *désaidié* is one who is unseated after losing his saddle, reins, or stirrups.

79. B.V.—"An entire day without writinglessness"; "He made himself look smart for this seeing-again"; "this awful agement."

Every language becomes enriched and more flexible. Artists, poets, and scholars are not the only ones who instigate this: the responsibility for such enrichment lies mainly in the collision and confrontation of languages, and translators are its principal craftsmen. One of us has dug up an extraordinary example of this in the preface to the second edition of the French translation of Darwin's *On the Origin of Species*. The translator laments the fact that despite her scruples she has been obliged to adopt the dreadful neologism *sélection*. "In abandoning the French word *élection* [she writes] we admit, as most will agree, that we have made a sacrifice about which our conscience is uneasy."

Terminological innovation has today been enormously intensified by worldwide cultural evolution. We are referring here not to terms adopted from a foreign language regardless of rules or necessity (the notorious *franglais*, in our case) but to the technical, scientific, and philosophical innovations imposed by our times. One example would be the French translations of German philosophers, from Hegel to Heidegger. The attention given to language, to its hidden resonances, its etymologies, its resurgences, is a modern phenomenon in which psychoanalysis itself has played a fundamental role.

So let the translator of Freud, unlike that translator of Darwin, unashamedly arm with both determination and boldness. The French language has already been enriched through psychoanalysis with a great many neologisms or, more precisely, neological usages: *ça* ("id"), *surmoi* ("superego"), *pulsion* ("drive"), *étayage* ("anaclysis"), and so on. The sole test of the quality of these innovations is whether they are necessary and can be fitted into our linguistic tissue. When terminological innovation is earnest, boldly proposed, and perseveringly maintained, it becomes one of the major operations in translation. There is no better comparison than that of the artificial but sufficiently well-constructed nests we build, destined to furnish an attraction and to be reinhabited by some migrating bird, some stork who has deserted our land. If the neologism works, it constitutes an attraction for meaning and will be inhabited by the meanings brought to it by many different contexts and the many people who read it. This is what happened with *pulsion* ("drive"), which was once a didactic term exclusive to the field of Newtonian physics. Its psychological usage, imposed by translations of Freud, has made it indispensable not only in psychoanalysis but also in everyday French.⁸⁰

80. Starobinsky has given a good description of a diphasic neologization with the term *civilisation*: it was initially created (before 1743) with the purely legal meaning of "turning a criminal trial into

Neologism and neological usage are essential factors in the anasemic function we ascribe to translation (compare above, p. 170). Let us have no illusions, however: a new entropy of meaning, which one might call "catasemy," will go to work on the second terminology as soon as it becomes common usage.

HOW WE WORK

No one person could take on all the tasks,⁸¹ so we had to put together an organization that could give all necessary homogeneity and coherence to the *Oeuvres complètes* while considering both style and terminology. To do this, we had to assemble three indispensable competencies: a thorough knowledge of Freud's work as a whole, as well as of both German and French languages. Often these capacities were combined in a single person, but sometimes they were contributed by several individuals. We were able to agree on terminology and principles of translation because all who participated had in common admiration for Freud's work and thought.

The necessary organization was gradually set up during 1983 and 1984. It includes three closely interdependent levels: the editorial team, the terminology commission, and the translation teams.

The editorial team consists of six members, led by André Bourguignon and Pierre Cotet. André Bourguignon, from the fields of the neurosciences and psychiatry, works mainly on the architecture of the project and the conception of each volume. Pierre Cotet, in German studies and teaching, is the translators' main intermediary and oversees their work. Since 1963 Bourguignon and Cotet had taken part in Jean Laplanche's seminar on translation. Both, in association with various friends, had published works by Freud prior to the *Oeuvres complètes*—with Payot in 1981, the Presses Universitaires de France in 1984 and 1985, and Gallimard in 1985 and 1987. Jean Laplanche acts as scientific director and is in charge of the terminology, bringing with him his long experience as a translator of Freud (*Pour introduire le narcissisme* 1957) and as a specialist

a civil process." It was in 1756 that the Marquis de Mirabeau gave it the meaning we are familiar with. Starobinsky writes: "It is an important moment when the signifier is formed into a neologism. The appearance a little later of the same word, in its modern meaning, will constitute less a lexical neologism than the entry into the arena of a competing signification, soon to be triumphant" (1983, no. 4, p. 14). There is no better description of the way a new meaning may move into ("inhabit") a neologism. The new meaning is not always comparable to the stork in our allegory; it is sometimes more like a cuckoo, who dislodges the previous inhabitant.

81. We pass over the administrative, legal, and financial problems, whose solution became the sole responsibility of the Presses Universitaires de France.

in Freudian conceptualization (Laplanche and Pontalis 1967). François Robert plays a key role in elaborating the lexicography. Janine Altounian harmonizes the working ensemble, from start to finish. Alain Rauzy provides introductory notes, footnotes, and variants. Inevitably, each contributes to everyone else's work, and all major decisions are made jointly.

The first of these decisions concerned the writings that were to be the object of this translation, together with the order and mode of their presentation. We chose to make a distinction between the psychoanalytic and neurological writings, even though the latter, such as *On Aphasia*, are not without interest to psychoanalysts.

With regard to content, we found ourselves faced with three collections of the works of Freud, one in English and the other two in German, all markedly different from one another.⁸²

We have adopted the following principles for the *Oeuvres complètes*:

- all the texts are classified in the order Freud wrote them (when the date is known), not in order of publication;
- all the inventoried texts published in German, including all those in the *Nachtragsband*, are translated;
- with regard to the letters, we publish only those printed during Freud's lifetime. The letters to Fliess, for example, together with their drafts and "The Project," will be published separately;
- a few texts missing from the English and German editions appear in the *Oeuvres complètes*, such as letters to André Breton.

Our presentation of the texts deliberately refrains from commentary. The introductory notes are reduced to an indispensable minimum—that is, the conditions surrounding the writing and publication of a text and its principal editions, especially where these include variants. This edition is presented in such a way as to show the different strata of the text, particularly when it has undergone profound alterations (*Three Essays* [Freud 1905c] and *The Interpretation of Dreams* [Freud 1900]).

Like the introductory notes, the footnotes have been reduced to a minimum and deliberately do not include any fundamental comment, comparison of texts, historical data on concepts, and the like. In this respect, the introductions and notes of the Standard Edition remain

82. D.G.O.—Here a brief comparison of these three editions (GW, SE, SA) was cut because it repeated part of the discussion at the beginning of chap. 6.

indispensable, but there was no question of retranslating them, much less of undertaking their necessary revision. Our notes therefore have clearly limited objectives: to indicate the variants in the different editions; to give, as completely as possible, the references of the texts and passages from other authors to which Freud alludes; to translate the quotations that were given by Freud in a language other than German; to justify the exceptional translation that is inconsistent with our systematic choices; to indicate (rarely) by the use of *sic* that our translation follows some strangeness in the Freudian text to the letter; and, last but not least, to provide necessary explanations of idiomatic German expressions and particularly Freud's plays on words, associations, and his own comments on German words. Earlier we explained what we mean by the objective limits of translation; these are particularly obvious in *Jokes and Their Relation to the Unconscious* (1905b), *The Interpretation of Dreams*, "The Uncanny" (1919b), and some other works.

The development of our terminology was a task whose scope we did not appreciate at the start. Remember that the Commission pour l'Unification du Vocabulaire Psychanalytique Français met only four times between May 1927 and July 1928 and produced very little. Since then, Laplanche and Pontalis's *Vocabulaire de la psychanalyse* (1967) had greatly advanced our understanding of psychoanalytic technical terms, Freud's in particular, though not just his alone. Thus more than four hundred fundamental terms had been inventoried and defined, with commentary on their history, their structure, and their problematic aspects. These studies had to be extended, because alongside the major concepts, Freud's vocabulary is full of important intimations and had to be reexamined on numerous counts: the critical study of his entire work had greatly advanced in twenty years. Finally, and above all, it had to be gone over again in a completely different spirit: despite the reciprocal entanglement between Freud's vocabulary and the terminology of psychoanalysts—that was inevitable—we held to the idea of reestablishing a radical difference between them. Psychoanalytic terminology is set within a clinical, psychiatric, or theoretical practice, and there is no question here of laying down the law or of trying to change it: our terminology is meant to go back to the Freudian source, before it gave rise to various offshoots. "Obsessional neurosis" will remain the dominant psychoanalytic and psychiatric designation, even if the prevailing Freudian category is psychic "constraint."⁸³

It was necessary to establish that the *Vocabulaire de la psychanalyse* is not

83. B.V.—Zwangsneurose is inventoried as *névrose de contrainte* ("constraint neurosis").

a terminology for the use of translators. A modest basis had been prepared by Jean Laplanche in the 1960s, with a terminological card index of some three hundred supplementary terms, but that was far less than the scope of the present work.

In March 1984 Jean Laplanche set up a commission on terminology, whose permanent nucleus consisted of the six members of the editorial team. It functioned on a regular basis until the end of 1987 and then intermittently, as work on the translation progressed, until the appearance of volume 13, the first published volume of the *Oeuvres complètes*, in 1988. Other associated members were: Bertrand Vichyn, who appeared rarely, Maurice Dayan, who took part in the first meetings, and above all Denis Messier, whose assistance was particularly valuable.

The commission worked on the basis of lexicographic research carried out by François Robert, who is jointly responsible for the terminology. He inventoried and then compared the occurrences of the principal terms throughout the whole of the Freudian texts as well as in the existing translations. This preliminary work was indispensable to ensuing discussions. Every terminological option was the subject of open debates in which linguistic and Freudological points of view confronted each other. In almost every case agreement was reached fairly easily; but it sometimes happened that no agreement appeared to be possible, and Laplanche was obliged to settle the matter. These discussions had the virtue of revealing the diversity of the participants' lexical sensitivities. French dictionaries (Robert, Littré), German dictionaries (Duden, Grimm, Wahrig), bilingual dictionaries (Berteaux-Lepointe, Birman, Sachs-Villatte), and other standard works usually provided sufficient references. But occasionally we had to consult more extensive works in the Bibliothèque Nationale and other experts from France or from across the Rhine.

It soon emerged that the concept of "terminology" was in fact far too narrow. Freud's salient terms and his explicit conceptual elaboration are integral parts of a veritable lexicographic mycelium on a much vaster scale, which Robert diligently pursued in all its ramifications. Some of the objections that will certainly be raised with regard to one choice or another are likely to miss the mark if they take into account only the isolated equivalence between a German term and a French term instead of the complex tissue of terms related through their roots, terms related through their meaning, antonyms, and so on. This overall view of the Freudian linguistic code is what the "Glossary," based on our "Reasoned Terminology," tries to exemplify, although its author, François Robert,

was in fact able to present only a small part of our inventory of Freud's usage.

Translation Teams, Translation Work

While the terminological work was in progress, Pierre Cotet was setting up teams of translators (four, three, two people, or in rare instances, only one person), with the requirement that each team combine all three competencies: knowledge of German, of literary and scientific French, and of Freud.

At the initial meeting of the translators in November 1984, Laplanche and Cotet announced our positions and proposed that our points of view should be discussed. Most allied themselves with us, but some preferred not to follow.

In 1985 those who joined in the undertaking received the necessary working documents: our directives on translation and on presentation of manuscripts, the *Richtlinien* drawn up by Cotet.

In 1986 and 1987 the results of Robert's lexicographic work and the conclusions of the terminology commission directed by Laplanche were put into concrete form in the shape of a German-French glossary compiled by Robert, which was sent to the translators. At that time it already contained more than five thousand words. At a subsequent general meeting in March 1987, the translators were invited to give us their criticisms and suggestions. In this way coherence between the translators and the editorial team, necessary for the unity of the enterprise, was established.

The glossary quickly spread beyond our group and was adopted in part by translators at Gallimard, even before we published the first volume of the *Oeuvres complètes* in 1988 (vol. 13). We interpret this as tacit recognition of the validity and value of our selections. Let us emphasize again that our edition cannot be reduced to a mere isolated innovation; rather, we mean to propose a unitary version as close as possible to Freudian terminology and expression. This distinguishes our work from all previous or ongoing French translations, which as a whole constitute a veritable patchwork, where the style of each translator protects its own preeminence over Freudian style.

To achieve such unity, incessant two-way exchange is indispensable. This was established among the members of the editorial team, for which Janine Altounian became, as it were, the memory. We encouraged feedback between the editorial team and the teams of translators (the latter often including members of the editorial team); terminological feedback

(the glossary, not being limited to proposing general directives, also registers, after discussion, the translators' objections, exceptions, and innovations, with a view to integrating them and enabling other teams to benefit from them); feedback in revision of the translations (these are reread—and not just once!—within the editorial teams, and any important elements in dispute are then discussed again with the translation team). On every occasion it is not a matter of imposing arbitrary choices but of convincing others in accordance with a clearly defined overall view. Moreover, translators regularly participate, individually or as representatives of the group, in the translation and revision carried out by members of the editorial and directing teams. Our worktable, a welcoming one since the early beginning, is often, and we hope it will continue to be round.

Today, after more than five years of work, a sort of "collective Strachey" has formed under the guidance of the three directors. Individual contributions have become indiscernible, what was multiple has become one, and the parts now form a coherent whole. Although initial heterogeneity gave reason to fear that it might never come to life, slowly and steadily this homogeneous body matures and, with mutual respect and progressive self-organization, achieves the unity of a complex and efficient organism.

Whereas all the aborted attempts in the past could have given rise to suspicion and our scientific requirements made it difficult to assess how much time we would need, we emphasize that we could not have attained our objectives without the complete freedom of action, unlimited assistance, and trust accorded by our publisher.

Conclusion

A work of thought, the Freudian *œuvre*, is motion, development, and progress toward an ever better differentiated conceptualization. It is too little to say that the translation adapts itself to this motion and tries to render it: any genuine translation is not only put to the "test" of that "alien" which is the work but also, in turn, puts the work to the test of that alien which is the experience of translation itself. What is latent in the work only an alien can discover and only the transition into an alien, foreign language can carry through the development and destiny of the work.

In this sense, as Benjamin put it, a translation may become a major moment in the life of the work itself. . . .

Obstacles to Improving Strachey's Freud

DARIUS GRAY ORNSTON, JR., M.D.

We have reviewed examples of hard work to be done and emotional resistance to be absorbed, of credulity that must be recognized and conflicts that must be aired, before a modern scholarly edition of Freud's works can be put together in any language. There are further obstructions.

During the early 1950s, at about the time when the first few volumes of Strachey's edition were being published, A. A. Roback wanted to do a little book about the nineteen letters and postcards he had received from Freud over the years. Roback assumed and was advised by his lawyers that because Freud had sent the letters to him, they were now his personal property and he could publish, translate, or sell them as he saw fit.

Ernst Freud, who had left architecture to administer his father's literary estate, advised Roback that under international copyright law these letters could not be published without explicit permission from Sigmund Freud Copyrights, Ltd., which is the Freud family's agent. Furthermore, he told Roback (1957) that it was the policy of Freud's heirs to disallow the publication of a complete correspondence with any individual. Eventually, Roback (1957) was allowed to choose and publish six of the nineteen pieces. The others were published for the first time in the final volume of Ernest Jones's (1953-57) biography of Freud.

This story illustrates several points about ownership and copyright law as they have been applied to the translation and publication of Freud's work. Ownership

has no relationship to copyright unless the copyright has also been separately transferred. Both can be sold, and either can be contested. Although Roback owned the letters, the right to publish them belonged to the Freud Copyrights. I infer that Roback ran into a marketing strategy, a way of raising interest in what was withheld, because I can think of no other motive for the Freud family's allowing Roback to choose any six items he wanted. This story also illustrates how using Freud's name could give any proposal a quality of compelling command and what Strachey called the "all-powerful" stature accorded to Ernest Jones. As Strachey said, "Everything was under his control" (Strachey 1963b; Strachey and Strachey 1985; Steiner 1987).

Everyone agrees that the tangled bank of "authorized" translations and licenses for many works was planted—if not planned—by Freud himself; conventionally this is explained as the heedless behavior of a prolific scientific writer who was occasionally careless and unbusiness-like. I think it would be more consistent with both Freud's scientific strategy and his personal style to infer that he was at least half aware that a variety of illustrative analogies in alternative translations might advance the development of his descriptive science.

In the United States, the law regards any new translation as a distinct entity. James Strachey's Standard Edition, for example, is legally his creation, and both his translation and his extensive editorial apparatus were copyrighted quite independently of Freud's original works. Of course, any claim that one's work is "entirely new" is brash hyperbole, difficult to define, and therefore open for discussion and possible litigation. That may be why Strachey claimed that his translation *The Interpretation of Dreams* and Alan Tyson's translation *The Psychopathology of Everyday Life* were "entirely new" for the Standard Edition—although he was usually much more modest (compare Strachey 1953, p. xii, with Strachey 1966a, pp. xvii–xix).

Strachey certainly developed his own voice, but he understood that any entirely new translation would have been riddled with mistakes and distortions as an inevitable consequence of straining to be distinctly different from prior translations, some of which were good. For example, many people were introduced to Freud's work by reading various editions of A. A. Brill's original translation of *The Interpretation of Dreams*. In 1915, both James and Alix Strachey had been satisfied to study and discuss Brill's first edition. Ten years later, in the midst of his own translations, Strachey wrote about Joan Riviere's translations: "I must say the translations are extraordinarily well done. They're very clear, and the sense seems always to be correct. The woman must have taken a devilish

amount of trouble with them" (Strachey and Strachey 1985, pp. 27, 232). This is why Strachey did not tinker with most of Riviere's choices when he used her versions in his Standard Edition.

Because the English-language copyright on Freud's published works expired in 1989, on the fiftieth anniversary of his death, anyone is free to translate and edit, to obtain a copyright, and to publish and distribute any of Freud's works in English if—and only if—this version is fresh and independent enough to pass for entirely new.

Of course, there is no requirement that a new translation be accompanied by commentary. And in chapter 8 we have a carefully reasoned and elaborately documented position in favor of presenting Freud's translated works with a minimum of interpretation and explanation. Because Strachey's scholarly apparatus is still under copyright, however, editors of any new English edition may have to work from the German without the cooperation of those who hold that copyright as well as access to an undetermined mass of unpublished research material.

Any new project is threatened by competitive contentions and personal vendettas. Intimidation and threats of expensive litigation still play their roles in this game of bluff because prestige, political control, and large sums of money are at stake. One might anticipate a vigorous contest both from publishers who maintain that they hold exclusive license and from certain heirs who are likely to defend their interests as they see them. Finally, any clear and consistent dissenting voice is likely to sound dissonant, if not outright wrong, to a person who first read Freud's work in Strachey's very British cadence.

In summary, the holder of a valid copyright controls permission to quote more than a short passage or to copy published material; the right to read, refer to, or print unpublished material is ruled by individual owners and archives as they see fit. I believe that in the English-speaking countries there is no longer any copyright that would either forbid publication of an entirely new translation of any of Freud's works into English or require any sort of payment for the legitimate right to translate and publish Freud. Those who disagree must make their case.

A recurrent hitch in producing any critical edition, even one set of letters exchanged with a single correspondent, is finding qualified translators and editors who will stay healthy and get their share done on time, not to mention raising the funds to pay them fairly (Grubrich-Simitis 1989). The curators of both major collections of Freud's papers (the Library of Congress in Washington, D.C., and Sigmund Freud Copyrights, Ltd., in Colchester, England) say that they will have their holdings

published as soon as they can find the right editors and translators and enough money to pay them. The Library of Congress reports, however, that the terms of several wills and bequests require that it withhold some collections until well into the next century.

Freud destroyed many of his handwritten letters, sketches, and drafts. Occasionally he wrote his final corrections of both substance and style on galley proofs, which he almost certainly discarded after the work was published (Grubrich-Simitis 1977, 1985, 1987b, and in preparation). Every once in a while, he systematically purged records of his dreams, correspondence, and visitors. We also know that his “palace guard” destroyed articles that they felt might be damaging. Anna Freud and Marie Bonaparte, for example, burned some of Freud’s papers that they felt might be dangerous in Nazi hands. At the same time and under the same extreme conditions, these two loyal souls literally “rescued” work from Freud’s wastebasket, papers that Freud had clearly and consistently said he wished to have destroyed.

James Strachey’s “Project” may be the best known of these. Strachey used this nameless, unfinished, and salvaged chunk from a private and discarded correspondence—which he christened “The Project for a Scientific Psychology”—to interpret the difficult seventh chapter of Freud’s (1900) book about dreams. In one of his rare open disagreements with Freud, Strachey looked at this unpublished work as the fountainhead of Freud’s most fundamental theories, although that would certainly undercut Freud’s claim to have based psychoanalytic conceptions on decades of empirical observations, and no one doubts that Freud wanted it suppressed (Freud 1987, pp. 386–477; Strachey 1953, 1957, 1961a, 1962b, 1966b).

But generations of analysts have extended Strachey’s vigorous and pervasive interpretation of that discredited fragment, and this may serve as an example of how people with good sense, perfect connections, and impeccable credentials can resuscitate an obscure, time-bound, failed, and abandoned “sketch”—*einen Entwurf* is what Freud (1950) and his German editors called it—to make it profoundly influential.

I think Strachey made too much of “The Project.” Some will argue, however, that he was right or even that he and Jones did not wholly appreciate its detailed prescience and psychological validity (Kanzler 1973). The editors of any thorough edition must work out a way to present such controversies. I favor explaining the choices and giving the reader specific references to alternative views in the literature (for example, see Pribram and Gill 1976, pp. 159–69). Modern scholarship will make such books extremely expensive and bulky, if not difficult to read.

Again, Strachey's authoritative, simplified, and standard manner is easier to take.

As so often turns out to be true in studying Strachey's work, he was very much aware of this problem. He asked, "Can it, then, be of any value?" and went on to argue in the affirmative that "The Project... threw light for the first time on some of the more obscure of Freud's fundamental hypotheses" (SE 1:176, 290; and see Strachey 1953).

I think his rhetorical question about the valid uses of such a manuscript remains a good one. Analysts well before Strachey had established the unscientific custom of using congenial anecdotes, plausible aphorisms, and occasionally private letters (or excerpts from them) as documentation on a par with Freud's formal publications. Although these materials may be valuable in their own way, a historian will differentiate them from one another and from works Freud did choose to publish.

Not recognizing "structure" and "energy" as figures of speech common in many late nineteenth-century German psychobiologies, psychoanalysts accepted several of Strachey's basic assumptions, among them that Freud gradually came to put more value on "structure" (*Struktur*) than on "function" (*Funktion*) and that psychic "energy" was his most fundamental hypothesis. Although Freud had never said anything of that sort, Strachey's generation then discerned a whole new "Structural Theory" in what Freud had continued to picture as topography—*Topographie*—that is, rough diagrams and extended speculations.¹

The trouble is that once you have started burning or rescuing and clarifying or correcting a scientist's papers, it becomes ever more difficult to keep your own assumptions and motives sorted out, to keep track of what you have done, and to present a pure translation of the author's own fair copy quite apart from your own beliefs. As we have seen, Strachey (1966a) believed he could do that.

Strachey, Ernest Jones, Anna Freud, and Ernst Freud are among those who "silently corrected" some of Freud's obvious slips and "improved" his formulations while they were excerpting his papers and letters for publication.² I surmise that some of this selective preservation and conscientious improvement will turn out to favor the deep meaning accorded to "metapsychology" right after Freud died and also to bolster

1. Freud 1920, 1923a, 1925a, 1930; Ornston 1985a, 1985b, 1988.

2. For various reports about the selection, "correction," and destruction of Freud's drafts and galley proofs see: Freud 1986, 1988; Bonaparte, Freud, and Kris 1950; Strachey, SE 1:176, 286–93; Jones 1953, pp. 287–88; Cremerius 1971; Schur 1972; Eissler 1974; McGuire 1974, p. xx n.; Bertin 1982; Dickson 1985; Gay 1988, pp. 185n, 743; Mahony 1989a, pp. 71 n. 8, 76 n. 9; and Grubrich-Simitis 1985, 1987b, 1989.

the single-minded view of that era, portraying Freud as a positivistic scientist who sometimes happened to write very well.

Although it still may comfort some to murmur that these changes do not make much difference—and at the moment it is certainly fashionable to do so—the truth is that no one really knows. In spite of untold purges, scholars continue to unearth occasional drafts, reviews, and letters that shed fresh light on Freud's ever-shifting and ambiguous ambitions, interests, and intentions. Another of Freud's carelessly abandoned, recently discovered, and distinctly Romantic sketches—*Entwürfe*³—of his own anthropological myth or “phylogenetic phantasy” about inherited experience may begin to explain Freud's mercurial attitudes toward his own “metapsychology” and perhaps why he so rarely found a use for that term.

For now, there is no way of checking whether all of the changes other people have made in Freud's transcripts and publications are minor or meaningless. If there were, this would be a powerful reason for all sides to end the impasse and lift restrictions on scholarship because these protective and obstructive policies—even if they make some descendants of deceased letter writers and former patients feel safe—also embarrass a profession dedicated to candid reports of thorough investigations. It doesn't matter, however, if some of us see the caution as excessive, because possession remains nine points of the law. We can only hope that more of Freud's informative papers are still squirreled away in various formal “archives” as well as in private hands.

Ingeborg Meyer-Palmedo and Gerhard Fichtner (1989) have revised Strachey's bibliography of Freud's works and published correspondence. Fichtner (1989) has identified, located, and electronically transcribed some five thousand letters written by Freud, and nearly thirty-two hundred of these have been published in whole or in part. Fichtner estimates that Freud may have produced twenty thousand letters in his lifetime and that half of these may still exist. Kurt Eissler (1980), who assembled most of the Sigmund Freud Collection now in the Library of Congress, estimates about the same numbers and says that the constraint on Freud's letters will expire in the year 2002.

The Library of Congress determines what may be read or cited from the files deposited by the Sigmund Freud Archives, Inc., of New York.

3. Freud thought this informal manuscript would interest few other than Ferenczi—“You can throw it away or keep it,” he wrote. Ferenczi did choose to keep it, and many years later Ilse Grubrich-Simitis found it in a trunk with papers in the possession of Michael Balint, who was curator of Ferenczi's estate (Freud 1985, pp. 8–9, 89–90). Also see Freud 1969, 1986; and Fichtner 1987, 1989; Grubrich-Simitis 1985, 1989, and in preparation.

The Freud family's agent, Sigmund Freud Copyrights, Ltd., and the British Psycho-Analytical Society, in London, each administer separate collections of correspondence and other research materials written by Freud and some of his colleagues and translators. Much of this material is still restricted from open and scholarly investigation, not to speak of publication. The paucity of qualified editors and funds is also holding up publication of much informative correspondence that has already been opened for research.

Although we have some nearly complete and elegantly edited volumes of written exchanges between Freud and a few of his essential colleagues, other letters have been carelessly transcribed or badly translated and dispersed into obscure journals or even cut into uncertain fragments and then used to bolster personal polemics. We will come to some clear examples.

The fine McGuire edition of the Freud-Jung letters was possible only after long negotiations. Jung's family held onto their letters while agreeing to publication; an anonymous benefactor then purchased Freud's letters from the Freud family for the Library of Congress (McGuire 1974). Muriel Gardiner bought Freud's youthful letters to Eduard Silberstein from that man's heirs. These were then edited for publication with a private subsidy. On the other hand, the huge and crucial collection of letters between Freud and Sandor Ferenczi has only been available to scholars in the National Library because publication has foundered in a quarrel about money. The first volume has appeared in French, but there is no word on German or English editions so far. The Freud-Binswanger letters were recently edited, but very slowly and carefully—over thirteen years of work have gone into this project. Investors outside of the Freud family still hold an untold number of Freud's letters for appreciation; every now and then, a letter is auctioned off (Fichtner 1982, 1989).

Is it fair to assume that the various archives also have some of the suggestions and corrections that many Austrians and others tactfully mailed in during the creation of Strachey's Standard Edition? Actually, a great many alternative translations of single words, phrases, and whole passages have already been published here and there, but these are seldom indexed and therefore lie dormant as scattered footnotes in other people's books and papers.

We have said that Freud's wording is often more ambiguous than that of his translators. Furthermore, few modern scholars can make out every detail in Freud's abbreviated handwriting, so there is plenty of room for disagreement about what Freud wrote, let alone what he meant, even

when scholars are allowed to study an original manuscript. In fact, when all the archives are finally opened, unrestricted examination of their holdings by students coming from different disciplines and with divergent assumptions may be disappointing rather than definitive. These research materials may revive or muddle more questions than they resolve.

The nicely edited Freud-Jung (1974) correspondence, the Freud-Fließ letters (Freud 1986) and—although they are carefully selected and excerpted—the candid correspondence between James and Alix Strachey (1985) remain fair examples of the way personal letters may be bloated with the sort of loose and allusive stuff one mumbles to a beloved late at night, recollecting people and events we cannot recognize, catty characterizations, petty politics, petulant resentments, ramblings about trips to the zoo, train schedules, children's colds, and what somebody wore to the party. Even when we are able to reconstruct something of their contexts, reading unexpurgated letters is awfully boring. Scholars have to sort out occasional kernels of digestible wheat from heaps of apparently insignificant chaff.

On the other hand, what seemed trivial a few generations back may suddenly appear crucial, such as our startled realization that some of Freud's apparent convictions were skittish when not quite contradictory and that his hovering irony, his ever-varying usage of the same figures of speech in contrasting contexts, his redundant wordplay, and his overdetermined lines of thought all set a tone of uncertainty and skepticism about the ongoing complexity and psychological simultaneity he is portraying for his reader (Mahony 1984a, 1986, 1987a, 1987b, 1989a). I believe that these are essential traits in Freud's evocatively descriptive science as well as a sometime safeguard against mistaking one or another way of reading his words for scripture.

INSTITUTIONALIZED LANGUAGE

Anyone who has tried to translate more than a few lines of Freud has had a sobering experience, because it is impossible to sustain the self-same context, tone, and nuance, not to mention the same wording, from day to day without egregiously distorting the original. An even more enlightening exercise is to translate some unfamiliar paragraph from a target language back into German. The fact is that no two people are likely to apply Freud's pliable wording in the same way, and very few will agree altogether about what should be emphasized.

We are still recognizing and sorting out all sorts of scientific and literary

allusions, as well as some terminologic distinctions, which at one time either seemed self-evident or were a way of declaring personal loyalty to a powerful pooh-bah but which may not mean much anymore. For example, at the end of chapter 1 we noted how much economic and regulatory considerations mattered to some analysts a few years ago and how little they mean today.

Lagache (1967) has said that throughout his work Freud continued to use many plain and stirring descriptions of the ways in which he was able to imagine unconscious life and that he showed slight interest in refining his terms. I have suggested that this may have been a conscious decision to use all the analogies and approximations he could find in order to keep on approaching and forever modifying the principles of unconscious psychology.⁴ Institutionalized language may have made more sense half a century ago because it seemed to provide comforting stability—which does not feel like dogmatic rigidity unless one tries to move. Innovative analysts have been tempted into precisely retooling Strachey's terms and defining how they should be used—even devising words of their own. Although such attempts may occasionally contribute to the continuing evolution of a descriptive language, I think the evidence is mounting that it is vain to tell psychoanalysts which words to choose and how to use them (Loewenstein 1969; Ornston 1988; Moore and Fine 1990).

The natural selection of scientific terminology is at least as messy in psychoanalysis as in any other field. Jones (1924) saw this and plainly said that he meant to clean it up. As mentioned earlier, Strachey's Standard Edition treats most conceptual questions as if they had been settled once and for all, as if alternative wording and diverging conceptions were not worth mentioning—if not invalid.

ORTHODOXY

Freud (1905b) gave his enchanting imagination a free run, that of a brilliant, curious, and delightfully unpredictable thoroughbred. You can never tell for certain just where his whimsically impulsive and loosely reined language will take him. Strachey's stolid descendant is more consistent and seems quite steady. Without apparent humor, head down

4. Fichtner (1987) showed that when Freud was a neurologist, he was as eager to publish a definitive anatomy of the brain as he was prolific in contributing precise definitions of technical terms to several medical dictionaries. I am offering evidence that Freud (1915a) changed his mind about definitions as he developed psychoanalysis.

and blinders snug, he hauls incredibly heavy loads and comes closer than anyone else ever has to getting the huge job done, although occasionally even Strachey's horse has a mind of its own (Kaufmann 1980). Would a politically effective committee produce an ornery camel? Not necessarily. The King James, or "authorized," Bible is said to have been put together by a committee, but it is necessary to disentangle the quality of a committee's work from its passing political power. Therein lies the rub.

Scholars agree that the King James Bible is lovely. It has held up for over three centuries because it sounds like what people want to hear. All the same, since the eighteenth century it has been increasingly clear that the King James version is heavily slanted and often downright mistaken. But the analogy strains at this point because we are thinking about how to get across the protean works of one awesomely literate scientist.

As we have illustrated, in many countries most psychoanalysts were raised on Strachey. Where Freud often personifies a person's "fate"—*Schicksal*—English readers tend to take Strachey's mannered "vicissitudes" for their own, to say nothing of Strachey's metapsychological assumptions and convictions. Strachey has become scripture. If Freud is not put into Strachey's self-consciously stiff and masterly voice,⁵ either Freud sounds undignified or else the person who is citing him sounds incorrect. Will readers be able to handle alternative translations? Will they buy them?

I think so. As for the analysts, nervous orthodoxy and sectarian fidelity surely held down past generations, and institutional psychoanalysis still suffers massive problems with authority, but there are clear signs that some analysts are ready to move into the rough-and-tumble mainstream of open investigation and scholarly debate.⁶ Some analytic societies encourage discussion of these problems. Alternative readings are often taken seriously now and given a fair hearing. Within the fractious psychoanalytic movement there is much more diversity than may be apparent to an outsider. Many modern analysts take the trouble to portray

5. How can one consider the phenomenon of Strachey's worldwide influence on the translations of Freud into many languages in a way that is fair criticism of what worked in his era and is still quite useful in ours, that is, attain a balanced regard without either apologetic idealization or subtle depreciation? Grubrich-Simitis (1981) and Mahony (1987a) described this problem in Freud biography.

6. We are considering the problems in translating what Freud wrote. Of course, the presentation and validation of contextually determined clinical evidence is informative, but that is a somewhat different problem.

their ideas variously and have a genuine and informed interest in language. In fact, the significance of wording has become so much the spirit of our time that serious psychoanalytic writers sometimes slip into trivial word games and breathless preciosity.

OFFICIAL SECRETS, CONFIDENTIALITY, AND ACCESS TO EVIDENCE

Kurt Eissler gave two reasons for his decision to suppress many documents for several generations after the death of any person who might be hurt by publication. He meant to protect those who might be embarrassed or unfairly treated in these papers, and he wanted to reassure any potential donor of the Archive's discretion in order to gather and conserve as much material as possible for later research. Although some donations were made on condition that the use of these sources be delayed, Eissler set other release dates himself. Most files were sealed at the time they were handed over. Eissler has now retired, but he believes his decision has worked: the Library of Congress owns "a huge collection of Freud documents, which will be unmatched by any other collection relating to a scholar of our century." However, he also chose not to examine the unpublished letters, because gentlemen do not read one another's mail.⁷

Time has passed and times have changed. The Library of Congress now reports that almost three quarters of their Sigmund Freud Collection is "open without restriction to scholars." There remain portions that will be opened to the public at a given date and others that may be seen with the permission of the donor's representative. The current board of the Sigmund Freud Archives, Inc., "is now committed to a policy of removing restrictions as rapidly as possible." It also modified its procedure: when a restricted letter is requested, the Archives (not the Library of Congress) appoints someone to review and censor whatever passages are supposed to be kept from the public. From now on, the only material withheld will be passages that directly identify or make it possible to identify a patient.⁸ But we do not know who the censors are, let alone anything about their personal views and qualifications.

This kind of access is still slow, cumbersome, and discouraging.⁹ Inad-

7. Eissler 1974, pp. 403-04; letter to Carl Jung, 13 Aug. 1958, cited in McGuire 1974, pp. xxviii-xxix.

8. Personal communication from James H. Hutson, chief of the Manuscript Division, Library of Congress; affirmed by Harold P. Blum, M.D., executive director of the Sigmund Freud Archives, Ltd. *New York Review of Books*, 17 July 1986; Gay 1988, pp. 784-85.

9. In October 1988 I asked the Library of Congress for photocopies of two letters from Freud

vertently it creates the impression that secrets worth censoring must be more meaningful and valuable or that the new papers must be more up to date or reliable than what we already have in hand. We do know that if no one is allowed to study these papers, no one can adequately assess either the potential value of what is being withheld or the justification for continuing to restrict it. In historical research, as in translation, a different reading is not necessarily a better one.

Therefore, several authorities have proposed that the responsibility for protecting people's privacy be shifted from the archives to the scholars who want to work with these materials and whose credentials are in order. They could be required to sign the kind of simple contract that serves in other fields. That is, even when those who wrote the letters or are mentioned in them have either died or agreed to publication, any scholar using this material would have to delete all names and identifying details of those judged vulnerable by the archival censors.

Published letters lose much of their meaning and utility, however, when we cannot confirm just whom they were written about and what for, and how they fit into both an intact correspondence and whatever else was going on at the same time. The second drawback is that the copyright owners won't accept this arrangement anyway. Some feel that no scholar's contract is an adequate safeguard because so often a knowledgeable person can read between the lines. Deft innuendo, nasty allusions, and outright accusations may turn out to carry some sort of truth, and archivists still argue that any and every embarrassing release is likely to hamper future acquisitions. They may be right about that.

Although Freud carefully falsified his case reports to protect his patients, most of these people have been identified, and we know a great deal about them and their families. Some of what we have been told is no longer credible. Freud may have been careless, but it seems he made certain changes for other reasons. During the past few years, for example, scholars have found and fit together a great deal of biographical detail about the patients we know as "Anna O.," "Ka-

to Jones. After an exchange of seven letters with the library staff and with Sigmund Freud Copyrights, Ltd., I received the copies on 10 March 1989. In order to cite parts of these letters in this volume, I took the precaution of getting permission from Harvard University Press, which holds the English rights to the Freud-Jones correspondence. At the end of October 1989 I received a gracious but qualified permission and, after further correspondence, a form letter in December 1991 agreeing that my few and brief citations "constitute fair use" as described at the beginning of this chapter. On the advice of Mark Paterson I also requested permission to use the original letters from Freud's German publisher, S. Fischer, in Frankfurt am Main. Fischer then requested the actual number of German words and asked to see my proposed citations "in extenso." The final permission and form of citation arrived from Harvard in February 1992.

tharina," "The Wolf Man," and "The Rat Man" (Fichtner and Hirschmüller 1985; Mahony 1986, 1989a; Swales 1988). Mahony has also shown that Freud doctored his evidence, apparently to create a more convincing story. If modern scholars can track down so much information about heavily disguised patients who died many years ago, won't they have a much easier time identifying individual letter writers and their heirs who are still alive?

One can certainly argue the opposite as a way of protecting people named in these letters. That is such correspondence should be published intact and while any affected parties are alive and able to respond, refute, or elaborate as they will. The Freud-Jung correspondence was published after Jung's family agreed that this should be done while people who had known both men were still available to contribute to the annotation (McGuire 1974, pp. xxxiii-xxxiv).

Whatever else lies protected (or suppressed) in the archives, mean-spirited grudges and damaging gossip are bound to emerge, along with more detail and versions of events that may never be reconciled. No secret is ever more than a partial truth, but a secret may also be an unfounded rumor, a befuddled memory, or even an outright lie. Precisely because some "private" correspondence appears to have been written with one eye cocked on posterity or, perhaps at the same time, with a naïve faith that one could trust an intimate correspondent to destroy all traces, the people who wrote these letters may well need and deserve protection as much as or more than their intended victims. Finally, any code can be broken, any confidence can be given away, anything can be copied, and once a restriction has been lifted it can never be effectively restored.

Furthermore, professional discretion does not expire upon the death of a former patient or colleague or any generation of heirs, because we are not only collecting and conserving documents but also looking out for the probity and reputation of a whole, loosely constituted profession. The dignity and trustworthiness of all psychoanalysts may be at stake because, to judge from correspondence already published, Freud and his colleagues were rough on one another and quick to use putative clinical observations as manipulative epithets and diagnostic terms as ammunition against personal enemies.

Freud frequently disdained his Viennese disciples, and just about everyone appears to have bragged or gossiped or bashed an occasional opponent with terms such as "homosexual" and "paranoid." I suppose their vanity was that they were being either analytically astute or unabashedly candid about their feelings for one another, and it is only fair to

recognize that they were sometimes just as hard on themselves, at least in private correspondence. Peter Gay has described the now-peculiar mores of early psychoanalysis:

In their correspondence and their conversation, the psychoanalysts of the first generation employed an intrusive style that would have been wholly out of place in the discourse of other mortals. . . . They all practiced in their circle the kind of wild analysis they decried in outsiders as tactless, unscientific and counterproductive. . . . Freud played this game with the rest, even though he soberly warned his colleagues against abusing psychoanalysis as a weapon. . . . This slashing mode was irresistible, its coinage inflated, and its practice familiar. (Gay 1988, p. 235)

Although Gay explains that this may have been a relief and a release from being discreet most of the time, I find his apology too thin, and he writes as if this problem were only an artifact of that era.

The same questions must be asked of the agency that looks after the interests of Freud's heirs (Sigmund Freud Copyrights, Ltd.). Freud's letters to his fiancée, Martha Bernays—*die Brautbriefe*—were vigorously censored when they were first published in 1960 and even when they were reprinted in 1988. Now, at last, preparations have begun for an unexpurgated edition by Ilse Grubrich-Simitis. This correspondence was once described as "the greatest collection of love letters in the history of Western culture." But how can anyone know that as long as scholars from various disciplines who come with their own assumptions and methods are not allowed to read all of these letters (Gay 1988, p. 785)? How, then, can anyone discriminate honest enthusiasm from considered opinion—or marketing hype?

One might have thought that the relatively recent editions of Freud's (1974) correspondence with Carl Jung and Freud's (1986) letters to Wilhelm Fliess would dampen speculative fervor about radical revelations of official secrets, which would then lead to some inevitable and absolute truth about what Freud was trying to do at one time or another. That has not happened.

Freud's correspondence with Fliess and Ferenczi certainly shows that these men deserve more respect and understanding than they have been given so far. They were much more than a passive audience or imaginative stalwarts who stimulated and sustained Freud's genius through some dark and lonely times. What would have become of Freud without Josef Breuer (Hirschmüller 1978; Sulloway 1979; Mahony 1979b)?

But why this apparent diversion into the obstructions facing a historian? Why can't any competent translator simply reword into the target language whatever version of Freud's German is available? James Strachey's team managed to do a more-than-adequate job while seldom consulting Freud's manuscripts. What does restricted access to drafts and proofs, "complete" correspondence, and other documentation have to do with the problems we have in translating Freud's formal publications? That is, why can't we get by with a fair translation of what Freud himself chose to print?

For one thing, no one appears to have escaped Strachey's influence and the scientistic kind of psychoanalysis that seemed so essential in the decades right after Freud died. The official Standard Edition has been eagerly accepted, religiously reviewed, scholastically taught, venerably preserved, even enthusiastically imported into Germany, and almost wholly relied on for decades. Any alternative reading has had an uphill fight against an incumbent who has won and held the trust of most living psychoanalysts. A second reason is that word-for-word translation of Freud's subtle and ambiguous German is often unsatisfactory because, as chapters in this book amply illustrate, Freud's vivid and descriptive language may suggest several somewhat contradictory meanings—even to the same person at the same time.

For reasons summarized by Alex Holder, Freud's own handwritten manuscripts are neither our best source nor his final word. The last published edition that was revised by Freud—*Ausgabe letzter Hand*—is almost certainly the one for a translator to use (Grubrich-Simitis 1987b).

On the other hand, a scholar who is trying to follow the winding development of Freud's conceptions will need to collect comments from his correspondence and his references to other publications as well as sort out the changes Freud made over the decades through all editions of the work at hand. Some of these are neither clarifications nor improvements. Where Strachey saw Freud's terminologic deviations as inadvertent, blurred, or even indiscriminate, I see evidence of Freud's steadfast scientific flexibility and distrust of stolid definitions.¹⁰

A translator needs everything and anything that may inform about what Freud was trying to do and the various ways in which he may have meant to engage and stir an audience. We need to know how both

10. For sound evidence that as Strachey developed what he called "the structural picture of the mind," he was very much aware of these huge and tedious editorial chores, see Strachey 1961a and Ornston 1985b; then compare Strachey 1966a with Ornston 1985a.

Freud and his contemporaries used the imagery and metaphors he chose at any given time. Freud's (1985) recently discovered and published "Overview of the Transference Neuroses"—*Übersicht der Übertragungsneurosen*—reveals his skeptical, if not indifferent, stance toward his own metapsychological fantasies. His pervasive and uncertain irony, especially about himself, is almost altogether missing from the Standard Edition, perhaps because Jones and Strachey were not prepared to read him as ironic, let alone as wry or funny.

Max Schur chose one concise example to illustrate the translator's near-constant predicament, even when one has access to many unpublished letters.

All the translations of unpublished letters are my own. In general, I have sacrificed elegance of language to accuracy. It needs to be stressed, however, that the translation of letters presents a particularly difficult problem because Freud used many uncommon phrases, unusual metaphors, sometimes slang. In addition, his particular attitude may have been known to the person to whom he wrote, but is no longer available. Yet, this attitude often defines the choice of word. To give an example: In "Beyond the Pleasure Principle" Freud refers to "[die] grossartige Konzeption von W. Fliess." I began by translating this a "grand" conception; Jones used "grandiose"; Strachey "large"; and someone else coming upon this isolated sentence would be justified to adopt "magnificent." (Schur 1972, p. xi)

Much of the time I read the sober and serious Freud as also a profound ironist, and here his words sound to me as if he was using an apparent but excessive compliment playfully, in order to put Fliess down. In this book, and quite ambiguously, Freud immersed himself in his own biological fantasies. If his phrase were anglicized into a reference to Fliess's "fantastic conception" or "grand design," such words might catch and convey Freud's eagerness to believe as well as his simultaneous doubts about the singularly certain and determining power—*Alleinherrschaft*—of Fliess's hormones and biological clocks. In fact, Freud says this quite explicitly at the end of the same paragraph.¹¹ He then plunges back into his own, temporarily assumed, credulity.

This rhythm of engaging and compelling speculation, interspersed with sudden and candid distrust of his own or anyone else's fantastic

11. Freud, 13:47/18:45; Ornston 1985a. One must also take into account the relationship as it appears in historical context. Freud's (1986) stormy relationship with Fliess is a good example. In their early years *grossartig* had an altogether different connotation.

schemes, is characteristic of Freud's writings and has been described as his essential "romantic irony."¹²

Much of what Freud felt about his own terms and publications is contained in long letters, some of which turn out to be drafts of formal papers. What are we to make of Jones's assertion that it was Freud himself who thought of translating the colloquial idea of *Verdrängung*, meaning that one interest crowds another out of consciousness, into the English word "repression"? When was the occasion and what was the context? Freud's use of this term gradually became much more intricately and specifically psychoanalytic than most others. Was Freud mulling over a given passage (Jones 1953, 1959, p. 168; Madison 1956; Chertok 1968, p. 563 n. 4; Ornston 1982, p. 422)?

Furthermore, Jones clearly implies that Freud was not only working on "the best translation to use for various technical terms" but also going along with Jones's own plan for a uniform and international technical language. We are still not allowed to read many of Jones's sources. He asks us to take his own word for it—that is, until he got Freud to write to him in English and off and on thereafter, Jones made his own translations of his own excerpts from his own correspondence, which he made inaccessible to others. James Strachey and Ernst Freud agreed that Jones's biography is "full of mistakes and quite unreliable."¹³

When Freud was asked what a normal person should be able to do well, everyone knows that he is reported to have said "*Lieben und Arbeiten*" ("Loving and working"). Erik Erikson (1963, pp. 264–65) told this story about "the Professor's" formula as he was defending Freud against the common complaint that he was preoccupied with full and frequent orgasms to the exclusion of everything else. This does sound like something Freud might have said, but, as a historian, Erikson is a charming storyteller. Is there any evidence?

This may be trivial or not, depending on how you feel about Freud (or about love and work), but we are also nearly at a loss for evidence about the various translations of Freud's (1923a) *Das Ich und das Es*, although this problem has been reviewed beyond imagining. We do know

12. Mahony 1989a, pp. 92–93; Ornston 1985a, 1988, and preface, this vol., n. 4; cf. E. Freud, in his preface to Freud 1960, with Grotjahn 1976.

13. Strachey to E. Freud, unpublished letter, 18 Jan. 1961; E. Freud, cited in Grubrich-Simitis 1989, p. 891 n. 81; and for evidentiary examples, see Hirschmüller 1978. Cf. Strachey 1966a with Strachey and Strachey 1985, Trossman and Wolf 1973. I thank Sigmund Freud Copyrights, Ltd., for permission to cite Strachey's letter.

that Freud sometimes regretted writing this book and that he doubted that *das Es* could be rendered in English. We also know that after reading the book several times Strachey found it "utterly unintelligible" and that as much as he admired Joan Riviere's translations he considerably modified her 1927 version for his Standard Edition. On the other hand, and quite typically, Jones told Freud that he could not understand Freud's regrets or Strachey's difficulties because to Jones this was simply a matter of choosing the correct English word (Paskauskas 1988, p. 119; Strachey 1961a; Strachey and Strachey 1985, p. 148). Perhaps this is one reason it took so long to see clearly that from early on and throughout his widely variegated genre, Freud used the same term, *das Ich*, for several shifting and simultaneous concepts (Freud 1894, 1896b; Breuer and Freud 1895; chap. 8, this vol.).

Is it my own exasperation I feel when I read what a modern psychoanalytic writer has to say about Freud's terminology after 1923? "The idea of ego as subject is used very flexibly, ranging from the global meaning of the whole person as subject, including the entire psychic system, to the narrower idea of the person as purposive agent. Freud is less careful than before in specifying which of these several meanings he has in mind, shifting from one to the other without notice, sometimes within a single sentence, and often appearing to conflate the senses which I have been at such pains to distinguish" (McIntosh 1986, p. 441). McIntosh cannot bear this reading for long, and a few pages later he insists, "While his terminology is often imprecise, his concepts are not" (p. 446). I think McIntosh had Freud's ambiguous imagery and simultaneous contradiction right the first time. Again, we need open and continuous access to Freud's papers to be able to develop informed opinions about such questions.

MERCANTILE POLICIES AND POLITICS

Depending on where one sits, there is at least an unseemly—if not a seamy—side to psychoanalytic politics. As in any other field, personal ambition (or administrative ability), greed (or hard work), venal commercial deals (or sound business arrangements), and blind loyalty (or reliability) further some lines of investigation and block others.

Consider one controversial example. Perhaps, among other reasons, because supervision of their archives had been so casual in the past (Roazen 1971, p. xix), in 1985 the British Psycho-Analytical Society put what it chose to call an "embargo" on some of its holdings. They explained that while they were collating and preserving their collections,

a member of their society had reserved these unpublished files for his personal use. He argued that because his interests "coincide almost exactly" with work others have done and because he felt that two scholars cannot work on the same materials at the same time, he required indefinite private access as well as an exclusive right to publish for however long he needed.

The British defended this arrangement by suggesting that their embargo would enable excluded scholars to sharpen their sense for what was not yet revealed and thus to ask pointed research questions. The same genial person who contrived this bit of flummery also issued an unofficial warning that we must appease and placate the British Society, lest we harden the opposition to open use of its research materials in the future.

This kind of imperial monopoly is common in many disciplines, and it may be unfair to hold the British Society to a special standard. Most archives are hard-pressed for money. Perhaps this was one of those barter arrangements whereby the owners get their files organized, gain some public appreciation, and control how their material is presented.

Although there is a certain joy in uncovering secrets, a natural high in being the first to tell, and satisfaction of a sort in the knowledge that apparent novelty does sell books, well-weathered scholars will insist that research based on undisclosed sources remains more suspect than other kinds; until all primary and raw materials are openly accessible, the society must pay a stiff price in credibility. Perhaps for that reason they eased their embargo in 1990.

Who "Authorized" the Standard Edition?

Freud died on 23 September 1939. Only five days later Ernest Jones proposed to James Strachey that they immediately begin to secure "a *definitive edition*," not only because no one could do it as well as they could but also because it was "the most appropriate time to issue an appeal for American funds" (Steiner 1987, p. 42–43, italics added by Steiner; Holder, chap. 6, this vol.).

Samuel Lipton (1977) had already observed that in the years right after Freud died, both his technique and his various portrayals of abstract psychological ideas were rapidly regimented into a so-called classical method as well as into some sharply defined "metapsychological" theories. Lipton's emphasis was on technique, and his clearest example of the innovations that made the modern method so different and seem-

ingly rigorous when compared to Freud's was the psychoanalyst's (ostensibly objective) silence.

Steiner (1987) has described in painstaking detail the naïve positivism and urgent scholasticism that prevailed both in English psychoanalysis and in the medical establishment, where many analysts hoped to be accepted. From early on Ernest Jones was the prophet and political leader of this crusade. Steiner also supposes that Freud's support was "unconditional" and that he as good as gave Jones "an investiture as sole appointed spokesman of psychoanalysis on English soil." Accordingly, Freud "did not merely discuss and decide on terminology but went so far as to authorize an official translation in his name" and, despite his apparent "indifference . . . he nevertheless gave it his blessing," so that "the charismatic power conferred by Freud's legitimization dominates the whole enterprise." Steiner gives no evidence to sustain this view, and it is unclear how this position would fit with the encouragement Freud continued to give to many other expositors and translators, Jones prominent among them, to advance the cause of psychoanalysis in English-speaking countries. This may be why Steiner backs off a little. He does allow that Freud may not have intended the significance Steiner sees—that is, an "investiture" for all future translations of his work.¹⁴

If Freud really had authorized an official and standardized English version in his name, why did he never say so? Why did he avoid Jones's "international vocabulary" almost altogether? Why was it such a good idea to wait until Freud had been put away before going ahead with this project? And even if it should turn out that Freud did at some point go along with Jones's prospective scheme for a "definitive edition" (Jones 1924, p. 2; Steiner 1987), what use would that be to an English reader who wanted to distinguish the interpretations of various translators from what Freud chose to say in conversations or letters or formal publications—at one time or another?¹⁵

14. Steiner 1987, pp. 42–43, 59, 62, 81, 85, 92. After adding his own substantive historical findings to that amalgamated and slippery cluster of ever-shifting images and conceptual combinations that Freud sometimes called forth with the traditional German term *dem Ich*, Steiner conjectures the "undeniable fact" that Freud endorsed "the ego" for the officially approved translation. Steiner ignores the contrary report of James and Alix Strachey (1985), among others, and Freud's statement that he had sometimes intentionally personified *das Ich* (Freud 1933, p. 84).

15. The archivist of the Sigmund Freud Copyrights, Ltd., and W. W. Norton, Freud's American publisher, both acknowledge that they do not know of any evidence that Freud ever authorized a standard edition of his works: "While James Strachey was approved by Freud himself as translator of many individual works, I can find no evidence of consideration being given before Freud's death to a standard English edition edited by James Strachey" (personal communications from Thomas Roberts, archivist, Sigmund Freud Copyrights, Ltd., and Susan E. Barrows of W. W. Norton and Co.).

Excerpting the Evidence

Because the British Psycho-Analytical Society is politically vulnerable and owns only half of the copyright on Strachey's Standard Edition (Strachey left the other half to his stalwart aide, Angela Richards Harris), both the society and the British Institute of Psycho-Analysis have a heavy investment in the scientific status and credibility, not to mention sales, of what they call the "second edition." If touted as planned—that is, as a "new revision"—it might form the basis for an outright claim to the whole copyright.

As one would expect, when other scholars have been allowed to study copies of the same letters from which Steiner concluded that Freud authorized a uniform and official edition, different passages have caught their attention. Peter Gay, for example, read the copies of Jones's papers that are available to all in the Library of Congress and noticed that when Jones in 1926 urged Freud to reconsider a paper in which Jones rigorously defined the superego, Freud read it again and said he had confirmed his first impression. Freud "did not believe that Jones's semantic exercise provided the remedy."¹⁶

Alle von Ihnen bezeichneten Unklarheiten u Schwierigkeiten bestehen wirklich, aber sie sind auch mit den von Ihnen betonten Anhaltspunkten nicht zu beseitigen. Es bedarf durchaus neuer Untersuchungen gehäufte Eindrücke und Erfahrungen, und ich weiss, wie schwer die zu gewinnen sind. Es ist eben ein dunkler Anfang in einer verwickelten Sache.

Mein Befinden wendet sich—ich möchte glauben, endgiltig [sic]—von der Arbeit ab. Besser sich nicht zu täuschen. Ich empfinde als ob das Leben mir noch eine Weile das Gnadenbrot schenken würde. Ihre Frau die ich sehr grüssen lasse, mag Ihnen das Übersetzen.

All of the unclarities and difficulties you have laid out really are there but the guidelines you emphasize are not going to get rid of them. We need altogether new investigations of accumulated impressions and [empirical] experiences and I know how hard these are to come by. We have just a dim beginning into a tangled thing.

My own view turns—I would like to believe for the last time—away from this work. It's better not to deceive oneself. I feel as if

16. Freud to Jones, letter, 20 Nov. 1926. This is Gay's paraphrase of Freud's opinion (Gay 1988, pp. 416, 706). Gay mistakenly says that Freud wrote this letter in English. I thank the Library of Congress for a photocopy.

life may provide "my daily bread" [alms] for a while longer. Your wife, to whom I send my warm regards, can translate that for you.

When Jones translated this letter for his own Freud biography, his reading was understandably more favorable to himself than mine, and he gave no reason for leaving out this passage (Jones 1957, vol. 3, pp. 129–30). This is the same letter in which Freud also explains that all ease and inspiration leave him when he puts his German into Latin characters for the sake of Jones, who, like so many others, cannot make out Freud's "Gothic handwriting"—*Kurrentschrift*. Freud's wary tone is impossible to capture because it subtly pervades the whole letter. His apparent purpose is to recognize Jones's twenty years of hard work and his contributions to the psychoanalytic movement. What Freud does not say is plainer if one compares the warm and even affectionate letters he usually wrote on such occasions.

Three years later, when Jones told Freud that he had been invited to select one-ninth of Freud's writings and edit them into an English source book, Freud carefully balanced his advice, saying that he was glad he did not have to decide, in spite of his feeling that the whole enterprise was "truly American and to me quite repugnant."¹⁷ Freud reasoned that an American publisher who smelled money would surely turn the job over to someone who could not do it as well as Jones might have and that American readers would seize on such an easy source and never even approach Freud's works directly. Once again Freud encouraged Jones, who was then fifty years old, to abandon attempts to get Freud's works across and instead to save his energies for his own original accomplishments. Freud's inner voice told him that "the world will go on very much the same whether the Americans get a good or a bad source book for my writings."¹⁸

17. "Im Grunde ist mir die ganze Sache, als echt amerikanisch recht zuwider." Jones's translation is, "The whole idea is very repellant to me, typically American"; and Gay makes it, "The whole thing is, being authentically American, quite repellant to me" (Jones 1957, pp. 143–44; Gay 1988, pp. 566, 743). There is little doubt about what Freud means. His enduring contempt for Americans comes through quite strongly in the personal letters that have already been released. The International Psychoanalytical Association and the producers of the Standard Edition were dependent on American dues and subscriptions (Strachey 1966a; Steiner 1987; Freud-Jones correspondence, in preparation). This was resented: "I have always said, America has no other use than giving us money" (Freud to Jones, letter, 21 Dec. 1925, in Freud-Jones correspondence, in preparation). This may be yet another carefully considered and politic reason for suppressing some of Freud's letters.

18. I thank the Library of Congress for my photocopy of this letter from Freud to Jones, 4 Jan. 1929; original in German, "source book" in English.

Political Considerations

No one should take the exclusionary tactics of the British Psycho-Analytical Society personally, because there is a long and intact tradition of closed sources and controlled leaks in psychoanalytic studies.¹⁹ In 1954 even James Strachey was refused free use of the minutes of the Vienna Psychoanalytic Society. Although Siegfried Bernfeld and Max Schur had allowed Jones to use much of their unpublished research material with little or no acknowledgment and Bernfeld had even given Jones a detailed critical annotation of the manuscript for Jones's biography of Freud, Jones still denied Bernfeld access to the "Goldmine" of papers and letters from which he had excerpted his evidence. In the late 1960s, when Alexander Mitscherlich began to organize and seek funding for a critical edition of Freud's works in German, he was denied free access to Freud's papers by Anna Freud, and that splendid opportunity was lost.²⁰ Much more recently, Albrecht Hirschmüller (1978, 1991) was denied access to crucial letters Freud wrote about his decision not to become a psychiatrist. At present Gerhard Fichtner is not allowed to publish his computer files of Freud's wording; these contain the words Freud used, transcribed from his collected works—*Gesammelte Werke*—and all currently accessible correspondence.

A better-known example from the past: in his biography of Freud, Ernest Jones is harshly critical of Brill's translations: "Well, the translations in question were not only seriously inaccurate, with misunderstandings of the German text and ambiguous renderings that greatly impaired their value for scientific purposes, but were also couched in an undignified and colloquial form that was unworthy of Freud's style and gave a misleading impression of his personality. I was horror struck. I have not to this day been able to fathom his cavalier attitude in this matter of translations. . . . To Freud ideas were always more important

19. Damage from the British Society's selective and temporary embargo was assuaged because the Library of Congress apparently holds untold copies and indeed originals of much of the material that the British may have squirreled away; furthermore, in the humanities such arrangements are common practice among holders of copyright, publishers, and favored scholars. As Freud wrote in a comparable situation, which I have described elsewhere in this chapter, in any case "the world will go on very much the same."

20. James Strachey 1966a; Grubrich-Simitis 1981, p. 39, 1989. Grubrich-Simitis describes Mitscherlich's effort in some detail. She says that another main reason this venture failed was the lack of an editor who had Strachey's stature and was both capable and available for the duration of this huge project (Grubrich-Simitis 1989, p. 900). Strachey, Paul Roazen (1971, p. xix), J. M. Masson (Vorwort, in Freud 1986, p. x), and Peter Gay (1988) were among many others who were allowed to read the Freud-Jones papers before the British Psycho-Analytical Society embargoed them.

than form" (Jones 1959, p. 231). Jones does not document his critique with examples. Apparently he could not see many of Freud's ways of picturing unconscious life as both ambiguous and colloquial (Jones 1957, p. 38; compare Mahony 1987a; Ornston 1988).

Even as Jones bragged about James Strachey's familiarity with German idiom, he exaggerated Freud's adequate but awkward command of English, saying that Freud's English was excellent and even rather literary (Jones 1955b, 1953–57, 1959, p. 168; Steiner 1987, p. 49 n. 23). Freud certainly read English easily, and his first books were translations from English and French into German, which fits the basic principle that the most readable, if not the truest, translations are done by people who are at home in the target language. Freud's translations were regularly and favorably reviewed by Arthur Schnitzler²¹ and have recently been studied by Maria Pollak-Cornillot (1986).

I find Freud's English letters clear enough, some are even elegant, but they are obviously written by a foreigner. Some of Freud's pronouns and prepositions, for example, are a little off-key in a manner that may be inevitable for a person who has never lived in an English-speaking country. What we have described as Freud's wry tone and romantic irony usually vanishes in translation. Jones never explained why he felt it necessary to "improve" and excerpt these "excellent" letters for publication.²²

Freud did not seem to mind that Brill had learned his English in New York. Not only did Freud choose Brill as his translator over several eager Englishmen,²³ but he continued to recommend Brill's versions in print, explicitly and enthusiastically. In a 1930 endorsement of Brill's translation *The Interpretation of Dreams*, Freud began by saying that he had thought the book was untranslatable (Freud 1900, 2–3:104n/4:99n; also 1914a, 10:71/14:32).

In 1930 Brill's revised translation was the only edition available in

21. Schnitzler 1887, 1889, 1892a, 1892b; the last of these reviews is not signed, but the style and circumstances are too similar not to be Schnitzler's.

22. On 1 Sept. 1909 Freud wrote the following to G. Stanley Hall of Clark University: "My English is but poor as you will have found out at this moment. So I am obliged to transfer the difficulty to the side of the hearer and talk in my native tongue." He was referring to his forthcoming lectures at the university, which he (1910a, 1910b) delivered in German. For permission to cite this letter I am grateful to the Clark University Library, where the original is kept. Jones 1953–57, 1959, pp. 168–69, 231; Roazen 1971, pp. 13, 551 nn. 16, 17, and 18; Strachey and Strachey 1985; Gay 1988, p. 185n; Mahony, chap. 2, this vol.; and Freud-Jones correspondence, in preparation.

23. Freud to Jones, letter (in English), 9 Aug. 1911, excerpted in Jones 1955a, vol. 2, pp. 88, 467 n. 73; Freud to Marthe Bernays, letter, 20 Sept. 1912, in Freud 1960, p. 42; Jones 1959; Bernays 1965, p. 26.

English. At an earlier time and in a private letter, Freud wrote that he would describe Brill's translations as "more conscientious than beautiful."²⁴ In 1914 he wrote to Jones that he did not care who translated his recent *History of the Psychoanalytic Movement* and that he had left it to Brill to decide about that (Freud to Jones, letter, 24 Dec. 1914, in Freud-Jones correspondence, in preparation). During the 1920s he preferred certain translations by Riviere and Strachey (Freud to Bernays, letter, 14 Sept. 1923, in Bernays 1965, p. 268). However, those who believe that Freud was grooming Strachey to be his only authorized English translator and that he would have approved of Strachey's editorial standardization of his works must explain why Freud let Jones revise C. J. M. Hubback's translation "Beyond the Pleasure Principle" for publication in 1922 and why, at the end of a lifelong fascination with Moses, Freud (1939) allowed Jones—or more precisely, asked Jones's wife—to translate his last book into English.²⁵

Although Freud's conflicting attitudes toward the many different translations of his work have not yet been systematically studied, we do know that he advised some translators to replace his German examples of dreams, witticisms, and slips with their own colloquial ones in the target language. Again, Freud suggested that it might work best for both Brill and Jones to write their own papers in English instead of translating his. This certainly bears on the common complaint that Brill used some of his own English examples in place of Freud's. Furthermore, Freud absorbed some of Brill's English examples into his German works during revision. Even Strachey thought that this made good sense at that time, although he did go back and forth about this "drastic" solution.²⁶

Jones accused Brill both of being pro-German and then of becoming rapidly over-Americanized and noted that Freud ranked Brill ahead of himself as late as 1934; but Jones scoffed at Freud's suggestion that he might be jealous (Jones 1955a, 1957, pp. 38 & 460, 1959).

In the end, Brill had no taste for a political fight and Jones won. Brill's work is still commonly derided by people who paddle in the mainstream, obediently repeating what they have been told. In contrast, an exemplary historian of psychoanalysis summed up his view: "Brill con-

24. "Eher gewissenhaft als schön" (Freud to Putnam, letter, 5 Dec. 1909, in Hale 1971a, pp. 351–53).

25. Roback 1957; Strachey 1964a, 1964b; Blum 1989. In Freud's letter of 1 Nov. 1938 he explains to Jones that he is running out of time and that Strachey is not going to be able to finish translating this book before Freud dies. Again, this would sustain the view that Freud cared more about getting his ideas across than about the production of a homogeneous English translation.

26. Strachey 1953, p. xxii, 1960, p. xi; Bernays 1965; Weiss 1970; Roazen 1971; Freud to Jones, letter, 20 Nov. 1908, in Freud-Jones correspondence, in preparation.

tributed more than any other single man to the success of psychoanalysis in America" (Hale 1971a, p. 395). Brill is certainly a better translator than Strachey in some respects. Brill's variegated translations of Freud's ordinary metaphor *Besetzung*, for example, allow this protean little word to fade into contexts more like Freud's²⁷ and are considerably clearer than Strachey's "cathexis." When Brill did consistently translate a term word for word (as Strachey promised to do), Brill's English did and does sound awkward, but in light of what we now know, I think Brill's versions deserve a fresh look. Of course, we have no way of knowing what Freud might have made of a standard edition of his works because Jones did not unleash his major campaign for a uniform English edition until Freud had died. By that time there were many different translations, varying in quality and style, and this was one reason Jones gave for standardizing Freud.

Almost all of Joan Riviere's considerable correspondence with Freud is now unrestricted, and some excerpts will soon be published in the *International Journal of Psychoanalysis* (ed. Athol Hughes, tr. Michael Molnar). Students who work with her early translation of Freud's *Introductory Lectures* often find her wording plainer and more descriptive than Strachey's. When she edited her five-volume set of Freud's *Collected Papers*, she allowed more leeway to her several translators, including the Stracheys, who revised their initial version of Freud's case reports for Riviere's edition. At first, for example, Riviere translated *Besetzung* as "investment," which made some sense. In later editions she bowed to Jones's Glossary Committee and accepted Strachey's intentionally meaningless word "cathexis." "If the 'right' translation can be fixed upon as a word with no ostensible meaning at all, people may be induced to try and discover what the meaning really is" (Strachey to Jones, letter, 27 Nov. 1921, in Ornston 1985b, pp. 393–94; and compare Strachey 1962b).

This willful illusion endures at psychoanalytic meetings where people wistfully ask if—and some even brashly declare that—it doesn't matter if Strachey created a few unfortunate terms, because he got all the rest of it right. This pacifying deception is comforting because it means one is not missing much and, of course, a few peculiar terms are easily fixed. We have shown that Strachey's scientific sense, attitude, audience, and program are plainly distinct from Freud's. This matters now because it remains a major difference between the present British design, based on their dedicated preoccupation with single words, and the more in-

27. See chap. 1, n. 16.

formed studies of Freud's language, such as that done for the *Oeuvres complètes* (chaps. 6 and 8, this vol.; compare Cheshire and Thomä 1991).

AUTHORITY AND HEGEMONY

One of the few things we know for certain about the early psychoanalytic movement is that power was centralized. Karl Abraham argued that Ernest Jones should not become president of the International Psychoanalytical Association because "London lies too eccentrically"—*London liegt zu exzentrisch*.²⁸ Abraham was writing to Freud from Berlin, and in 1914 his point was well taken although long before World War II Freud and his colleagues were planning to establish psychoanalysis in the English-speaking countries.

Some seventy-five years later, I wonder if the heterogeneous and scattered English-speaking analysts of today will ever find common ground and raise the wherewithal to sustain a momentarily modern, historical, and critical edition. Will the central powers of psychoanalysis recruit, retain, and rely on real scholars who may have little or no formal analytic training? Considering the abundant similarities between history and psychoanalysis, Wallace (1983; Sigerist 1935) asked why there are so few trained scholars involved in psychoanalytic studies. Of course, no matter what the discipline, a scholar knows that a lot of work may be scooped or spilled by more or less reliable revelations released from closed sources. Life is unfair, and one might see this as a hazard of the trade and inevitable if historical studies are going to move along.

Are there reasons other than political ones for putting psychoanalytic institutions or medical doctors in charge? Such emotionally explosive questions must be settled before any team can work together. The struggle to inhibit lay analysis in the United States has been a clear and present obstruction to engaging the kind of well-trained humanistic scholars who are essential to furthering Freud studies. Freud's lifework does not belong to institutional psychoanalysis anyway. If Freud's writings are not ransomed and made ready for use, if analytic organizations do not unite and move forward, they may be left behind. I favor the free market that Freud sometimes anticipated and sometimes evaded or suppressed

28. Freud and Abraham 1965, p. 170. On the other hand, by 1919 Freud was writing to Abraham about their need to clear every move with Jones "in our new orientation to the west" (p. 275), and as early as 1907 Jung had written to Freud that he was publishing a new journal that must become international because "as much as possible we must emancipate ourselves from the German market" (Freud and Jung 1974, p. 50).

(Freud to Putnam, letter, 1 Jan. 1913, in Hale 1971a, pp. 368–69). Eventually that will come. Although open access is not foolproof, it is the only ultimate safeguard against perpetuated mistakes, orthodox zealots, and scoundrels.

FUTURE EDITIONS OF FREUD'S WORKS

Should future editors of Freud's works once more try to settle all questions and to satisfy what Freud called our "unimaginable" and "all too human craven addiction to authority"?²⁹ Should any translation from Freud's works ever again be billed as "authorized" or "standard"? Will anyone ever again dare to claim that Freud's works are "complete"?

Strachey (1966a, p. xix) said he had discarded many earlier and excellent translations for the sake of a preferred uniformity, which does seem to have made some sense at that time. Now, as new or relatively complete single works and letters are found, we have begun to revive the vital tangle of alternative translations that was purposefully razed by the producers of the Standard Edition. Some may try to imitate Strachey's urbane style, but few if any will succeed. Renewed transcriptions and selective rewordings by scholars from various disciplines, all of whom carry over their characteristic assumptions, findings, and emphases, will contribute to the basic research about problems in translating Freud.

Some observations are, of course, bound to be imprecise or mistaken. I once said, for example, that Freud tended to put his attempts to visualize what he called "unconscious life"—*unbewusstes Leben*—into a subjunctive mode, whereas Strachey translated these lines into simpler declarative statements about what he called "the mind" and how things "are." Although I still believe this, I now think Wilson (1987) is right, that I made too much of the German "subjunctive of indirect discourse" that allows one to report what was said while making it clear that one does not wholeheartedly endorse this view of one's own work or of someone else's. It is a way of implying other perspectives. In English there is no such formal grammatical nuance, and Strachey therefore followed a convention among translators of German into English when he chose to make many of these passages into English declaratives. Strachey should have said that he was doing this, and he should have explained that this maneuver is as common in everyday language as it is in scientific presentation.

29. "Die Autoritätssucht und innere Haltlosigkeit der Menschen können Sie sich nicht arg genug vorstellen" (Freud 1910d, GW 8:109).

Rather than getting entangled in the subjunctive in different languages, one might put this better by saying that Freud often wrote in a conditional mood. I now see my point about German subjunctives as flawed and perhaps trivial. But the major observation still stands; where Freud often pictures how things might look or how the unconscious should work if a given observation "were" to fit into one or another hypothesis, Strachey tends simply to tell his reader the way things "are."

Could we aim to shift the body politic toward humility and historical sense? Will some future editors make scholarly attempts to describe the problems, clarify the questions, and delineate the choices Freud's reader may have—that is, lay out as clearly as possible the problems we cannot resolve and how very much we do not know? What hardy hero will give us a complete list of materials wasting away in protective custody or presumed missing in action and thus account for the many ways in which any future edition will be anything but complete (Fichtner 1989; and see appendix, this vol.)?

Some people who were trained in the standard way still wince at alternative translations; on the other hand, those who are informed about the problems of translating Freud fear that any revised version may refuel the passion of those who cite his word scripturally. How do we teach people that alternative readings can legitimately enrich or shift our views without being altogether "right," let alone threatening to wash away Strachey's time-honored and almost always adequate wording as if it were simply "wrong"?

That said, don't Freud's editors bear a responsibility to begin to show where Freud went wrong? Strachey began to do this, but Freud worked rapidly and made a lot of outright mistakes, many of which he chose not to correct, even when Strachey pointed them out (Ornston 1982). Why not weave Mahony's (1984b, 1986, 1989a) carefully researched analyses of Freud's classical and misleading clinical case reports into any new edition?

Although I have shown some of the major emotional and institutional obstructions to any formal revision, gradually the way is coming clear. More of Freud's letters have been catalogued, edited, opened to the process of scholarship, and published, along with some written by his early translators and correspondents. Various experimental innovations in translation and editing are being discussed, printed, and debated. Some of the early post-Freudian sharp definitions of metapsychological terms have blurred or loosened, and some have been modified or abandoned.

Different people from different disciplines will continue to teach from

different translations (as they always have done), and in time, we will learn what works best for a given set of readers. Of course, most mutants will be too seriously flawed to survive, but they may raise some disturbing questions before they fade away. Every translation will be shaped by its own zeitgeist, and the evolution of language as described by Wilhelm Wundt (1893, 1896) will go on.

It seems obvious that any translation must be based on a historical and critical edition in Freud's own German language, using the most credible versions available and, when possible, detailing Freud's variations, corrections, and inconsistencies. Obviously, these will be extremely ambitious productions. I think a new edition in any language should consider the early translations on which Strachey said he based his own, the assumptions, choices, and patterns made by Strachey and Jones, and the many alternatives that have been discerned and considered, then discarded or developed, in many languages since the early 1950s. Elaborate consultations will surely be necessary to get the job done. The bibliographic chores alone are staggering—for example, merely collecting fragments and the many whole letters that have already been published in widely scattered translations (Fichtner 1989; Meyer-Palmedo and Fichtner 1989).

A new historical-critical commentary should come up to the more informed and rigorous standards for editing and translating that have evolved during the two decades since Strachey died (Hill 1990). But even a thorough critical edition will be a timely and time-bound innovation only until it too withers into a cultural artifact, for science means superseding disproven facts and replacing them with facts and theories that have yet to be discredited. From now on, anyone who cites Freud in a scientific paper should be prepared to explain why and how it matters what Freud said at one time or another.

ON TIME

We are used to taking a long view of any developmental process. The *National Edition* of Galileo's published work and correspondence may be a reasonable model because it has held up so well. Galileo died in 1642. Antonio Favaro produced *The National Edition* in 1892, 250 years later. Occasional inaccuracies and alternative readings still turn up, and many of Galileo's manuscripts have yet to be published, but Favaro's edition has become nearly complete and something of a standard (Shea 1985; Westfall 1987). Charles Darwin died in 1882, and the first complete edition of his letters is just beginning to come out (Schweber 1985). Perhaps

a real and relatively complete historical-critical edition of Freud's work is right on schedule?

If we can come to terms with the institutional obstructions that impede free scholarly investigation, then confirmed findings will accumulate and alternative interpretations may be set afloat. Translators can experiment with wording and style. Scholars can trace, clarify, discuss, and even robustly debate. When much more basic research has been published and has withstood the test of time, we may be ready to attempt a historical and critical edition.

In 1985, when I wrote the report for the British Psycho-Analytical Society that is the basis for my chapters in this book, I felt quite single-minded and self-assured. At that time it was obvious to me that all primary sources such as letters and drafts must be found, conserved, organized, catalogued, and made available to everyone. I suspected that any delay or compromise was corrupt.

Although I still believe that, I am no longer comfortable with the scholars' familiar battle cry for the immediate release of "all political prisoners." For one reason, if some bruised soul chooses to hunker down over private relics and let no one else examine a prize, that position can probably withstand any assault. We can neither assess nor judge such motives, be they protection, profit, or spite. We simply have neither the power nor the right to study, let alone publish, what belongs to someone else. Second, the rush to publish apparent revelations is disadvantageous to science, because an excerpt from a private correspondence is by definition taken out of context. This is a major flaw in most editions of Freud's letters, and it is one of the ways in which Freud's work has been simplified, isolated from the scientific imagery of his century, and perhaps misunderstood.

I used to believe that the complete release of information was the only way to reveal the truth and protect the innocent. As I age, I learn that no story is ever complete and that some stories are too good to be corrected or abandoned. Privacy matters to me more than it once did because I now know that some of the material that had been buried has been freely flung about and has done a lot of harm. Whatever emerges may be either uncritically accepted or unthinkingly brushed aside, without any opportunity for a fairly matched response and a detailed picture of a forgotten context.

Finally, an informed, reflective, and balanced set of variations on any single work of Freud's will take a long time to produce, even when most sources are wide open. Over time new fragments and facets will always

work their way to the surface because apparently full freedom of information is never altogether true.

In summary, there is no complete or reliable version of Freud's work in any language, including his own, because much of the scholarly spadework that would shape a solid foundation for the next edition has not been done. The tension between scientific terms and descriptive language, let alone literary style, is only the most apparent and constant problem. The Standard Edition is a deliberately elegant period piece, invaluable for a time—almost certainly an essential mediator between Freud and the rest of the world.

Freud's intentions are disputed in part because of his relatively contradictory descriptions of the same or similar ideas and in part because of his frequently ironic skepticism and his engaging romantic technique that have only recently begun to come clear. Apparent copyrights, whimsical archives, ethical conflicts such as privacy against the public's right to know, institutionalized nomenclatures and orthodox formulations, traditional stories and official secrets, political authorities and emotional loyalties, profit and turf wars—even a siege mentality here and there—have choked off the development and dissemination of alternative readings. No wonder many yearn for a single if not for a simple version. Several of us have shown that a variety of opportune translations is useful because these may inform the reader about the ways one can read Freud in any language and especially his own.

Our most immediate needs are for a recognition of these problems and some reconciliation between those who are satisfied with Strachey and those who see his work as a major but temporary consolidation and far from the final word. Then we can work toward open access to research materials, a free market for ideas, and assorted single works or sets of books in a variety of translations and in many languages.

Whoever eventually puts together entire new editions of Freud's work must mediate among many critical opinions and vested interests. Those adventurers will also have to raise enormous and enduring funds and then try to hold together a team of independent workers while at the same time providing substantial moral support and political protection over a long term. Strachey and his many colleagues survived and produced through some perilous times; we may learn from them as more of their letters and working papers are found and opened for research.

Appendix

Indexes and Lists of Necessary Research Materials

PATRICK J. MAHONY

DARIUS GRAY ORNSTON, JR., M.D.

Various indexes have already been prepared, and some have been published: the *Gesamtregister* (1968) of Freud's *Gesammelte Werke* contains a dozen separate indexes of individual case and dream reports, symbols and figures of speech, jokes and quotations, and other classifications chosen by Lilla Veszy-Wagner. The Index Volume (no. 24) of the Standard Edition is relatively weak, having been built on English-language categories chosen by James Strachey. Some lists have been refined into handy tools: for example, the *Freud Bibliographie mit Werkkonkordanz* and James Strachey's bibliography of Freud's published works were corrected and brought up to date by Ingeborg Meyer-Palmedo and Gerhard Fichtner (1989). There are also published lists of the books in Freud's personal libraries: for example, N. D. C. Lewis and C. Landis (1957), in the *Psychoanalytic Review* 44:327–54; H. Trosman and R. D. Simmons (1973), in the *Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association* 21:646–87; and P. Brückner (1975), *Sigmund Freuds Privatelektüre* (Cologne: Rolf Horst). Both the Library of Congress, in Washington, D.C., and the Sigmund Freud Copyrights, Ltd., in Wivenhoe, England, have provided general descriptions of their holdings, although they have not had the funds to prepare detailed catalogs that would really be useful. One can of course argue that these catalogs should be the result of, rather than the catalyst for, more careful research.

Freud scholars need access to the following kinds of primary sources and documents. It would be useful to know (1) the contents of each category in detail, (2) the legal status for access, and (3) the location, including the address of the person responsible for permission to study them.

Drafts, revisions, corrected galley proofs.

Correspondence: (1) if published, whether excerpted or “complete”;
(2) if in the works, the status of the project and the address of editor;
and (3) the location of other letters.

Freud’s daily logs of his own letters.

Freud’s personal chronological log of his publications.

List of correspondents, including the identification of each.

Diaries of S. Freud, A. Freud, and others in Freud’s circle(s).

Oral reports, films, and photographs of Freud and his circle(s).

Appointment books, lists of patients.

Travel diaries, *Tagebücher*, notebooks.

Translations done by Freud and the original edition or manuscripts he
worked from.

Manuscripts by others that were annotated by Freud.

Family albums and bibles.

Freud’s personal libraries at various stages.

Memoirs of Freud’s friends and patients, as well as their diaries and
letters.

Freud’s school, synagogue, state, and military records.

Freud’s personal medical records; his personal physicians, with dates
of service; and the physicians to family members, including his im-
mediate family.

Spas and resorts: records of visits by Freud, colleagues, and family.

A glossary of Yiddish words used by Freud.

Freud’s bank records, recorded loans, and gifts to and from others,
with dates and whether a loan was repaid or forgiven.

Ownership, printing rights, and copyrights; their present status in Aus-
tria, Germany, England, France, the United States, and elsewhere.

Research centers: addresses and detailed catalogs in a widely available
or even mutually agreed-upon word processing program.

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